Ukraine (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, we have before us a very important report at an important time, indeed a turning point. Rather than pick out particular aspects of the report, perhaps I could summarise what I have been hearing so far this afternoon in three conclusions: Europe can no longer rely on the United States for its defence; Europe alone is not currently capable of defending itself or Ukraine; and President Trump’s most recent statements and conduct are compromising the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. Those are pretty serious conclusions for us to be drawing. I will say a few words on each.

On whether Europe can still rely on the US to defend itself, I strongly agree with what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said. The US has been focusing away from Europe and towards Asia for a long time, and has been doing so based on a ruthless and dispassionate assessment of its own self-interest. Flagging that up is not anti-Americanism; saying it is a necessary antibiotic to clear some foggy, sentimental minds, particularly those clouded by too much attachment to the special relationship. We all hope that Article 5 is still alive in Washington but, like many noble Lords in this Room, I feel much less confident about that than I was only a few weeks ago. Just as concerning is that a similar assessment will be being made by potential adversaries, and therefore the risk of an extension of this war, or some further war, even if caused only by a miscalculation on this, is made much greater.

I will provide a few figures on the second conclusion that I drew—that Europe is not currently capable of defending itself. European-NATO GDP stands at $27 trillion. By comparison, Russia’s GDP stands at about $2 trillion and the UK’s is $3.6 trillion. Russia is supported by China; in fact, I do not think we have discussed China enough today. Part of the key to the solution, or at least to providing a long-term peace, probably lies in Beijing. On the question of European weakness, President Trump is right: Europe is well capable of defending itself. Our weakness is derived from a weakness of collective will and failure to organise logistics and co-ordinate our manufacturing capacity; it is not one of underlying economic capacity.

While I am throwing out a few numbers, I also point out that, based on figures from the Kiel Institute, 0.5% of European-NATO GDP in one year provides a sum greater than the total value of US support to Ukraine in the three years of this war. Another figure worth bearing in mind is that China’s GDP is six times that of Russia, which has, at least to some degree, become a satellite of China as a consequence of this war.

On the third point, the question of nuclear deterrence, I strongly agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, and will add a couple of observations. Even if US nuclear policy has not changed in substance, President Trump’s disruptive style of diplomacy, and the uncertainty that comes with it, increases the risk of miscalculation. Certainty and consistency of policy bolster deterrence, but we are currently experiencing the opposite. Secondly, any diminution of the credibility of deterrence increases the risk of coercion of parts of Europe into concessions. That is the road to Finlandisation, and it is extremely concerning.

I end by referring to the fact that not only do we need to spend more money on defence and work much more closely with Europe to reconstruct our military manufacturing capacity and secure interoperability; we must also work with Europe to re-establish credible deterrence. On that, I quote what Friedrich Merz said two days before his election, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, referred:

“We need to have discussions with both the British and the French—the two European nuclear powers—about whether nuclear sharing … could also apply to us.”


Two days later, on the night of his election, he said,

“My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe … so that … we can … achieve independence from the USA”.


He said the US

“does not care much about the fate of Europe”.

I do not know whether he is right, but I do know that we cannot rely on him being wrong.