Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 5) Rules 2013 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Wallace of Tankerness
Main Page: Lord Wallace of Tankerness (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Wallace of Tankerness's debates with the Attorney General
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords Chamber
That the rules laid before the House on 27 June be approved.
Relevant document: 7th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments
My Lords, I beg to move that the Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 5) Rules 2013 and the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) (Amendment) 2013 be approved. The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 5) Rules 2013 amend the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 to make provision for closed material procedures in civil proceedings in England and Wales pursuant to the provisions of Part 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013. The Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) (Amendment) 2013 similarly amend the rules of the Court of Judicature to make provision for CMPs in civil proceedings in Northern Ireland brought in under the same Act.
I am sure that many of your Lordships present will be very familiar with the background to these rules: the provisions of Part 2 of the Justice and Security Act, which were debated thoroughly and considerably in your Lordships’ House, but perhaps I may set the context. Part 2 of the Act makes provision establishing a closed material proceedings regime for civil proceedings in the High Court, the Court of Appeal, the Court of Session, and the Supreme Court. CMPs allow national security-sensitive material which is held by a party and relevant to the proceedings to be taken into account through its disclosure to the court and a special advocate representing the interests of the other party. The other party cannot themselves see the material.
It is worth reiterating at the outset that CMPs will be available only in civil proceedings—cases where someone is suing or challenging the actions or decisions of the Government. They will not be available for inquests or for criminal trials and will not allow a person to be found guilty of a crime without knowing the evidence against him or her.
A CMP will be available in relation to any proceedings only if the court makes a declaration that the proceedings are ones in which it should be possible to apply to disclose material by way of a CMP. This can happen only if the court is satisfied not only that the material in question is relevant and that its disclosure would be damaging to the interests of national security but that it would be in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice for a CMP to be available in principle in those proceedings. In cases where the availability of CMP has been requested by the Secretary of State, the court must also be content that he or she has first considered a claim for public interest immunity in respect of the sensitive material in issue.
If those tests are met, the court may—but, equally, may not—grant a CMP declaration which establishes the principle that closed proceedings may be used in the relevant parts of the case where sensitive material would be in issue. Of course, a special advocate will already have been appointed to represent the interests of the other party. The party holding the sensitive material must then apply again for individual pieces of material to be held in closed proceedings and, in each instance, the judge must decide whether or not the disclosure of the material would damage national security. If not, it is heard in open proceedings; and, if it would and should be heard in closed proceedings, whether it may be summarised by a gist disclosed in open—that is, to all parties to the litigation.
Once that stage—known as pre-trial disclosure—is complete, the judge must review the original declaration to ensure that the tests are still met. If not, he must revoke the declaration. Indeed, the judge may revoke the declaration at any point if he or she considers that it is no longer in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice.
Turning to the specific rules, the rules before your Lordships’ House this evening insert a new Part 82 in respect of England and Wales into the Civil Procedure Rules and make consequential amendments and modifications.
Section I of Part 82 contains rules about the scope, interpretation and application of the part. Rule 82.2 modifies the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules for the purposes of Part 82 by placing a duty on the court to ensure that information is not disclosed where such disclosure would be damaging to the interests of national security and by requiring that the overriding objective be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with that duty.
The overriding objective continues to apply, so the court must still further the objective of dealing with the case justly, but it must also ensure in doing so that information is not disclosed where such disclosure would be damaging to the interests of national security. That, and the rest of Part 82, is, moreover, subject to Section 14(2) of the 2013 Act or in rules made by virtue of them is to be read as requiring the court to act in a manner inconsistent with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
A recent briefing published by Justice on the rules appears to suggest that new Rule 82 provides for the overriding objective and other provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules to be set aside. This is not the case. The overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules is still applicable, and is still the objective of,
“enabling the court to deal with cases justly”,
and, since the amendments made pursuant to Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations, “at proportionate cost”. The court is still enjoined to deal with cases justly, subject to new Rule 82.2. It is not enjoined to ensure non-disclosure at the expense of dealing with the case justly.
My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. As my noble friend Lord Phillips said just now, we are dealing with very sensitive issues, which, in the debates on the Bill during its passage, received considerable attention, not least because of the very fundamental issues of the administration of justice to which they give rise. I think my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames was fair in saying that these rules that we now have are a fair and proper reflection of the architecture and detail of the statute that was passed by Parliament. The fact that it is in the form it is owes in many respects a lot to the work of your Lordships’ House, which the Government had no alternative but to pay heed to after the amendments were passed. The legislation that is in place is the better for that.
A number of important issues were raised. I will try to respond to them but I am conscious that, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, I spoke without pausing to draw breath. He made a number of important points which I hope I will be able to capture. If I do not cover everything, I will certainly write to him and circulate it to all noble Lords who took part in the debate. I will also address the point he made about the various points in the Justice briefing, although he identified only one or two of those.
Not only was the statutory consultation followed with the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, but we sought also to allow an opportunity for your Lordships who had comments to feed those in, and for Members of the other place to do the same. I simply do not know whether the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission was engaged in this, or whether the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland consulted. Certainly, he was under no legal duty under the Act to do so. I can also say that the rules were being prepared as the Bill was going through and had to be very substantially changed in the light of the amendments that were passed. That was probably why they were not available at an earlier stage. Notwithstanding that, there was an opportunity for consultation, and, as my noble friend said, the rules we have are a proper reflection of what is in the Act.
Specifically, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Constitution Committee were not consulted. At this stage, when we are dealing with rules, the appropriate bodies of Parliament are the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and your Lordships’ Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Those are the appropriate committees to consider the court rules and, as I said, neither of them wished to draw any particular matter to the attention of the House.
In regard to the important point raised by the noble Lord in respect of Part 36 of the rules, Rule 36.14 provides for costs consequences for a claimant who fails to beat the defendant’s offer,
“unless it considers it unjust to do so”.
Therefore the court will, as set out in Rule 36.14(4), take into account all the circumstances of the case, including information available to the parties, and it is expected that the court will be very alert to any issues that might make it unjust to follow the normal rule where a CMP is involved.
It is also important to say that these rules are not set in stone. While the initial set of rules had to be submitted to Parliament for approval as a requirement of the Act in respect of Northern Ireland and England and Wales, any amendment to the rules will proceed by the normal course of amendment to Civil Procedure Rules. If, at a future date, there were to be a change in the rules as a result of representations, that might well be something that could be included in the annual report to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, referred.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked about further amendment; as I said, there is a procedure for that to happen. He asked what other forms of otherwise inadmissible evidence there might be. I recall that we went over this during some of our debates. He will find that the answer is in Section 6(4)(b), which says that,
“a party to the proceedings would be required to make such a disclosure were it not for one or more of the following”.
It may well be that if, for example, there had been,
“the possibility of a claim for public interest immunity in relation to the material”,
which could otherwise have excluded the material from closed material proceedings, that, of course, would not happen as a result of this. Therefore, that is another example, in addition to the obvious one he gave in terms of intercept material.
The noble Lord also asked about the database of closed judgments. The Government have sought to improve the database of closed judgments that is available to special advocates, and that work has been ongoing. I will come in a moment to the other important issues about judgments, which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned. Of course, the judge’s discretion is there throughout. Whenever the disclosure has happened under Section 8, the judge is then required under Section 7 to look again to see whether it is still in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice in these proceedings for the initial declaration for closed material proceedings to continue. Almost every step along the way, the interests of fair and effective administration of justice are brought into play.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the Bank Mellat case. What he said in many respects reflected what was said many times during the debate, not least by me. It was there from the very first Green Paper that the intention of the Government is that closed material proceedings should be used in just a very small number of cases. At the time when the Bill came before your Lordships’ House, in the 12 months from October 2011 to October 2012, the figure of 20 was talked about. I do not have an up-to-date figure, but I understand that it has not changed much. Some cases may settle and new cases come in, but that is roughly the order of the cases. It is certainly our view that these cases should arise only where we believe it is strictly necessary. I do not believe that there is anything in the rules that is contrary to the principles identified by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, as President of the Supreme Court. I have no doubt, too, that in considering applications for closed material proceedings, these will be drawn to the attention of whichever judge is dealing with it. I am sure that the special advocates involved will be very astute and keen to do so.
However, the important point is that these will be matters for the judiciary, and the judiciary has indicated in that case at the highest level that the threshold is quite a high one. I have no doubt that in the months and years ahead there will be litigation on provisions of this legislation when there will be an opportunity for judges to indicate—with specific reference to this legislation—how it should be interpreted. However, as I indicated, I do not believe there is anything in the rules which run contrary to the principles that have been identified.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, asked me about what might be in the review as opposed to just numbers. I will give him an indication. For example, if there were a change to the rules of the court—which would not come before your Lordships, it would come before Parliament—that might be reported. In terms of development there would be an indication from the Secretary of State as to how he sees this law working out in practice. Maybe not in the first year, but after one or two years when there is some experience of how it works. I certainly would not see anything wrong in having a bit of a narrative, which can perhaps be expanded, as is possible consistent with the information and national security. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, also asked me whether the Attorney-General was consulted with regard to the Bank Mellat case. I simply do not know and cannot remember being told. He and I know that there is some delicacy as to what you say the Law Officers have been asked; but his comments about the involvement of the Law Officer comes from a distinguished former Attorney-General, and therefore I will certainly ensure that his comments on this are drawn not only to the attention of my right honourable friend the Attorney-General but generally to those who are going to be involved in these cases.
The further point, which the noble Lord, Lord Bew, made, was with regard to special advocates. I have no detailed knowledge of this, but I have no reason to think that the vetting is any less now. Of course, special advocates in Northern Ireland are appointed by the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland, who is of course one and the same person as the Attorney-General for England and Wales, a position which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has previously held. Therefore, I think he can be assured that the scrutiny that is applied is done to the highest level. I hope that he has that reassurance.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised a number of points, and I hope that I have covered most of those raised in this debate. I believe that what we have here are rules that fairly and faithfully reflect the diligence of both Houses of Parliament in putting together a piece of legislation which we all recognise is hugely sensitive. In those circumstances, I commend them to the House.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I look forward to hearing further from him on some of the outstanding matters. He may well be right about Part 36 offers—well, of course, he must be right—and that the possible problem that might have existed in relation to costs of a Part 36 application is covered by Rule 36.14, as he says. But of course, that does not leave the party in any better position to assess whether to accept a Part 36 offer. There may not be a cost implication, but he is not in any position to assess the strength or otherwise of a Part 36 offer, which rather distinguishes it from the general case.
I am very grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate, especially to the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Bew, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, who broadly expressed support for the Motion. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, affects not to understand the reason or terms of the amendment. It is really fairly straightforward, I would have thought. The thrust of the argument that I sought to make, in which I was in various ways supported, is that we are seeing the transposition of a set of rules applicable to immigration cases under SIAC to ordinary civil procedure, as I said in opening the debate. That is the thrust of the first part of the amendment.
The second part of the amendment refers to the points made by the special advocates, to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, chose not to direct his mind at all. I cited a couple of their concerns, but there were others—and I shall quote them, as we are not holding up a debate on the Care Bill by so doing. For example, among the points that they make, they talked about the,
“inability effectively to challenge non-disclosure … The lack of any practical ability to call evidence … The lack of any formal rules of evidence, so allowing second or third hand hearsay to be admitted, or even more remote evidence; frequently with the primary source unattributed and unidentifiable, and invariably unavailable for their evidence to be tested, even in closed proceedings … A systemic problem with prejudicially late disclosure by the Government … the Government's approach of refusing to make such disclosure as is recognised would require to be given until being put to its election, and the practice of iterative disclosure … The increasing practice of serving redacted closed documents on the Special Advocates, and resisting requests by the SAs for production of documents to them … on the basis of the Government’s unilateral view of relevance”.
These were all matters that were raised, and none of them appears to have been dealt with—