European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued) & Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 16th January 2020 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 38 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, Clause 38 is purely declaratory: it has no effect whatsoever, except to appease the appetite of the hard ideologues on the Conservative right. The Select Committee on the Constitution notes explicitly that

“this Clause has no legal effect”.

Its opening phrase,

“It is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom is sovereign”,


is poorly drafted. It does not say who recognises it, or what effect that might conceivably have. It ought, at least, be an active declaration of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.

The model for such a declaration was, of course, the ultimate Henry VIII clause in the Statute in Restraint of Appeals 1532, which asserts that,

“this realm of England is an empire”.

It did not surprise me when I checked the date of that statute on Wikipedia to find an accompanying side reference to Sir John Redwood calling for the full restoration of our imperial sovereignty by excluding any appeals to any continental court. This clause is about the myths of English identity and history far more than about current practice.

The foreign appeals which the 1532 Act were restraining were to the Pope in Rome, rather than to any political institution. It has often struck me as odd and eccentric that several of the most ardent English nationalists and Brexiteers are right-wing Catholics, some of them converts, who regard the current Pope critically as tending towards a dangerous liberalism rather than the dogmatic orthodoxy that they prefer. They have nevertheless embraced an English doctrine which is rooted in our Protestant Reformation and its rejection of the universalism of the Catholic Church.

Since the 16th century, the doctrine of sovereignty has evolved a great deal and been the subject of a great deal of scholarship, some of which I had to teach when a university teacher. As Dutch, Danish, English and other lawyers have argued, national sovereignty is embedded in a framework of international law, which is necessary to enable trade and peaceful interchange among nation states. Under our system of parliamentary sovereignty, trade agreements and treaties have to be transposed into domestic law, but Parliament accepts that it cannot renegotiate what the Government have agreed and that international treaties therefore limit absolute parliamentary sovereignty. That is why it is inconsistent with any coherent doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty for a Government to neglect to carry Parliament with them as they negotiate major treaties which have significant implications for domestic law and domestic economic life.

International law and domestic law—as the Minister who is to answer knows extremely well—are closely intertwined. This Conservative Government, like their predecessors, stress the depth of their commitment to the legal, institutionalised international order. As the ideologues on the Conservative Benches rejected the constraints of European Union law, they will still be hemmed in by wider international commitments on human rights, standards, aviation safety, environmental law, shipping, data exchange and a great deal more.

Purists within the United States have gone further than English nationalists and argued that the perfection of the American constitution and the democracy it encapsulates must override the constraints of international law and treaties. Justice Antonin Scalia, appointed by President Reagan to the US Supreme Court, explicitly argued this exceptionalist view that international law could in no way override American law but, so far as I know, no right-wing English lawyer has gone quite so far yet.

The cry of the Vote Leave campaign was to re-establish parliamentary sovereignty by leaving the EU. Now that we are leaving, we hear a different tune, calling on Parliament to accept that it should not examine the process of government too closely. I listened this morning to the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, no doubt reading from his brief when he said that it is vital that we restore the traditional relationship between government and Parliament. I understand that to mean: that Parliament should accept that majority government has now returned; that it should accept what the Government propose without significant amendment, particularly in the second Chamber; and that the key principle of Britain’s unwritten constitution is that the Queen’s government must be carried on without let or hindrance. That is not easily compatible with parliamentary sovereignty.

This clause therefore declares a half-truth. The relationship between Parliament and government in reality remains contested. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, spoke yesterday of the importance of maintaining the separation of powers between Executive, Parliament and judiciary, but there is nothing here to suggest that the judiciary can in any way be a counterbalance to government. If I correctly understood what the Prime Minister implied in Prime Minister’s Questions yesterday, he thinks it improper for judges to play such a role.

Twice in the last week, we have probed the promise in the Government’s manifesto and the Queen’s Speech to establish within the next 12 months, as the manifesto said, a commission on the constitution, justice and democracy. We have gathered the impression from the incoherence of ministerial answers that the Government are unsure how far they wish to open up such underlying questions of our constitutional and democratic order. It may even be that some within the Government now regret that the commitment has been made, but the commitment to a constitutional commission has been made and these questions will have to be addressed.

This clause, however, with its very poor drafting and its failure to refer in way to the unavoidable influence of European law on the UK as we negotiate a close future relationship, as the political declaration makes clear, does not offer any useful contribution to that task or to providing clarity for our political, legal and constitutional debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to this part of the debate. I express some concern that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, wishes to concertina hard ideologues of the right, English nationalists and Brexiteers into one uniform group. That is regrettable shorthand and, indeed, the very fact that his party has adopted that sort of attitude towards the issue of our leaving the European Union might go some way to explaining why it returned after the general election with a total of 11 Members in the House of Commons. There are many, many people in the United Kingdom who are not English nationalists but voted to leave the European Union. There are many people in the United Kingdom who are not hard ideologues of the right who voted to leave the European Union.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I entirely accept that. I am merely talking about those who have written about this. I am talking, as my noble colleague on the Labour Front Bench suggested, about those who have been agitating for clauses such as this, who have been expounding—the Martin Howes of this world—and not, of course, the average voter, who has much a simpler collection of views on all this. We know that the vote came for many reasons, but for those who have written and spoken about the justification and the necessity for this, in overlapping groups, I think that the terms I used were justified. We are talking about a view of English exceptionalism, which perhaps even some Scots share—a view of English identity and our difference from the continent, which I do not share but which I was taught at university. I have learned a great deal about it and I dispute it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, even though the noble Lord may seek to narrow down the characterisation he advanced in his opening, I still do not accept it. It appears to me to go far too far in its assertion of who might be concerned to restate and recognise the sovereignty of our Parliament, and why. I will make two comments on his observations. He did not mention the duality principle, but he ought to bear it in mind because, of course, while the Executive may enter into obligations at the level of international law, they have no impact on domestic law unless and until they are brought into domestic law by this Parliament. So there is no question of parliamentary sovereignty being undermined in any sense by the ability of the Executive to enter into treaties, and to have and enjoy that treaty-making power. That is simply not correct.

On the noble Lord’s observations about the separation of powers and the position of the judiciary, I invite him to revisit, as am sure he has often done before, the work of Dicey on the constitution—I think the 1887 edition was the last one that Dicey himself edited—in which he makes very clear the position of the judiciary vis-à-vis the sovereignty of Parliament.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I have indeed read Dicey and I am conscious that his views on a number of issues were influenced by his growing opposition to home rule.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is well known that, latterly, Dicey developed views on home rule for Ireland that differed from what might be regarded as the mainstream at the time. Be that as it may, his works on the principles of the constitution stand the test of time and are worthy of being revisited by the noble Lord.

I shall deal shortly with the point advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about the scope of the present clause. The Sewel convention is not itself a matter of constitutional law; it is a political convention, as the Supreme Court made clear in the first Miller case. It is a political convention into which the courts would not intrude. Be that as it may, it has of course been restated in statutory form and therefore does not require repetition. Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016 and Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017 restated it expressly in statutory form. So it is there on the statute book and does not invite repetition. What is not contained in any of the devolved legislation, for obvious reasons, is a restatement and recognition of the fundamental principle of our constitutional arrangement, namely that Parliament is sovereign, and there is therefore a desire to see that made clear.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, suggested that there was some deficiency in the drafting of the clause, but I resist that suggestion. It says, in terms, that the principle of our constitutional arrangement—namely, parliamentary sovereignty—is recognised. It is universally recognised, and that is an appropriate way to express the position of our constitution. In other words, nothing in the Bill derogates from the sovereignty of Parliament, and this clause makes that clear.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It would not detract from the clause but it would be an unnecessary repetition. We do not normally put precisely the same provision into statutes two or three years apart. Here we have the provision with regard to the Sewel convention in Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016, and again in Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017. It is there. It is on the statute book; it exists. That is why there is no need for repetition.

As I say, leaving the European Union is a matter of some significance in the context of our constitutional arrangements, in particular, the repeal of the ECA. It is therefore appropriate in this context that there is an explicit recognition of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, as the Bill implements the withdrawal agreement so that we can leave the legal order that is the European Union, it is appropriate, when disentangling ourselves from those international obligations, that we ensure that there is no concern about the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. It is for Parliament, acting in its sovereign capacity, to give effect to the agreement in domestic law—that is the duality principle, and nothing in the Bill derogates from that principle as recognised by this clause. In these circumstances, I submit that it is entirely appropriate that this clause should stand part of the Bill, and I invite the noble Lord not to oppose it doing so.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, in that case, I find the phrase “unnecessary repetition” entirely appropriate to this clause as a description of what it is for. I referred to the duality principle; I remind the noble and learned Lord that the United States also has that principle, and that the view of the exceptional position of the American constitution and its relationship with international law means that, on occasion, the Senate turns down treaties that the United States has negotiated, sometimes to the extreme discomfort of the international legal order.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I think we are aware that it did not join the League of Nations.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

Not just the League of Nations—there was also withdrawal from the joint agreement with Iran, although that was an executive act.

I was saying that our Parliament, which is sovereign, is constrained by acceptance of the legal order. On the delicate relationship between Parliament and government over the negotiation of treaties, particularly trade treaties, we need to bear that in mind, because, as a Parliament, we have never rejected a treaty that a Government have negotiated. That is one reason why many of us are still pressing for that. I wish merely to mark that these issues need to be examined in more detail, that the Government have committed themselves to some sort of commission on the constitution, the judiciary and democracy, and that as we leave the European Union, it is entirely appropriate—indeed, necessary—that we re-examine some of these questions about which, as the noble and learned Lord and I have shown in our discussions, there is some contestation.

Clause 38 agreed.