Lord Whitty
Main Page: Lord Whitty (Labour - Life peer)
Lord Whitty
Lord Whitty (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 76A, I shall speak also to Amendment 76B which is grouped with it.
We now come to the central part of this Bill which takes up 60 pages of the main Bill; it comes to something like 60 clauses and a large chunk—two-thirds—of the schedules. It has received relatively little attention in the course of the Bill’s proceedings, and virtually none in another place. We gave it reasonable consideration in Committee and we reached a degree of consensus. There are some things I still have queries about, but I am grateful to the Minister for explaining aspects of that and also to her officials who explained some of the aspects even further.
It still remains, however, that this is part of the Bill which has received very little public and wider attention. Yet it is one of the most important parts of the Bill because it regulates the nuclear industry. The policy of the Government, and to a large extent the policy of all parties now, is that of a significant shift towards nuclear power within our energy mix. We know the history of nuclear power is controversial, not only in the past here, but also worldwide. It is therefore essential that we get the system of regulation in this area right and the balance right. The Government have, to a large extent, done that. It has been quite a long gestation period taking what will be the ONR out of the Health and Safety Executive, giving it certain additional powers and clarifying in one piece of statute what its role is. I commend that. While it makes for a rather lopsided Bill, it is an important achievement. My amendments, therefore, are not attempting to upset the main thrust of the provisions within these sections, but they are trying to clarify some aspects of it. I hope that the Minister can give me some satisfaction on that.
One of the main roles of the ONR, and one of the most important public roles, will be the approval of designs for new reactors and the construction process that goes with it. Yet in all those pages there is very little mention of that role. It is mentioned here in Clause 60 and it is mentioned specifically under nuclear safety. The reason that it is so important is that both those who argue strongly in favour of nuclear power and those who argue strongly against it are concerned about the nature of the design of the reactor. It has been an issue in relation to the Hinkley Point approval that this reactor may not be the most appropriate reactor for the future—it may not be the most cost-effective and it may not be the best in terms of the contribution to the environment. Whether those criticisms are true or not, the Government rightly had a very heavy assessment, verification and approval process before they gave the go-ahead to the Hinkley Point project. The ONR in its shadow form and the Environment Agency both had a role in looking at that design. They looked at the design itself, its engineering, its safety requirements, its operational requirements, its effect on the ecology and the environment and of course they looked at its economics. They gave approval following a pretty long process and managed to rationalise the number of planning and other approvals that were needed.
I declare an interest in that until the end of last year I was a member of the board of the Environment Agency and I took a particular interest in the nuclear dimension of its activities. Both on the ONR/HSE side and on the Environment Agency side that was a very effective process. It was, however, an ad hoc process. It was a process that the Government invented when we were talking about several different designs that were possible and several different sites a couple of years earlier. It is still true that there has been some criticism of the choice of design being what some people refer to as an old design for what is a 35-year project. I do not want to enter into an argument about the merits of those criticisms myself, but it is important that the Government and the regulatory system have a robust system of ensuring that the design has been through the most rigorous appraisal system.
There are of course other designs that will be coming along. We have other sites that are capable and have been already designated by the Government as potential nuclear sites. There are other designs out there which are already operational or nearly operational: the CANDU system, a boiling water system, a PRISM system and there are companies and consortia that are promoting those here and elsewhere in the world. It is therefore highly possible that a different consortium from the one that is operating at Hinkley Point will come up with a different design which will need to be subject to an equally rigorous process. In that process it is vital that part of the responsibility of the ONR is to be at the cutting edge of nuclear technology and all the sub-technologies that go to make up the design. It is also important that it is cost-efficient.
The other criticism of the Hinkley Point deal is that we are paying too much for it. I again make no point on that at this stage. It is clearly right, however, that it is done on the most cost-effective basis, both for public acceptability and for the importance to the economy of moving to a greater share of nuclear power through the 2020s. It is also important that maximum safety is built in and, more generally, the protection of the environment.
Reading these sections of the Bill, one would not immediately deduce that this is, in a sense, the central role of the ONR. The approval of new systems, the new reactor designs and the appropriateness in the timescale is an important part of our ability to meet our carbon targets and to ensure that there is no detrimental effect either to the economy or to the environment. It deserves at least underlining—which is all my amendment does—that the role of the ONR in this respect is crucial and comprehensive, and that it is not only to do with safety but all these other matters as well.
Amendment 76A makes it clear that it is not only the safety of persons that is relevant but the safety of, and impact on, the environment. For that reason it is also important that there is specific reference in the Bill to the role of the Environment Agency. That agency played an equal role in the Hinkley Point case. The Environment Agency clearly has powers under the environment Acts but what we discussing is a joint responsibility. The ONR is not taking over that responsibility from the Environment Agency, which presumably could have been an option when the ONR concept was delivered.
Amendment 78B underlines what I have been talking about and makes it clear that in approving a design, and the construction plans that go with it, there is an absolute obligation on the ONR to ensure that they are of the very highest quality. The amendment also covers issues of cost-effectiveness, safety and security. This is central to the task of the ONR, as I have argued. The safety dimension is central to the safety of the population and of the environment. It is also important in a political sense. The public’s acceptance of the shift to nuclear power is fragile. It is significant but fragile, as we saw in Germany and other countries following the events at Fukushima. Therefore, it is important that the regulator we put in control of this system is seen as having a comprehensive and robust responsibility to deliver on all those elements when approving a major new reactor design. On every occasion we need to go through a very detailed process. It is important that it is written in large letters that this is one of the ONR’s central functions.
The Minister may say that this amendment is superfluous but in terms of reassuring the public it is important. The Government’s policy on this issue may be sufficient but the issue of the certification and approval of design must be an important part of the Bill. I hope that my few words on these two amendments will take it some way in that direction. I beg to move.
Lord Jenkin of Roding
My Lords, the House is very much indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for the amount of time and the expertise that he has brought to bear on this important part of the Bill, as he rightly said. It has been a very long time in gestation. It was recognised two, even three, years ago that the difficulties which the ONR—it was then the nuclear inspectorate—faced in recruiting people to do the very specific task that is required when approving nuclear designs meant that they had to be sui generis so far as the terms of the employment were concerned. They could not be subject to the normal standard Civil Service rules. That is the primary aim of this part of the Bill: namely, to take the ONR out of the standard Civil Service terms of contract for the people it employs. It takes anything up to 20 years before an inspector becomes fully qualified to carry out the extremely expert work that is necessary to approve the designs of nuclear power stations and they are difficult people to come by. One needs to be competitive in this regard. The Select Committee on Science and Technology heard evidence from the former chief inspector, Dr Mike Weightman, who was very clear about this and, indeed, was glad that the issue was at last coming forward in this Bill. He made it clear that he had had to wait rather a long time for this to be done. The Government are very much to be congratulated on including the issue in the Bill.
Amendment 76A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and others, seeks to add the words “and the environment”. As a former board member of the Environment Agency, the noble Lord has had much more experience of this issue than I have. As he rightly said, the regulation of this area is done by both bodies—the inspectorate, now the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and the Environment Agency. Their roles may overlap but they are most emphatically not the same. Nuclear science and technology is essentially the area of expertise of the ONR whereas the Environment Agency has the broader role of looking at the impact of a nuclear plant on the surrounding environment and at atmospheric pollution and so on. These roles are not the same. I will be interested to hear what my noble friend has to say on this. However, if I may say so, to add “and the environment” would confuse the issue. This part of the Bill does not deal with the Environment Agency, which continues to do exactly what it did when the noble Lord was a member of its board. I would be interested to know the reaction of the Environment Agency to the amendment. I think it would say, “It is not for them, it is for us”, meaning the agency. As I say, I shall be interested to hear what my noble friend has to say but it raises a question.
As regards Amendment 78B, we need to pay greater attention to cost-effectiveness. I do not know how many noble Lords have read the very interesting article by my noble friend Lord Ridley published a few weeks ago in which he talked about the cost pressures of the nuclear inspectorate on the price of a nuclear power station. I do not have the article in front of me but I remember he said that the inspectorate is taking a very, very safe system and insisting that it will be a very, very, very safe system. The question is: what will that cost? I would be interested to know to what extent it is the inspectorate’s role to consider the cost of the additional requirements that it may impose on the design of a plant.
I am absolutely satisfied that the public will expect the inspectorate to have very high standards. Indeed, I spent some years as the honorary president of the Energy Industries Council, which represents some 650 companies in the supply chain for all the energy industries. One of the things I find myself saying over and over again is that if firms are going to sell to the nuclear industry they must get used to nuclear standards which, for the most part, are considerably higher than general engineering standards, and rightly so. However, is it the role of the ONR to look to the question of cost? It has to consider the design of the plant that is put before it. As the noble Lord rightly said, there will be several. It is already looking at the advanced boiling water reactor put forward by Horizon Nuclear Power, which is now owned by Hitachi. It is not yet looking at either CANDU or PRISM—the other two items the noble Lord mentioned—which are still being examined by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority and the department. However, if a design is put forward for either of those two items, the inspectorate will have to look at those as well. Should it be concerned about the cost? The only cost with which it ought to be concerned is whether we are expecting too high a standard at too great a cost, and whether this is absolutely essential. I suspect there is a temptation to say that anything which makes an installation safe—even if it has to be very, very, very safe—should be done even if it costs a lot. I do not agree with that. There must be a role here for looking at the particular cost for the particular requirement that the inspectorate is asked to look at.
As I say, I shall be interested to hear what my noble friend says about that but I think there may be greater merit in this amendment than in Amendment 76A.
Baroness Verma
I shall try to seduce the noble Lord better next time, but in the mean time I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, withdraws his amendment.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I thank the Minister and everybody who has taken part in this debate, and I will answer some of their points. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, is clearly right that the trigger for setting up the ONR under a new statutory basis was to take it out of the Civil Service, and a large part of the reason behind that was the need to ensure that we have adequate expertise in this field. It is a field that has been allowed to run down; we are probably not without expertise at this point, but they are ageing. Some of them are tempted elsewhere and it is a global market, and therefore it was important for us to ensure that this happened.
Although that may have been the trigger, we have a wider prospect here of a largely comprehensive regulator having its duties set out in a fair amount of detail in this Bill. It would be wrong to say that it is entirely a reflection of the fact that we potentially face a scarcity of resources. Having said that, it is of course important, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, and my noble friend Lord Judd have said, that we address that issue in terms of training provision, investment and our ability to compete for global talent. However, there are wider issues involved here as well.
Objection was made to the reference in the first of these amendments to putting “and environment” in the responsibilities of the ONR. I have no desire—and my previous colleagues at the Environment Agency would no doubt shoot me if I had—to change the boundaries of responsibility between the EA and the ONR. It is important that they are both operating in this area and operating to their own expertise. However, it is also true, if you look at nuclear processes, and some other processes as well, that the hazard involved, the potential risk and the need for minimising that risk is not only to the personnel in the immediate area and those who may be visiting in the immediate population, but also to the environment. If my noble friend Lord Judd lives 12 miles from Sellafield, he will know what I am talking about. If anything were to happen at Sellafield, not only would he and the population in his village be at risk but the totality of the environment of West Cumbria would be at risk as well. It is therefore important that, in approving a particular process or way of dealing with that process, the ONR at least takes cognisance of the fact that there is an environmental dimension. The expertise and regulatory authority may rest with the Environment Agency but the ONR will also have to take that into account. I do not find that confusing; it rounds off what the responsibilities are but does not change the regulatory boundaries.
Baroness Verma
My Lords, the amendments in this group respond to a number of issues, the majority of which were raised in Committee or by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. They are intended to add further clarity to the Bill.
Amendments 77 and 78 have been tabled in response to the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, that we define “associated sites” within this part of the Bill. I thank him for his contributions to the debate and hope that he finds that the proposed definition adds clarity to Part 3.
Amendments 79 to 82 are made in response to the DPRRC’s recommendations that a parliamentary procedure be applied to the production of approved codes of practice. A procedure akin to the negative procedure will now apply to any issuance or amendment of an ONR code, and the Secretary of State’s approval must be granted for the withdrawal of such a code.
Amendment 83 has been tabled to ensure that the provisions on disclosure of “protected information” in Schedule 9 apply to information shared by HMRC under Clause 89 and an inspector appointed by the ONR under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.
Amendment 84 aligns the definition of “relevant provision” in Schedule 10 with the definition in Clause 73.
Amendments 85 to 87 apply the affirmative resolution procedure to the first set of nuclear regulations that the ONR makes under the Bill, any nuclear regulations which amend the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 or the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, and any such regulations that create new offences. This is in response to the recommendations made by the DPRRC, for which the Government are very grateful.
Amendments 88 to 90 will allow the Secretary of State to make transitional provision for the ONR to continue to apply certain regulations under the current regulatory regime until specific regulations are made for the ONR. This includes provision for the conduct of inquiries and the current health and safety fees regime for the nuclear industry. These small amendments will allow us to make a smooth transition to the statutory ONR and will also ensure that the ONR is not significantly reliant on grant in aid for the first few years of its existence.
Amendment 91 clarifies that compensation can be paid by the Secretary of State only in respect of property transfers and not in respect of staff transfer schemes.
Finally, Amendment 92 has been added to allow for regulations to be made jointly under the Energy Bill and the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 where the Energy Bill requires an affirmative resolution procedure to be followed. Where this is the case, we have chosen that the route followed by such regulations should be subject to the subordinate legislation provisions in Clause 104.
I hope that noble Lords are satisfied with my explanation of these amendments and can agree to their inclusion in Part 3 of the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I very much welcome these amendments. Obviously, I particularly welcome the ones that relate to my suggestions for the definition of sites. I think that they make a significant improvement and add clarity.
I am sure that were the noble Lord, Lord Roper, here, he would very much appreciate the move in the direction of the Delegated Powers Committee that the Government have taken in introducing a number of these other amendments. It is always right that any Government should not only take note but follow the advice of the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendations, otherwise they would find themselves in serious trouble. The Minister has managed to avoid that, at least in this part of the Bill.
The transitional provisions in Amendments 88 to 90 also seem sensible. I welcome the amendments and hope that the House will accept them.
Lord Whitty
“(3) At least one non-executive member must have experience of, or expertise in—
(a) matters relevant to nuclear safety management;(b) representation of employees in health and safety;(c) matters relevant to the ONR’s nuclear security purposes.”
Lord Whitty
Amendment 78A deals with the governance of the ONR. There is relatively little in all these pages about that governance; the amendment attempts to beef it up, in terms of who should be the independent members, or non-executive members or whatever you like to call them. It relates to two issues, which are separate and can be dealt with separately if the Government so wish, although they need to take both of them on board.
The first relates to the expertise of the members of the governing body, on nuclear safety and nuclear operations in particular. That point has been raised with us by the potential operating companies of nuclear installations. The second relates to expertise in the area of worker representation and attempts to carry over the provision that has always been there under the Health and Safety Executive and the shadow ONR.
The only reference to expertise in this section of Schedule 7 is to a non-executive member who has expertise in,
“matters relevant to the ONR’s nuclear security purposes”.
That is important; some would argue that it is very important. We know that it is different, and has different connotations, from somebody having expertise in the area of nuclear safety and operating systems for nuclear safety. We would be looking out for somebody who has industrial expertise in managing such systems and who was not a member of the ONR staff. That is, the post could not be filled by appointing the chief inspector, who would be, in any case, a member of the governing body. If I were to second-guess—although “second-guess” is probably the wrong expression—we would be looking for somebody who can bring expertise to bear from a different perspective from that of somebody directly employed by the ONR.
The Government must have received representations—if I can put this in a subtle way—from those who very soon might be operating such a system. They want to see that those overseeing the ONR have expertise in the operation of the safety system and the general management of such sites, or at least that one of them does so.
Secondly, we have seen that the ONR is, essentially, a spin-off from the Health and Safety Executive. Since 1974, the Health and Safety Executive has operated on a tripartite basis. That has been reflected in its superstructure and, in a slightly informal way, in the oversight structure of the shadow ONR that operates under the HSE’s purposes. It has helped the engagement and co-operation of the workforce and has ensured that the worker side of operating complex plants and sites is fully taken into account. It is my contention that that needs to be reflected explicitly in the new structure. If it is not, a valuable part of the whole HSE experience will be lost; and it is unnecessary to lose it in a structure in which the ONR is responsible not only for nuclear safety but for health and safety generally on nuclear sites. It is important that we retain that structure and oversight.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, on this occasion I cannot say that I am happy with the Minister’s response. The nature of the board, together with the expertise of the personnel of the ONR, will determine the degree of confidence there is in the ONR. On the issue not of worker representation in the sense of somebody who represents the workers of the nuclear industry on the board but of someone who has knowledge of working concerns, which in HSE terms has normally been a trade union representative, the fact is that the Government are taking out of the HSE an important, high-profile and, in industrial relations and personnel terms, quite a delicate part of its responsibilities. They are abandoning what was the great strength of the HSE, that at the highest level it had tripartite representation which had the confidence of all sides of industry and the Government. Most of the other provisions of these clauses of the Bill reflect procedures and responsibilities which have been directly or indirectly under the aegis of the HSE. It is odd that the one thing removed is the HSE’s governance, which has proved its worth for over 40 years. That is a serious mistake.
Expertise in nuclear safety management affects the confidence that the management of the industry has in the ONR. One hopes management will have confidence in the inspectorate and the chief inspector, but it has been put to me and I expect it has been put to the Government that the operators of nuclear installations want to think that there is somebody who knows their side of the story in the governance structure. They are worried that that is not prescribed in the Bill. The Minister says the Secretary of State will make a judgment and it is quite possible that he will appoint people with these qualifications or background, but the Government do not want to stipulate that in the Bill. However, sometimes it is the Bill which gives the confidence and the particular appointments are what give confidence. At the moment we are potentially reducing the confidence that workers in the nuclear industry might have in the governance and therefore the direction of the ONR—unnecessarily threatening it, because the rest of the provisions, I think, look after their interests well. We are also threatening the confidence of management of nuclear sites in the overall governance of the ONR.
These may not be big issues in practice but in certain circumstances they could become big issues. It is therefore important that the Government take on board the argument so that, if we cannot stipulate it in the Bill, the Secretary of State will have regard to these two dimensions to make sure that the ONR operates not only in the best traditions of the HSE but in a way that inspires confidence in the industry and the workforce. I fear that, by not accepting this amendment, the Minister may be jeopardising both. It would not be a big thing for either proposal to be included, maybe not in the terms that I have them here but in terms of how the Secretary of State should look at appointments to the governing body.
I am disappointed. I thank my noble friend Lord Stoddart—who I think I can call my noble friend on this occasion—and my noble friend Lord Judd for their support for my position. I regret that the Minister has not been positive. I am slightly surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, was not more supportive at least on the first of the propositions, but I understand his position. However I do not fully understand the Government’s position and I hope that they will think again. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.