Eurozone Crisis

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

Let me first tackle this issue of who kept us out of the euro. The fact that a previous Conservative Government secured an opt-out from the Maastricht treaty meant that we were not going to join the euro. Also, one of the things that we did when we came into office last May was to close down the euro preparations unit in the Treasury. We are taking action on contingency planning for a whole range of outcomes, and that work is under way in the Treasury.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether work would be put on hold on the three legs of the deal that was agreed last week. It is important that the euro area continues to work on those three legs, particularly on the ring fence and on the recapitalisation of the banks. They are important parts of the package, and they are needed to ensure that the eurozone is stabilised. He talked about the various European mechanisms that are in place to support finance. He will remember that the Greek bail-out was originally paid for purely by the eurozone; the UK did not contribute to it and has not contributed to subsequent parts of the bail-out package for Greece. We have negotiated that when a permanent mechanism is put in place to replace the one that the previous Government signed us up to, which we do have to contribute to, that permanent mechanism will not require UK participation. That is an achievement of this Government, getting us out of the mess that the Labour Government put us into in May last year.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the IMF. He will have to remember that it was he who led opposition to increasing our subscription to the IMF—[Interruption.] He says that that was to safeguard Britain’s subscription to the IMF, but it would in fact have marginalised the UK in international debates on tackling the global economic problems that we face today. Labour should think very carefully about its repudiation of the legacy left to it by the previous Prime Minister, who agreed to a trebling of resources for the IMF. We need to take action to stabilise the situation in the eurozone. The uncertainty is casting a chilling effect on the UK economy, and it is important that those issues are tackled as soon as possible.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

I wonder how much we can reasonably learn from the Minister, given that the negotiations are taking place in Cannes and that he is here with us today. Anyway, there are one or two questions that we might ask. What assurance can he give us about the UK banks’ exposure not only to Greece but to other eurozone countries at risk? What confidence does he have that the eurozone banks have the capital strength required to withstand a eurozone default?

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend asks some interesting questions. I think that I would rather be here in the House than in Cannes at the moment—[Interruption.] It is important that Parliament should hold Ministers to account on these matters, and I am here to answer its questions. On my hon. Friend’s first question about the strength of the UK banks, there has been a process with the leadership, through the European Banking Authority, which is based here in London, and it concluded that the UK banks did not need to be recapitalised. That is partly a consequence of the measures taken over the past two or three years to increase banks’ holdings of capital and highly liquid assets, which have helped to ensure that they are to an extent insulated from the problems in the euro area.

On my hon. Friend’s wider question about the strength of the European banks, I can tell him that, in calculating the amount of additional capital that banks should hold, the EBA determined that they should hold 9% core tier 1, and that, crucially, their holdings of sovereign debt should be marked to market rather than held at face value. That led to the calculation that banks across Europe need to hold an additional €100 billion of capital.