Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Wolfson of Tredegar
Main Page: Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Wolfson of Tredegar's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it appears that there has been some constructive discussion behind the scenes in preparation for this debate—I can see the Minister nodding his head.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his very clear exposition of the issues he is raising with this. Essentially, his points were that the law should not threaten prison if somebody is careless, when a disqualification is more appropriate, and that adding the word “very” before the words “careless” or “serious injury” is not an appropriate way forward and there should be another approach. I hope we may hear from the Minister on that in due course.
I support the opposition to the clause itself expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and also listened with great interest to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on whether the Minister thinks there may be any possible increase in prosecutions under this new definition of carelessness. I hope that is not what the Minister intends.
I also share the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, that in magistrates’ courts you often see dangerousness and carelessness charged in the alternate and it is up to the court to decide which is the more appropriate charge. Having said all that, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, referred a moment ago to constructive discussions. There have indeed been discussions between me, the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and, so far as I was concerned, they were constructive. I am grateful to both of them for the time they gave to those conversations. I will set out the Government’s position, and I hope it will reassure them on the various points they raised.
Clause 67 introduces a new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving. By creating this new offence, the clause fills an admittedly small but, we think, significant gap in the current legislation. We considered the creation of this new offence and the maximum penalty it attracts very carefully during the review of driving offences that cause death or serious injury. We remain of the view that there is a clear gap in the law. That view was supported by the vast majority of people who responded to the consultation and by the other place.
Although I understand why the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, says that this clause is wrong in principle, I respectfully disagree. I will explain why we think there is a gap in the law by looking first at the position with regard to dangerous rather than careless driving.
For dangerous driving, there are three main offences. The most serious—causing death by dangerous driving—has a maximum penalty of 14 years, to be increased to life by Clause 66. Secondly, there is causing serious injury by dangerous driving, which has a maximum penalty of five years. Thirdly and finally, there is the basic offence of dangerous driving—for example, where there is no injury. That has a maximum penalty of two years.
I thank the Minister for his explanation, which is very interesting and largely reassuring. The one aspect of it that worries me is the comparison with the maximum six-month sentence for driving while disqualified, because that goes back to the points my noble friend Lord Marks was making: if I go out and drive while disqualified, I am doing so with a settled determination to do something I know is wrong. I have already been punished for doing something pretty bad, and I am building on that by ignoring the disqualification. Comparing that with the case of someone who goes out with no intention to be careless—because it is at the heart of carelessness that it comes on you unexpectedly—but does something wrong by mistake and someone is injured as a result, it seems to me that the mental state is far worse in the case of the person who goes out to drive while disqualified, however perfectly they manage to drive.
My Lords, of course I understand and to a certain extent accept that point; we have previously helpfully discussed it. What we try to do with the two-year maximum is find the appropriate level. One has to fit it between that six-month point and the five-year point for the reasons I have explained. Even if the noble Baroness does not accept the comparison with six years, it still obviously has to be below five years. The question is where we should put it. The central point is that maximum penalties are there for the worst imaginable case. The two years, therefore, is really for the worst imaginable case. I have sought to set out, in not too great length but clearly, why it is two years and, more importantly, what a maximum sentence means in this context and what the very limited circumstances are in which we would expect a maximum sentence to be imposed—not because the Government are telling the courts what to do but because, given the guidelines under which the courts already operate, it would be a very rare case to have a term of imprisonment or, certainly, a maximum term of two years. That is why I set it out earlier in the terms I did.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate, and in particular to the Minister for his careful attention to the points that I have raised and the carefully worded assurances that he has given us in the past few minutes.
The worst imaginable case is the reason why I accept that there is a gap that needs to be looked at and filled, and this offence obviously addresses that gap. But one is faced with the mental element that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, have drawn attention to. It is that which makes it very difficult to accept that, even for the middle layer, there should be a sentence of imprisonment at all, in comparison with the many offences where there is a distinct mental element and a deliberate intention to flout the law—to disregard it, shrug your shoulders and go ahead anyway. It is not that kind of offence, which is why it is so important to signal, as the Minister has done, that it is only for the most extreme cases that a sentence of imprisonment for this kind of offence would really be appropriate.
Obviously, we must listen and wait for the Sentencing Council to set out the scales, and no doubt it will do so with great care. But, for the time being, what the Minister has said offers some reassurance, and I am extremely grateful for that. For those reasons, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.