Lord Wallace of Saltaire
Main Page: Lord Wallace of Saltaire (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)(13 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, perhaps I should start by responding to the request of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, to update the Committee as far as possible on where we are in consultation with the unions. As Members may know, the Government have been engaged in active consultation with the unions in parallel with the progress of the Bill, following the clear signal given on Second Reading and in Committee in the other place that there was consensus on all sides in that House that the negotiations should proceed as rapidly as possible.
As noble Lords opposite are aware, the Council of Civil Service Unions was asked to advise the Government whether the Government’s proposals might form the basis of a wider agreement that the individual unions could then recommend to their respective members. In the event, the CCSU did not accept the proposals, but five of the unions—Prospect, the FDA, the POA, the GMB and Unite—then approached the Government directly and asked to continue discussions on the terms. There followed an intensive period of meetings between the five unions and officials that, on 5 October, resulted in an agreement being reached between the parties on terms that might form the basis of a new compensation scheme.
Later on 5 October, the GMB, Unite, the POA, Prospect and the FDA wrote to confirm that the terms accurately recorded an agreement that all five unions were able to recommend positively to their executives as being the best that might be achieved in negotiation. Soon after 5 October, agreement was reached between the Government and the trade union negotiating teams. The POA executive committee then voted to distance itself from the agreement and to request further discussion. The sixth union—the PCS—withdrew from the talks at the point that the five other unions agreed to negotiate separately.
The Government remain committed to trying to reach an agreement with the CCSU. The Minister for the Cabinet Office has since made a number of personal approaches, orally and in writing, to the PCS general secretary and the Prison Officers’ Association in which he has invited the CCSU to put forward alternative proposals for a reformed Civil Service Compensation Scheme and has sought to engage with them further. I understand that a letter was received from the Council of Civil Service Unions this morning, but we have not yet had a chance to consider that further.
It may be helpful to remind the Committee that the main outcome that the Government seek to achieve through the Bill is to enable necessary reform of the Civil Service Compensation Scheme in a way that is both economically and fiscally acceptable and fair to the civil servants affected.
The key elements of the new scheme that we propose to introduce include, first, a standard tariff whereby each year of service provides one month’s salary in the event of redundancy. The tariff will be capped at 12 months for compulsory redundancy and 21 months for voluntary redundancy. Secondly, all civil servants who are made redundant, voluntarily or compulsorily, will be entitled to a three-month notice period. Thirdly, there will be significant protection for lower-paid civil servants. This is one of the most important aspects of the scheme that the Government have agreed with the majority of the unions. Any civil servant earning less than £23,000 a year who is made redundant will be deemed to earn that amount when their redundancy payment is calculated. Payments to the higher paid will be limited so that staff earning more than six times the private sector median average earnings—currently just under £150,000 a year—would have their salary capped at that figure for the purpose of calculating their redundancy payment. When staff have, in addition, reached minimum pension age, they may be able to opt for early payment of pension when they leave, in return for surrendering the appropriate amount of any redundancy payment.
We believe that this proposed new scheme meets our goals and those of the majority of union representatives. It is affordable and sustainable, it caps the amount that can be paid out and it reforms the accrual rate, but it is also fair and provides protection for both the lower paid and those closest to retirement. This new offer is a good one and we seriously hope that it will still be possible to secure the agreement of all the Civil Service unions.
The Government have reservations about the amendment because it takes us very wide of the compensation scheme. The purpose of the Bill is very much to deal with the reform of the compensation scheme. Section 1 of the 1972 Act deals with a much broader set of issues. Noble Lords opposite may have been seeking simplicity in applying their amendment to all schemes made under Section 1 of the 1972 Act, but it goes some way beyond the matters principally addressed by the Bill. It asks us to consider its application to a variety of schemes under the Act, of which some are required ultimately to reach agreement with consultees and some are not. That makes the amendment’s fit with the range of Section 1 schemes rather less elegant than it might be. Our strong sense, therefore, is that we should resist this amendment. We recognise, however, that the approach of the 1972 Act and the Government to relations with the unions—like that of our predecessors in government—has been and remains to reach agreement by consensus wherever possible and as fully as possible. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for that full explanation and update as to where matters rest. Around that, I ask him specifically what he sees the steps over the next few weeks as being. I understood from our earlier debate that it was planned that, the day after the Act comes into force, an order will be laid that repeals Section 2. The day after that, the scheme will be laid, maybe in the other order. Can the Minister confirm that? In a sense, it gives some framework to the discussions that we will have about Clause 2 and the caps, which are a particular bone of contention.
More generally, my noble friend Lady Turner makes some very telling points about the concerns that people have and how the changes to the compensation scheme may impact on them. The amendment that I have pursued is to Section 1 of the 1972 Act, not the Bill that is under consideration. We will debate that in a moment. Specifically on the amendment, I am sorry that the Minister does not feel able to accept it. All it does is to qualify the obligation to consult in a way that the Government’s own amendment does. I am not sure whether his principal argument was that the scope of the Bill precludes its acceptance or that under the 1972 Act some arrangements need agreement and some do not. Even if they do not, presumably the consultation is to some effect, which ought to be to reach agreement, whatever the substantive matter under consideration.
Obviously, given where we are, this is not a matter that I would press today but could the Minister confirm whether it is the scope of the Bill or other matters as well that are precluding acceptance of this amendment? I would certainly appreciate it if he was able to update us on the precise steps envisaged between about now, when the Bill becomes an Act, and what flows from that in terms of orders, particularly on the demise of the caps.
I thank the noble Lord for that helpful intervention. There were two questions there. First, our resistance to this is partly on the basis that this is a much more narrowly focused Bill. Secondly, the 1972 Act is fairly complex and deals with a large range of different activities. Although there is of course a general acceptance of consultation, the exact element of commitment to agreement and consultation under different clauses is fairly complex. If we were to go into a wholesale revision of the 1972 Act, we would be doing a very different exercise now.
On where we are with the Bill and what is intended, as I am sure noble Lords are aware, this Bill is a fallback position which is felt to be necessary because these negotiations have been under way for two years and have become subject to litigation. The Government are anxious, as were our predecessor Government, that attempts to introduce a satisfactory new compensation scheme should not be delayed further by continuing litigation, some of which—as noble Lords will know—could last for a very long time.
The hope and intention is that once Royal Assent to the Bill takes place, the cap will be in force and, if everything is then accepted by those involved, the sunset clause will come into operation on day two and the new scheme will be laid on day three. We would then go through to the new scheme coming into operation so that compensation could be provided on the agreed new basis. That is the hope and intention and, as those who were Ministers in the previous Government will recognise, it is the essence of what we are attempting to do to avoid further delay.
Could we just be clear on that point? If the Act receives Royal Assent and comes into force, I think that the Minister said that would bring the sunset clause into play. I thought the proposition was that if you had the new scheme introduced by order, you would then have to do something with the caps—otherwise, there is what I hope is a clear inconsistency between what the caps and the scheme provide—and that the proposal was to repeal Section 2. Is that not the case? It is quite important that we have clarity because we have tabled amendments about doing away with Clause 2. That might be the safest route in any event but I assume that, once an order is laid and a new scheme is in place, the caps would have to be removed on a permanent or, at least, a temporary basis.
The caps, as the noble Lord will be aware, are there in case litigation were to prevent the new scheme going into operation, so that there would be an alternative. However, the caps can be repealed by negative order and the intention is that that order would be placed the day after Royal Assent, if all else is in play.
Can my noble friend explain what kind of litigation might be anticipated and therefore the need for Clause 2? Clause 1 is self-contained and does away with the need for agreement in relation to a scheme, and Clause 2 has these caps, which are inconvenient because they will get in the way if they are not what we want to bring into effect. The Minister just explained that we might need these caps if there is litigation. What sort of litigation could follow once this Bill has been enacted, doing away with the need for consent?
Neither the previous Government nor this Government expected the challenge to the agreement presented by the PCS on the previous occasion. The outside possibility with which we are concerned is a successful challenge that might ask for judicial review under the Human Rights Act and might under certain circumstances go as far as the ECHR. That process could last for some considerable time.
If it is the case that we are providing some kind of insurance policy against litigation that might take us all the way to the European Court of Human Rights—I think that is unlikely, but let us assume that that is going to happen—why are the Government providing caps that are so out of line with anything that they think they are going to agree? It is perfectly plain that Clause 2 is something to wave at the unions to say, “If you don’t agree, this is what we will do to you”. It is not a reasonable fallback position if Clause 1 is litigated. I am still very confused about the structure of the Bill, as I explained to the Minister at Second Reading.
The noble Baroness has raised a very pertinent point but, in terms of the litigation—whatever the outside risk of it might be—that could come from challenge under the human rights legislation, what leads the Government to assume that that might be successful in relation to a scheme that would not be equally successful in relation to the legislation around the caps? You would expect them both to be subject to the same sort of challenge.
The caps as they stand can be increased but not decreased under Clause 2. This is a fallback Bill that we hope it will not prove necessary to implement but, in that unlikely event, the caps can be increased under Clause 2 in the interim if by any chance there were to be a challenge or a judicial review which delayed the implementation of the scheme that had been agreed.
I shall speak also to government Amendments 7, 9 and 16. All these amendments are intended as a reassurance that the coalition Government will consult the Civil Service trade unions fully if any future proposals to change the Civil Service Compensation Scheme would have the effect of reducing benefits for civil servants.
Amendment 2 responds to the commitment that my right honourable friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office, Francis Maude, made on Report and at Third Reading of the Bill in another place. When my right honourable friend gave the commitment to add an amendment to the Bill in your Lordships' House, he did so to put beyond doubt the need for meaningful consultation with the unions. He also agreed to show the amendments to the unions and to the opposition Front Bench. That has now been done and officials sent the text of the amendments to the Council of Civil Service Unions.
Amendment 2, the lead amendment in this group, will insert a new clause after Clause 1. As I made clear at Second Reading on 26 October, the Superannuation Act 1972 already requires consultation. However, the new clause will make a further amendment to Section 2 of that Act by requiring that a report of the consultation be laid before Parliament. Proposed new subsection 11A will mean that a report is required only where there is a change to the compensation scheme that would result in reduced benefits. Proposed new subsection 11B requires the report to include details of the consultation that took place, the steps taken with a view to reaching agreement with the unions or other persons consulted and whether agreement has been reached.
I repeat that the coalition Government’s view is that they should consult the Civil Service trade unions and, just as the previous Administration tried to do, seek to reach agreement with them all on changes to the Civil Service Compensation Scheme. However, that may not be possible in all cases, in which case the report will explain why. Perhaps I may add for the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, that my understanding of the difference between the scheme that the PCS wishes to promote and the scheme that the Government have agreed with the other unions is that the government scheme is much more advantageous to the lower paid than that which the PCS proposes. It seems to us that we should stand firm in these difficult circumstances for the lower paid, who, as the noble Baroness will know, are a substantial proportion of those who are likely to be affected.
Noble Lords will note that the report will have to include the steps taken,
“with a view to reaching agreement”—
precisely the same wording that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, so elegantly proposed in his much wider amendment that we discussed earlier. I very much hope that the spirit and the letter of the new clause will meet with the approval of your Lordships.
The effect of government Amendments 7 and 9 is that the consultation provisions would come into force two months after Royal Assent has been granted to the Bill. This is the standard interval before commencement of new legislation. However, because of the need for certainty, the other provisions in the Bill will come into force immediately on Royal Assent. As a consequence, the requirement to publish and lay before Parliament a report of the consultation would apply to future changes to the Civil Service Compensation Scheme and not to those changes currently being developed for implementation once this Bill is enacted. To introduce a requirement for a report on the current consultation would be unnecessary and nugatory. No one could claim that there has not been long and extensive consultation on the proposed changes or that Parliament is not well aware of the proposals. Equally, it would be wrong to risk a further delay while a report is prepared and laid before Parliament, before the currently proposed new scheme could be introduced.
Government Amendment 16 simply amends the Long Title of the Bill so that it will now cover the new clause that makes wider amendments to the Superannuation Act 1972.
My Lords, I did not base my argument on the fact that there was comparability with the private sector. We know the history of the scheme—the Minister helpfully recapped on it on Second Reading—and that the prospect of compensation arrangements was an integral part of the terms and conditions, historically. It might be challenged as not necessarily the case now, but what people accepted in terms of salary, pension rights and compensation opportunities was seen as a package that was seen as collectively valuable. I suggest that it is a big step, for the people affected, to move away from that. It is right to do it—we have made that clear and support the Government in seeking to do it—but we think that there ought to be protections around it so that Parliament has a role and an opportunity to take a view on whether the process that should be undertaken, in a sense, to justify giving up unanimity is robust.
My Lords, at this stage I should declare an interest, in that I have a family member who is about to go on six months’ maternity leave and is not at all sure that her Civil Service job will be there when she comes back. The Civil Service has changed a lot over the past 20 years—civil servants indeed have to apply for their next positions—so life is not as it was when the 1972 Act was founded. I reassure the Opposition that the Government’s intention throughout is to be as transparent as possible about the proposed scheme and the consultation with the unions. If it helps the Opposition, I am willing to give a clear commitment that the coalition Government will table a Written Ministerial Statement at the point at which the scheme is agreed, to make sure that both Houses are fully informed of what has been agreed.
In answer to what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said about this being an unprecedented development, I say that I am not aware of any precedent in which proposals of this sort have to be submitted for the approval of both Houses. I do not think that the previous Government would have wanted to accept that, and I am not sure that this Government wish to do so. Therefore, Amendment 3 is one that the Government are not in any sense minded to accept. However, I am prepared to look again at the wording of the proposed new clause to which Amendment 4 addresses itself to see whether there is any way in which we can meet the noble Lord’s concern over the inclusion of the wording,
“such information as the Minister considers appropriate”.
On that basis, I hope that he will be willing to withdraw Amendment 3 for the time being.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for the assurance about a Statement being made to both Houses, and that he will look again in relation to the wording on the information that needs to be provided. We will reflect on the debate that we have had about Parliament’s approval, but I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 3. In doing so, I say that although Amendment 2 is not as we would most like it, it is a step in the right direction so we feel able to support it today.
The noble Baroness, Lady Turner of Camden, has said twice this afternoon that the civil servants who are potentially affected by the Bill are often not very well paid. This may have been the case in the past, but all recent studies show that on pay levels up to £40,000 or £50,000—that is, “well paid”—public sector employees are better paid than their equivalents in the private sector. What may have happened in the past, and may have been part of this notional package whereby people say, “I accept low pay and get a better pension and redundancy”, has, over the years, been completely eroded. The terms and conditions are collectively out of balance with private sector comparators. In particular, pay levels at the lower levels are high.
There are, however, a substantial number of low-paid civil servants. I am rather surprised at the number of them earning less than £21,000, most of them working outside London. One of the Inland Revenue computer centres is half a mile from Saltaire, and I am well familiar with average rates of pay in the northern part of Bradford. The reason why the scheme is set to be biased in favour of those earning less than £23,000 is that there are a very large number of them. There are a small number of extremely well paid civil servants; the changes in the compensation scheme are also to limit the payouts to which they might be entitled.
The amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, seem designed to remove the substance of the Bill. To rehearse briefly, the intention behind the Bill is to bring to a close two years of negotiation by successive Governments with the trade unions, to change a compensation scheme designed nearly 40 years ago, which does not fit current conditions or circumstances.
Amendment 5 would, in practice, go further than the requirement in Section 2(3) of the Superannuation Act 1972, which, as I have explained, we have already needed to amend. First, under Section 1(3) of the 1972 Act, it is for the Minister to judge who should be consulted—
“persons appearing to the Minister … to represent persons likely to be affected by the proposed scheme”,
or with those persons themselves. However, rather than requiring the agreement of those who have been consulted on this basis, Amendment 5 would prescribe that consultation must take place with “the relevant trade unions” and, indeed, that these unions must agree.
We have already explained the efforts that successive Administrations of all parties have made, and which some of the trade unions have made, to reach such agreement. We are setting out in primary legislation and have reiterated in both Houses our commitment to meaningful consultation but, as I have described, our intention in adding Clause 1 was to remove any union veto on changes to the Civil Service Compensation Scheme. I cannot imagine that any of your Lordships will be surprised to learn that, after more than two years of consultation, the Government's view on this is resistant to change.
The second respect in which the noble Baroness's Amendment 5 would go further than the approach set out in the 1972 Act is that it would apply to any changes proposed to the Civil Service Compensation Scheme, not just to those changes that would have the effect of reducing benefits. This would create a new bureaucratic process, in which any change to the compensation scheme including, to pick a trivial example, a minor amendment to its title would require consultation and agreement from all the Civil Service unions. Amendment 6, which is grouped with this, seeks to remove from the Bill the main provisions covering the potential caps on the value of benefits provided under the compensation scheme. This guts the Bill.
The Government are determined that there is a fallback position that can be used and that, bearing in mind the lessons of the previous Administration's scheme, we are not left unable to progress due to some sort of unforeseen legal challenge to the details of the new scheme. We are therefore providing in Clause 2 to have in reserve the possibility of applying caps on the maximum value of redundancy payments under the Civil Service Compensation Scheme: a maximum of 12 months' pay for compulsory departures and 15 months' pay for voluntary departures. Putting these limits in primary legislation leads to greater legal certainty and democratic accountability and, as I have already remarked, the Government can, by negative order, raise the level of the caps, but cannot lower them. I hope that provides reassurance to the noble Baroness and that on that basis she will be willing to withdraw the amendment.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, which has been very interesting. I still have concerns about the Bill and about provisions within it. However, I will study very carefully what the Minister said and the assurances that he has given this afternoon to see what should be done before Report. I do not think that it is useful in present circumstances to have comparisons between the private sector and public sector. A government report has recently been issued that appears to indicate that if you take the total rewards of employment in both sectors, the private sector still exceeds in total the public sector. If you take all the rewards, not just money, but also what is available in superannuation and so on, the private sector is still rather better than the public sector, but that is another issue. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I feel I should not reiterate the arguments that I have made already about the necessity of Clause 2. My feeling about this is that after two years of negotiations, any Government would have introduced such a proposal. Therefore, I do not want to push this in any partisan way. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, thinks that this has soured the negotiating environment. That is not my impression of the quality of the negotiations between the majority of the unions and the Government on this. We have made real progress and both the unions and the Government have been negotiating with clear commitment to reach a consensual agreement in the circumstances in which we find ourselves.
As I described at Second Reading in your Lordships’ House, the caps in this legislation serve several purposes. First, they set out a basis for discussion of reform of the compensation scheme with civil servants and with the trade unions representing them, comparable to best practice in the private sector. Secondly, they provide an interim solution if agreement cannot be reached. Thirdly, they provide a fallback if, following discussions and what we believe to be the conclusion of a new workable compensation scheme with terms improved beyond the caps, we find that we cannot implement it.
If we do not have this clause, we shall be in a state of legal uncertainty in which it is possible there might be a judicial challenge. Primary legislation provides much greater legal certainty, which may be important in the event of protracted litigation, where the case might be referred from one court to another. Therefore, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his opposition.
The Minister said that he did not want to rehearse the arguments he put up before, but I would invite him to rehearse them because that is where the crucial issue lies. The Minister gave three reasons for having Clause 2. One is as a basis for discussion, which is no basis on which to put anything in legislation. A second is as an interim solution if there is no agreement. As I understand it, once we have Clause 1, there is no necessity for agreement, so there is no necessity for an interim solution. The third item is a fallback, if for some reason the Government were not able to implement an agreement under Clause 1. So we come back to the crucial issue of whether Clause 1 is legally robust. If it is not, on what basis is it not legally robust, or potentially not legally robust? If that is the case, what are the differences between a potential lack of robustness in Clause 1 and a potential lack of robustness in Clause 2, if that is what one has to fall back on?
I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, that these are punitive caps as I think they are relatively generous compared with what the private sector offers. The Government are indeed prepared to go further and offer a more generous scheme. I have no problem with the quantum but I seek to challenge why we have this clause. If it is just for a basis for discussion, it is no basis on which to legislate. We have to tease out why Clause 1 might be challenged and why Clause 2 would not be challengeable.
My Lords, logic might suggest that all we need in this Bill is Clause 1. I understand that point, but since the High Court judgment in May, it has become apparent that when the terms of the compensation scheme were subject to legal doubt, the purpose of restructuring within government might be stalled altogether, with consequential financial implications and uncertainty and consequent distress for staff. Having Clause 2 in reserve ensures that, if a scheme is subject to prolonged litigation, there is a provision which produces certainty and can be brought into force to prevent the process of government restructuring being put into limbo. Therefore, this is a reserve power which the Government are asking for which we hope will not be necessary. I stress again that it is a fallback in the event of refusal to agree followed by judicial challenge. The question then arises as to what the default position should be if a scheme is stalled by prolonged litigation. It is right that Parliament should decide in an Act of Parliament what the default position should be, hence Clause 2. I repeat: putting these limits into primary legislation leads to greater legal certainty and thus democratic accountability.
My Lords, I will obviously not pursue the proposition that Clause 2 do not stand part of the Bill but, like the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I am struggling to understand fully the Government’s position on this, particularly in relation to the fallback. Can the Minister be a bit more specific on the fear that the introduction of the scheme, by way of order in a parliamentary process, is somehow less secure than caps being included in primary legislation as a fallback, particularly when those caps are, pretty much across the range, substantially more adverse than the scheme which is going to be introduced?
It seems to me that Governments, as they legislate, could argue right across the piece that there is always the prospect of a challenge. Somebody might take a different view—the courts might take a different view to the Government—and there are consequences of that. If there are, the Government have to face those consequences. I suggest that to try and build in, or hardwire, if I may use the expression, a sort of fallback position in all sorts of circumstances, particularly these, does not seem appropriate. It is something which concerns us greatly and to which we shall certainly return on Report. It is not only our view. The Delegated Powers Committee made a further point about reviving these provisions but, if we adopted this across all government legislation, legislation would be littered with provisions so that if there were a successful challenge here, there or anywhere else, there would be something in your back pocket as a fallback. That does not seem a very sensible basis on which the Government should legislate.
While I hear what the noble Lord said, I am not convinced by the proposition that he has made, certainly on the issues around the basis for discussion and interim solution. In a sense, that is now past and we have something which is, if not fully agreed, on the point of being implemented. Yet, as the noble Baroness said, Clause 1 has moved us on from it anyway, so I remain unconvinced. The issue of having a measure like this in the background, which of itself must be a deterrent for somebody who believes that they have a case in law to pursue, whether they are right or wrong, is that it must make it less likely that they would seek, in their terms, to get justice. That is a regrettable step as well.
Since the High Court judgment—since, indeed, one of the unions decided to take what had until then been negotiations to judicial review—we find ourselves in a situation where it is possible that judicial review may be used as a means of delaying the introduction of the scheme. If that litigation were to take a sufficiently long time, the current default would be the previously existing scheme. Now, the previous Government negotiated for some 18 months to change that scheme, rightly insisting—and having the agreement of the unions—that the previous scheme was no longer viable or affordable. We wish to make it absolutely certain that, in the event of continuing litigation, the default to any failure to introduce the new scheme would be enshrined in primary legislation, which is therefore much less open to judicial challenge. That is the justification for Clause 2.
We are in danger of getting a bit repetitive. Could the Minister say a little more about why the primary route is more secure? Fundamentally, if the Government’s judgment is that there are risks around a legal challenge that could delay the implementation of the scheme, I would have thought that the Government should be concerned about that and should seek to address it—not by having this fallback position, which they have accepted all along they do not want to deploy, but by looking at the arrangements that they will implement to ensure that those are less likely to suffer the legal challenge that the Government clearly fear on this. It seems to me to be the wrong approach. If we think that people’s rights are being impaired and are not secure in our judgment about this, I would have thought that the thing to do is to change arrangements until we are secure. I know there is never certainty in everything in life, but that seems to be the right route for the Government, rather than to have this back-pocket fallback that, at their own admission, the Government see as a blunt instrument that they never intend to deploy.
I used to teach international politics, not law, and this is the point where I should appropriately offer to write to the noble Lord, and place a copy in the House of Lords Library, about the statutory basis of the scheme as it applies to the cap and to make sure that there are some informal conversations between now and Report to tease out the details of this difference.
My Lords, this is clearly a justified probing amendment, but would not suitable to be in the Act. In any event, it will be overtaken by events rather soon, but I would wish to hear from the Minister as much as he is able to say. If it is necessary to postpone a full answer today because these issues have not been fully resolved, I hope that before the next stage of the Bill the Government will be in a position to give indication about redeployment and reskilling.
My Lords, I recognise the concerns which lie behind the amendment. Again, we have inherited from the previous Government the published protocol, to which reference has already been made, and the determination, where possible, to build a leaner and more efficient Civil Service. In the nature of the case, many of the civil servants about whom we are talking are outside London, so there will have to be a variety of different schemes aimed at local circumstances. There will have to be a certain amount of outsourcing. The Cabinet Office is responsible for the protocols and the staff working on the protocols remain hard at work late in the evening. I am assured by those behind me that the director in question is responsible for pay and pension policy, employment policy, trades union issues at a national level and, until last month, diversity and well-being issues.
Could the noble Lord cover—or write to me on—the issue of timing? The issue was raised because I referred earlier to people knowing that the RDAs will go. With that knowledge, at what point do the processes start and at what point do either the current arrangements for compensation apply or new arrangements apply in the future? Does he feel comfortable about there being a level playing field in the way in which these are dealt with across the service?
My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord is aware that, although the RDAs will disappear, some of their task will be undertaken by the new LEPs and some of those involved will, naturally, be strong candidates to find posts in those new sectors. This is not completely a zero-sum affair. I am very conscious that in Yorkshire, we have one of the more effective RDAs. We are now in the process of agreeing local economic partnerships and I have no doubt that many of the staff in the Yorkshire RDA will work for the Yorkshire-based LEPs.
I thank the Minister for his response. Of course, I shall await the replies which he has undertaken to send me in response to what I accept were a large number of questions. Obviously, I intend to withdraw the amendment, but perhaps I could make a general point. As I am sure the Minister appreciates, one of the things which prompted the question is that, unless I have misunderstood the situation, the potential number of staff who will be interested in redeployment and retraining is presumably likely to be somewhat larger than in previous years; hence my asking for information about the numbers this year, in the next two years and the previous two years to try to gauge to what extent there is an increase.
It is a case, as I am sure the Minister is aware, of making sure that the number of staff who are involved in assisting with the practices and procedures that are in operation now will also be sufficient to cope with what is likely to be a significant increase in the number of people seeking retraining and redeployment. It is from that angle in particular that I ask these questions. Has sufficient thought been given to the increase in workload that is likely to come from people seeking other employment opportunities? Will the system be geared up to cope with that fully? I realise that that will no doubt emerge from the answers to my questions that the Minister will send me. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
If this amendment is agreed I would be unable to call Amendments 12 to 14 because of pre-emption.
Before I reply to this, perhaps I may say a little about changing patterns of employment which affect redundancy and people moving from one job to another. I think there are some generational issues here. My father spent 40 years in the same job, apart from Army service, from the age of 15 until he was 60. The old pattern of employment in which you left school and expected to be in the same career until you retired is one that those of us of a certain age still cling to, but our children by and large do not expect to do so. The levels of turnover in the younger levels of the Civil Service are higher than in the older levels of the Civil Service, so there are certain generational issues here. Our younger generation is more attuned to the idea that you do not have a single career pattern or job pattern for life, and they are prepared to move. That is certainly the Government’s hope.
In discussing Amendment 11, it is almost unavoidable that I trespass on the amendments that will follow because the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, has already mentioned the Delegated Powers Committee’s report. We have welcomed it and recognise that the sunset and sunrise clauses are open to question. We hope that the three-year time limit that the two government amendments in the next group will introduce will go a long way towards meeting the points raised by the committee about the power to revive Clause 2 by order. It seems to us that that is a reasonable response to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report.
As with much of the Bill, this is a question of how we ensure that we come to a satisfactory and stable settlement on the new compensation scheme by agreement as far as possible with the unions, but avoiding litigation that would challenge the new scheme. It is our hope and intention that Clause 3 would not have to be used for a further revival of the Bill at any point, but it is there to ensure that we have the necessary guarantees. I have already explained to noble Lords opposite what our hope and intention is when this Bill receives Royal Assent, so we hope that much of the Bill will thus be superseded. I hope that when we move on to the next group of amendments the noble Lord will recognise that the Government have moved some way towards recognising the concerns which the Delegated Powers Committee expressed and which this amendment seeks to address.
My Lords, there are some further comments, and perhaps we can pick them up in relation to the next group that we are about to debate. I accept that the Government have moved some way but, I suggest, not very far. We can come on to that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
For the convenience of the Committee we will discuss together Amendments 12, 13, 14 and 15 which respond to the concerns expressed at Second Reading about what some noble Lords called the zombie clause. The Government also intend these amendments to respond to the comments about the unusual use of a sunrise provision in Clause 3(4)(c) that were made in the third report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which was published on 28 October.
We are very grateful to the committee for its report, and we hope that these amendments respond to its criticisms. The committee rightly commented that “these arrangements are complex”, but went on to say that these two delegated powers,
“do not appear to the Committee to be inappropriate”.
However, the committee was not so persuaded by the need for the power in Clause 3(4)(c) to revive the caps. Its particular objection was to,
“a power which has no time limit, and which is therefore capable of being used in the context of future proposed amendments to the scheme, unrelated to the present circumstances”.
These amendments aim to respond to that point, and I hope in speaking to them also to simplify, or at least clarify, some of the complexity in Clause 3. The Government accept that there should not be an unlimited power to revive Clause 2, which might be used many years in the future in circumstances that we could not predict today. On reflection, we accept that that is going too far, and I am therefore grateful to the Delegated Powers Committee for drawing it to the attention of the House. Accordingly, the Government have tabled these amendments which will provide a very similar set of limits on the Clause 3(4)(c) sunrise power as already apply to Clause 2.
If I might concur with my noble friend Lord McKenzie, given a sunrise provision with a life of three years and a reading of the amendment which seems to suggest that there can be unlimited occasions on which it can be extended, that does not seem much of a concession—if I may presume, having not been in Grand Committee before. Even listening to the Minister’s argument that there is a need for a fallback position, surely that is still taking the need for it to an extreme extent, because if there were to be a human rights challenge from one or more of the unions I am sure that it would manifest itself very quickly. I cannot see them waiting indefinitely or until thousands of people are made redundant before they would make such a challenge.
I remain extremely concerned that this seems a very open-ended provision, even allowing for the argument put about the need for the Government to have a fallback position in the event of a legal challenge. If I were a trade union negotiator, I would feel very anxious about the integrity of the negotiating process on an ongoing basis if there were such an unlimited sunrise provision.
My Lords, there were two questions which I will take. One was the question that was rightly raised—I thank the noble Lord for reminding me—of scrutiny only by the other place. The second is on the justification for three years, which might be extended.
On the first, noble Lords will recall that there was some debate in the other place on whether this should be considered a money Bill, because it involves public expenditure. The justification for scrutiny only by the other House is that changes made by order under the Bill could have a direct impact on public expenditure, for example by changing the level of the caps as provided for under Clause 2 or by reviving the powers to impose caps under Clause 2 using the powers in Clause 3(4). These seem to the Government to attract Commons financial privilege. It is therefore entirely defensible for the Bill to have been drafted to allow scrutiny of these delegated powers in that House and not this one.
On the three-year time limit, it is not simply a question of when a judicial or a legal challenge might be mounted; it is a question of how long it might take for a process of appeal—for a legal challenge—to be worked through. I am sure that noble Lords who have been involved in trade union negotiations will recall how lengthy litigation can be as one moves from lower courts to higher courts and, when human rights considerations are at stake, even occasionally appealing to the European Court of Human Rights. The only reason why the three years is there—and why there is a permissible clause for extension by order each time, which has to be laid before the House for six months at a time—is for the extreme case that such successive appeals might be taken in an extended judicial process to try to prevent a compensation scheme being implemented.
I am willing to take this back to see whether it is possible to squeeze the three-year extension any further, but we are playing, as we can, with making the workable scheme possible. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord may be willing to accept the government amendments as they stand.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for expanding on some of those points. Certainly, we do not propose today to oppose the amendments, but, as I said earlier, we will want to revisit them on Report. I am grateful for his offer to look at whether he could squeeze the number of opportunities in which the period could be extended. In doing so, in a sense, the Minister has accepted that, as drafted, you could have a succession of six months extensions which would go way beyond three years and six months. It could go on for a very long time.
There is no qualification here or criteria attached to when that extension might be sought. Despite the fact that it may be an order that has to go to Parliament, there are no criteria under which Parliament is able to judge whether that is a fair outcome or not. On the grounds that it is potentially more than three years, I am grateful for the Minister’s offer on that. It seems to be three years regardless of the circumstances. There needs to be no trigger which causes that extension to take place, which seems to be unfortunate as well.
I would stress that all of this is second order for us because we do not want it there anyway and we will continue to do what we can to get it removed. I hope, in that context, that the Minister will do what he can to see whether it can be further constrained. It does not seem to have moved that far from the starting position in the Bill.