Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That the Report be now received.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, before we consider the Report of the Bill, I should like to put a couple of points to the Minister. We are about to embark on a major constitutional reform at Report, but since we considered the Bill in Committee, a matter of considerable constitutional significance has taken place. That is to say, there was a referendum on the alternative vote system which, I am delighted to say, was overwhelmingly defeated by the British public—including, I might say, a 72 per cent no vote in Telford and a Labour-control gain from the Conservatives in Telford.

It is normal, if significant national events occur after Committee or between any stages of the Bill, that there be some reaction and, perhaps, amendments to the Bill. I see the Minister looking a little startled and, I am sure, thinking, “What is the significance of the referendum to this Bill?”.

I put it to him that there is considerable significance. Many of us on this side of the House spent a lot of time, when we debated the Bill that set up the referendum, arguing strongly that this was not an issue that the British public wanted put to them in a referendum, and that it was certainly not at the top of their list of priorities. I suggest that the read-across ought to be that the Government, rather than concentrating on constitutional Bills for which there seems to be very little public support, should concentrate on bread and butter issues.

The Deputy Prime Minister has repeatedly said that the three Bills that we will consider—the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, the constituency boundaries and referendum Bill, which we have already considered, and the Bill to reform the House of Lords—are part of the greatest reform package since 1832. Therefore, if one plank is shown to be fallible, one would assume that, even in the view of the Deputy Prime Minister, other parts would be as well. I do not know what the Minister's experience was when he canvassed, but after the canvassing that I did my judgment is that there is as little public support for, or interest in, the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill—and I predict the same for the Bill to abolish the House of Lords and replace it with a Senate—as the yes campaign garnered in the referendum.

I will put two questions to the Minister. First, what is the urgency to consider the Bill on Report, in particular as the Government have decided very wisely that a period of three months’ reflection is sensible between Committee and Report for the health Bill? That is a welcome development and—I think the Minister will agree—a clear precedent for doing a similar thing with this major constitutional Bill. Secondly, does the Minister, with his long political experience, have any grounds for thinking—perhaps I have missed something—that there is strong public demand for the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill and for the Bill to abolish the House of Lords in its present form? If he cannot answer those questions reasonably positively, it would make sense to have a period of reflection before we go on with constitutional Bills in which there is no public interest and for which there is no public support.

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[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, I have heard the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, my noble friend Lord Cormack and the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington. I am sorry to disappoint, but it is worth pointing out that this Bill was introduced in the other place on 22 July last year. It had its Second Reading in the other place on 13 September and was introduced in your Lordships’ House on 19 January this year. I do not think that, by any stretch of the imagination, it could be said that the Bill is being rushed through. There has been plenty of opportunity for scrutiny, and there will be further opportunity today and on a second day on Report in your Lordships’ House. This in no way diminishes the Government’s attention to the important issues facing this country—not least addressing the deficit that we inherited from the party opposite.

Report received.

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[Lord Blencathra]

My Lords, I rise, as far as it is necessary, to make a few observations on this Bill. I support the five-year term. I hope that your Lordships will not consider it impertinent of me to speak on this measure since I was not in the House when it was first debated. I have had an opportunity to read the Select Committee reports and so on, and I can only offer what is perhaps the doubtful benefit of 27 years’ experience in another place as an elected Member of Parliament. I went through six Parliaments in the other place, three Parliaments of four years and three of five years. I must say that, at the time, I did not feel that the five-year Parliaments were somehow depriving the British people of some fundamental human right or a great opportunity which they had missed because we had gone beyond four years.

Arguments have been made today that four is better than five. I do not accept that and see no great body of evidence for it. I accept that there is a considerable weight of opinion for it. Some of the opinion which has been given to your Lordships’ distinguished Select Committees is learned, some is notable and a lot of it is tremendously experienced, but it is still opinion. I would not say that it is firm evidence which this House is therefore bound to follow and pass judgment on.

Perhaps I may deal with a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. He pointed out that the evidence was that every time a Prime Minister went beyond four years, it was pretty awful. I would not entirely disagree with that, but it was not the fact that the Prime Minister went beyond a magic four-year trigger that made it awful. I was privileged, honoured and proud to serve in John Major’s Government right up until 1997, but the difficulties that the Prime Minister experienced did not materialise in 1996 because he had passed four years; they materialised after the ERM problems. From then on, it became difficult for the Prime Minister; indeed, it became a bit bloody for him. Moreover, he had a low majority. One has to look at the majorities that Prime Ministers have to determine whether their last year will be difficult. That may happen after two years, three years or four years.

Where Prime Ministers went to the polls after four years it was not because they wished to give the people a chance to make their Government accountable; it was not through some great constitutional issue of principle. In fact, they breached our 100-year, five-year norm because they thought there was a dashed good chance they would win, and good luck to them. Margaret Thatcher did that exceptionally well and so did Tony Blair. But let us not pretend that those four-year Parliaments came about as a result of some issue of principle or great conscience, or moral wish to give the British people more accountability. Therefore, I do not accept the argument that going beyond four years is somehow bad for the Government and nothing can be done. Considerable things were achieved towards the end of those five-year terms in office.

There has been discussion on whether the people want four or five years. I was for 27 years the Member of Parliament for Penrith and The Border, the largest constituency in England. I do not a recall a Dock and Duck there, but in The George, where I had regular surgeries, I would constantly meet constituents who, within weeks of an election, irrespective of who had won, would say to me that it was time to get rid of the Government, or that they wished they would continue for 20 years. I never met a single constituent who had a view on whether it should be a five-year term or a four-year term. All they wanted was that, in due course, at some point, not more than five years, they would have the chance to express their view and for it to be taken into account.

I hope that your Lordships do not consider it too impertinent of me to comment on a Bill where I was not here for the Second Reading nor able to participate in the early stages, but it was my experience in 27 years in the other place that five-year Parliaments were no less accountable to the people than four-year ones. I accept the point of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that if we move to fixed five-year terms, over a period of many years, the public will have slightly fewer general elections, but I submit once again that having an election every five years instead of every four years does not somehow remove accountability and give the British public less say in the Government whom they want. Therefore, I support the five-year term.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has been a very full debate with some thoughtful and challenging contributions and strong arguments on both sides. I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will not object if, in dealing with his amendment, I take account of Amendment 3, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, spoke. It gives a different perspective and a different choice.

The position taken by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is that if you are going to have four-year fixed-term Parliaments we should start with a four-year fixed-term Parliament, whereas the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, takes the view that this Parliament, elected for five years one year ago, should be allowed to complete its five-year term and thereafter move to four years. Clearly there is a distinction. The noble Lord, Lord Owen, gave a good explanation as to why five years for this Parliament is proper—the fact that very difficult decisions have to be taken. There is accountability, too, in being able to make a better judgment at the end of five years than might be possible at the end of four years.

As a Government we believe that it is not just five years for this Parliament but that there should be five years for subsequent Parliaments as well. In saying that, I was getting slightly confused with the arguments that I had to address. I understood, and I apologise if I got it wrong, that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said that the Government could have five years if they wanted and thereafter four. I may have misunderstood what he said.

[Lord Goldsmith]

That is the position under our present arrangements, which do not provide for a statutory term for Parliament other than the maximum term. If that is what the Government had wanted they could have had that without the fixed-term Bill. They could simply have said, “This is what we are going to do”. History and time would have told us whether that was actually what would happen. That is what I was saying.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I apologise. I misunderstood the noble and learned Lord. I thought that he was arguing for four years subsequently. But the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—as one of the three key reasons why he said it should be four and four—said that it would be wrong if the Government had one set of rules for the first Parliament and a different set of rules for the others. Of course the Government are not seeking to do that. We are seeking to be consistent with five years both for this Parliament and for subsequent Parliaments. Therefore, he cannot hold that argument against the Government.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords—

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I will just finish the point and then give way to the noble and learned Lord.

If the Government had come forward with a proposal for five years for this Parliament and four years thereafter, I can imagine the criticism that would, with some merit, have been directed at us.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

So if this House decided that it should be four years for subsequent Parliaments, the right course would be for the Government to say that it should be four years for this Parliament as well?

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I have made the point that it is not the Government who are proposing four years for subsequent Parliaments; we are proposing five years. I indicated that if we had proposed five years for this Parliament and four years subsequently, that would have been the subject of legitimate criticism. But that is not what we propose—we propose a consistency of five years. I will come on to argue why we believe that five years is right for subsequent Parliaments as well.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

I understand the noble and learned Lord’s point. However, as I tried to ask on previous occasions, does he take the point that a five-year term for this Parliament and this Government could have been achieved in a way that did not involve this Bill?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Clearly the Government could have continued for five years, but the point is that the Government are seeking to introduce the principle of fixed-term Parliaments. In wishing to introduce that principle, we believe that it should apply to this Parliament as well. It is not just the length of time; it also involves the trigger mechanisms for an election other than at the end of the five years. In terms of consistency, we are saying that what is right for the future—and we are self-evidently legislating for the future—is something that this Parliament should equally be obliged to have regard to and, indeed, to be bound by. I hope that I can make some progress.

[Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton]

My Lords, surely the point is that this Government could have determined and announced that they were going to last for five years. They could then have produced legislation for the future, were that their wish, on which there could have been pre-legislative scrutiny—which the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, believes, and I share his view, we would all have been the beneficiaries of. So why on earth are we doing this Bill now, dealing with the future?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The answer is the same as I gave a moment ago to the noble Baroness, Lady Jay—we believe there should be fixed-term Parliaments for the future and that this Parliament should be subject to the same rules, including of course the rules that would trigger an early election. Of course, there is no guarantee that either of the coalition parties will be in power after 2015 and that is why we reject the case that this is somehow our own self-interested political fix. We believe that this ought to be implemented for future Governments, including ones where we may not be in power. It was very interesting that when my noble friend Lord Rennard challenged the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, as to whether, when this Bill is enacted with the five years as proposed, a future Labour Government would amend it to four, he was not able to give a definitive answer that they would.

However, it must be recognised, too, that even under fixed terms, Parliaments come under pressure, both in their earlier and in their later years. We have had a number of speeches to that effect. At the beginning of the term, new Governments are understandably keen to start implementing their ideas, but there is increasingly a tension between that and the desire to allow more parliamentary scrutiny. If we go back to the 1970s and 1980s, there was very little pre-legislative scrutiny. We have come under some considerable criticism for not having had more pre-legislative scrutiny in our first year and it is inevitable that we are going to move to having more. If that is the case, it will limit the ability of the Government of the day to bring forward more legislation during the first year of their term of office.

Moving to the final year of a term of office, my noble friend Lord Renton of Mount Harry indicated that in his experience five years was right, given all the pressures that were on a Government, in order to get a legislative programme through. There are real advantages, therefore, to five years. I regret that what we have been asked to do in some respects with four years is to fit a quart into a pint pot, with a squeeze at both ends. At the other end of the term, the predictability of the election date may limit some of the hurly-burly of anticipation that up until now has inevitably attended the speculation as to when an election will be called. However, at Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, albeit opposing the principle of fixed-term Parliaments, made it clear that if there were to be a fixed-term Parliament, he thought that a four-year term would not leave enough room for sensible policy-making and a good parliamentary debate before a forthcoming election began to cast what he described as its distorting shadow.

The noble Lord’s concern was that if we had a four-year term, it would start to disrupt the parliamentary business as we approach the end of three years. The noble Lord, Lord Butler—who is in his place, and I hope I am not misrepresenting him—has also expressed strong reservations about the principle of fixed terms, and indicated that his experience also lends him to the view that five years would be more effective than four. That experience was shared by my noble friend Lady Stowell, when she was in government as an official.

Clearly, if we have four years, it shrinks the time available to Governments to deliver their programme; especially if we are going to have even more pre-legislative scrutiny. Some of the arguments against five years insist that precedent in our own system favours a four-year term. In fact, if we exclude the elections since the war that took place after less than two years, the average, I think, is between four and a quarter and four and a half years. The fact of the matter is that elections that are called at the end of four years are often examples of the Prime Minister of the day seeking to give his or her party a political advantage. It was not that they thought four years was the appropriate length of time, or that the term had come to its natural break, but that it was a judgment for them—as my noble friend Lord Dobbs indicated—as to when they thought they could win. If they thought they could, that was when they went. Indeed, on the second day in Committee, my noble friend Lord Dobbs said:

“I am afraid that these decisions have nothing to do with the astrological significance of the figures four or five. It has simply been a matter of self-preservation”.—[Official Report, 21/3/11; col. 495.]

I think that when an election has been held after four years, it has been because it has been more electorally convenient for the party in power than for any great reasons of measuring accountability or suiting the political biorhythm—a view that I think is shared by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. In holding up this practice as a standard for fixed terms, the advocates of four years are arguing strongly for the very enemy that the Bill is seeking to combat—that of political expediency triumphing over the national interest, with parties holding an election after four years when they see it as expedient to do so. We are trying to take that power out of the hands of the Prime Minister and give it to Parliament. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, said at Second Reading, for that reason this is a “collector’s item” of a Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Morgan, clearly wishes to intervene.

[Lord Morgan]

Is that not a totally false distinction? Do not a Government necessarily equate their party interest with the national interest? Is that not precisely what the Liberal Democrats have done by serving in this Government?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am not sure that last Thursday would necessarily have been thought to be in my party’s interest. I shall not rehearse all the arguments for the coalition but we heard the comments of my noble friend Lord Dobbs, who has been there when some of these decisions have been taken. As he indicated, the question has been: can we win? No doubt all parties think that they are right for the country but clearly the decision is taken for partisan reasons—when they think they can win. If one looks at 1983 and 1987, it is interesting that Mrs Thatcher, as she then was, did not hold an election exactly after four years—or at least she did in 1987—but she made the decision in 1983 after the local election results had come through. If I recall correctly, that was when I was first elected. The Dissolution took place the week after the local government election results in the first week in May, when she quite clearly saw that that would be to her party’s advantage.

It is also suggested that Parliaments that have gone to five years have been destabilising—I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, used the expression “an awful fifth year”—but in many respects the term has been self-selecting, as my noble friend Lord Blencathra indicated. There have been fifth years under Governments who did not have the confidence to go to the country after four years because they did not think that they could win, having run out of steam and lost their way. No doubt they thought that if they carried on for a final year something might just turn up. That is not a very good argument for saying that five years would not work. I shall pay a passing compliment to the Government of whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, was a member. I suspect that if the Government elected in 1997 had gone into a fifth year, that year would still have been very purposeful. The noble and learned Lord shakes his head but I think that he may be doing a disservice to his party.

As my noble friend Lord Rennard pointed out, it is also interesting that when the Government gave the devolved Parliament in Scotland and the Assembly in Wales the opportunity to change their election date to avoid a clash with an election in 2015—the offer was to hold an election between the first Thursday in May 2014 and the first Thursday in May 2016—in each case they opted for a five-year term. They could have gone for four years and six months or three years and six months but they opted for five years, and that Motion was, I think, assented to by the leaders of all parties, including the Labour Party, in both the Parliament and the Assembly.

The question that has been raised, not least by the noble Lords, Lord Wills and Lord Pannick, is: how do we ensure accountability? Accountability can come in many ways. It is not just in parliamentary general elections that parties and politicians are accountable. My noble friend Lady Stowell talked about some of the ideas that came out in the Power inquiry to try to engage ordinary people in the political process. The point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Owen, in what I thought was a very thoughtful contribution, that five years is very often required for an assessment to be made of the effectiveness of a Government’s early policies and for people to make a proper and informed decision after there has been an opportunity for those policies to feed through.

[Lord Wills]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his espousal of these methods of public engagement. I, too, was pleased to hear that espousal from his noble friend Lady Stowell. Can he explain to the House why they have not taken advantage of one of these methods of public engagement to ask the public what they think about this measure?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, in the Constitution Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, asked my honourable friend Mr Mark Harper about opinion polls which showed public support for establishing fixed terms. These are not old opinion polls: the Populus survey conducted for the Times, published on 30 May 2009, found that 74 per cent of those surveyed supported the establishment of fixed terms; a poll conducted by ICM Research for the Sunday Telegraph, published on 26 May 2010, found that 63 per cent of those surveyed supported the establishment of fixed terms; and a survey by the Scottish Youth Parliament conducted in August 2010 found that 76.4 per cent of the young people surveyed were in favour of establishing a fixed term for the United Kingdom Parliament. I accept that the question as to whether it should be four or five years was not put, but there was clearly in the surveys support for the principle of fixed-term Parliaments.

My noble friend Lord Dobbs talked about the opportunity for policies to mature and to be assessed. Therefore, there is an opportunity for accountability because the electorate can see what has been delivered, not only by this Government in the present Parliament, where it may take some time for the necessary remedial measures to work through, but by other Parliaments. It is possible for a Government coming into office at the beginning of five years to plan their legislative programme and the other things that do not require legislation, and at the end of which the public can make their decision and judgment on the effectiveness of the Government over those years. That will help accountability.

Practical issues were raised by a number of noble Lords, not least by my noble friends Lord Renton and Lord Blencathra. The questions of stability, practicality and allowing for accountability point to five years.

[Lord Bach]

Something is troubling me. If the noble and learned Lord has all these strong arguments against four years rather than five, why was it that his party went into the 2010 general election supporting a fixed-term Parliament of four years? What changed? When did the noble and learned Lord change his mind?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, if the House will bear with me, I shall find the quote from the Liberal Democrat manifesto of last year. It states:

“Introduce fixed-term parliaments to ensure that the Prime Minister of the day cannot change the date of the election to suit themselves”.

As my noble friend Lord Rennard indicated, there is not a reference to four years. However, in the past the party has supported—

[Lord Bach]

Is the noble and learned Lord really suggesting that the Liberal Democrat party was in favour of five-year fixed Parliaments at the time of the general election of 2010? We know about the Private Member’s Bill that was supported by many of those who are now prominent in Government. Liberal Democrat policy has always been four years. Why has it changed so suddenly?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

What the noble Lord claimed was in the Liberal Democrat manifesto was inaccurate. I am not shying away from the fact that four years had been Liberal Democrat policy, but everyone knows that you have to have negotiations if you want to get the outcome of a fixed-term Parliament, and that was the negotiation. I have listened to the argument and, heaven forfend, I am persuaded by it. The arguments that have been made for five years are very compelling indeed.

On the point made by my noble friend Lord Blencathra, although there has been a great deal of opinion in favour of four years, we have heard in today’s debate—and from the noble Lords, Lord Armstrong and Lord Butler, in Committee—that the evidence points in favour of five years. I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The Minister confirmed a moment ago—I am grateful to him—when he spoke about opinions that none of the three surveys asked the people what they thought about the precise length of term. Can he say why it is—he did not address this in his remarks—that the experts, I think without exception but certainly the vast bulk of them, who came to the Select Committee spoke in favour of four not five years, and none of them supported five? Why is that?

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am not here to speak on behalf of these experts. In my closing remarks, I picked up the point made by my noble friend Lord Blencathra that there has been a lot of opinion on this from people who have had experience, including former Cabinet Secretaries and Chief Whips as well as those in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly who favoured five years when given the opportunity to do so. Some of them have indicated that they would quite like five years to be put on a more permanent footing. The evidence suggests that they have had practice and five years is what they have concluded is probably the right period of time. So again I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[The Lord Speaker]

I have to inform the House that, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 3 to 7 inclusive by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, in the spirit in which the amendment was moved, I do not wish to detain the House. We have had a full debate about the arguments about four years and five, but I shall simply talk about how the Government would prefer the position to be determined with regard to this Parliament. I think that I indicated in my reply to the previous debate that if we are going to have fixed-term Parliaments, it makes sense if we oblige this Parliament to move into the same rules as those governing what will happen in future Parliaments. I understood the noble and learned Lord to say that he thought there was some merit in that consistency.

While I have no doubt that this Government will carry on in our measured fashion up to an election in May 2015, if something is not fixed at that date it is inevitable, as one knows only too well, that speculation can start running rife, and the measure not being in place would perhaps give more grounds for speculation. That would actually hinder the productivity of this Parliament in its latter years when there might be more focus on opinion polls than on the legislative programme, something that the Bill is intended to avoid. We would be far better knowing definitely when the next election would be—namely, the first Thursday in May 2015. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Persuasive an advocate though the noble and learned Lord is, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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[The Lord Speaker]

If this amendment is agreed, I cannot call Amendments 4 to 7, by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, this is what the noble and learned Lord, in earlier discussions, described as the “five-four-four” amendment. The Government are opposed to it for reasons that have been advanced and I do not propose to repeat. I am sure that it will be to the noble and learned Lord’s great disappointment that we cannot accept the amendment. If he wishes to test the opinion of the House, I should make it clear that we believe there should be consistency and that there should be a term of five years for this Parliament and for ensuing Parliaments.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

It is very difficult to answer that question, and I will not try.

This is an important opportunity for the Government to show their sincerity in relation to the way that constitutional legislation should be done and to accept the amendments. If they do not, I will support the movers of the amendment if they put it to the vote.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as we have heard, Amendments 4, 5 and 25, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Armstrong, provide that the Bill’s provisions would be subject to a sunset clause combined with a potential sunrise clause after the next general election. As my noble friend Lord Tyler said, these amendments are both interesting and seductive. It is also fair to say that they are somewhat complex.

I want to take a moment to set out what the amendments seem to be designed to achieve. They would enable the next parliamentary general election to be on the date set out in the Bill, namely 7 May 2015. After this parliamentary election, however, the apparatus in the Bill—the date of general elections after the 2015 election; the process for calling early elections, and it is important to remember that there is a process for calling early elections which has sometimes been overlooked; and the consequential matters in the Bill—would all cease to apply unless revived. It could be revived by a resolution of each House of Parliament—a sunset clause combined with a sunrise clause. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, gave an accurate and factual answer to the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, when he said that that resolution could take place at any time. It could add to the uncertainty, and I do not think that that is a particularly happy arrangement.

In bringing forward this Bill the Government sought to put in place a provision that we hoped would become part of our constitutional arrangement—fixed terms for the United Kingdom Parliament, just as there are fixed terms for local government, for the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies and for the European Parliament. Two of the Bill’s key provisions are: to deny the Executive the ability to choose a date for a general election to suit their own party political ends, and to deliver certainty about how long a Parliament should last. On Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, remarked on the importance of these provisions. I think that he also called them a collector’s item, not least because the Executive, and specifically the Prime Minister, were surrendering a long-held power.

If these amendments were accepted, the position would not be clear not only in the Parliament elected after May 2015 but, indeed, in subsequent ones. Again, the political parties would be able to choose whether Parliaments should have a fixed term, in which case all the arrangements would be in place, or whether to return to the default position of the Prime Minister of the day choosing at some stage during the five years, assuming the quinquennium was revived, when to hold an election. That would mean that in each Parliament the Government of the day could have the allegation levelled against them that they were in some way operating for a partisan advantage.

It has been suggested not just in this debate but in a number of debates that the whole purpose of the Bill is to make arrangements for this Parliament. However, it is clear that it is intended that the fixed-term Parliament should, as I said, become part of our constitutional arrangements. That is what the Labour Party said in its manifesto and my own party has argued that for some time. I thought I heard the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, say that that was still the Labour Party’s policy but I fear that supporting this amendment, as he does, puts that into question. It would allow the Government of the day elected after 2015 to decide, if they had a majority, whether to table the Motion or resolution to re-establish fixed-term Parliaments or whether to revert to the situation that existed prior to this Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

If we discovered that these provisions did not work well or reduced confidence in our constitution, would it not then be right not to prolong them?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, in spite of all the criticisms that the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House made of these proposals, it thought that the architecture of Clause 2 and the double triggers for Dissolution were suitable and appropriate. However, if it were felt that other mechanisms were required, clearly amending legislation could be brought forward, and later I shall say something about the importance of using legislation.

In establishing fixed-terms, we are providing that the Government and the Opposition have to face the electorate on a set day. As my noble friend Lady Stowell said on the first day in Committee,

“it would ensure that the Government and the Opposition had to face the electorate on a predetermined date, whatever the political conditions are at that time. That is the most compelling thing about fixed-term Parliaments”.—[Official Report, 15/3/11; col. 223.]

If this amendment were passed, we would allow the situation to revert to the status quo and, as a number of my noble friends have indicated, it would mean that the fixed term would apply only to this Parliament. When this Parliament established fixed terms for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, a sunset clause was never suggested, and indeed no one in any of the devolved institutions has ever suggested that we should revisit the idea of fixed-term Parliaments. No one is suggesting that Mr Alex Salmond should be able to choose to call an election to suit the best interests of the SNP some time over the next five years. I accept all the caveats that it is not possible to make a complete comparison between this Parliament and the devolved institutions; nevertheless, fixed-term Parliaments for legislatures have worked and no one is suggesting that that should change.

A fixed-term Parliament will deliver certainty. We debated earlier whether better planning is achieved over four or five years, but we believe that a fixed term will facilitate better planning across government. The nation will no longer be left on tenterhooks or have to deal with wild speculation about whether the Prime Minister will go to the country or how the opinion polls are going. In introducing his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, talked about Prime Ministers agonising over the decision, and sometimes they got it wrong. Harold Wilson arguably got it wrong when he called an election in June 1970. However, let us not kid ourselves: the agony is over whether it is going to be in the best interests of their party. As my noble friend Lord Dobbs has said on more than one occasion during our debates, the key question is, “Can we win?”. It is not unreasonable for a political party to want to win but that is not necessarily the same thing as national advantage. In his book, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical, my noble friend Lord Lawson said about the then Prime Minister, now the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher:

“Her view was that a Government should always wait until the final year of the quinquennium, but once there should go as soon as it is confident it will win”.

Noble Lords may say that that is stating the obvious but that is what the Bill tries to change. There will be a fixed term and it will not be possible for the Prime Minister of the day to choose the moment that will be to the party’s partisan advantage.

I should be interested to know how the proposers of the amendment would react if the change were made by repealing legislation rather than having an affirmative order. How would they react if a Minister came to the Dispatch Box of your Lordships’ House and argued that the Government wanted to return to the Prime Minister of the day being able to make a decision to suit his party interest rather than sticking with fixed terms? Perhaps in his reply the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will tell us how he expects all this to work. The schedule of consequential amendments contains quite important and weighty matters—for example, the repeal of the Septennial Act, changes to the Regency Act 1937 and provisions relating to the demise of the Crown. Does he see those being revived, having been repealed? He will know that there are provisions in the Interpretation Act concerning the revival of an Act that has been repealed. However, I think that there is some uncertainty about whether these would be revived.

The other point that has been made is that not much has changed from the present situation, in which a Government have come to power and introduced a maximum fixed five-year term. I do not think it is fair to say that that is analogous to the situation that would be in place after 2015. The present system is uncertain for the voter and we think that that uncertainty should be removed by introducing fixed terms. However, these amendments would add an entirely new layer of uncertainty for voters. Not only would they not know, when voting, when a subsequent general election might be but they would not even know the legal system under which the next Parliament would operate and how the next general election date would be chosen. I do not believe that that is fair or sensible for the electorate.

It has also been pointed out that the Bill alters the apparatus for calling elections. The crucial difference is that the Government propose moving to fixed terms through an Act of Parliament subject to all the safeguards that that implies. We have heard much in this debate about the importance of our constitution. The noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, talked about the fact that we do not have a written constitution. However, if the constitution is changed, it is done through an Act of Parliament rather than through a special procedure, and people have cherished the idea of parliamentary sovereignty.

It is not the case that this Parliament, through this Bill, is trying to bind its successors. That point was made forcefully by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, but it was answered by my noble friends Lord Tyler and Lord Marks. We do not seek to entrench these provisions. We cannot bind a future Parliament. However, we can say that this important constitutional change has been brought into the law of our land through an Act of Parliament—by First Reading, Second Reading, Committee, Report and Third Reading in the House of Commons and by the procedures that we know in this House of First Reading, Second Reading, Committee, Report and Third Reading and by Her Majesty giving Royal Assent. That is how we change our constitution—by Act of Parliament.

Surely, if we were being true to our constitutional heritage, we would say that any change to that heritage should also be carried out through an Act of Parliament. It would have to have the same scrutiny as this Bill has clearly had and Ministers would, in the other place and this place, have to argue their case for making the change. I do not think that we can just sweep aside the concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Marks. With the exception of amendments to the Parliament Acts, with this amendment a resolution of the House of Commons could be overturned or at least thwarted by a resolution of this House. It is a unique situation and we should think long and hard before going down that route. If we do go down it, one can imagine the tensions there would be at some stage if the other House had voted for a fixed-term Parliament but this House decided it would not. I fully understand and associate myself with the concerns about our constitutional procedures and heritage, but we change the constitution by Act of Parliament and not by simple resolution. A very new venture is embodied in these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Can my noble and learned friend tell me whether he knows of any mechanism by which an Act of Parliament which has come into force can have its force suspended for a given period?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I cannot readily think of one off the top of my head. However, there are enough people in the Chamber and, if there is such a mechanism, I am sure that one of them will be able to tell us. My noble and learned friend, who has wide experience, might be able to think of one, but I cannot. However, the “sunsetted and sunrisen” approach is very novel.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My recollection is that we put sunrise or sunset clauses into a significant amount of the terrorist legislation, the result being that they would continue to have an effect only if there had been a resolution in both Houses of Parliament to carry on with them. I think that that is an answer to your Lordships’ question.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble and learned Lord is right. There is a difference between an Act lapsing and not being revivable and the situation under this provision where if it lapsed for the first Parliament because it was not passed in resolution, it could be revived for the second Parliament. In practice, however, the difference may not be that great.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I stand to be corrected, but as far as I am aware it is a novel approach. Not only could it lapse and be put in suspension; it could be revived, lapse again and be revived again. We are not switching on and off light bulbs. There are quite important issues here and I am not sure that these procedures are designed to give them proper weight. That is why we argue that primary legislation should be the way of dealing with the issue, if it is felt that the provisions for a fixed-term Parliament are not working and should not be the basis for the future.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this interesting debate and for the support that has been expressed on all sides of the House. My answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is that we are dealing with an exceptional Bill which is being brought forward by the coalition Government to deal with a particular short-term political problem. In the light of that, we should think very carefully before we embody on the statute book, as a permanent measure introducing permanent constitutional change, a measure which has at best a short-term political purpose.

I respect the views expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Marks, and by the Minister. I respect their views because they and the Liberal Democrats strongly believe in fixed-term Parliaments as a matter of principle. However, their difficulty is that large numbers of noble Lords on the government Benches do not agree with fixed-term Parliaments as a matter of principle. They are rightly concerned about the constitutional implications of such a measure, as so eloquently expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton and Lord Cormack, in this debate. They are particularly concerned about this matter in the absence of any public consultation on this issue, in the absence of any pre-legislative scrutiny and given the lack of any evidential basis for the new constitutional principles we are about to enact.

The inescapable reality is that the Government and large numbers of noble Lords on the government Benches are supporting the Bill not because they believe in the constitutional principle but because it is part of the coalition agreement, and it is part of the coalition agreement because of the political needs of this coalition Government to remain together for five years. I repeat: I do not deprecate that; it is a perfectly proper political position to adopt as a basis for legislation which applies to this Parliament. However, it is not an acceptable basis for general constitutional change, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, has pointed out.

The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, asked whether under the amendments a future Parliament could approve a resolution at any time during that Parliament. The answer is yes, and the reason the amendment is so drafted is that it would be inappropriate to limit the events and the circumstances that may occur during a future Parliament. It is quite possible that a coalition Government might be formed part of the way through a future Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the Minister were concerned about the Parliament Act, but of course a future Parliament could at any time enact primary legislation on this subject.

The Minister asked a fair question—all his questions were fair, of course, but he asked me to address this one in my reply—about how this will work in the future. My belief, my expectation, is that no future Government will want to apply the provisions in this Bill as they are unless there is another coalition Government with similar political demands to this one. I hope and expect that after the next general election, if there is a desire in principle for fixed-term Parliaments, the relevant responsible Government will bring forward new primary legislation that will be based upon proper consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny and in the light of experience.