Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Bill (First sitting)

Luke Pollard Excerpts

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd July 2019 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you. I invite Luke Pollard to open the questioning.

[Luke Pollard (Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q Good morning. There is a lot of cross-party support in this Bill Committee for the key measure of increasing the sentence from six months to five years, so there will not be too much back and forth in arguing about that. Why is it important that this sentencing maximum is increased? Can you give examples of animal cruelty you think should be punished with a much greater sentence than the current six months?

Michael Flower: I will start, if I may. It is important that sentencing is increased because the current maximum penalty does not reflect the serious offences that we see in the animal cruelty world. There is a huge upsurge in public opinion, which seems to want increased sentences. We have encountered comments from the judiciary in our prosecutions and they would also like to see higher penalties so that they could deal adequately with the types of offence that have been encountered.

For example, we would be looking for increased sentence in cases such as “man pours lighter fluid on a dog and sets it on fire” and “man puts kitten in microwave, switches it on and kills it”. We have had recent cases involving puppies being kicked to death. We had a recent case involving two men who wanted to kill a dog, with some reason to do so, but rather than take it to the vet, one chap hammered a nail into the dog’s head. Then they buried the dog, and the dog was still alive. I could go on, but I don’t think I need to. Some of the cases we are encountering are, frankly, awful.

Claire Horton: I endorse everything that my colleague has said. I think probably the most significant case that brought it home to me and really kicked this off was Baby the bulldog, which Ms Turley has fought for significantly. That is the most horrific example of animal cruelty: it was filmed on a mobile phone; people joked and laughed and deliberately sought to cause injury to that animal. The sentence that they got was a matter of weeks. The sentences are way too low given the scale that we see this happening: six months is the maximum, with a 20% reduction if a defendant pleads guilty. Battersea, as well as the RSPCA and other animal rescues around the country, sees almost on a daily basis animals coming in as victims of cruelty.

[Luke Pollard]

Q Thank you both for that. That sets the context and shows why it is important that we get this legislation through. On the scope of the Bill, as I mentioned, there is cross-party support for including domestic animals and increasing the sentence to five years. The Bill deliberately has been drawn quite narrowly, around just domestic animals. Could you set out whether you feel there should be a distinction between domestic animals and wild animals in a Bill such as this? In the past, there has been a sense that cruelty to animals in general is what the public want action on, and the distinction between domestic and wild is a legal definition rather than one that the general public take to heart.

Michael Flower: We would have to concede that there are differences with the legislation. The Animal Welfare Act 2006 protects animals that are considered protected animals. Broadly speaking, those are domestic animals. It does include wild animals if they are under the control of man. Some cruelty cases will involve wild animals, such as a badger or a fox, which often are caught during illegal hunting activities. Those animals will have dogs set on them. We had a case in Wales recently where a group of men were involved in that activity, and a young baby badger was skinned alive by two dogs pulling at each end.

Some offences relating to wild animals will be caught by this legislation. Some will not be. The crux is whether the wild animal is under the control of man. In some circumstances that is not the case, whatever cruelty is perpetrated upon them. In an ideal world, at some point in the future I hope there will be some merit in looking at animal-related sentences across the board, because we have the Protection of Badgers Act 1992, the Deer Act 1991 and Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, which protects wild birds, but all those animals can be caused to suffer in the course of other activities. The Bill does not solve all problems for all animals, but, given that the vast majority of cruelty cases that are prosecuted relate to domestic animals, it is an extremely important first step.

[The Chair]

Trudy Harrison indicated that she would like to ask a question, presumably on the same theme.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We have until 11 am for this session.

[Luke Pollard]

Q Thank you both for coming. Mike, in the biography that you kindly provided to the Committee, you note that you have

“concerns about the impacts of a significant increase of potential sentences in one area of animal protection law, but not in other comparable areas.”

Is that about what happens with domestic animals versus wild animals? If that is the case, why do you have those concerns, and what might the implications be of increasing sentences in one area?

Mike Schwarz: Yes, it is precisely that: the danger of disparities and distortions, and even confusion, caused by the ramping up—that is not a critical comment—of maximum sentencing in one area, which is the domesticated and under-control-of-man area, while leaving well behind the maximum sentence in other areas. As you know, the disparity is between six months in most other areas—in the Hunting Act 2004, it is even less—and five years under the Bill. That may cause problems when it comes to sentencing.

The root of the problems is the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which is about sentencing, and two provisions in particular. The first is section 143, which says that the essential issues when it comes to sentencing are the culpability of the offender—that is not so relevant to today—and the “harm…caused”. That term begs the question why harm, cruelty and suffering in one sector are sentenced at a more serious level than in another. That is one provision that sparks potential problems.

The other provision is in section 152 of the same Act, when the court is required to look at whether the threshold for custody is passed. It is not a helpful comment—it is rather circular—but the section asks whether custody is justified and whether a fine or a community sentence is not appropriate. That begs the question whether the sentencing and custody threshold should be passed in one area when similar activity in another that causes similar suffering and harm might not reach the threshold. I can develop that if you like, but you might want to ask another question. I am happy to continue with that.

You know as well as I do that the “unnecessary suffering” provision in the Animal Welfare Act 2006 is perhaps key to today’s discussion. As far as I can see, “unnecessary suffering” is not significantly different in terms of cruelty from the animal affected in all the other areas of animal welfare and wildlife law. One thinks of the Wildlife and Countryside Act, the Protection of Badgers Act and the Hunting Act. We are talking about the same sort of serious offence and the same cruelty, so there is nothing to distinguish between the activities and the suffering caused in those areas.

That brings us to the obvious point, which is that different sectors of the same activity—animal welfare, animal care, animal husbandry—are treated differently. I cannot think of an area, although I am happy to be corrected and I might be wrong, where there is that difference in sentencing when it comes to the same offence. I am not an expert in the area, but one thinks about health and safety law and the same principal offences that apply. Obviously, the sectors are regulated differently, but it would be unusual in that and similar areas for the sentences to be significantly different for the same offence and the same mischief in one area than another.

[Luke Pollard]

Q Thank you. I think the Committee has found that quite helpful in setting it out so clearly. If you were to dropkick—not that you would—a domesticated rabbit, it would be a potential sentence of five years, but the same act on a rabbit in a field could be only six months, even though the harm to the animal might be similar in both instances. Do you feel that the distinction between wild and domestic animals might be used as a legal defence by the people being prosecuted, or is your concern a moral one about the law treating those two scenarios differently?

Mike Schwarz: Obviously, we are talking about sentencing here rather than defences. That is the starting point for now, but I agree entirely with your example about the rabbit, or the hare. If we think of a rabbit or a hare that is kept in a hutch by a child and that is being mistreated by the father, why should he be liable to such a significantly greater sentence than if he had just gone into a field to injure and be deliberately cruel to a wild hare? One can think of lots of other examples. You have heard the evidence already, but that encapsulates the problem of, why should things be treated differently? But it goes wider than that.

One disparity, which I am sure you are aware of, is that if one increases the sentence beyond six months—again, I am not saying that that should not happen; in fact, quite the opposite—that entitles a defendant to a Crown court trial. Therefore, a defendant—let us say the abuser of the rabbit in the hutch—would be entitled to a Crown court trial, whereas the abuser of the rabbit or hare in the field would not. That starts playing into the substance of the criminal justice process where one is entitled to a jury for apparently random reasons as a result of this perhaps artificial, though it appears inevitable, distinction that has been drawn.

One can think of other ways that the system is distorted, particularly for judges when they come to sentencing, or even for prosecutors when they decide whether to prosecute. For example, in the case of catching a badger or a fox for no other reason than for dogs to kill it, if one focuses on the impact on the fox, that is, arguably, in the wildlife area where there is a maximum sentence of six months. The fox dies. If one looks at the impact on the dogs that are controlled by a hunt or the abusers, they are “under the control of man”, as the Act says, and therefore if one focuses on the injury to the dogs, which invariably will survive, the maximum will be five years. That throws up another point, which is the question that was discussed earlier: what “under the control of man”, according to the terms of the Act, means.

For what it’s worth, and this has no legal weight as I don’t have any legal authority for saying it, my view is that just because a badger or a fox is caught, and if it is caught simply for the purpose of baiting and killing it, that does not make it not a wild animal, because that is part of the offence, otherwise every single offence would be caught by the protected species and domesticated animals provision. It might be different. If, for example, the fox or the badger was already in a domesticated or controlled setting and was then set upon, it might be different, but that plays into the point that because of the disparities in sentencing, any prosecutor in court, and particularly a judge sentencing, would need to bear in mind those considerations about what exactly is the definition of “under the control of man”.

[Luke Pollard]

Fantastic. I would like to come back to Inspector O’Hara later when other Members have put their questions.

[Sir Oliver Heald]

Q As you know, there has been a recent change in the law to make it more straightforward to prosecute under the Animal Welfare Act, in the case of service animals. At the moment, the sentencing guidelines talk about taking account of the fact that an animal is in public service.

Do you think there is a case for making the situation of the service animal clearer in the sentencing guidelines, and making it absolutely clear that it is an aggravating feature to attack a service animal? Inspector O’Hara might like to start on that.

Inspector O'Hara: Obviously, the service animal provision is relatively new, and we have yet to see how that will play out in court. I take quite a pragmatic view that the courts will be able to read between the lines with what is specifically written in the guidelines, to come to a correct conclusion in that regard.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Rutley]

Thank you.

[Luke Pollard]

Q Inspector O’Hara, when the Bill is passed into law—hopefully very soon—how will it be implemented, and what about the deterrent effect that was spoken about earlier? From an outsider’s perspective, the idea that the cruelty sentencing could increase to such a large degree should have an effect. From your point of view, as someone who works in this area, how best will that be communicated to individuals who would consider abusing an animal? What is the best way of communicating the increased sentence to the general public and to those individuals, so that it has a deterrent effect?

Inspector O'Hara: Typically in this topic, media have been led and have focused on case results and outcomes, on the back of some successful prosecutions with high sentencing. I think there is a key prevention message that can go out before the legislation comes through. There is one thing that worries me slightly: I have not known many people charged with animal welfare offences to enter a guilty plea at the first hearing. I can see that there will be quite a lot of cases, particularly if sections 4 to 8 are charged, where somebody will elect to go to Crown court, so it will be some considerable time down the road before we get those sentences coming through, but you might find that the cases that go up to the Crown court get no more severe a penalty than they would have got in a magistrates court. We have to manage our expectations of what that will bring.

In my other area of work, dangerous dogs, following the legislation changes in 2014 and the 14-year penalty that came in for a dog dangerously out of control causing death, we have not seen significant sentencing increases as a result of that legislation. While the current provisions are very good, and we very much support them and hope they will come in quickly, expectations in the court outcomes will need to be managed.

[Luke Pollard]

Q Thank you, that is an important point. Do you get the sense that with greater sentencing there will be greater public awareness of animal cruelty, and therefore more people coming forward? In particular, I am thinking about cases that currently are not reported. Do you think there is a possibility that greater awareness and the higher penalties might encourage more people to step forward, or do you think the opposite will be true—that the greater penalty might make people more hesitant, because the consequences will be more extreme?

Inspector O'Hara: I certainly do not think it will cause people to be more hesitant; the British public are a nation of animal lovers, and nothing riles people more than animal cruelty. I do not see a negative effect as a result.

[Luke Pollard]

Q Brilliant. In all our postbags, animal welfare is by far the most important topic, beating Brexit hands down. Looking at your CV and your work in this area and on status dogs, I want to ask about individuals whose behaviour and control of an animal might be beyond what you and I would expect of a dog owner. Do you think that the idea of increased punishment will prevent people doing things in terms of using animals as a status symbol, or using animals as a sign of bravado and machismo?

Inspector O'Hara: It is a difficult question because we are starting to see, and have been seeing for a number of years, a reduction in the number of section 1 dogs in particular coming to notice as status-type symbols. However, people are moving on to non-prohibited breeds, and we see quite a lot of those. Simple possession is not an offence in any way, so whereas a pitbull terrier would have been a typical dog in the past, there are now people with, for example, dogs that are larger than a pitbull terrier. Typically, we do not see a lot of dog fighting, and we do not see a lot of mutilations and ear-croppings, although we do see them occasionally, and they do come to note. If I look at my animal welfare offences prosecuted alongside the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 offences, I am not necessarily sure that there is a real strong parallel. If anyone is charged with a Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 offence, mostly there are not really cruelty offences on top of that, other than in the odd case.

[Luke Pollard]

Thank you.

[Thangam Debbonaire (Bristol West) (Lab)]

I want to follow up some of the questions asked by Members. You may be aware of the wildlife law report from the Law Commission—There was a consultation, and recommendations were published in 2015. Among those recommendations was one that the patchwork of existing legislation be replaced by a single statute. This Bill does not cover wildlife, as we have said, but as mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport said, to our constituents that distinction would not be quite so understood. I do not see how our constituents who care greatly about animal cruelty will understand why there is a distinction, and why there is still effectively a patchwork. Whilst we welcome this Bill, it does seem to be doing that. Do you have any thoughts on the differences and the continued existence of what seems to me and to the Law Commission to be a patchwork?

Inspector O'Hara: It seems to me that we are pressed for time to put this Bill through. It would be a great shame, in my view, if we were to do that consolidation work now at the expense of this Bill. With the Animal Welfare (Service Animals) Act 2019 there has been a split into piecemeal chunks to get them through, essentially, and to get them in. There could perhaps be a review at a later date, as mentioned today in the Committee. A review could look at a consolidation piece of work, along with any other bits that needed tidying up.

Mike Schwarz: I agree entirely with the thesis that there needs to be some systematic review. Animal cruelty has the same effect on animals regardless of where the animal lives, and whether it is husbanded. The impact on the humans involved is the same, and the culpability of the humans is the same. We all know that the way of inflicting injury, cruelty or death on animals varies according to the sector, but the disparity of sentences and the patchwork nature of the current legislation risks distortions, as I said earlier, and even risks bringing the law into disrepute when there is not a sense of fair prosecution and sentencing. It may help judges and the public understand the situation, as they may have difficulty piecing together the legislation as well.

Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Bill (Second sitting)

Luke Pollard Excerpts

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd July 2019 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley (Redcar) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 10, at end insert—

“(2A) After subsection (1) insert—

‘(1A) Subsection (1B) applies where the court is considering for the purposes of sentencing the seriousness of an offence under any of sections 4, 5, 6(1) and (2), 7 and 8, and the person guilty of the offence—

(a) filmed themselves committing the offence, or

(b) posted online a video of themselves committing the offence.

(1B) The court—

(a) must treat the fact mentioned in subsection (1A)(a) or (b) as an aggravating factor (that is to say, a factor that increases the seriousness of the offence), and

(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”

It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bailey. Before I move on to the specifics of the amendment, I beg the indulgence of the Committee to say a few words of thanks to everyone who got us to this position. As I did on Second Reading, I thank my constituents, who responded so powerfully to the death of Baby the bulldog in such terrible circumstances with petitions, campaigns, floral commemorations and so on. They really have been moving and inspiring.

The fact that we are here in Committee shows this place at its best. There is a lot of cynicism in politics at the moment—a lot of people are getting angry and shouting at each other, there are threats of violence and so on—and it is very easy for people to feel frustrated and disempowered by the system and to think that the things that happen here do not make a difference. However, the progress of the Bill shows that, when there is a problem that needs fixing, if we are positive, we campaign, we are constructive, we petition and we work together collectively across parties—I am proud of the way we have done that—we can change the law and make things happen.

That sends a powerful message back to the public: “Don’t get angry; get even. Change the law. Work with your politicians—campaign and go and see your MP—and you can really change things for the better.” I thank my constituents for what they have done, and I thank Committee members. My colleagues have supported me so much in this process, but the Government have responded considerately and collaboratively. As an Opposition Back Bencher, I am proud to have been able to work with them to make this happen. I also thank all the organisations that we have received evidence from and that have supported the campaigning over the past couple of years. Collective thanks are due to so many people.

I am very happy with the Bill, but I would never want to miss an opportunity to add an extra couple of thoughts. As much as anything, my intention with the amendment was to stimulate a bit of debate. One of the most overwhelming issues in the case of Baby the bulldog was the fact that the young men involved filmed themselves undertaking the abuse, laughing as they did it. The filming was part of the abuse—part of what made the incident so horrific was that they glorified it and thought it was something worth capturing, saving and possibly even sharing.

The other side of the social media aspect is that, because the abuse was videoed and stored on a chip in a mobile phone, which was subsequently found on a supermarket floor, we had evidence that enabled us to bring those young men to justice. There is something very powerful about the role of social media and video in tackling the scourge of this cruelty, as we are seeking to do. That was why I wanted to raise awareness of the role of social media through my amendment. Although we are all outraged at any animal abuse, the use of social media and the sharing of video is a horrible aspect of abuse, which as a society we cannot condone and must not allow to continue. Videos of abuse must not be allowed to be shared and amplified in this way.

My amendment seeks to require courts, where people filmed themselves committing the offence or posted online a video of themselves committing the offence, to treat that as an aggravating factor in sentencing. In explaining the amendment, I want to set out some of the examples I came across in the course of my research that made me more determined to raise awareness. Again, I beg the Committee’s indulgence. We have already heard some horrible evidence—I know we have all had our fill of seeing and hearing about horrific abuse—but I want to demonstrate the severity of what we are dealing with and what social media has done.

Three men in the Forest of Dean were jailed for filming their dogs while they mauled badgers to death. The judge described that as “medieval barbarity”, and there is sickening footage showing the young men in peals of laughter as their dogs slaughtered the badgers. They had a total of 447 video clips of animal cruelty on their phone, but were jailed for just 22 weeks.

A pony was removed by police after video footage showed it being mounted by a man and falling backwards to the ground, which caused widespread outrage on Facebook. That was in Tunbridge Wells in Kent. Two teenage girls in Scotland admitted animal cruelty after a video showing them abusing a snake went viral. A Snapchat video of the couple, who were clearly drunk, showed them laughing as they tortured the reptile, which sparked online outrage. A video was shared on social media showing a black and white dog being thrown off a cliff into the sea. The dog is then seen swimming back to the shore. That video was shared widely on Snapchat, as we heard this morning. In June this year, another video was circulating online of a man laughing as he violently beats a terrified cat: he smacks it in the face and throws it down on the bed so hard that the video is absolutely horrific to anyone who watches it.

A Sunderland poacher is now behind bars after making shocking videos of his whippet brutally killing wild foxes. He posted graphic photographs and videos of him forcing his dog to chase the foxes, which he claimed was for sport. Three girls were arrested in March after shocking footage showed two kittens being abused and hurled into the air, and a man has been jailed and disqualified for life from keeping animals after appalling videos showed him setting his dog on a cat and a fox. This is happening, and we only have to tap something like “animal cruelty” into a search engine to see an awful lot of those horrendous videos.

It is clear that people are posting this stuff for clicks or likes, or as a way of making themselves notorious. It is awful to see: not content with simply inflicting injury on animals, these people are motivated by the prospect of their films going viral and being shared. It is grotesque and horrific, and demonstrates a greater level of malicious intent, which is why I felt we ought to debate the possibility of a specific deterrent. My amendment would make these crimes subject to an aggravated sentence for those who film themselves undertaking such an attack.

I found the evidence submitted by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals very powerful. We heard its representative say during this morning’s Committee evidence that, in 2015, the RSPCA investigated just 27 cruelty complaints related to videos and social media. By 2017, that figure was 167—a fivefold increase over just two years. That shows the scale of this issue and, as ever with legislation, we are struggling. Sometimes, we are on the back foot when it comes to catching up with changes in society and technology. This is our chance to get on the front foot.

Even more strikingly, the RSPCA’s evidence included a statistic from a recent survey showing that 48% of young people have witnessed some form of animal cruelty. Only 3% of those witnessed it directly, but a huge number—23%—had witnessed it on social media. What effect does exposing our young people to this material have on them? Does it have a normalising effect—glamorising, even—or lead to dehumanisation and lack of empathy? What effect will it have on our young people, particularly given the role of social media, with videos, clicks, likes and going viral seen as a means of success and of being popular? I worry that this is enabling and facilitating a nasty streak in society that we would not want to expose our children to, and would not want them to witness.

That is all I wanted to say to share why this deserves to be discussed and debated in this place. It is a great concern to me and, I think, anyone who cares about animal welfare and wants sentencing to reflect the severity and gravity of the action. I just hope that, in the course of this discussion, we get a sense of how serious this is.

I say up front that I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, because I hope the Minister will reflect on it. He has already been very responsive to my questions. However, when considering such a Bill, it is important to talk about the context and the role of technology to make sure that when we are drafting it, every “t” is crossed and every “i” is dotted, so that these actions cannot slip through the net and be allowed to happen without any consequence. I appreciate having been given time to speak to the amendment.

[Luke Pollard (Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport) (Lab/Co-op)]

I support the statements of my hon. Friend the Member for Redcar, but I would also like to raise a further matter for the Minister to reflect on in his reply: the possibility of including in the Government’s online harms White Paper elements that would address the online distribution of abuse images and videos.

The Government have rightly made much effort to tackle online abuse, address mental health concerns and deal with offensive imagery and online behaviours—a critical issue, especially for our young people. However, when I skimmed through the online harms White Paper in advance of this Committee sitting, I found no mention of animal welfare or of the distribution of the kind of images that my hon. Friend mentioned. There is an opportunity for the Minister to reflect on how a conversation between the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport might help to support the collective Government effort against the sharing of these disgusting images and videos, and create a more comprehensive system.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Redcar. No one has done more than she has to advance this legislation. I entirely endorse the spirit and intention behind what she proposes, and simply want to volunteer some thoughts by way of context.

It is important to note that the recording of an offence is already set out as an aggravating factor in certain other criminal offences such as rape and sexual assault. As we know, the Sentencing Council publishes guidelines that the court is obliged to take into account. It is therefore important to ensure that the Sentencing Council has the widest possible rein to reflect the full spectrum of aggravating features in respect of this offence, as it has done with other offences.

My only question mark relates to whether there is a risk that, if we legislate for one particular aggravating feature, the Sentencing Council might not have as broad a remit as it might like. I say that because its guideline on the Animal Welfare Act 2006 lists “Other aggravating factors”, including “Use of a weapon” and “Use of another animal”. My rhetorical question is whether, in focusing legislation purely on one aspect, however heinous an aggravating feature it is, we risk inadvertently downplaying other aggravating features.

While I respectfully and entirely endorse the hon. Lady’s intention and the spirit of her amendment, I venture to suggest that the Sentencing Council has shown itself well capable of reflecting the issue of degradation through publication, and well attuned to the need to do so. Inevitably, I think it would include that factor, but it would also include other aggravating features such as use of another animal, use of a weapon, or whether the victim—so to speak—was a public service dog. That would ensure that the offending received the condign punishment it deserves.