Middle East: Recent Developments

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Friday 13th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for today’s debate. There has been an excellent, wide-ranging and stimulating discussion on the changing face of the Middle East. I have certainly learnt a huge amount over the course of today from noble Lords with far greater experience and expertise than I have.

We have heard a variety of perspectives on the individual countries in the region: we heard about the Israel-Palestine issues from my noble friends Lord Haskel, Lord Mitchell and Lady Blackstone and from the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. We heard a considerable amount about Iran from the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and others. I want to make a slightly different kind of speech. I want to take a step back from the details of specific countries and ask how the extraordinary events of the past two years in the Middle East should force us to reassess what kind of foreign policy is appropriate for a region experiencing such profound change.

I would argue that the suddenness, the irreversibility and the variety of transition processes that we are seeing—from Libya and Tunisia in the west to Iraq in east—should force noble Lords on all sides of the House to think again about the kinds of challenge faced across the region. It should make us reconsider the instruments of foreign policy that are most suited to supporting the region’s move to greater stability, greater prosperity and greater democracy. Although I shall not discuss the question of military intervention directly, I associate myself with the strong scepticism expressed by both the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, and the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, about the consequences of such intervention, however well intentioned.

The security situation in the Middle East has always been of greater concern to the international community than that of any other part of the world. Crises in the region can trigger global recessions; they divide the international community as well as bringing sustained misery to those in the areas affected. Perhaps because of the region’s unparalleled sensitivity, the approach of the West to the region has, with some notable exceptions—such as over Palestine and Iran—been characterised by a strong preference for stability over change.

Broadly speaking, our approach to the Middle East has been governed by a set of orthodoxies: an orthodoxy that the governance of Arab nations of the Middle East was broadly stable, at least at the level of the regimes; an orthodoxy that the interests of the international community lay in support—tacit or explicit—for these regimes, because the maintenance of order, and the suppression of sectarianism, required us to support authoritarian rule; an orthodoxy, especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979, that we should be reticent in wishing for democracy in countries where the ballot box might deliver Governments who were radical, populist and Islamist in character; and, among some, an orthodoxy that there was no great yearning for democracy among the populations of many Middle Eastern countries.

The developments of the past 18 months have exposed the limits of these orthodoxies. Some of the most remarkable moments of our era—Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia; the demonstrations in Tahrir Square; the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi; the Yemeni President agreeing to hand over power after a third of a century in power; and the announcement of Mohamed Morsi’s victory in Egypt just two weeks ago, when many thought democracy would be strangled at birth—have forced us to think again about the categories that we use to understand the Middle East and the way we respond.

The responses within the regimes to the popular pressure have been diverse and in many cases surprising. The Egyptian regime of President Mubarak collapsed quite quickly, while in Syria, as we all know, the continuing brutal response of the Ba’ath Government to opposition demonstrations and, now, armed civil war has disgusted the international community. In general, the regimes of Arab monarchies have proven more resilient than Arab non-monarchies. In Iraq, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, we are watching the first fragile steps of nations towards some kind of post-authoritarian democracy, however imperfect. These developments are still in train. The political situations are fraught and fluid, but, although we have not arrived at stable settlements in any of the countries of the Middle East, we know that a foreign policy for the region based on past orthodoxies is no longer up to the job.

I suggest a revised approach to foreign policy for the Middle East and three different categories of action: first, policies to help end conflict, contain violence and protect civilians; secondly, policies to help support peaceful transitions and new constitutional orders; and, thirdly, in the longer term, policies to build up the democratic capacity of post-authoritarian countries.

Before turning to these three categories, I suggest that there is one precondition for the effectiveness of any aspect of our foreign policy towards the Middle East: the need for international co-ordination of policy. We will rarely, if ever, have a positive effect on the lives of the people of the Middle East by going solo. When the international community is co-ordinated in taking disciplined and decisive action, it has a chance of success. In Libya, concerted action by and through UN followed by military support to Gaddafi's opponents helped avert the threat of a protracted civil war, while the co-ordinated imposition of US and EU sanctions two weeks ago on Iran’s oil exports has already had a significant effect on immobilising Iran's oil tanker fleet. However, where the international community has been divided, as it has in different ways over the Iraq conflict, Israel/Palestine and most recently over Syria, our ability to support peaceful change is diminished.

Co-ordination requires close partnership with our allies in the EU, as well as in the US. Although I shall not make any other partisan remarks in this speech, I hope that, despite this Government’s seemingly accelerating Euroscepticism, they can in this area of foreign policy at least commit to working in constructive partnership with our European allies.

I turn to the three categories of foreign policy that I mentioned earlier. The first is the immediate task of action to help end conflict and protect civilians. Violence is a daily occurrence in too many countries of the Middle East. Bahrain has witnessed violence perpetrated by security forces against pro-democracy protesters. In Libya and Iraq, security forces, armed gangs and militias continue to disrupt government and economic life and to threaten and kill innocent civilians. In Syria, now in a state of civil war, yesterday saw the highest number of deaths in one day, I believe, since March 2011. As we have heard, the total death toll now is around 17,000. I strongly support William Hague’s call this morning for access for an urgent United Nations investigation of the atrocious massacre in Traymseh yesterday.

Disturbingly, Syria’s internal conflict also now seems to threaten to spread to Turkey, Lebanon and perhaps even Israel. Foremost among our challenges in the international community is to prioritise efforts to force the cessation of violence in these varied situations, without which the other aspects of transition simply cannot take place properly. In this context—and in light of today’s report by the Joint Committees on Arms Export Controls recommending a change in our policy towards sales of weapons and military equipment to authoritarian regimes—what is the Minister’s view of the action the Government are proposing to look again at the rules for exports to such countries as Syria and Bahrain, where the world has witnessed such brutal oppression?

Alongside efforts to contain and defuse violence sits the priority of responding to dire humanitarian situations across the region. In Yemen, estimates suggest that nearly half the population—about 10 million Yemenis—are,

“either hungry or on the edge of hunger”.

In Aleppo in Syria, there are reports that residents are now forced to scavenge for food and fuel, yet international humanitarian access is virtually non-existent.

Finally, a less widely noted but severe challenge to many countries is the deterioration of their economy. Transitions—even successful ones—bring uncertainty and thus undermine the confidence of investors. For example, Egypt has seen foreign investment collapse to quarter the levels seen under Mubarak. Global economic fragility continues to undermine opportunities in the Middle East, particularly for young people. That is often cited as one of the causes of the Arab spring. Across the Arab world, over half the total population is now under 25, yet youth unemployment remains at frighteningly high levels—and is growing.

These immediate concerns tend to dominate discussion of our foreign policy in the Middle East. But, however remote the prospect of more stable times might appear at the moment, it is crucial that our foreign policy begins to look to the longer-term needs of countries undergoing transition. These needs may be less immediate but responding to them may be the most effective way of our playing a part in securing a more peaceful and democratic region.

Let me turn to the second category of actions: policies to help support stable transitions and the emergence of new constitutional orders. We know that the toppling of long-standing undemocratic regimes is more often the prelude to disorder, chaos, the surfacing of age-old sectarian enmities and sometimes protracted violence than it is the first step towards some kind of Swedish liberal democracy. The first challenge is to support efforts to establish processes that can help countries navigate the multiple small steps from overthrow of the regime to providing officials whose election enjoys broad legitimacy. In their different ways, Libya, Egypt and—most successfully—Tunisia are all embarking on this delicate but transformative process.

We may feel like bystanders as we watch, for example, the tussle between the newly elected president and the military elite in Egypt—to a large extent, we must let these transitions chart their own course—but the onus is on us all to find ways of supporting the process of transition, such as UN efforts to press for a national unity government in Syria, as discussed today, or building on the success of the limited transition deal brokered in Yemen by the Gulf Co-operation Council. Now is the time for us to consider ways in which we can support the establishment of new constitutional arrangements that suit—as the noble Lord, Lord Empey, reminded us—the particularities of each country but which embed authority in elected institutions and protect the rights of citizens of whatever religious or ethnic background. In the long term, the stability of countries undergoing transitions will depend on the legitimacy of the institutions of political power. This might seem a long way off but we can play an important role in stimulating what one might call “constitutional imagination” about which institutional arrangements suit the emerging democracies of the Middle East.

For example, in countries marked by bitter sectarian conflict, such as Lebanon, Bosnia or even Northern Ireland, institutional arrangements that embed power sharing in legislative, executive and administrative life have been central to ensuring basic stability and legitimacy—sometimes called consociational democracies. In other countries, different kinds of federalism are used to meet the demands of different communities for greater relative autonomy. It may seem odd, or perhaps utopian, to argue that such applied political science should be an integral part of our foreign policy thinking, but experience from across history suggests that a constitution that responds to historical grievances and commands respect for its fairness as well as its efficiency is a huge prize in the search for true stability.

That brings me to my third and final category of policy interventions: ways to make democracy work effectively and to reinforce the habits of democracy. We know from the experience of transitions in Africa, South America and elsewhere that real stability and functioning democracy do not, as the noble Lord, Lord Risby, reminded us, emerge spontaneously when elections happen and new constitutions are drawn up. Over time—and it may take a long time—embedding the habits of democracy, ensuring that obstacles to the effective functioning of democratic institutions are overcome, is indispensable. The path from nominal to genuine democracy is often long and tortuous, but it can be shored up with support from countries such as ours.

Let me take two brief examples of barriers to effective democracy to make the point. First, when authoritarian regimes collapse, the collapse often reveals a nexus of power structures underneath that prove much more resilient to change and persist into the period of democratic transition—a good case being that of the military in Egypt at the moment. The historic experience of countries such as Pakistan and Turkey shows that the relationship between the military and formal democratic institutions can remain problematic for a long time. In other countries, it is the relationship between religious and secular authority that can limit the extent to which democracy can truly take root. There are no easy answers to those cases where countervailing forces limit the effectiveness of democracy, but we need to take them seriously and use experience from other countries to inform our approach in addressing them.

A second example is the need to build up civic capacity in countries that have had precious little organised civic life outside organised religion and the state. We know from previous transitions that the development of what some American political scientists have called a civic culture, acceptance of the authority of the state and widespread participation in civic life are important parts of what makes democracies end up working well. In this area, we need to take a much broader conception of foreign policy: one that embraces the role of political parties in Britain working with new political parties in the region; one that seeks partnerships with NGOs to build capacity with nascent NGOs in the Middle East; one that looks to support the work of organisations such as the BBC, the British Council and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Anderson and the noble Lord, Lord Risby, which do so much to promote debate, culture and transparency; and, as my noble friend Lord Giddens reminded us, imagination about how social networking can be used to strengthen civic society.

Our foreign policy towards much of the Middle East was historically based on the premise of stability, but we now find ourselves in an era of dramatic change. It was based on a view that stability and democracy were not easy bedfellows, but we now find the thirst for democracy spreading across the region. It is a time of great excitement and great uncertainty. Our foreign policy towards that part of the world needs to adjust.

The three areas of priority that I have suggested are approaches that enable us to welcome transition from authoritarian rule toward some kind of democratic future rather than, as is too often the case, being scared of the instability that it brings. Turbulent times are dangerous times, but they need not be cause for pessimism if we work in partnership with other nations to build a foreign policy based on a commitment to support and reinforce democratic values. The courage that the people of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria and elsewhere have shown deserves nothing less.