Armed Forces: Capability

Lord Walker of Aldringham Excerpts

Thursday 12th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Walker of Aldringham (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, welcome the discussion opened by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. In my meagre four minutes, I will address merely one issue that has come to the fore recently: the notion of a European army—a European military capability, because of course it would have to have the other sorts of capabilities.

Brussels has made no secret of its wish to set up its own joint headquarters, which would oversee, and presumably in due course command, the shared military assets provided by member states. Details about the wider development of that force are few, but the argument is that it would enable the Union to be taken more seriously as an international force.

Rather more worryingly, it has also been suggested that our agreeing to support the setting up of such a capability could be the price we pay for access to the single market in our Brexit negotiations. Britain’s contribution to any European force is seen as essential for such a capability to be convincing. Apart from the French, we all know that the other EU member states simply do not have the resources or capabilities necessary. I know that the Government are currently opposed to the notion of a European army and I very much hope that they will continue so to be.

First, the development of the force is unclear, but the EU has a track record of getting increasing jurisdiction over its instruments and it is highly probable that, ultimately, Brussels would control the military assets of member states, rather than member states retaining the authority to decide whether they wish to involve themselves in a particular EU security initiative. As a nation, we must retain absolute control over all our Armed Forces. Such powers should never be ceded to anyone. That does not mean that we cannot take part—there have been some very successful examples, including EUFOR in the Balkans and security operations tackling people-smuggling gangs in the Mediterranean and piracy in Somalia. Those are entirely satisfactory.

Secondly, as has already been discussed, we are seeing the not unexpected re-emergence of Russia as a formidable military neighbour of the European Union. But if Europe were to rely solely on the contribution of European member states to defend their interests, it is unlikely they would be able to summon the resources necessary to deter President Putin, who makes no secret of his ambitions for greater influence in the Baltics and eastern Europe. Moreover, the very establishment of a so-called European army could well be perceived in Moscow as a threat to Russian security interests and a sign of a more aggressive European posture. This is the last thing that we need in the coming decade.

Thirdly, the establishment of a fully fledged joint operational headquarters would consume considerable resources. Senior officers would have to be contributed by member states, with all the necessary and expensive infrastructure to support them and their families. In 2008 the EU as a whole spent more than €200 billion on defence. By 2013 the sum had dwindled to €170 billion and all analysts reckon that it will soon shrink to about €150 billion. In the face of such declining resources, creating yet another major EU structure simply does not make sense. To imagine that European nations would be more prepared to increase their defence expenditure for a European military capability when they have shown a collective reluctance to meet the 2% target for their NATO capabilities seems wildly optimistic. But, of course, unless they did so there is no way that that the Union could be taken more seriously as an international force.

Fourthly, and most fundamentally, by establishing its own command structure, the EU would be setting itself in direct competition with NATO, with the duplication of a structure that works well already and has shown itself to be adaptable. Why on earth would we want to replicate it? We have a situation—others will no doubt talk about it well—in which we are suffering from inadequate military capabilities, inadequate financial resources, inefficient use of defence expenditure and limited defence industrial capabilities. Surely we do not want to compound the problem by going to Europe. I ask the Minister to ensure that we stick very firmly by our non-support for the European army and that any suggestion that it could be a bargaining tool in our Brexit negotiations is killed dead.