Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

The Chancellor took a major step by handing responsibility for fiscal forecasting to an independent body, and he took an equally bold step by asking it produce a long-term assessment of the strength of the public finances. He could have opted for a validation model, and instead he has gone for something much more adventurous.

The first inquiry of any significance that the Treasury Committee undertook after it was reformed at the start of this Parliament was on this subject. Rather than wait for the Government to come forward with a draft Bill, we took the initiative and tried to make some suggestions on how we thought it should look. We set eight criteria as minimum requirements for the new body, which for the most part the Government met. I thank the Treasury team for their co-operation in doing what they could to accommodate the Committee’s points.

Absolutely crucial to the success of the new body will be its credibility on independence. To achieve that, some new, groundbreaking arrangements have been made in the relationship between parliamentary Committees and the Executive. The Bill establishes a statutory veto for the Treasury Committee over the appointment of the chairman and executive members of the OBR. This is the first time that a Select Committee has been given such a veto over public appointments, which reflects the importance of cross-party parliamentary oversight of the OBR’s work, and the need for people of the highest calibre and independence to take on the job of running the OBR.

The Treasury Committee has already held its first appointment hearings for the OBR committee, and endorsed the appointments of Robert Chote, Stephen Nickell and Graham Parker. We also welcomed the appointment of two non-executive members. We were particular eager that there should be non-exec oversight of the work of the executives. The non-execs will provide an important check to ensure that the OBR lives up to its requirement to act transparently, objectively and independently.

Non-execs provide an opportunity for two-way traffic. If the OBR chairman becomes a patsy, they have a good chance of alerting the Treasury Committee at an early stage. If the Chancellor or the Treasury lean on the chairman too much, the non-execs offer a first line of defence. If the OBR chairman gets carried away and starts to offer a running commentary beyond his brief on the overall conduct of fiscal policy, the non-execs, as a first port of call, can say, “Steady on.”

The Committee looked carefully at how the OBR’s success ought to be measured. Economic forecasting is an imprecise art, and success on that cannot necessarily tell us much. To be seen as successful, the OBR must provide clear, impartial forecasts and a commentary that improves public debate on the key issues. It must guard against optimism and pessimism, and above all, it must avoid being drawn into political controversy. The Treasury Committee will monitor how the OBR fulfils those performance criteria. We will watch carefully and speak up if we feel that the OBR is not doing its job properly.

Of course, ultimately and simply, the OBR will be judged on the quality of its publications and its responsiveness to reasonable requests from Parliament or the Government for information or work. A few weeks ago, I wrote on behalf of the Treasury Committee to the OBR chairman to seek further information on the treatment of privatisation receipts in the accounts. Frankly, I was not encouraged by his reply. These are early days, and I very much hope that there is more responsiveness to future requests.

In two ways, the Government did not fully implement the Treasury Committee’s recommendations. The Committee asked that an independent group accountable to Parliament be set up after five years to review the OBR’s work. We said that among other things, that group should examine whether the model for the forecasting body chosen by the Chancellor was the right one in the light of experience. To make that judgment, the group would need to examine both the validation model and the much more independent model—the fully independent model—implied by the Congressional Budget Office in the United States. I think, and the Committee concluded, that judging which model is best should be done after a period of experience of the OBR’s work, which is why we suggested the five-year review. I urge the Government to agree, on a non-statutory basis, that the five-year review should report directly to Parliament rather than to the Government via the non-executives, as the legislation currently envisages.

One other proposal in the Treasury Committee report is that the OBR should retain the ability to assess the robustness of the fiscal plans of major political parties in the run-up to an election. That would enhance the quality of debate and take us forward from the world of claim and counter-claim on Labour tax bombshells and Tory stealth cuts and so on, which often leave the public perplexed and do not necessarily move the debate forward much. Although the Bill does not rule that out, it strongly discourages such a role.

I understand the OBR’s reluctance to get involved in anything that could prejudice its appearance of independence, but I hope the door is not completely closed to the idea. Public understanding of what is at stake in elections could be enhanced by the OBR’s involvement. Furthermore, the need for such scrutiny might make parties more careful with their claims and improve their pre-election proposals. I hope we can return to that idea when the OBR’s reputation for independence has been firmly established after a run of years—that could also form part of the five-year review to which I alluded.

Overall, the Treasury Committee was greatly heartened by the degree of engagement from the Government and from the Opposition over the creation of the OBR. That demonstrates that the Select Committee corridor can influence policy rather than just offer critiques of it, which I hope marks a way ahead for improving legislation more widely.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with an amendment.