(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, looking at the matter from the point of view of a sheriff sitting in a court in Scotland, I think that the order is much to be welcomed. The fact is that people move about, and some offenders coming to Scotland from England or Wales disappear back to England or Wales after they have been sentenced. It is necessary that this measure be passed so that the order that the sheriff would like to make can be properly put into effect.
My Lords, we also support the order, but I have one or two questions for the Minister. We heard in the previous debate about legislation that came into effect in 2012 and we were only now getting around to considering the order. My understanding is that the Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act was passed by the Scottish Parliament in late 2013 and received Royal Assent in January 2014. Here we are, more than five years after Royal Assent, considering this order.
Paragraph 7.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum states: “Included in these measures”—that is, the measures in the 2014 Act—
“is the victim surcharge, a new financial penalty to be imposed on offenders in certain cases as will be set out in the Victim Surcharge (Scotland) Regulations 2019”.
Is it right that we do not yet have these regulations, so we do not know what will be in them, what the circumstances would be nor the measure of the penalties? I think that there is reference somewhere to a sliding scale, but has the Minister seen any draft regulations? In inviting the House to approve this measure, it might have been reasonable to give us some idea as to what precisely the Scottish Government had in mind. I know the Scottish Parliament will be able to look at this order, but it would have been helpful to have had a bit of colour: if he has that information, it will be very welcome.
I emphasise that it has been a very long journey to get here. On a visit to Victim Support Scotland in August 2014, the then Justice Secretary in the Scottish Government, Mr Kenny MacAskill, met victims who had been helped by the existing fund, run by that very important organisation. Mr MacAskill indicated that they were the kind of victims who would be helped by the victim surcharge fund. Indeed, the Scottish Government’s press release accompanying Mr MacAskill’s visit said:
“A new fund providing more than a million pounds a year of practical help for victims of crime is set to be introduced in the coming months as part of the Scottish Government’s package of measures to improve the support for victims and witnesses in Scotland … The Victim Surcharge Fund will be established in the next few months and is likely to be administered by Victim Support Scotland”.
That press release was dated 13 August 2014.
A series of questions have been asked in the Scottish Parliament about when we are actually going to get these regulations. My Liberal Democrat colleague Alison McInnes, then Member for North East Scotland, asked in July 2015,
“what (a) criminal offences, (b) circumstances and (c) descriptions of offender can cause a victim surcharge to be imposed”.
She was told by Mr Michael Matheson, who by that time had taken over from Mr MacAskill as Scottish Justice Secretary:
“The victim surcharge is not yet operational, nor have the relevant provisions in the Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014 been brought into force. Therefore, no surcharges have been imposed or payments made. The victim surcharge is due to be introduced later in 2015, ensuring that offenders contribute towards a fund specifically to support victims of crime. Preparatory work for the establishment and administration of the fund is ongoing … details of how it will operate, including the circumstances in which a surcharge is to be imposed, will be set out in subordinate legislation and will be subject to parliamentary approval in due course”.
Fast forward—or not-so-fast forward—to February 2016, when Ms McInnes was given a further answer from Michael Matheson:
“Preparatory work for the establishment and administration of the victim surcharge fund is on-going. The timetable for the introduction of the fund has been influenced by a number of factors, including further detailed consideration of viable options for delivery and the potential role of third sector or other organisations in this process”.
Then we get to an answer given to my colleague, Member of the Scottish Parliament for Orkney, Mr Liam McArthur, who asked in December 2016 what progress had been made in establishing the victim surcharge fund and when it was expected to be operational and issue its first payments. To this, he got the reply:
“It is the Scottish Government’s intention to establish the fund in 2017 and to initially impose the surcharge on offenders given a court fine. Further details of how the fund will operate will be set out in subordinate legislation, which will be subject to parliamentary approval in due course”.
So here we are at the beginning of 2017, three years after Royal Assent, and we are still talking about it being done “in due course”.
There were further questions of a similar kind. Mr Humza Yousaf, who had by this time taken over from Mr Michael Matheson, said on 17 July last year:
“Our intention is to announce further details on the VSF, following the summer Parliamentary recess”.
The then Conservative Member for North East Scotland, Liam Kerr, asked in October 2018 on what date the fund would become operational. Mr Yousaf, replying on 7 November 2018 said:
“In order to ensure effective operation of the victim surcharge in Scotland, an Order under section 104 of the Scotland Act 1998 … is required to amend section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 … which is reserved”.
That is the very point we are debating in relation to this order, but one notes that not until November 2018 did the Scottish Government ever say that there was any issue about trying to get a Section 104 order. Will the Minister tell us when the Scotland Office was first approached by the Scottish Government with regard to identifying the necessity for such an order? Mr Yousaf went on to describe the order and said:
“The UK Government have agreed in principle to this Order and have estimated that, once all the necessary steps are completed, it will come into force in summer 2019, subject to UK Parliamentary timescales. The Victim Surcharge (Scotland) Regulations, which will implement the surcharge, will be laid before the Scottish Parliament, as soon as practicable after the section 104 Order comes into force”.
In all fairness to the United Kingdom Government, they have held to summer 2019 reasonably well. In a reply to a parliamentary question from Liam McArthur last month, that timescale was repeated by Mr Yousaf in very similar terms.
It is widely agreed that this is an important provision. It is one that will actually give support to victims from the fund created, and it is a matter of considerable regret that it has taken the Scottish Government five years after legislating to even come up with a proposal on how their flagship policy might work. That is not a responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, but it would be very helpful for us to have some colour as to the detail of the proposal. For example, while it is important that we look at the position of victims, we also need to consider those who might have this sanction applied to them. What are the guidelines to ensure that they do not have so much taken out of their benefits that they then struggle to make ends meet, which might actually drive them, in some circumstances, to further crime? That is a detail we do not know and if the Minister has any information on that, it would be very welcome.
As I say, my Liberal Democrat colleagues in the Scottish Parliament have been pushing the Scottish Government hard to make progress on this and it is important that we have this order tonight. We very much welcome it and will certainly give it our support.
My Lords, this is one of these rather interesting areas in which I seem to be called on to explain the inscrutable workings of the Scottish Government, which I am unfortunately rather ill equipped to do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, raised a number of issues regarding the lengthy delay. To be frank, I do not have an adequate answer to give him on behalf of the Scottish Government.
I have before me a statement which says that the Scottish Government have undertaken detailed consideration and consultation. Clearly it has taken a very long time. Exactly why that has been the case remains to be seen. Indeed, through a series of questions asked by a number of Members of the Scottish Parliament, it is quite evident that the Scottish Government were very optimistic that this would be delivered—that the answer would be arriving now—and that has simply not happened.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, asked who is to blame for this. I would not use the term “blame”, but I suggest that the Scottish Government have responsibility in that regard. When we learned that there needed to be an amendment of the legislation which was reserved, we of course acted expeditiously to move that forward and will do so. Today is a measure of how quickly we have been able to move. I have not had sight of the details of the Scottish Government’s proposals. While I could speculate that they may look rather like the English and Welsh version—I would only be speculating in saying that—I anticipate that this will come through the Scottish Parliament in due course. I am afraid that I cannot speak on its behalf, however, so I am unable to answer that question.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, raised the issue, echoed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, of those individuals who find themselves outwith the territorial jurisdiction of Scotland—in Wales or in England. That is a correction which we can take forward. As to the mechanism whereby that will be undertaken, I have to admit to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, that I do not have the detail on that. If it is equivalent to the English or Welsh version, I can certainly have that information placed in the Library. If it is some variation on that, we will have to wait until the Scottish Government determine what it should look like.
As to the amount of money not gathered as a consequence of the length of delay, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, is correct in his figures. The estimate is that around £1 million is available to be gathered in this way, but that of course depends on the details of the Scottish Government’s regulation, which I do not have. I am not sure whether that is an accurate reflection of the money or whether it is just speculation on our part. It may be that, once we have more detail on this, I can secure that information and place it in the Library. Of course, the avid Members of the Scottish Parliament may be better equipped to interrogate the Scottish Government further on these issues, about which I am afraid I have remarkably little information to satisfy noble Lords.
Perhaps I might ask the Minister something that hopefully will be within his responsibilities. The Explanatory Memorandum says that it has been,
“prepared by the Office of the Secretary of State for Scotland”.
Paragraph 6.1 states:
“On a practical level, there need to be enforcement measures to ensure that the victim surcharge is paid. One such measure is deduction of sums of money from the relevant offender’s benefit payments”.
Given that that was written by the Office of the Secretary of State for Scotland, can one reasonably infer that there are other ways in which the other enforcement measures could have been done—and, indeed, that they could have been used against people who do not have benefits and might be very wealthy? Therefore, given that that is in an Explanatory Memorandum from the UK Government, can the Minister explain why an interim order was not brought forward before there was a need for this particular one?
Again, the noble and learned Lord asks a question to which I am afraid I do not have an adequate answer in terms of an interim approach to this. Scotland has two Governments, and of course we are active in the area where we can control the elements within our remit. The Scottish Government are responsible for those matters which they must determine and drive forward. As a consequence of that, I am less able to answer the question.
However, I do have an answer to the question of whether the rates of subtraction from benefits are a potential risk to the individual’s ability to pay, or indeed to struggle to pay. The DWP has set out very clear guidelines to avoid any suggestion that the deductions themselves are in any way harmful to the individual. If these guidelines are followed in the Scottish example, I anticipate that this would therefore not be an issue that would occur in the Scottish Government’s proposals. Again, I am speculating on what they will be putting in there; I do not have that detail.
As I move this forward and welcome the support of the House this evening, I suspect that that the Members of the Scottish Parliament may well be better equipped to continue to prod the Scottish Government in order to elicit the responses which I have been unable to deliver on their behalf. On that basis, I hope that I can move forward and commend this order to the House.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this time last year, during the final stages of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, never a day seemed to go by when we did not discuss common UK frameworks. Can the Minister perhaps update us on what is happening? It seems to have gone quiet. How will he ensure that in areas of shared responsibility there is parity of esteem and there will not be direction from Westminster?
The noble and learned Lord is correct. There needs to be parity of esteem in all these discussions. The intergovernmental review should look at the functioning of the frameworks. The existing joint ministerial committees can be improved, and I suspect that the improvements will emerge from the intergovernmental review.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I concur with both of my noble friend’s observations.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord emphasised the importance in the joint instrument of urgency. Indeed, paragraph 7 of the Attorney-General’s opinion today states:
“Therefore, provided the United Kingdom can clearly demonstrate in practice that it is effectively organised and prepared to maintain the urgent pace of negotiations that they imply, the EU could not fail to match it without being at risk of breaching the best endeavours obligation”.
As the Minister has emphasised that this is political, perhaps rather more than legal, I ask him a political question. Can he give the House three examples of when, since March 2017, the United Kingdom Government, in dealing with Brexit, have clearly demonstrated in practice that it is effectively organised?
Lord Keen of Elie
Respectfully, it appears to me that we have demonstrated that throughout the process.
(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. This House debated the vital issues of devolution over a number of hours and days during the passage of the EU withdrawal Bill. I pay tribute to noble Lords on all sides of the House for interrogating the Government on the issues with care and a wealth of knowledge. This House agreed a package of amendments to be sent back to the other place for their careful consideration. It is, frankly, remarkable that the Government provided less than 20 minutes for the elected House to debate the proposals in front of them on issues as fundamental to the union as devolution and the future of the Northern Irish border.
When this House gave the Bill its Third Reading, we expressed our regret at the absence of a legislative consent Motion from the Scottish Parliament and our hope that the UK Government would convene cross-party talks with the Welsh and Scottish Governments to look at ways forward. We are informed that requests for such talks, including by the shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, have been declined. This is, at the very least, disappointing.
The Government did not give enough thought to devolution in their drafting of the Bill, as in many other areas, and brought forward a flawed piece of legislation. The Government’s own Ministers conceded this point. A great deal of time and debate went into trying to address problems which are in part of the Government’s own making. It is unreasonable, at the next stage of that process, to claim that there is no time left for the other place to have a full debate on the new Clause 11 that it was promised.
We have repeatedly asked the Government to think more carefully about the devolution settlements, and the place they have in upholding our union and shaping the future of the Brexit negotiations. Are the Government actively considering Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition’s calls for the Joint Ministerial Committee to be put on a statutory footing, and have the minutes of its meetings published? We have a situation and there has to be a discussion, agreement and consensus, and I hope that the Minister can provide some hope in that quarter.
I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I am not sure whether to thank him for the name check, which was a fairly broad interpretation of a somewhat more complex legal point. However, clearly, the Statement was made in the other place in response to the failure to have an adequate debate on the Lords amendments and following on, too, from the stunt of the SNP walking out yesterday. However, anyone with even a limited knowledge of Scottish politics knows that the SNP is a grand master at cranking up the grievance machine. Can the Minister therefore say why the Government gave them a gift-wrapped grievance to exploit?
We must also ask about the role of the Secretary of State for Scotland. Let us recall that he promised the House of Commons that amendments to Clause 11—which was, by that stage, completely discredited—would be tabled in the House of Commons on Report. That did not happen. I think there was some forbearance, when the Bill came to this House, because we took the view that, if time was needed to get these amendments right, then time should be taken. Indeed, we had good debates in Committee and on Report and even some further debate at Third Reading. But that was done on the expectation that Scotland’s elected Members, not just the SNP Members but those from the Conservative Party, Labour Party and Liberal Democrats—and indeed Welsh and Northern Ireland Members, because it affects their constituents too—would have a proper and adequate opportunity to look at these amendments. They are a total recasting of the devolved situation post Brexit and the Government must really answer why they did not arrange the timetable in such a way as to allow that to happen. We are entitled to ask whether the Secretary of State for Scotland made representations for the timetable to be arranged in such a way for there to be adequate debate. If he did not, he was derelict in his duty and, if he did, I ask the Minister what conclusions can we draw about the weight he carries within government in as much as these representations were overlooked?
If one goes to the substance of the Statement, it says that:
“While the devolution settlements did not predict EU exit, they did explicitly provide that, in situations of disagreement, the United Kingdom Parliament may be required to legislate without the consent of the devolved legislatures”.
It is of course the case that, legally, Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998,
“does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland”.
That is a statement of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. Section 28(8) goes on to state:
“But it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”.
As the Supreme Court found in the Miller case, it is a convention and, therefore, it is a perfectly legal position that the United Kingdom Parliament can legislate. Can the Minister indicate—it may be that he has not had time to look back at exactly what Lord Sewel said—whether Lord Sewel explicitly said, as was claimed in the Statement, that in some way this would be used as a form of dispute or disagreement resolution? I would quite like to know where this explicit reference to that came from.
We know that this particular Bill is a forerunner to agreeing frameworks. The principles of the frameworks for the United Kingdom were agreed by all parties at the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations back in October. Can the Minister indicate what steps have been taken to put some meat on to the frame of these frameworks? Has the position that has been taken by the Scottish Government—indeed the Scottish Parliament—in any way hampered these discussions in recent weeks, both at official level and at ministerial level?
For my final point I just return to the issue of dispute resolution because, if we are going down the road towards UK frameworks, it is important that we have a better form of dispute resolution than taking the sledgehammer to what has happened in the meantime. We want to know what thought has been given by the United Kingdom Government, in discussion with the devolved Administrations, to ensure that there is far better dispute resolution than we have had to date.
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for beginning what I think is a very necessary discussion on the functioning of the Sewel convention. If I may—to go in reverse order—I will address the question of the frameworks themselves and their functionality, because I think this is where we need to focus our attention. These have been the subject of extensive engagement at an official level. If we add up the number of hours that have now been spent with officials examining each of those frameworks, we are in excess of 100 hours of meetings specifically to look at the functioning of the frameworks themselves. A phrase that comes to mind is: “officials are smiling on it”, which we always widely interpret as things are going quite well—but officials smiling is not the same as Ministers themselves signing it off. One challenge that we have often had is that what appeared to be agreement at the level of the officials—where examination on the detail of the frameworks themselves appeared to be reaching consensus and agreement—did not always match and meet the next step of making sure that Ministers themselves were able to sign that off. That has been one of the greater challenges that we have experienced because, again, this is without precedent. We are trying to establish how we can repatriate laws that we have not had functional control over, and trying to do so within a devolved framework, which of course did not exist when those laws were first moved from the United Kingdom Parliament across to Brussels.
In terms of the events in the other place, time was given, but it might be argued that time was misspent. A great deal of time was spent on a number of elements in discussion, thereby precluding serious engagement on these specific aspects. There needs to be some soul-searching across a number of parties as to how it ended up that way. I do not think that we in this place—or indeed those in the other place—can legitimately say that there has not been substantive engagement on the devolved clauses, Clauses 11 and 15, on many different occasions, both here and through the various forums that exist for officials and for Ministers to examine them. There has been, I suspect, on this clause alone, more correspondence, engagement and meetings to try to bring about the necessary agreement. Clearly, we were able to secure that agreement with the Welsh Administration but not with the Scottish Administration.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, raised the point that my right honourable friend in the other place said that he would bring agreed amendments on Report, but the key part is “agreed”. In order to achieve that, the two sides had to reach agreement. It was not for want of effort that that agreement was not found. The reality is very simple: if you are unwilling to accept that there needs to be some form of concessions to seek that agreement, then you are simply not going to get it. At each stage when we thought that we had moved far enough to change the structure of the clause in such a way that we would be able to get support, we found that the goalposts had shifted slightly further away from us. Clearly, we were able to deliver the support of the Welsh Government, but we were never able to secure the support of the Scottish Government. Even though the officials—and indeed certain Ministers in the Scottish Government—believed that we had made enough progress, unfortunately, when it came to the final sign-off, that was simply not the case.
I take the point from the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, about the JMC and how it shall work. There are examinations now about how we shall create structures that will necessarily address the changing environment and changing reality. How that will evolve is yet to be determined, but I take on board the points that he has made; it is useful for us to be part of that engagement. There will need to be cross-party engagement on the functionality of what, in effect, is a new constitutional arrangement—one that we are still writing. That is part of the challenge that we are living through right now; we have not yet signed off the final chapter of what this will look like. It is therefore quite difficult, in one respect, to determine exactly how we, as the Government, shall address that—my word, that is very unusual handwriting on the note just passed to me; I will read and speak to it momentarily, but not right now.
To conclude my remarks on this particular point, the important thing is that the show is not over. We are trying, and continue to try, to deliver the outcome that is right, but there needs to be an acceptance of agreement, which has to be based upon at least some acceptance of a concession. At the moment, the Scottish Government’s view on this is so didactic, specific and unmoving that, in essence, we are placed in the invidious position right now of taking a journey that we did not set out to take but which is facilitated within the law. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has said, the Sewel convention does allow for this particular approach under not normal circumstances. We do not want to be taking this journey at all, but we are and we must, because the key thing is that, on day one after Brexit, the statute book must work, not just here in London but in Edinburgh, in Belfast and in Cardiff.
I thank the noble Lord for his words of advice, but Scots are renowned for telling it like it is, and I assure him that I moderated my language a great deal when I chose those words. What I saw yesterday was scandalous, and I think anyone who saw it would agree. It was a dereliction of a democratic role. That level of theatrics may play its part—I do not doubt that—but there are other things that should be done in the other place.
On qualified majority voting, in the United Kingdom we have a degree of asymmetry. Attempts were made by the other party to address this through regional assemblies within England, but that was simply not supported by the public will. It is not easy to accept in such a small island archipelago such as we are, where one nation is so dominant in terms of population, that we should somehow simply divide the land into four parts and pretend that each is equal and should be considered as such. That would not be easily done. I do not think that the Government today are ruling anything out, but we have to be realistic—something else the Scots are renowned for.
My Lords, if no one else is rising to speak—we still have 12 minutes—I will ask a question. The Minister said in response to the questions I raised that time was taken up by Divisions, but can he confirm as a matter of fact that the Government could have arranged the timetable, given that it happened over two days, so that the issues on what became Clause 15 were taken first and were not truncated in the way they were? It is also part of the Government’s own timetable that time for Divisions is taken account of. Can the Minister confirm that it was a matter of the Government’s own judgment that they did not put this item in a place where it could be properly debated?
I thank the noble and learned Lord for that point. I can confirm that the Government could have adjusted it, had they been minded to do so. However, the problem was that they did not anticipate what happened as the votes began to dominate and consume the speaking time. Part of the dilemma that was faced was therefore that by the time this was recognised, the time itself had elapsed. I do not doubt that yesterday, had the Scottish National Party not left the building and had lodged their request for a debate, there would have been a debate on that very point to allow each of these issues to be aired adequately.
(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Baroness. I wish I could give more than warm words at this time. We have to consider the judgment very carefully; it is 140 pages long and came out only this morning. However, the early analysis suggests that the technicality that the noble Baroness and I have both touched upon will in due course be addressed by another case, and that technicality will be eliminated.
The issue is therefore how this matter shall be addressed in Northern Ireland. Clearly, as I have said on a number of occasions on a number of matters, we would prefer a devolved Administration—a devolved Executive—to take these issues forward. None the less, the last time that the Assembly in Northern Ireland debated this issue on a cross-party basis—on each occasion regarding each of the elements that were part of the judgment today: the fatal foetal abnormalities, rape and incest—the Assembly itself did not endorse progress on these matters. It is important that the issue is addressed with some urgency but also with some care, because there are a number of wide implications that we must take on board. That is why at this stage we will consider the judgment very carefully to ensure that we understand exactly what it is saying, so that we can appreciate how to take the next steps.
My Lords, this is obviously a very charged and sensitive issue. As the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, have said, the judgment will require a lot of detailed consideration. None the less, it is clear that there was a majority in the Supreme Court who, but for the fact that there was no legal standing on the part of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, would have found a declaration of incompatibility. Given that under paragraph 3(c) of Schedule 2 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 human rights and the observance and implementation of our international obligations, including human rights obligations, are an excepted matter and therefore fall within the responsibility of the Westminster Parliament, and given that both the relevant United Nations committee and now a majority in the Supreme Court have said that the current law of abortion in Northern Ireland is lacking with specific regard to Article 8 of the European convention, is there not some responsibility on the UK Government to address this matter with a degree of urgency, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, encouraged?
I certainly agree with those who have said that it would be far better if this were dealt with by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Indeed, my colleague in the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, David Ford, had already brought in a Bill before Stormont was suspended with regard to addressing fatal foetal abnormality in relation to abortion. While that is obviously the best route to go down, as long as the Northern Ireland Assembly is not functioning there is within the current devolved settlement a responsibility on the UK Government to do something.
I thank the noble and learned Lord. He is absolutely right that the judgment itself, even on a cursory reading, does not allow us to escape the conclusions that have been drawn simply because there is a technical matter there. The obligation for us right now is to ensure that we are able to move forward on this matter. The challenge, however, is that we must ensure clarity from the parties and communities in Northern Ireland as to how. We do not wish to be seen as, in essence, trying to interfere from over the water deliberately to change what are clearly very deeply held views by a number of parties. None the less, the finding itself will need to be considered very carefully and we must do that in order to be clear that we are upholding our obligations, something that the Government will continue to do.
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Lords Chamber
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, we are dealing here with truly technical amendments to ensure that the provisions of the Bill deliver the intended policy. They achieve two things. The first is to clarify how the requirement for regulations made by devolved Ministers under Schedule 2 to be within devolved competence interacts with the principle of severance applied by the courts.
The normal practice would be that when a Minister makes regulations that include, for instance, 10 different provisions, should one of those provisions be outwith the scope of the power, the courts would not strike down the regulations as a whole, they would simply sever the offending provision and allow the remaining nine provisions to stand as law. Some concerns were raised that the requirements in the Bill might imply that this standard practice should not occur. The amendments therefore make it clear that when a provision is outside devolved competence, only that provision would be ultra vires and not the whole instrument in which the provision is included.
The second purpose of the amendments is to allow for a devolved Minister and a UK Minister acting jointly to make provision that would not be in the competence of the devolved Minister acting alone. It has always been the Government’s intention that the Schedule 2 powers can be exercised jointly to allow us to work together in areas where we may need to make the same or related changes to retained EU law and so that, where appropriate, those changes can be subject to formal scrutiny and approval in both this Parliament and the relevant devolved legislature.
We believe it is right that, for instance, where a UK Minister and a Welsh Minister jointly make regulations in relation to a matter that concerns the England/Wales border, those regulations can include both the provision for England and the provision for Wales, even though it would not be within the Welsh Minister’s competence to make the provision in relation to England if they were acting alone.
We will also be bringing forward at Third Reading a number of further drafting changes to permit combinations of instruments beyond what is normally possible, reflecting the level of joint working that will be needed in relation to these powers. I will be speaking to the Government’s Clause 11 amendments shortly, when we reach the group beginning Amendment 89DA. I am sure noble Lords will appreciate that we have a number of further groups to get through on other parts of the devolution provisions before we reach that debate. The amendments provide what I hope to be welcome legal clarity. They reflect standard practice and the mechanisms for good, collaborative joint working between the Administrations. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation of these technical amendments. Can he say whether there is agreement among the devolved Administrations and the UK Government on these amendments?
My Lords, at last we have reached this stage, although I find it a little off-putting that we are coming to consequential, technical matters before we look at the meaty issue; but that will come, as was said.
I would like to pay the respects of those on our Benches to the serious way in which the Government have contributed through the joint ministerial group to the success of the proposals, and thank them for bringing them to us now. I would also like to thank Mark Drakeford from the Welsh Government and Mike Russell from the Scottish Government for the part they played, even if the latter has thus far been unable formally to sign up to the inter-governmental process. As the Minister said, we are going to discuss Clause 11 and neither of us can wait for that. It is coming in more detail later this evening. However, we on these Benches recognise and appreciate the progress that has been made. We have come a long way since the Bill was published and it is against that backdrop that this and subsequent groups of amendments should be considered.
The Labour Party has always been the party of devolution. While we will be watching the Government’s treatment of the devolved Administrations very closely throughout the Brexit process—that is our job—we recognise the genuine progress that has been made and welcome the amendments in this group. They allow United Kingdom and devolved Ministers jointly to exercise powers in Schedule 2 in order to make provisions that could not be made by a devolved Minister acting alone. This clarifies the use of so-called composite instruments, as the Minister said, and we hope paves the way for collaborative working between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government.
Other amendments in the group improve the position regarding ultra vires provision within instruments made under Schedule 2. I believe that the devolved Administrations previously raised concerns with the Government as to whether the courts would permit those parts of an instrument that were within competence to remain law. We are glad that Ministers and officials have responded positively to the appeals from the devolved bodies and that the amendments provide greater clarity for all involved. The group amounts to just one piece in the jigsaw puzzle. I usually start my jigsaws with the edge pieces. This looks like putting a piece in the middle and working around it in due course. It is a piece that these Benches are happy to support.
My Lords, since submitting this amendment, I note that Clause 7(8) covers the point and therefore I do not wish to move it.
My Lords, I will return to the points on the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, but first I endorse what has been said by everyone who has contributed to this debate so far—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—in expressing gratitude, if that is the right word, to those who have laboured hard to try to move forward and get an agreement on the kind of structure we need for when EU law is, as it were, repatriated. I think there is common ground that the original Clause 11 proposals were not fit for purpose; that has been said on many occasions, and I will not rehearse all the arguments for that now. It is to the credit of the Government that they recognise that and have sought to address it —unfortunately, some valuable time was lost, but nevertheless they have done that in a constructive way. Indeed, I am grateful to both Mark Drakeford of the Welsh Government and Mike Russell of the Scottish Government for their efforts. What has been brought before us represents a considerable advance with much better arrangements for dealing with retained EU law after exit day. It is regrettable that the Scottish Government did not feel able to sign up, notwithstanding the considerable advances that had been made. One or two people have speculated that, if one is not satisfied with what the Government are doing, there may be an argument for voting it down. I pointed out that if you did that, we would be left with Clause 11, which no one seems to think we should give any house room to any longer. However, the progress made is welcome.
I listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said when he moved his amendment. I have been trying to work through it, because something about it was not quite right. It may be just my approach. He quite rightly drew attention to the fact that the “type A” Order in Council procedure is deployed when changes are to be made in the competence of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Ministers, and specifically where there is a change to Schedule 5, which defines what is reserved, and to the restrictions which are currently set out in Schedule 4. Where I possibly have a difficulty is that of course these are not the only two restrictions; the noble and learned Lord himself pointed out that EU law, and for that matter the European Convention on Human Rights, is another restriction, as indeed is territoriality. As he acknowledged, we are dealing with a situation that was never foreseen when the Scotland Act was being drafted and taken through both Houses back in 1998, and that is a situation where, potentially, the restriction on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament —namely, that it must abide by European Union law —will fly off, and we will be in what might be described as a sui generis situation. The question is whether the procedure which is for modification of Schedule 4 or 5 is appropriate for this one-off situation.
My Lords, there is a provision in Section 29 of the Scotland Act that covers the thing that worries the noble and learned Lord. Section 29(2)(a) provides that it is outside the competence of the Scottish Government to apply,
“part of the law of a country or territory other than Scotland, or confer or remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or as regards Scotland”.
So this raises a great problem in the area he is talking about.
My Lords, if an Act of Parliament gives the Scottish Parliament power to say no and refuse its consent, what I am asking is whether that affects what might happen in other parts of the United Kingdom, so that you would not be able to get the common UK framework which people might otherwise think is necessary and desirable to be able to sustain a single market within these islands. At the moment, we have to some extent a form of competence at a different level—the European level—which is being brought back down to the United Kingdom. I ask these questions because it possibly means that there is a difference between the procedure which has been used if you wish to modify Schedule 5 or change Schedule 4 and one where we are returning the laws which hitherto have been subject to the European Union.
The amendments in my name, which I know are supported by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, are Amendment 89DAF in respect of Scotland, Amendment 89DAJ in respect of Wales and Amendment 89 DAK in respect of Northern Ireland. These amendments would, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, indicated, change the sunset—although it is not really a sunset in this respect—overall from seven years to five years, and they do that by changing the period during which the frameworks must be established from five years to three years. I did not seek to change the two-year period during which these orders have to be made, because that is consistent with other provisions in the Bill.
If my understanding of the situation is correct, if an order is not made that would identify the area for a framework and freeze, the power would automatically flow back to, let us say in this case, Edinburgh. Is it therefore to be expected that all these orders will be made, identifying the areas for freezing to establish common frameworks by the time we leave the European Union? Otherwise, it might appear that, within a period of days, weeks or months between our leaving the European Union and the order being made, there could be divergence between the different parts of the United Kingdom. After the order is made, I suggest that there should be a three-year period for the frameworks to be established rather than a five-year period.
I welcome the fact that time limits have been put in at all—that was a step forward, and the Government have obviously been listening on that. But I have not heard why it should be five years rather than three. That figure may have been plucked out of the air. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, is not in his place, but he did have an amendment in Committee in which five was suggested. It may be that that commended itself to the Government because it came from the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. I would like to hear a rationale as to why five years is to be preferred to three. The noble and learned Lord said that they had agreement from the Welsh Government on this. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s views on whether the Welsh Government thought that a shorter period of time would be ideal but they were prepared to accept this.
No one disputes the amount of work to be done but we are potentially in a Parkinson’s law situation, where work expands to fill the time available for its completion. If we say five years, it could take up to five years; if we say three years, it would focus the mind and we could possibly do it in three. That is not least because we are dealing with dynamic issues, and if we are to freeze retained EU law in areas where there might be need to update the law—I assume that in these circumstances we would seek to do so by agreement—three years would allow progress to be made faster.
Also in this group is Amendment 90, which again provides a sunset. However, I think it is superseded by what we are debating and so I will not seek to press it. But it is important that the Government give us a rationale as to why they have chosen this period of time.
On a very specific point, Amendment 92AD—on page 19 of the Marshalled List—talks about the reporting that is to be made by Ministers to Parliament:
“After the end of each reporting period, a Minister of the Crown must lay before each House of Parliament a report which … (b) explains how principles … (i) agreed between Her Majesty’s Government and any of the appropriate authorities, and (ii) relating to implementing any arrangements which are to replace any relevant powers or retained EU law restrictions, have been taken into account”.
I rather suspect that these are the principles that were agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee back in October or November, which have certainly been discussed before. However, it is slightly odd to have reference to “principles” which, as far as I can see, will not actually appear in the Bill. Because we have debated this often enough, we perhaps know what the principles are, or at least know where they can be found, but to anyone coming to this fresh it would not necessarily indicate where these principles are. Will the Minister confirm that these are the principles that are being referred to—the ones agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee—and explain whether there is any reason that they should not be added as an annexe to the Bill?
In conclusion, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, quoted a letter from the First Minister, which was very measured in its terms—slightly more measured than her writings in last week’s Sunday Herald, in which she said that the Tories would “completely demolish” Scottish devolution. I immediately thought of the many debates we had during the passage of the Scotland Act 2016, in which the Conservative Government extended devolution to cover almost all of income tax and a substantial amount of social security. This could be a very cunning plan, if they assume that the Scottish Government will—I was going to say “screw it up”, but I am not sure whether that is parliamentary—act in such a way that it would end devolution, but I do not think that that was the plan. This Government have shown a very strong commitment—and I say this from the opposition Benches—through the number of things that they have devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Take one example from the 24:
“EU regulations on the classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (CLP); the placing on the market and use of biocidal products (e.g. rodenticides); the export and import of hazardous chemicals; the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH); and plant protection products (e.g. pesticides)”.
I cannot honestly believe that trying to establish a common framework on that somehow undermines devolution, given that the Government transferred, almost entirely, income tax to the Scottish Parliament. It is a degree of hype that does not serve the debate well.
I rather hope that, as we go forward, we can recognise that what we are trying to do is seek a position so that, when we are no longer part of the European Union, we can in many important areas where it is thought necessary—indeed, the Scottish Government have accepted that in some areas it is necessary—establish a common framework throughout the United Kingdom. There will be further arguments as to the content of these frameworks, but for the moment we need to identify what they are. I would welcome a response to the points that I have made.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, in addressing Amendment 89DA, I will, as did the Minister, cover the broader ground contained in the amendments in the group. Some of my misgivings with the new proposed settlement dealt with in this group will arise in later amendments, 91 and 92, which for some reason have not been coupled with these.
While I welcome the progress that was made in the joint discussions on resolving some of the difficulties between Westminster and the devolved Governments—a welcome that has been expressed by both Mike Russell of the Scottish Government and Mark Drakeford, Wales’ Brexit Minister—I am acutely aware that not all the difficulties were resolved, and I beg the indulgence of the House for a few minutes in setting these issues in their context. I realise that some of my points may seem to be Second Reading ones, but in these amendments—there are 21 in this group alone—we have matters before us which were not in the Bill at Second Reading. I noted in particular the Minister’s invitation in his speech for us to contribute positive ideas in this context.
The adjustments before us tonight are in the context of what many people in Cardiff and Edinburgh, across party lines, regarded as a power grab—to use the term that was used then—by Westminster, in taking unto themselves powers returning from Brussels, including powers in what had previously been regarded as devolved functions such as agriculture. The fact that the Labour Government in Cardiff held out so long before agreeing reflected that fear; as did the fact that members of all parties in the Assembly—including initially Tory and UKIP AMs—supported having a continuity Bill to withstand that perceived power grab. The recent debate in Edinburgh reflected similar cross-party support for its continuity Bill. Rather than just scream “power grab” and hurl abuse at those we see as the authors of our difficulties, I will try to put forward what I see as a considered case and implore, even at this late stage in the Bill’s passage, that noble Lords appreciate the complexity of these issues—some of which have already emerged tonight—and rise to the challenge of finding a positive way forward, if not in this Bill then in some parallel or future legislation.
There have been calls from all sides for greater mutual respect in this process—for a mutuality that is not reflected by one side having a veto but other partners being denied that facility. The difficulty, repeated time after time by those involved in the recent negotiations over several months, is that there seems to be a basic lack of trust between Westminster and the devolved regimes. That is not so much a personal lack of trust but rather a lack of trust in the respective institutions.
Part of the lack of trust felt in Wales arises, perhaps, from different social values and from historic experience. There has been a growing lack of trust in Wales during my lifetime, emanating from difficult issues such as the Tryweryn Valley flooding in the 1960s, the S4C debacle of 1980 and, more recently, the Barnett formula. Devolution was meant to help avoid at least some such difficulties, but power devolved is power retained—a truism of which we have become acutely aware in these recent experiences. The underlying issues, which recent difficulties in the context of Brexit have highlighted, are not going to go away. They will continue to plague us until a proper constitutional settlement is reached. I suggest that the sunset clauses define a timescale within which this has to be sorted out.
In the wake of Brexit, the sorts of issues that will arise, and which will strain our constitutional settlement, perhaps to breaking point, include for Wales state aid for threatened industries like steel, the establishment in place of the CAP of a viable sheep-meat regime, and an acceptance that procurement rules can be used to ensure maximum community benefit from public expenditure. Sheep meat is an excellent example of the different perspectives of Westminster and Cardiff. Westminster tends to see it in terms of consumer needs; the Assembly sees it as the cornerstone of our rural economy and of local communities and their attendant culture. Quite frankly, I do not begin to see such considerations being addressed, and if Westminster insists on having a veto over such policies as agriculture, it will be seen as a constraint on devolved ambitions. There has to be give and take or the whole edifice will crumble under the strain of its own self-inflicted tensions. We are in fact trying to constrain the needs of a quasi-federal system within the straitjacket of a unitary state, and it just will not work; four into one will not go.
It seems that we have an explanation. Were officials of the Scottish Government involved in that and, if in-depth work has been done, would the Minister help the House by publishing it?
Lord Keen of Elie
I am not in a position to say that such work would be published, because of course it has been on the basis of engagement between officials dealing with this. I do not believe that there is any official report to that effect; it is just a matter of the product of engagement between officials negotiating these matters. Therefore I cannot indicate that we will publish anything in that regard. That is to try to explain the position with regard to the sunset clauses in the regulations. I turn to the question—
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, and support Amendment 245A, to which he also spoke. He has given a very comprehensive explanation as to the origins of the amendments and why we believe that they are important.
Two weeks ago, when we were debating Amendment 70A and other related amendments, one suggested that there should not be any change to equalities legislation, and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in responding indicated that that might not be appropriate. He said:
“For example, the Equality Act refers in several places to EU or to Community law. These references are likely to need to be replaced with the term, ‘retained EU law’. As such, we believe that it is essential that the Clause 7 power is able to address these deficiencies so that we can ensure that the legislation that safeguards these rights and protections can continue to function effectively”.—[Official Report, 7/3/2018; col. 1168.]
The amendment gets around the practical objection that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, had to previous ones because, if all that was being done was changing terminology from EU law to EU retained law, clearly the test or certification referred to in Amendment 245A that the regulation did not,
“remove or diminish any protection provided by or under equalities legislation”,
would be quite easily met.
The noble Lord, Lord Low, indicated some of the background to this amendment. An amendment was brought forward in the House of Commons in response to concerns expressed by the Women and Equalities Select Committee. He also indicated that what the Government did in their response really did little more than to reiterate a public sector equality duty that was already there under the Equalities Act. One reason why we were concerned that that was an inadequate response was, as the Minister responding to this will be well aware, that the public sector equality duty goes much further than just the one that has been put in this Bill. Given that in bringing forward secondary legislation, Schedule 19 of the Equality Act 2010 indicates that the public sector equalities duty is on Ministers when bringing forward subordinate legislation, on the principle of inclusio unius exclusio alterius—
They talk about nothing else in Harrogate, as my noble friend Lord Willis said. But this proposal is just for clarity’s sake, given that putting one public sector equality duty in the Bill could raise questions as to the status and validity of the other ones.
Another Latin maxim, if I am allowed, is ubi jus ibi remedium. In a number of our debates on equalities and human rights issues, we have heard Ministers talk about rights but say all too little about remedies—and when they do talk about remedies they do so in a way that gives some cause for alarm. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, time and again, reminds us that the underlying purpose of the Bill is to ensure that there is a smooth transition in law on our departure from the European Union. That entitles us to question what is meant by law.
On 5 March in a slightly different context, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said in response to an intervention from me:
“They will have rights but they may not have the same remedy, but that is quite distinct. We are talking about maintaining rights at the point when we leave”.—[Official Report, 5/3/18; col. 964.]
But is it right to divorce rights from remedies quite so easily? The noble and learned Lord will be familiar with Section 126(9) of the Scotland Act 1998, which states that,
“all those rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the EU Treaties, and (b) all those remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the EU Treaties, are referred to as EU law”.
For the purposes of the Scotland Act, EU law embraces both rights and remedies.
Too often in our debates, we have heard Ministers reassure the House that the Government are committed to retaining rights but they have sidestepped the issue of remedies. I believe that if there is to be a smooth transition from EU law to EU retained law, it must include rights and remedies. The Government have not given us sufficient reassurance on this. That is why these amendments are necessary and I commend them to the House.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 245A and 242A, and I assure your Lordships that you will get no Latin from me—maybe some Cockney rhyming slang, but certainly no Latin. I have added my name to these two amendments, which were so eloquently and powerfully moved and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, and powerfully supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness.
Noble Lords will be aware that I spoke at Second Reading on the issue of rights and protections, and have returned to the same during Committee in your Lordships’ House. I make no excuse or apology for repeating what are grave concerns about the continuation of rights and equalities that we currently enjoy in the United Kingdom. As I have said before—it bears repetition—these rights have been hard fought for and, often, hard fought against. That they exist now is due to the hard work, persistence and sacrifices of generations.
These rights have been achieved through either recourse to law, proceeding through the courts to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg or through the Court of Justice of the European Union, or by legislative changes primarily introduced since the election of the Labour Government in 1997. As I have said, there is deep concern that this Bill, and particularly delegated powers contained within it, will ultimately be used to reduce rights and equalities in the United Kingdom—including in Northern Ireland, where consequent problems for the Good Friday agreement will arise. I will not return to the issue of the charter of fundamental rights today but I will on other occasions.
Amendments 242A and 245A seek to bring security of protection and non-regression by ensuring that delegated powers are not used to diminish protections in the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010. But I and other noble Lords, and people and organisations outside Parliament, also have concerns about other equality and human rights laws. The certification approach adopted in Amendment 245A could be extended to cover such rights, by requiring a Minister to certify that secondary legislation under the Bill does not diminish protection in equality and human rights law generally.
On Wednesday 7 March, we again discussed amendments that would restrict the use of delegated powers from making any changes to equalities and human rights legislation. The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, raised an objection to the amendments that we were discussing on the basis that delegated powers would be needed to make technical changes to our laws to reflect exit from the European Union. He went on to state that the Government could not accept the amendments,
“as the legislation that underpins these rights and protections will contain many provisions that will become deficient after our exit”.—[Official Report, 7/3/18; col. 1168.]
In his reply, the Minister offered examples where the Equality Act refers in several places to EU or community law, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said, and that such references needed to be replaced with the term “retained EU law”. I will not detain the House further by extending the quotation, but I point out that Amendment 245A addresses this concern because it does not prevent a Minister making necessary technical changes to reflect our exit from the European Union, as these technical changes would not diminish existing protections.
In the same debate, the Minister referred to the government amendment tabled in the other place, now paragraph 22 of Schedule 7, saying that it will,
“secure transparency in this area by requiring ministerial statements to be made about amendments made to the Equality Acts under each piece of secondary legislation under key powers in the Bill. These statements will … flag up any amendment to the Equality Acts and secondary legislation made under those Acts, while also ensuring that Ministers confirm that, in developing their draft legislation, they have had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and other conduct prohibited under the 2010 Act”.—[Official Report, 7/3/18; cols. 1167.]
This statement does not answer the concern addressed by Amendment 245A: that the Government’s approach in the Bill does not fulfil their commitment to maintaining our current protections. It merely restates the existing statutory duty to have “due regard”.
In debate, the Minister has reiterated clear commitments that there will be no roll back of rights. Therefore, I say to the Government and to the noble and learned Lord the Minister: put the commitments, and the assurances given in this House and in the other place, in the Bill and end the uncertainty that is so widely shared. I ask your Lordships that, when we return again on Report to the issue of the protection of equality and human rights, as we will, we work together to ensure that the departure from the European Union does not signal the beginning of a departure from the rights and protections that we currently enjoy and which are continuously under threat.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 266, which is in my name, is in a series of groups dealing with devolution. It is in the first of five groups dealing with rather technical points arising out of Schedules 2 and 8. They precede a lot of government amendments which are in the group following my groups. I suggest that the main discussion about devolution and its consequences is best reserved for the government amendments which are focused on Clause 11 and other clauses. I am afraid my groups are rather boring, because I am dealing with a whole series of little technical points which need adjustment to some extent in the light of progress that is being made in discussions with the devolved authorities, among other points.
The theme that runs through all my amendments is the need to respect the devolution settlements in Scotland and Wales. I am confident that the Government share that sentiment. It is all a question of how the matter is worked out in points of detail. The basic rule following our withdrawal from the EU, I suggest, is that returned EU competencies in the devolved areas should be distributed among the devolved authorities in accordance with the devolution statutes. That means that what falls within devolved competence should be treated as devolved, with all that that means, and what falls within reserved matters should be treated as reserved, with all that that means.
The statutes that form the foundation for the devolution settlements—the Scotland Act 1998 and Government of Wales Acts, the latest of which was in 2017—were all built on the foundation of our membership of the EU. In each of these statutes, it was taken as accepted that it would not be within the competence of the devolved Administrations to legislate on matters relating to EU law or indeed to take executive action in relation to these matters either.
What we have in the Bill, in place of EU law, is a new creature called “retained” EU law, which is the law that comes back to us either because it is already present in the United Kingdom or is direct EU law that is coming back to us and is not yet built into our laws but requires being built in using the mechanisms described in the Bill. In the original drafting of the Bill, retained EU law is treated as simply a mirror image of EU law, so that in that original drafting—which can be seen in Clauses 11(1) and (2)—the same restriction on competence which applied in relation to EU law is applied to retained EU law. I am delighted to see that, in developing their thinking on this matter, the Government recognise that this really is not acceptable within the devolved arrangements. A much more nuanced approach to that topic can be seen in the government amendments that we will come to later this afternoon.
What I seek to do in the preliminary groups is to draw attention to various other passages in the Bill that need to be corrected in order to be compatible with the devolution settlements. In some of the groups—but not in the first—it is already clear from the government amendments that they are in almost the same position as I am as to what needs to be done.
I turn to Amendment 266, in the first of these groups, and also mention amendments 278 and 292, which raise exactly the same point in relation to different parts of the Bill. Amendment 266 deals with the power to deal by regulation with deficiencies arising from the withdrawal from the EU, which is the subject of Clause 7. It appears in Part 1 of Schedule 2 in the form that is appropriate for the activities of the devolved institutions in carrying out the exercise to which Clause 7 refers.
Amendment 278 deals with the power by regulation to prevent breaches of international obligations, which is the subject of Clause 8. The devolution mechanism for this is dealt with in paragraph 13 of Schedule 2. Amendment 292 relates to the power by regulation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the mechanism for the devolved Administrations is set out in paragraph 21 of Schedule 2.
The point to which these three amendments draw attention is a qualification that is to be found in each of these contexts on the power of the devolved authority to make provision by regulations regarding these three matters. The particular provision that I am concerned about is found in paragraph 1(4) of Schedule 2:
“Regulations under this Part, so far as made by a devolved authority … (b) may not confer a power to legislate (other than a power to make rules of procedure for a court or tribunal)”.
At first sight that qualification cuts across the concept of devolution, the effect of which is that if a matter is within devolved competence, it is for the devolved authority to take its own decisions as to how to deal with that matter, in whatever way it regards as appropriate. Under the devolution statutes, the qualification that we find in this provision and its equivalents in paragraphs 13 and 21 is new: in my experience it has not been encountered before. To an extent, therefore, these three amendments are probing, to enable the Minister to explain why this qualification has been inserted in these paragraphs and, if no reasonable explanation is given, to suggest to her that maybe the qualification should be removed, on the ground that when it comes to exercising powers within the devolved area, it should not be there.
It is right to add that Part 1 of Schedule 2, for perfectly understandable reasons, contains qualifications. For example, paragraph 2 states that:
“No regulations may be made under this Part by a devolved authority unless every provision of them is within the devolved competence of the devolved authority”.
That is a perfectly sensible provision, and consistent with the devolution scheme. What troubles me is why the qualification that I have mentioned should be there. My question is: should it be there at all? And if it should not be there, should it not be taken out? I beg to move.
My Lords, the Committee is indebted to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his detailed analysis of the Bill as it originally stood, and the points arising. My name is on the amendment, but I would be happy to deal with the important issues of principle that prompted me to sign some of these amendments, in an attempt to honour the spirit of the original devolution settlement, when we deal with the group containing the government amendments. Obviously, however, I support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has moved.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I too support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, and I entirely agree with his approach—that it is best to focus on a couple of larger debates rather than going through all the minutiae at this point. However, it is important to underline the principle—that matters coming back from Brussels that deal with devolved subjects should go to the devolved authorities. It is on that principle that I hope we shall concentrate as we move forward.
Lord Wigley
Indeed—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was making earlier; I agree. Given the current role of EU law regulating action in all parts of the UK in such subjects, partly to facilitate a single market with a level playing field—the point that the noble Lord was making—and partly to ensure that in matters which by their nature cannot be constrained by political borders, there is a coherent common approach. I accept this. Indeed, last week I proposed an amendment to provide a framework agreement for environmental policy—which, quite amazingly, the Government rejected. However, if there are to be such frameworks, the devolved Administrations and the devolved legislatures, whose legislative competence is being constrained by such frameworks, must surely agree the proposed steps jointly with the UK Government. I have tabled an amendment to an amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, providing a mechanism to this end. That will be debated later so I will not anticipate that debate now.
Let us be clear: unless there is agreement between Westminster and the devolved Governments on these matters, the continuity Bill will be enacted by the Assembly and will take precedence in Wales. Surely it is time for the UK Government to reconsider what is seen as an obdurate stance and agree a sensible, balanced and respectful way forward.
My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate because in many respects government Amendment 302A answers the initial point of concern—that the current limitation on competence in the Scotland Act under European Union law would be replaced by a restriction on retained EU law. Of course, under the new amendment that has gone, but there is a wider point on which the Minister could perhaps assist the Committee, which arises from the draft agreement on the transitional period.
As I understand it, during the transitional period basically the acquis will still apply. I have looked at Articles 4 and 82 of the draft agreement. Article 4 says:
“Where this Agreement provides for the application of Union law in the United Kingdom, it shall produce in respect of and in the United Kingdom the same legal effects as those which it produces within the Union and its Member States”.
Article 82 says:
“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall continue to have jurisdiction for any proceedings brought before it by the United Kingdom or against the United Kingdom before the end of the transition period”.
We will have a lot of debates this afternoon about whether UK Ministers, Scottish Ministers or Welsh Ministers will be exercising powers after exit day, but can the Minister indicate how the United Kingdom Government see the position? If we are going to have to abide by European Union law having the same legal effect as it produces in the Union, is there any room for movement at all? How is effect going to be given to that if, under Clause 1 of the Bill, the European Communities Act 1972 has been repealed?
My Lords, I cannot allow the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, to continue with his heresy that the Government are right in what they are doing. I noticed the shock that passed over the face of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. What I think the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, does not appreciate is that the proposal of the Government is to introduce frame- works into this country to save the internal market of the UK, whether or not the devolved Administrations consent. All they are prepared to do, as the noble Baroness the Minister said in response to something earlier, is to consult—they are not necessarily seeking agreement. That is where he has it wrong.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Wigley
Not only do I agree with my noble friend but I will surprise the Committee by reminding him that Penderyn whisky was in fact formulated as a result of devolution itself. It was on the evening of the setting-up of the National Assembly that people came together and thought, “Now we have to start doing something to help ourselves in Wales. What shall we do?” They concluded that a whisky would be one way forward. As they say, the rest is history—a very enjoyable and successful history. I thank my noble friend for reminding me of that.
The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, correctly said that the European Commission objected. But in fact the Court of Justice of the European Union found that the Scottish Government’s proposals were actually consistent with the rules of the single market, principally because the minimum unit price was based on health reasons.
Lord Wigley
Indeed—which shows the importance of the health and social agenda that underpinned the initiative.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 302BA, 312 and 318 in my name, but I shall start by speaking more to the generality by responding to the government amendments moved by the Minister. It is fair to acknowledge that much has happened since Second Reading when I and many others criticised the architecture of the original Clause 11, not least because it showed scant regard for the spirit and structure of the original devolution settlement. It had a system of conferred powers that was totally alien to how devolution had performed and been structured until this point.
However, I give credit to the Government for tabling these amendments. They have thought to recast Clause 11 and the related schedules, and I think it was acknowledged earlier that there is more work to be done. When you get legislation like this and new situations arise, it is amazing how new words come into the vocabulary. The Government have claimed that most of the powers at the so-called intersects will go directly to Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast on exit day, subject only to relatively few remaining—they emphasise that this will be temporary, though I shall return to that—to secure the UK single market until such time as that framework is put in place.
As has been acknowledged, that is a welcome step. It shows a lot of progress and, I think, a lot of good will towards seeking an agreement. However, it has clearly not yet been sufficient to allow the Scottish and Welsh Governments to recommend the Legislative Consent Motions to their respective Parliament and Assembly. Indeed, the letter from the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales to the Lord Speaker that was circulated to all Members of your Lordships’ House says:
“In being asked to give legislative consent to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill on this basis”—
that is, on the basis of the new amendments—
“the devolved legislatures would be being asked to agree to the creation of this power with no certainty about where frameworks will be established, how these will work, how they will be governed and how we will go from temporary restrictions to longer term solutions”.
It is also arguable that the amendments do not do precisely what the Government claim they are seeking to do. The Government have said—indeed, the Minister has said today—that the intention is that the vast majority of powers identified at the intersects will go directly to the devolved institutions. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, rightly said that that is the proper thing to do. However, if one looks at the amendments before us, while much has been said about a figure of 24, one sees that there is nothing in the Bill that restricts it to 24. Technically, and I think this was a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, all 158 could be subject to this freeze and this restriction. They could all be subject to regulations made under the powers in the revised Clause 11 and there would be no provision for consent from the Scottish or Welsh Ministers, let alone from the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly.
It would help considerably if, in the body of legislation, it was made clear in some way which powers would go directly, or if there was a schedule concerning which powers would be the subject of framework agreements. I do not doubt for one minute that there will be some negotiation about what should be in frameworks and what should or should not be a UK framework. That is perfectly proper for negotiation. I welcome what the Minister said earlier: agriculture is set out as a broad heading but he accepts that agriculture has to be subdivided and not all aspects of it would be the subject of frameworks. Indeed, it is worth noting that NFU Scotland identifies in a briefing paper animal welfare and traceability, public health, pesticides, regulation and food labelling as examples of overarching areas of regulation that would be best suited to being managed on a commonly agreed framework basis. There is lots of scope for talking to stakeholders about what the framework should be, but it would be very helpful if that could be in the Bill.
I do not underestimate for one moment that there will be work to do, but we should perhaps reflect that it will be at least four weeks until we come to deal with these issues on Report. It is worth reminding ourselves that the House of Commons Select Committee on Scottish Affairs recommended back in November that there should be clarity on this before the Bill reached Third Reading in the House of Commons. I do not take away from the work that has been done by officials, but if there is a will to get there, I am sure it could be done.
One other reflection on this point is that earlier today, in response to an intervention from me, the noble and learned Lord said that, given that we are now to have a transition period, we will have to accommodate that transition period in future legislation, a withdrawal and implementation Bill, so we may not need these frameworks until 31 December 2020 or 1 January 2021, which provides further time to sort out what should be in later legislation. But I would rather strike while the iron is hot and seek what can be done in this Bill.
It has also been said that these measures are temporary. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster went out of his way to emphasise that in the letter that he sent to all Peers. The Government have, to their credit, included several extra provisions to buttress their position that they should be temporary by reporting requirements, and these are all welcome, but, unlike some other parts of the Bill, there is no sunset clause. That is why, in Amendment 312, which was tabled before the new amendments, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and I recommended that there should be a sunset on the whole power after two years and, in Amendment 302BA, I suggest that any regulations brought forward under the new powers should themselves lapse after two years. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, said that it should be five years. We could have a debate about that but, again, the principle is trying to build confidence to get an agreement between the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the UK Government, and to have a sunset clause would go a considerable way to help that.
As we have heard in the previous three contributions, there could be dispute about the frameworks. Our Amendment 318 would put the Joint Ministerial Committee on European negotiations on a statutory footing. In October 2016, to much fanfare, we were told that this new committee had been set up,
“to ensure that the interests of all parts of the United Kingdom are protected and advanced, and to develop a UK approach and objectives for the forthcoming negotiations”.
That has probably been more honoured in the breach than it has in practice. We know that in recent weeks there have been more concerted efforts in the committee to try to gain agreement on what we are discussing tonight, but there might be a lot of advantage in putting it on a statutory basis so that there could not be any backsliding on when it meets, as has happened before.
I welcome the initiative taken by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and the amendments proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, because they constructively try to address how we resolve some of the difficulties. There clearly are difficulties and differences, and we must try to start thinking outside the box and creatively. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, picks up very well one difficulty: the United Kingdom Parliament is also the Parliament for England—England does not have a separate legislature, as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do.
I was reminded of my colleague Mr Ross Finnie, Minister for the Environment and Rural Development in the first Scottish Administration. His experience of meeting counterparts from Wales, Northern Ireland and Defra was that some Secretaries of State saw their role as to be the UK chair of the meetings, with the English Minister of State arguing England’s case, whereas other Secretaries of State could not see the difference between an English position and a UK position. He said that, clearly, they made far more progress when they had a Secretary of State who saw him or herself as holding the ring as the UK Minister with an English Minister of State arguing the English position.
We must recognise that, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said, it is asymmetrical.
I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. He referred to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, who said in his speech that he hoped that one day there would be a federal constitution and, I think, implied that the noble and learned Lord supports the same idea. There are other Members, including Cross-Benchers, who feel that that is a very good idea.
The tragedy is that with the constant muddle we have, with our inability to have other than fairly chaotic governance for various reasons, including the lack of a written constitution—which most people would not agree with, of course, but I think is a growing field of thought—how does one get that without first having a constitutional convention to launch it, and how on earth would you get agreement on a constitutional convention in Britain?
There are lots of questions there from the noble Lord, Lord Dykes. First, as a member of a party that has supported some form of federal United Kingdom since the days of Asquith, I have no difficulty in saying that I believe in federalism. Equally, I do not diminish the difficulties and challenges in getting there. I rather suspect that, with what we have at the moment, we do not have time for a constitutional convention. That is why, as with so many other aspects of our constitution, we must move incrementally.
A lot of this has hinged on consent. Interestingly, the report from your Lordships’ European Union Committee on Brexit and devolution states:
“Any durable solution will need the consent of all the nations of the United Kingdom, and of their elected representatives … A successful settlement cannot be imposed by the UK Government: it must be developed in partnership with the devolved Governments”.
The Scottish Affairs Committee also referred to the fact that it would require the consent of the devolved Administrations.
On the issue of legislative consent Motions, as the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland knows, there is concern that frozen areas of EU retained law might well be seen to be beyond the legislative or executive competence of the devolved institutions, and therefore no legislative consent Motion would be required, at least under the enunciation formulated by Lord Sewel in the Scotland Act. I accept that devolution guidance note 10 could kick in. I think that the Minister said something to the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, in a previous debate, but it would be very helpful if he could clarify that, in the event of subsequent primary legislation in pursuance of the common UK framework, legislative consent Motions would indeed be expected.
Finally, we are moving into uncharted waters. Arguably, if we had not been in the European Union in 1998, the Scotland Act would have been constructed differently. The single market of the United Kingdom, which I certainly value and numerous other Members of your Lordships’ House have said they value, has been maintained since 1999 by the single market of the European Union. We are now into new territory with, for example, trade agreements. Negotiating international agreements is a function of the United Kingdom Government, but the detail of these trade agreements could well impact on devolved competences. How will that be accommodated? Canada, for example, when it negotiated its agreement with the European Union, had representatives of the provinces and territories in the room at the table during those negotiations. It would be very welcome if the Government were to make a similar commitment. That, again, would be a confidence-building measure.
At a later date, we will no doubt have to consider how frameworks operate when we have them. I welcome the suggestion of the Welsh Government of a council of UK Ministers with qualified majority voting to operate the frameworks. That would take us much further down the road towards federalism. In the meantime, the challenge is to find workable arrangements in the interim.
We do not really have a concept of shared competence. Perhaps that is something that we should work up. It was something which we discussed in the Calman commission back in 2008-09. It did not have much traction then, but we are in a new situation.
There is also the question of consent and trust. It has been said that constitutional propriety does not really allow for anything like consent. Those of us who argue for a written constitution are often told of the benefits of having a flexible, unwritten constitution. We are in a new situation. The Government responded to the campaign for English votes for English laws by bringing out a new device which, arguably, undermined the sovereignty of Parliament, because the House of Commons and the House of Lords can vote for an amendment, but if English MPs, a subset of one House of Parliament, say no, it does not become law. That is a move away from the sovereignty of Parliament.
Those who were in the Chamber earlier today heard my noble friend Lord Alderdice talk about the Good Friday agreement. He talked about the need to be adventurous and creative and suggested that if that process had involved some of what we have been hearing in the EU debate—people not willing even to entertain the idea of any differences or of how you work with sovereignty—we would never have had the Good Friday agreement. I would encourage the Government to be adventurous and creative; to be willing to think outside the box; to be willing to compromise; and to be willing to seek pragmatic solutions, even at the expense of 100% constitutional purity. What we are discussing, at the end of the day, is not about institutions. It is about people, businesses and the certainty they want in the law and their rights when we move out of the European Union. We should keep that firmly in our minds. In that spirit, I hope that the Government can come to successful negotiation with the devolved Administrations and that, by the time we come to Report, we can have amendments that we can all support.
I completely agree with my noble friend; he spelled it out very clearly.
At the same time, this approach would provide transparency about the areas in which devolved competence would be affected, which is sadly lacking in the approach embodied, until now at least, in the Government’s amendments. It would also enable the Scottish Parliament and the Assembly to agree to the list of retained powers—reinforcing my noble friend’s point—through the very act of providing legislative consent to the Bill. Such an approach would thus reassure the devolved institutions that the regulation-making power proposed by the Government could not be used to specify areas of retained EU law not requiring frameworks. That is a very important point.
If the schedule idea is potentially a magic bullet, why might the Government resist it? I am informed that the first argument is that it cannot be done in time for Report. I am not sure that I buy this argument; Report does not take place until well after Easter, which is many weeks away. We are told that significant work has been done on potential framework areas and the list published recently by the Government—though not agreed with the devolved Administrations, I understand—comes fairly close to defining legally which current EU law restrictions may need to be continued while frameworks are negotiated. Surely if the Government need to specify these areas in regulations, they will need to do so sooner rather than later in any event.
Perhaps I may reinforce what the noble Lord said. He said that Report stage was still some time away. I am sure that it would be possible for the Government, if the will was there, to put down a marker at that stage and, if it needed another two weeks, to come back at Third Reading and fill in the gaps. I support him in saying that in those areas where they want a UK framework a schedule could be a constructive way forward and give reassurances.
I welcome what the noble and learned Lord has said. If it really is not possible to work up such a schedule before Report—for the reasons that he has explained, I do not see why it should be the case—might not the Government find another legislative opportunity to do so? We know that in the autumn we are likely to have to consider a withdrawal agreement implementation Bill. That might provide an opportunity, although it would be better to do it in this Bill.
The second objection that the Government might make is the need to account for unforeseen circumstances. Since Brexit appears to be a process where every stone turned over reveals yet another problem lurking beneath it, there is some validity to this argument. But if, exceptionally, a new area where a framework is required is identified even after the passage of this Bill with the proposed schedule, there is an easy solution that is wholly consistent with the approach to devolution adopted to date—namely, a power to amend the schedule by Order in Council with the express agreement of Parliament and those devolved legislatures affected. That could be included in the Bill as well.
In reality, if the Government resist this proposal, we would be right to suspect that they have an ulterior motive in wishing to press ahead with such a wide regulation-making power as that encapsulated in the current amendment, although I accept that it is about to be withdrawn. I commend to the Government the idea of putting in the Bill a list of areas agreed with the devolved Administrations—I stress, agreed—where the constraint on devolved competence will apply and ask them to consider bringing forward an amendment that does that at Report stage.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I deeply regret and resent the fact that we are having to discuss this and waste the House’s time. We had an opportunity at the beginning of the day to make an unequivocal declaration that we would grant these rights to EU citizens. We voted in that sense, a number of us spoke in that sense and we had a large majority in that sense. Yet here we are, arguing. Frankly, I agree that the amendment is necessary, but we are now arguing unnecessarily about something we could have taken the moral high ground over and dealt with immediately after we had activated Article 50. It is indicative of the mess into which we have got ourselves, and we are taking up so much parliamentary time that should be devoted to other things. I bitterly resent it and wanted to get that on the record.
My Lords, as someone who is a co-signatory of the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, I support what he said and also endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said. This should be a no-brainer.
The United Kingdom Government have agreed with the European Union; the terms of that agreement were set out in paragraph 38 of the document of 8 December 2017, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, has spoken them into the record. If one goes back to paragraph 33 of the same document, it is interesting to read that:
“It is of paramount importance to both Parties to give as much certainty as possible to UK citizens living in the EU and EU citizens living in the UK about their future rights. The Parties have therefore reached agreement on the following specific set of arrangements to implement and enforce the citizens’ rights Part of the agreement”.
Admittedly, a later paragraph suggests that the bestowing of or guarantee of rights will come in the withdrawal agreement implementation Bill, but if one reads the paragraph on the consistent interpretation of citizens’ rights, one will see that there is no such commitment there with regard to a future Bill. It would not be right for this Parliament to pass a Bill which cuts off recourse to the Court of Justice of the European Union when we have already agreed that that avenue should be open in this specific case of ensuring consistency in determining the rights of EU citizens living in the United Kingdom and UK citizens living in the European Union.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that if at the end of the day there is no agreement and we go crashing out, surely he is not suggesting that we would not honour our commitment. We have made that commitment to European Union citizens living in the United Kingdom and United Kingdom citizens living in the European Union. It must send some very alarming signs to UK citizens living abroad if it is suggested that, should we go crashing out, nothing will be done to establish or secure the rights of those citizens—
Did the noble and learned Lord notice that in the Prime Minister’s Statement on Monday, she specifically mentioned that the United Kingdom might seek to achieve associate membership of certain European agencies? She said that,
“the UK would also have to respect the remit of the ECJ in that regard”.—[Official Report, Commons, 05/3/18; col. 26.]
Now that the Government themselves have recognised that there will be a continuing role for the European Court of Justice, is this not an absolutely appropriate further role that it should play?
It is not only appropriate as a further role but one we have already agreed to. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, on many occasions noble Lords from all sides of the House have spoken about securing the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom and UK citizens in the European Union. This amendment fleshes that out and it would be wrong to pass a Bill which denied something we have already agreed.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Foulkes and I will speak to Amendment 54, which stands in my name. I will not detain noble Lords for long because much of what I intended to say has already been said and covered. Agreement on the wording of this amendment has been expressed by various Benches in this House, so this is not simply a one-sided argument. It seems to me that this country’s reputation globally will simply go down the Suwannee if we are prepared, at one moment, to say that we agree to certain protections for people who have become embroiled in this dreadful situation in which we find ourselves and then, a moment later, decide that, no, we do not agree with that and will not give those protections. What will people think of us as a nation if that is how the leadership of this country behaves?
My amendment would extend the requirement for certain persons to be able to refer their legal matters back to the European Court of Justice to a period of eight years. I trust that noble Lords will understand the need for such an extension. There is a statute of limitations existing for six years; if we do not include a period of coverage, people whose claims may well start quite late after the leaving date may well find themselves without that coverage, which I hope will be agreed.
My Lords, I would like to intervene, following what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has said, and referring to the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. One of the problems I have faced since looking at this Bill, is trying to find hard examples of situations in which the Supreme Court would wish to refer a matter to the European Court of Justice.
There is a very good example reported in Monday’s Times of a case called SM (Algeria) (Appellant) v Entry Clearance Officer. I will take a moment to explain what the case is about, because it is a good example of citizens’ rights. SM was a little girl, who was placed into the legal guardianship of EU citizens, who happened to be in Algeria. The question concerned her position in coming to the United Kingdom as a member of that family under the Immigration (European Economic Area Regulations) 2006. Merely referring to those regulations reminds us that they would become, as I understand the position, retained EU law under Clause 2 of the Bill.
The problem arose because the court saw that the regulation had been transposing wording from a directive, which is the normal way in which these things work, but the transposition was inaccurate. This is a situation I have encountered before—it happens from time to time. The question is how to deal with the inaccuracy. The inaccuracy was that while our regulation talked about “family member”—somebody who was put into the legal guardianship of a couple, would normally be regarded as a member of the family—the directive was talking about “direct descendants”, and she was not a direct descendant, because she was not actually related, in that sense, to the people who had become her guardians. In order to resolve that problem, the court found it necessary to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice—which it did on Monday. That was under the existing position.
In resolving the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, it may help to ask how that matter would be handled after exit day. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that it would be for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue itself. The directive would come into EU retained law under Clause 3, so we would have both pieces of legislation to look at. I think that the court, having regard particularly to the way in which we had translated the directive, would give great weight to our own language and regard this little girl as part of the family and therefore entitled to take the benefit of the regulation.
In explaining the situation, I hope I have not made it too complicated, but it is a good example of citizens’ rights, accorded by our own regulations, giving effect to EU law. There must be very many in the corpus of regulations which forms part of EU law. It comes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Supreme Court looks very carefully at the interests of children and would accord every weight to the normal rules about the priority given to the interests of the child in construing the regulation in a sense that fits with our own language. I should have thought that, after exit day, the question of referring the matter to the European Court of Justice simply would not arise because the court would be capable of resolving the issue itself without being bound by the problem of having to refer something which was not that clear. If I may use the English expression, it was not crystal clear; therefore they were bound to refer. Under the situation after exit day, any superior court will be fully able to resolve the problems of interpretation that arise. Will the Minister confirm that, in this situation, there would be no need for a reference because our courts would be able to deal with it perfectly properly, looking at the language of our own regulations, despite the problem that might have arisen in translating them from the directive into English?
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, in moving this amendment— I referred to it myself—was that, as part of the agreement that was struck between the United Kingdom and the European institutions in December, provision was made to,
“establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it”.
So it is not a case of questioning the ability of the Supreme Court. We have entered into an agreement which says that there must be an opportunity or a mechanism to refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union. How does the noble and learned Lord see the mechanism for giving effect to what the United Kingdom Government have agreed?
I have listened with great care to what the noble and learned Lord has said but I cannot look into the future. I do not know what is going to happen as a result. We just have to look at the present situation. There are two factors to bear in mind. As far as the UK is concerned, for people looking to come here, an immense amount of citizens’ rights are guaranteed already under the regulations which implement directives. We ought not to lose sight of that. Secondly, problems of interpretation because of conflicts between the wording of the directive and our transposition of it, give rise to some doubt. Under the existing position, there is an obligation to refer which will not be present after exit day. This is a different situation with which I believe our courts will be able to cope perfectly well.
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect to the noble Baroness, businesses affect individuals, so it is not appropriate to try to draw a distinction between citizens’ rights and businesses in that context. The right to work involves the right to maintain a business in various countries; you cannot simply draw them apart in that way. As regards regards timing, of course we are concerned to ensure that we achieve a withdrawal agreement sooner rather than later. That is why these negotiations are under way. If perchance no agreement is achieved—and I am not aware of anyone who wishes this, although others will perhaps assert the contrary—we will have to look at how we then deal with matters in the absence of that international agreement.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I hear what he is saying about the duality principle. Can he conceive of any circumstances in which the consensus reached between the United Kingdom and the European Union on the way in which we should treat EU citizens in the United Kingdom and United Kingdom citizens in the EU would not be taken forward or would fall apart? Can he see any circumstances where that might happen?
Lord Keen of Elie
At the present time, no, but we are only now undertaking the detailed negotiation of the withdrawal agreement. It may be, for example, that the situation of UK citizens in Europe will alter during the course of those negotiations. It may be that the European Parliament will take a different view on how the rights and interests of those UK citizens in Europe should be approached. The noble and learned Lord will recall that, at an earlier stage, there were some suggestions that the rights of UK citizens in Europe would be limited to the member state in which they were resident at the time of exit. There are all sorts of possibilities and I am not going to indulge in an analysis of those possibilities—we are concerned with achieving certainty. We have achieved, by way of the joint report in December, an expression of joint opinion about where we are going, with regard not only to the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom but also to the rights of UK citizens in the EU. Of course we want to bring that in to the final withdrawal agreement, in order that we can then draw it down and implement it in domestic law.