Chilcot Inquiry

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Tuesday 11th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, for that extremely constructive and helpful speech, which took a number of themes which I, too, wish to cover.

Perhaps I, like others, should admit that I am not entirely a neutral observer in this. I was my party’s defence spokesman at the time, and I was involved in the development of what was then Liberal Democrat opposition to the war. Part of my reason for being so was that I had been a relatively frequent visitor to Washington both before and after 9/11. I met there people whom I had known when I was a graduate student in the United States in the early 1960s and who had become some of the leading neo-conservatives within the Administration. It was because of what I knew of some of their underlying assumptions and of my participation in two National Intelligence Council-sponsored conferences in Washington, one in the autumn of 2001 and one in the summer of 2002, that I concluded that the Bush Administration were determined to go to war with Iraq against the advice of some of their own intelligence analysts who knew the Middle East well.

Having said that, I should say that this is a very different inquiry from the Franks inquiry. It starts with the examination of the Government’s Iraq policy papers in 2000, before 9/11, and concludes with the withdrawal of British troops from Iraq 10 years later. It therefore covers a much longer period than the short period of the Franks report and deals with a coalition war in which we were only a secondary contender. Franks was concluded in six months, but evidence was taken in private; the report covered only the period before the conflict; it did not publish many of the documents. I again declare an interest: I was one of those who reviewed it very critically on publication because it seemed to me that it had distorted the actual situation. The intelligence community had indeed got it right. The only mistake that it had made was in thinking that the Argentinians would not be unwise enough to try to invade the Falklands before the winter; it thought that it would do it six months later.

I also looked back at the Dardanelles inquiry, and reference has been made to the situation after Suez. What we now have with the Chilcot inquiry is a very much more thorough examination in which we are talking about several thousand documents—I must correct the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan: they have not been declassified by being released to the Chilcot inquiry. This is an inquiry by privy counsellors; they have access to everything that they wish to see, including intelligence documents et cetera. The question at stake is not access; it is publication.

I am informed that, when we see the eventual publication, a great deal will be published that it has not been the custom of British Governments to publish before. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, when you get into the question of how far you publish Cabinet minutes that appeared less than 20 or 30 years ago, clearly, whatever happens, you will be seen to have been setting a number of precedents. Another question is how far you publish documents which relate to conversations with some of our closest allies, whether or not you have their permission. There are here some very large issues of national policy and national interest which we all have to consider.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

I quote here from the Prime Minister’s letter of 5 November in reply to the letter of the day before from Sir John Chilcot. He states:

“I am aware of the scale of the task declassification has presented to a number of Government departments, and it is good to have the acknowledgement of the work that has been done by the Cabinet Office and other departments to deal with the disclosure requests, involving several thousand documents, including many hundreds since the summer”.

That seems to me to say—I may be wrong and I apologise if I am—that thousands of documents have been declassified, but I will be corrected.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I would distinguish between access and publication. The delay is very much about working through thousands of documents, many of them very lengthy, and deciding how much can safely be declassified for publication—how much therefore can be published, how much some documents should be redacted in part and whether there are documents which it would be safer not to publish at all. That has taken a good deal longer than was hoped, but it is now well under way and is what we are currently considering.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Is it true that the request by the inquiry was only made last June?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

Sorry, which request?

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

The request to publish the documents set out in the letters.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I am not informed on that matter. I know that, last July, they hoped to be able to start the process of Maxwellisation within a few months. That has been delayed because what happens in a Maxwellisation process—here again I have to correct the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan—is that those who are mentioned in the report will be allowed to see in full those elements of the report which carry their evidence and will be published. So they will not see more; they will see what will be published.

This is not, incidentally, a court of law. In no sense is this a legal inquiry. It is not a matter, if I may quote the noble Lord, of people against whom there is a case; it is a matter of those who may see themselves as being criticised in the report being given time ahead of publication to prepare their response to the criticisms. So, if I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, this is not a roadblock. It is, however, an obstacle course, and that takes a good deal of time and discussion among different government departments, which I regret has taken longer than we hoped. I very much hope that it will be concluded soon. The Maxwellisation letters will then be able to go out and we will proceed at the normal stately but sure pace of government publications to a publication of the final report.

I also raise the role of the Cabinet Secretary because I know that he has been criticised quite substantially in the press. The Cabinet Secretary is entitled to see all the papers of previous Governments. In the final resort, as we all know, the Cabinet Secretary only advises and the Prime Minister can always override, but I am old-fashioned about civil servants. Senior civil servants are servants of the Crown as well as of the Government, and they advise in their perception of the long-term national interest. That is what the Cabinet Secretary is doing and I regret that there has been some rather partisan criticism in the press about his role, criticism which I think is unjustified.

The question was also raised as to whether the Butler report covered intelligence, so that we do not need to take it again. The Butler report covered intelligence leading up to the war. This inquiry, which takes us several years past the war, may well need to address one or two other questions. I should perhaps also mention the Gibson inquiry, which, as noble Lords will know, provided an interim report last December on some of the issues of rendition and alleged ill treatment of British nationals and others. A picture of various different dimensions will come into that.

This does, therefore, take a good deal of time to complete. It has not been helped, sadly, by the illness of one of the five members of the Chilcot inquiry, but the other four are well under way and I stress again that Gordon Brown’s promise at the beginning that:

“No British document and no British witness will be beyond the scope of the inquiry”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/6/09; col. 23.],

has been carried out for the inquiry. The question that therefore remains, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, rightly points out, is how much of this it is wise to publish. That is what has caused the delay and it is what we are currently working through.

So there are questions about how fast we can work towards this conclusion and there are, as the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, said, questions for the future. I disagree with those who have suggested that the report, when it comes out, will be simply a historical document gathering dust. I think that it will raise precisely the sorts of questions which the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, has suggested. What should be the conditions for future intervention? How much information should be shared with Parliament and with opposition parties in order to carry Parliament and the public with the Government? How should we handle the coalition aspects of interventions, given that it is highly unlikely that Britain will be involved in any serious military operations abroad in the future which are not in coalitions with others? There, I think, is where the debates will focus.

The Government are well aware of the sensitivity of these issues. I return to the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle. What is a reasonable time before we disclose conversations with our closest allies and what precedents do we set if we start to publish Cabinet minutes of the previous Government, when others give their advice in Cabinet and elsewhere on the basis of full confidentiality? These are serious questions with which the Government are currently struggling.

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, for raising this question. I assure the House that a large number of officials are working through those issues. The Chilcot inquiry and its four active members are still at work, and we very much hope to publish the final report within the foreseeable future. I will be pushing for that future to be as foreseeable as it can be.