Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th January 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

No, that is not what I am saying; I am saying that we will have procedures in place to allow Parliament to scrutinise legislation. We will also have procedures in place to ensure that, as part of that, relevant parliamentary committees can be notified of work by the regulators. That is just one aspect of how Parliament will conduct its role in the scrutiny of financial services, legislation and regulation. While the notification of consultations is one aspect, there are many others, such as the procedures for secondary legislation, the other procedures that Select Committees have to scrutinise the regulators’ work, the procedures for the provision of annual reports laid before Parliament, and others. So Parliament will be notified of consultations, but that does not imply that the Government view Parliament simply as a consultee in the process.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

The Minister has said that the use of Treasury powers under this Clause will normally be subject to affirmative resolution by Parliament. In the Minister’s experience—she could offer her personal view if she feels unable to offer a government view—does she think that that scrutiny is usually relatively effective or ineffective?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, standing here at this Dispatch Box, I would offer only a government view. I view it as entirely appropriate for the model we have set out today. I acknowledged the wider debate being had within the House of Lords on different mechanisms of scrutiny and lawmaking. As I have noted, the approach we have taken in this Bill has not been drawn to the House’s attention by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.

In the model of financial services regulation that we seek to put in place, a large number of the rule-making powers flow to the regulators. We are delegating that further to the independent regulators that have the expertise to make rules in this area. This is the right model for the UK. We have consulted on it carefully and extensively, and we received broad support in that consultation. It reflects the careful approach we have taken and the choice we have made as to the model for the regulation of our financial services.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My understanding is that Amendment 28 contains powers to provide for amending secondary legislation, not primary legislation. I will seek a fuller explanation and I suggest that we briefly degroup that amendment, if we reach it today, to provide that explanation for the noble Baroness, so that she has further clarity. I do not think I will provide it for her at this point.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

That would be very helpful. Before the Minister leaves Amendment 28, can she say whether she discussed with officials whether to add a sunset clause to what otherwise will be a very open and extensive power in the hands of the Treasury?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

No, that discussion was not had. The powers are constrained in that they relate to the provisions in place to transition away from and replace retained EU law, rather than going beyond that.

Amendments 242 and 243, put together, enable provisions subject to the negative procedure under an Act other than this Bill to be included in affirmative regulations made under the Bill. This is a procedural change with well-established precedent. Where any element of a statutory instrument is subject to the affirmative procedure, the combined instrument would also be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there will be no reduction in parliamentary scrutiny.

To conclude, the Bill will repeal retained EU law to establish a model of regulation based on FSMA. It will do so in a way that prioritises growth while moving in a sequenced and measured way, and through scrutiny, engagement and consultation. At this stage, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, will feel able to withdraw his amendment and that other noble Lords will not move theirs when they are reached. Subject to providing that extra clarification to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I intend to move the government amendments when they are reached.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st February 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that. Of course, I got carried away by my usual desire to knock the EU and lost sight of the essential principle, which is that the PRA is in fact applying the MREL rules disproportionately. I think that on that, the noble Baroness and I will agree.

So the PRA is applying a system that is designed for systemic bank failure to smaller banks, which present no systemic risk at all. While some modifications were made in 2021, medium-sized banks still end up having to issue MREL-compliant capital, which adds to their cost of capital, and this in turn reduces their capacity to lend. A number of mid-sized banks told the Treasury late last year that this reduction in the capacity to lend could amount to £62 billion over the next five years. Everyone loses—except the larger banks, who see smaller competitors facing considerable competition barriers. I believe that the regulators need to focus more on proportionality, which is the aim of my amendment.

Earlier I said that I was sceptical about the regulatory principles in FSMA, but they exist and we need to make sure that they are comprehensive. My Amendment 77A introduces an additional regulatory principle of being evidence-based. We have inherited all those EU rules, which were drawn up in the context of the EU’s well-known precautionary approach to regulation. I can see how easy it is to slip into the habit of regulating in the UK in the same way, just because we had to regulate that way in the past.

On our first day in Committee, we had a short debate on short selling. There is no evidence that short selling is or has been a problem in the UK, and yet the Government and the FCA are lining up to carry on regulating it. We need a shift of mindset in financial regulation in the UK, because the regulators should regulate only where the evidence points to the need for regulation, and we should not be regulating on the basis of hypothesis or speculation. That may well mean stepping back from regulating in areas where there is a possibility of a problem but no evidence that problems actually exist.

If we have a nimble system with agile and responsive regulators—I accept that that might be a rather big assumption—we should have no problem in stepping back, because we can act when a problem emerges. I certainly do not recommend or seek the widespread dumbing down of our regulation, because good regulation is part of the strength of our financial services sector. However, I believe that we are failing to take advantage of our Brexit freedoms to liberate our financial services businesses where there is no evidence that it is not safe to do so. That is what lies behind my seeking to add an additional regulatory principle.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

I declare my interests as in the register. I was not intending to begin with these remarks but I think the one thing we can all agree on is the fundamental weakness of the Bill, which is that it repatriates considerable powers to UK regulators from the EU without giving any meaningful consideration as to how these powerful bodies will be scrutinised and held accountable.

The noble Lord, Lord Bridges, has made a detailed proposal; there are others around. Somewhere in that area we have to put something on to the statute book to accompany these measures. I think that is relevant to the consideration of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. One task such a body can be asked to accomplish is to evaluate and make suggestions for more far-reaching reform. A number of the amendments in the noble Lord’s name might fall into this category and they may have quite profound effects on the way that we are regulated.

As for competition—which I also was not intending to speak about but I cannot resist it—I spent an enormous amount of effort and time, with the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and others, when we were in the other place, trying to get competition and competitiveness built into FiSMA; this was in 1998-99. We largely failed and even now we have not succeeded as much as we would like. I strongly agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said about these multi-tiered objectives and principles—operational objectives, strategic objectives, et cetera. The consequence, of course, is that they are gamed by regulators, which implement the bits that they most like and leave behind the bits that they do not like if they are all too difficult.

These two first points I have made are interlinked. Currently nobody holds regulators to account for that gaming. If we did have a more powerful body, if Parliament could have at its disposal more effective expertise—something akin, perhaps, to the NAO but much smaller and specialising in regulatory scrutiny; we will come on to this in more detail next week—we might find that the regulators stopped picking and choosing.

When I first read the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, I thought they were easy to support. They have some of the character of motherhood and apple pie about them. What could be more reasonable than that the regulator should be given the additional statutory objective of predictability and consistency? But, having thought about it a bit and discussed it with quite a few people, now I am not so sure. I am becoming concerned that, taken together—the noble Lord’s amendments are interlinked—and notwithstanding his good intentions, they could have a major effect on the conduct of financial regulation in the UK, and not altogether necessarily for the public good.

Perhaps I could step back for a moment and explain why, in the context of some of the work we did on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. The current regulatory framework derives directly from that commission, which I chaired, and from the Vickers commission. These proposals have largely been put on to the statute book and implemented, where appropriate, in the rulebook, with many of those rules being implemented only recently.

When the PCBS and subsequently the Treasury Select Committee were trying to work out how to improve the regulatory framework, which had so manifestly failed in 2008-09, we had several core purposes in mind. Among these were, first, to challenge and, where possible, expunge the box-ticking, back-covering culture which had grown up in both the regulators and the regulated community, often in the search for safe harbours—safe harbours for both of them, incidentally. In doing so, we hoped to bear down on regulatory capture—the dangerous community of interests between the regulators, the regulated and the sponsor departments, which develops at the least opportunity. I strongly agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, said about what regulators will regulate for if no one keeps an eye on them at all.

A second purpose we had in mind was to try to safeguard market entry; that is, in particular, to develop a regulatory framework that did not discourage challenger banks: regulation to competition, not from it. I mention in passing that this is very much unfinished business, to put it mildly. There are barriers to entry everywhere.

A third purpose, and closely related to the second, was to bear down on excessive legalism. Access to the law is rarely cheap and usually favours large incumbents. Regulatory barriers to entry suit them and they are difficult and expensive for small firms to deal with. Big firms can certainly look after themselves. Tracey McDermott—I am almost quoting; I tried to look up the quote just before I came in this afternoon but could not quite find it—once suggested in evidence that we catch the small fry, the big fish get away.

A related point on excessive legalism is that legal scrutiny can provide greater certainty, but after a certain point it comes at the price of effective regulation. Markets are themselves inherently uncertain. Risk-making is of its nature forward looking. It will therefore always be imperfect for the conditions in markets at any one time. Regulation can be a lot better than nothing, but there will always be regulatory failure, and there will always be some legal uncertainty.

The fourth purpose we had in mind was to limit the FCA to a narrow range of objectives and to expect it to explain in much more detail than prior to the crash how they should be applied. This lies at the heart, at least in theory, of principles-based regulation supported by guidance. Multiple objectives, as I said a moment ago, will always be gamed by the regulator. Generally, the fewer the objectives, the better.

Others may disagree with everything I have said, but I still think that those purposes, which were not the only purposes that we had in mind, were probably on the right track. What concerns me about these amendments is that, among other effects, several of them will strike at some of these core purposes. For example, building on Amendment 54, Amendment 85 seems to suggest that the regulator can make new rules only if, or will find it difficult to make new rules unless, they are fully consistent with existing rules and that they are capable of prediction. At the least, even if the regulator can make rules, can they be enforced? This is what I understand proposed new subsections (1) and (2) in that amendment to say. It seems to me that it is how the objectives of consistency and predictability will be satisfied in law. My concern is that this will restrict adaptation and enforcement by the regulator. Fast changes in markets and the creation of new markets are features of much of the financial sector. We want to encourage dynamism and creativity and it seems to me that this proposed new requirement of predictability could make it more difficult for a regulator to enforce rules to address new market developments. It certainly seems likely to make regulators more cautious about enforcement.

I heard calls on the radio today for regulation of the cryptocurrency markets. I offer no view on the merits of cryptocurrency market regulation at the moment, but if they are to be regulated and enforced, does that have to be done in a way that could have been predicted from current regulation; for example, from the regulation of securities markets? I hope not, and I may have misinterpreted. I certainly do not think that was the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, but I hope it is not the effect of his proposal.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, I once again declare my interest as an adviser to and shareholder in Banco Santander. It gives me great pleasure to open today’s proceedings. After several days of debate on this Bill, I get a sense that there is widespread agreement from all sides of the Committee on one point: the measures in this Bill to improve accountability and scrutiny are insufficient and must be strengthened. While the regulators are getting more powers, there is no commensurate increase in their scrutiny and accountability. That comes at a time when many of us were already concerned that that level of scrutiny is too low and the accountability too weak. The breadth of that concern is shown by the fact that there is cross-party support for this amendment. I thank those who put their names to it.

That said, as I have said before, in addressing our concerns we need to proceed with some care. We must get the balance right between accountability and independence and we need to avoid new forms of accountability and scrutiny, politicising the regulatory system and thereby creating uncertainty. With those caveats in mind, we need to do three things, all of which require amendments to this Bill. We need to improve the reporting by the regulators; improve parliamentary scrutiny; and—this is the purpose of these amendments, Amendments 160 to 166, to which I have put my name—improve the quality of scrutiny and accountability by providing independent and impartial assessment and analysis of two things.

First, we need an assessment of the FCA’s and PRA’s overall performance in meeting their statutory objectives and regulatory principles under FSMA 2000. Secondly, we need to provide analysis of the impact assessments for specific pieces of financial regulation so as to determine how those regulations are contributing to meeting the regulators’ objectives, also under FSMA 2000. That can be achieved, as the amendments set out, by creating an office for financial regulatory accountability, a specialist, independent, statutory advisory body, which would work to a charter set by the Government and laid before Parliament. To be clear, this is not a new concept. It has been proposed in various guises by others—and here I am thinking particularly of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, as well as the International Regulatory Strategy Group in the City of London and the London Market Group, with which I have worked on this proposal. While I accept full responsibility for any flaws in these amendments, I cannot take credit for the idea.

I shall not waste your Lordships’ time in giving a line-by-line description of each amendment, from Amendment 160 to Amendment 166, which set out the body’s role, its powers and duties and its membership and financing. I think, or rather I hope, that they all speak for themselves—and for that I am thankful for the work of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which set out precisely how these kinds of bodies should be set up and whose approach these amendments follow.

I am sure that the amendments could be improved and I would be delighted to discuss with any of your Lordships, on any side of the Committee—in particular, my noble friend the Minister—how we might do so. Rather than regurgitate what the amendments say, instead I shall address questions that may be in the minds of those who may be wary or sceptical of the need for this body.

First, is it not going to duplicate the work of the Treasury Select Committee? No, it will not. As we all know, parliamentary committees are there to hold regulators to account, not to provide the rigorous analysis needed to do so—nor do they have the capacity to do so, as we have discussed previously. Furthermore, few question whether the OBR duplicates the work of parliamentary committees; it provides analysis for Parliament and everyone else to use. The same applies here.

Secondly, will not this body duplicate the work of the cost-benefit analysis panels that the FCA and PRA will now be required to set up? No, it will draw on their work and analyse and interrogate it, but it will also take a wider view. Perhaps more important, this new body will be utterly independent of the regulators, not a body created by them—nor, for that matter, will it duplicate the work of the Regulatory Policy Committee, whose focus is on government departments.

Thirdly, what about cost: can we afford to set up this body? Of course, setting up a new body will carry cost, but I argue that this will be outweighed by its benefit. Let us not forget the enormous contribution that financial services make to our national coffers. They demand, if not deserve, special attention to ensure their regulation meets the objectives that Parliament has set.

Fourthly, will not this simply be a regulator of the regulator? No, as I have said, its role and purpose is one of analysis, to improve and inform scrutiny by and accountability to Parliament and others, period.

Finally, and most important, will this new body undermine the regulators’ independence? I argue—this is crucial—that it will do the reverse. If we have a source of independent analysis of their actions, we can have a debate about that based on fact. It should therefore strengthen the legitimacy of regulators which are fulfilling their objectives and acting in a proportionate and timely manner.

I cannot see any real objection to the overall concept. As I said, I am sure that the amendment can be improved and I look forward to hearing from others how that might be done. Given the wide support that it has, I very much hope that my noble friend the Minister will give it a supportive reply. Many of us want to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the Government on Report, not just on this point but on all the other proposals we have debated that would strengthen accountability and I stand ready to work with her and others to turn this idea into reality. I beg to move.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

I am surprised that nobody else is rising to support this; I was hoping that everyone would. I certainly agree with just about everything that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, said, but then again I agreed with just about everything that the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Noakes, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, and others said on 20 February, about all this. We are all agreed because we can all see the same problem. As has been suggested, the Bill confers huge new powers on the regulators, repatriated from the EU, without making any meaningful suggestions to make them more accountable when they exercise those powers. I will support any and all amendments that improve scrutiny and accountability until and unless the Government come forward with a meaningful proposal of their own. I will come to how they might go about that in a moment.

Our first job as a Committee must be to make sure that the Government grasp that we just cannot carry on as we are. I am not sure that Ministers and, in particular, the Treasury have fully grasped how inadequate the existing structure of accountability is. There are four major bodies that should be contributing and all of them, in their various ways, will be defective. There is the NAO, but we cannot rely on VFM studies alone; the Treasury is frequently conflicted in its relationship with both the regulators; nor can we rely on the boards of those bodies. In principle, there should be some rigorous internal challenge—and that achieves a lot in some regulators—but in practice the boards are all too easily captured by the senior executives and there is a massive problem of asymmetric information.

As the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, said, parliamentary Select Committees should be on the case, and frequently they are, but on the current resources available to them it is simply not reasonable to expect them fully to plug the gap, particularly given their range of other responsibilities —at least not in enough detail on a sustained basis to make the difference that I think most of the Committee thinks is necessary.

The clearest evidence that something needs to be done is the performance of the regulators themselves. Among the many criticisms of the financial regulators have been neglect of some of their objectives and duties, a box-ticking culture, excessive and unnecessary regulation stifling innovation—the “confetti before quality” problem—and inadequate ex post scrutiny of existing rules, without which a steady one-way ratchet develops right across the regulatory piece. A slow and legalistic approach is also a frequent complaint.

In defence of the financial regulators, for the most part they are in much better shape since the crash. That shook them to the core—indeed, one of them was split. Both the Bank and the FCA provide much better explanations for their actions and decisions than prior to the crash. No doubt some of the criticisms have been levelled unfairly, but not all of them.

In any case, we are not in a steady state. With new powers conferred by the Bill will come more of what has come to be known as the restless regulator syndrome. As the regulators identify new problems—real, imaginary or media fuelled—the risk must be of further inadequately considered additions to the rulebook. If the Government can be brought to agree that something needs to be done, one or more of at least three routes to forcing greater accountability are available.

First of all, and in principle the most attractive route for the Government, could be to try to pre-empt pressure from Parliament by creating their own much more rigorous scrutiny team at the heart of Whitehall, probably in the Cabinet Office. A body such as that could do some good work, but I am not convinced that it could fend off the vested interests that all too easily cluster around the sponsor departments at the moment and will no doubt cluster around such a group in the Cabinet Office over time.

A second approach has been set up by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, today. It is the statutory independence of the body he proposes that makes it particularly attractive. Like the OBR, on which I think it is modelled, it has a reasonable chance of fending off those lobby groups. Therefore, I will certainly support his proposal if it is put to a vote.

But by far the most straightforward approach would be for Parliament to plug the accountability gap directly, as colleagues from all sides of the Committee have suggested, by creating its own specialist scrutiny committee. To be effective, a new committee would need support from a small group of specialists in financial regulation, much as the PAC is supported by audit specialists from the NAO, now a much larger group. This body would need only a small group, but it cannot hope to rely on the kind of very ad hoc tiny group, without institutional memory across Parliaments after elections, that Select Committees rely on at the moment.

Furthermore, in my view the committee—the Joint Committee, if some want that—would need to empower the specialists in a number of ways. Among the tools that should be considered are powers to see all people and papers, the authority to embed experienced and specialist staff into the Bank or the FCA where a particular concern has been identified, and the power to attend key decision-making committees to check out the quality of governance in regulators. In theory, all Select Committees have those powers already, but in practice, for various reasons, few use them fully. Those powers were all deployed to good effect by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards without being disruptive to the work of regulators.

My main concern about this whole issue is that the Government will now listen carefully to what we have all said and murmur friendly noises but do nothing. The Minister told the Committee on 20 February that

“it is not for the Government to impose”—[Official Report, 20/2/23; col. GC 394.]

a scrutiny tool on Parliament. I understand where she is coming from but, as she well knows, that is not a strong line. If the Government come forward with a worked-up proposal for a new committee with adequate staff support—that is essential—and commit to supporting a change to Standing Orders to implement that reform, it will happen. If they did so, I for one would reconsider my support for statutory reform of scrutiny, and I think many others would too.

I think the Minister is listening—she certainly is now. I hope that her department and a couple of Treasury Ministers in the Commons listen to her and that she will tell us in a moment that she has been listening carefully and agrees to this amendment or to the lion’s share of what was said on 20 February.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I regret that I was not able to take part at Second Reading as I was working in the United States. I hope I have the indulgence of the Committee to make some comments on this set of amendments. As someone who has chaired a major regulator, I found the representation of the principles and approach to regulation as “vague” a rather chilling remark.

What we have seen with the amendments of the noble Lord, Lilley, and those who have supported them, is an attempt significantly to change the entire philosophy on which the regulatory system has so successfully developed in this country. That philosophy has been based on principles-based regulations. Those principles are not vague, as has been asserted; they are determined by Parliament. The rules have then been developed on the basis of serving an industry which is dynamic and continuously changing, unlike the building industry, many of whose practices have not changed since Tudor England.

The fact that the regulatory system can adapt to a rapidly changing industry has been a source of considerable strength within our regulatory system. If we are to introduce an entirely different legal approach, that has to be argued out. There should be a Green Paper, a White Paper and a proper Bill saying that the regulatory approach in this country is going to be fundamentally changed. That is what I fear: the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, would effectively introduce a wedge of change that would fit very uncomfortably with the current structure.

On the other hand, I support the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and particularly commend the remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Hill and Lord Forsyth. They argued that although this new accountability device—this new entity—would deal with, let us say, the technical side of regulatory issues, we still need a parliamentary committee to deal with the political side because regulation is both highly technical and has an essential political core. That is why we need both components. Therefore, I strongly support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and the views put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Hill and Lord Forsyth, on the need for the dual structure to ensure a proper level of both technical and political accountability.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

First, I declare my interest as in the register. I am deeply concerned about this second set of amendments; they could have a profound impact on and consequences for the SMR, the ombudsman’s service and the RDC in particular, and I shall go through each in turn. I strongly agree with what has just been said about the nature of regulation and the risks of moving at such pace to a wholly different approach, bearing in mind for how many decades this system has been in place and has become understood and accepted—at some cost, by the way, and, therefore, changing it is itself something whose costs we need to bear in mind.

On the question of predictability, consistency and unintended consequences, in response to an earlier amendment I cited abuse of cryptocurrency technology, which might be made more difficult for the regulator to adapt to if it has to show that what it has done was predictable on the basis of existing law. That could be spread betting or, to take a topical example of 15 years ago, asset-backed securities. I am extremely nervous about including this without substantial consultation, which should be preceded by a detailed explanation of what is intended. We have not had any of that, and it is certainly not suitable to be put in this Bill.

Although I have not said very much so far on the Bill, I fear I will speak at some length on these three areas, which in my view are crucial to providing fairness and making sure that we are better prepared for the next financial crash that will inevitably come.

As I read Amendment 169, it would create a defence before the Upper Tribunal, and possibly a complete defence if a person could show that they had acted reasonably and in good faith. That might sound quite reasonable in itself—more apple pie—but a defence of reasonableness and good faith would mean that if an individual did not know about a problem, he could not be held responsible for it. That would be goodbye to the SMR, at least, as an effective regulatory tool. It strikes me as likely to reintroduce all the gateways to unacceptable risk and risk taking that the SMR was designed to expunge.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

As I have said, I will set out further detail on the consultation process in writing. It is worth just noting that this question was also considered by Parliament through the Treasury Select Committee in its report The Future Framework for Regulation of Financial Services, which said that

“The creation of a new independent body to assess whether regulators were fulfilling their statutory objectives would not remove the responsibility of this Committee to hold the regulators to account, and it would also add a further body to the financial services regulatory regime which we would need to scrutinise.”

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Can the Minister explain whether that constitutes opposition? I had a cup of tea with the chairman of the Treasury Select Committee only the day before yesterday to try to establish exactly that. She is fully supportive of the idea—we ought to get that on the record—although I should also say that she had not specifically consulted her committee on it.

The Minister must see that the Government are probably going to lose a vote on this at Report. Would she be prepared to sit down with a group of us to see whether we can work up some sort of proposal that she might be prepared to accept? To make that meeting effective, in the meantime, would she be prepared to ask her officials, on a contingency basis and without any commitment at all on her part, to write down on the back of an envelope—a long envelope, I admit—what it is that might conceivably, in certain circumstances, be acceptable to the Government?

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Tyrie]

8: After Clause 23, insert the following new Clause—
“Regulatory Decisions Committee
(1) The FCA must establish and maintain a committee to be known as the Regulatory Decisions Committee (the RDC). (2) The purpose of the RDC will be to take contested enforcement decisions on behalf of the FCA.(3) The RDC must, in its decision-making function, be operationally independent of the FCA.(4) The chair of the RDC must be nominated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and such nomination only has effect if confirmed by the Treasury Select Committee in the House of Commons.(5) All other members of the RDC must be nominated by the FCA Board, and such nominations only have effect if approved by the chair.(6) Members’ appointment must be for a fixed term to be determined by the FCA, with such term to be no more than five years.(7) Members of the RDC may be appointed for up to two terms.(8) The FCA Board may remove a member of the RDC, but only in the event of that member's misconduct or incapacity.(9) All members of the RDC including its chairman and deputy chairs, must be operationally independent.(10) For the purpose of subsection (9), a person is not operationally independent if they are an employee of the FCA or any other UK financial regulator.(11) Other than those for purely administrative purposes, all interactions between the FCA and members of the RDC relating to any specific potential enforcement actions must be minuted and disclosed to any person potentially subject to that action.(12) The FCA must make available to the RDC sufficient resources, including legal advisers and support staff, to enable it to perform its function of determining fairly and expeditiously the matters which it is required to consider.(13) Such staff may be employees of the FCA but must be operationally independent of FCA staff involved in conducting investigations and presenting cases to the RDC.(14) The Chair of the RDC must, at least once per year, deliver a report to the FCA, His Majesty’s Treasury, and the Treasury Select Committee in the House of Commons. Such report must address at least—(a) the extent to which the RDC was able, in the period under review, to determine fairly and expeditiously the matters which it was required to consider,(b) the resourcing of the RDC, and the extent to which the resources available to it have been sufficient to enable it to perform its functions, and(c) the independence of the RDC, and in particular any circumstances or events where any impression of partiality, bias or undue access by the FCA to the RDC may have arisen.”

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

I declare my interest as a consultant to DLA Piper, which helped me with drafting the amendment.

The need to provide the RDC with statutory autonomy was a recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which I chaired in 2013. The purpose of my amendment is to give the FCA’s internal watchdog, the Regulatory Decisions Committee, greater independence by putting it on a statutory footing. I set out why this is necessary in Committee so I will not repeat all those arguments now but, in a nutshell, the benefit will be greater fairness for firms and individuals; it can be accomplished without compromising high-quality enforcement.

The case for this is pretty straightforward. The RDC was created to act as a check on what would otherwise be the FCA’s almost untrammelled power of enforcement. The RDC is the FCA’s in-house watchdog —a second pair of eyes—which can stop an enforcement action. In theory, firms could go to the Upper Tribunal, the equivalent of the High Court, but that is very costly and the fact that its proceedings are in public creates huge reputational risk for a firm or individual going there. For many of them, that can be terminal. So, the RDC is often the only practical safeguard they have against overly zealous enforcement by the FCA.

The problem for the RDC is that it does not have enough statutory authority to do the job as well as it should. At the moment, the RDC’s operational independence is wafer-thin. For a start, the RDC is subordinate to the FCA board. The board can and does decide what type of cases the RDC looks at, what resources are available to it and what procedures it should follow. The RDC also sits down the corridor from the enforcement team in the FCA. So it is small wonder that firms think it is much less than fully independent.

The price of the perception that the RDC is not fully independent is not just a sense of unfairness among some in the regulated community; it also carries a significant economic cost. It acts as a deterrent to activity and investment to many who do not want to take a risk of being on the wrong side of the enforcers. It is for these reasons, among others, that the Parliamentary Banking Commission, which I chaired, concluded that the RDC should be provided with statutory autonomy for its operations.

No doubt the Minister will have been briefed by the FCA, via her Treasury officials, that all these changes that I have set out are unnecessary—but they are necessary. The dangers that come with lack of independence have recently been vividly illustrated by the FCA board’s decision significantly to limit the scope of the RDC’s activities. There was very little public discussion. As of 2021, it no longer supervises the FCA’s decisions relating to a firm’s licensing, authorisations—the specific activities permitted under its licence—or an individual’s approval: that is, whether people are suitable for senior appointments under the senior managers’ regime. It also leaves firms and individuals unable to make oral representations in front of the RDC for many decisions that are crucial to their future. For many cases, those oral representations have now been closed down under the 2021 reforms.

So the narrowing of the remit will matter a lot, particularly for smaller firms. What is more, it will drive a coach and horses through the RDC’s already fragile independence and certainly through the perception of it. The fact that such a change could have been pushed through by the FCA board, after a consultation exercise which did not even support it, illustrates the need for much greater accountability and much better explanations from the regulator. Something was already needed in 2013 when we looked at this, to boost the RDC’s operational independence, but this 2021 reform shows that it is even more badly needed now. The modest amendment on the Marshalled List will entrench the RDC’s independence in statute. It will give the RDC the jurisdiction to challenge—publicly, if necessary —FCA board decisions that are relevant to its work, and it will create a direct statutory line of accountability to Parliament for everything it does.

Since 2013, I have scarcely heard any arguments against the banking commission’s proposal and, since I raised these issues in early March, I have been flooded with support from all sides of the financial services industry, and from a number of Peers and several former senior regulators. Two former Cabinet Secretaries have contacted me to tell me they strongly support it, as has the right reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. This is quite a large collection of varied support for a relatively small but sensible measure. They have done this, I think, because it has clear upsides, and neither they nor I can think of any downsides. It does not even carry an Exchequer cost.

I very much hope that the Minister will not be the last opponent standing when she stands up, but, if she is unpersuaded, I very much hope that she will at least agree to a consultation taking place on whether something should be done to boost the RDC’s independence, with an open mind on what should be needed. In that conciliatory frame of mind, I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I had the privilege of adding my name to this amendment, and of serving with the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, in his pre-Lordship days, when he chaired the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Like virtually everyone else who was on that committee and had spent two years taking evidence across the full range of issues that underpinned the crisis of 2008 and 2009, we were very surprised that the Government did not seize upon the recommendations for a body such as the RDC to have the kind of statutory independence that is described in this amendment. The amendment is extremely well drafted, as anybody reading it can recognise. It is not one of those where people say that the idea is good but there is a problem with the language. In this instance, there is not.

I have always thought that the regulator benefits as much as anybody else from oversight and challenge by an independent body with the requisite expertise. I also have the privilege of sitting in the Economic Affairs Committee. We have had discussions in the context of the independence of the Bank of England, but this has far broader implications. The problems of groupthink are becoming extraordinarily evident. Creating independence in a body such as the RDC is a mechanism for breaking down some of that groupthink. It is not because people are bad, incompetent or inadequate, but because, if there is not a process of challenge with sufficient gusto, groupthink begins to take hold. There begins to be a measure of complacency, people become less inclined to challenge and that benefits none of us.

I see no downside to the Government accepting this amendment. I hope that they take it extremely seriously and recognise that the quality of the language is here, meaning that they can run with this amendment as it sits, and that the regulator will benefit, the industry will benefit and individuals will benefit. There are very few occasions when one can look at a measure and say that this is true on all those fronts.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, for raising this important issue through Amendment 8. The Regulatory Decisions Committee, or RDC, takes contested enforcement decisions on behalf of the FCA where the FCA has not been able to settle a case with the relevant firm. The Government recognise that the RDC performs a critical function within the regulatory framework. FSMA requires that decision-makers are independent, and the design of the RDC reflects this.

It is important that the RDC makes decisions fairly and transparently. To ensure this, the members of the RDC are wholly independent of the FCA’s executive. The RDC also has its own team of support staff and legal advisers. This structure ensures that FCA personnel involved in the investigation of the enforcement case are not involved in supporting the RDC in its final decision-making.

As noble Lords noted, the FCA has recently made a number of operational changes to transfer decision-making responsibilities in certain cases from the RDC to the FCA executive, which will increase the speed of decision-making. However, decisions in contested enforcement cases continue to be made by the RDC.

In addition, should a firm or senior manager disagree with the final enforcement decision taken against them by the RDC, they generally have the right to refer the case to the Upper Tribunal. Where decisions fall to FCA executives, the relevant parties retain the right to make representations in writing. The FCA will also consider taking oral representations in exceptional circumstances, when not doing so would be detrimental to the fairness of decision-making. As set out above, the decisions made by FCA executives can also be referred to the Upper Tribunal should a firm disagree with them.

Any proposed legislative changes to the structure of the FCA’s supervision and enforcement framework should be subject to appropriate public consultation. As we have discussed previously during the passage of the Bill, the Government sought views from stakeholders on the operation of the future regulatory framework through a review. However, we concluded during that review that the case had not been made for changes to the FCA’s enforcement and supervision functions given that these responsibilities were not increasing as a result of the UK’s departure from the EU, unlike the significant increase in its rule-making responsibilities, which was the focus of the review and the subsequent enhancements made by the Bill.

Nevertheless, I am grateful to the noble Lord for bringing the importance of the FCA’s supervisory and enforcement framework to the Government’s attention. The Government do not see the need for legislative change in this area at this time. However, we support the noble Lord’s aim to ensure greater independent scrutiny of and accountability within the regulatory framework. The Economic Secretary and I will look at this issue further, outside the passage of this Bill, to ensure that the FCA’s supervisory and enforcement framework remains appropriate as it takes on new powers. We will continue to listen to the views of the noble Lord and other stakeholders as we do so.

I have also raised the issue with the FCA, and will pass on the response with further detail on the decisions and changes made to the operation of the RDC to this House. Therefore, I hope, for the reasons I have set out, that at this stage the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment and continue this conversation further outside the passage of the Bill.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

I would be grateful for an opportunity to respond to a few of the points made there. Before I say anything more, I should say I have discussed this amendment on a couple of occasions with the Minister. If she does not mind my saying so, she makes a first-rate fist of doing an impossible job. I also hope she does not mind my saying that from time to time—and this was one of them—I had the impression that people in other places are pulling a number of the strings. That does give me cause for concern.

I will just make a few brief points. The Government have set great store by the Edinburgh reforms. They are designed to bolster business confidence and investment, and make sure that regulation and the threat of enforcement do not end up damaging the UK’s pre-eminence in financial services, among other things. But if the Edinburgh reforms mean anything, they must mean that measures such as this—which would give businesses, particularly smaller businesses, greater confidence that they would be protected from arbitrary enforcement—should be seriously considered. I regret that they are being dismissed somewhat peremptorily.

The Minister said that oral representation is still possible before the RDC. I will not read out the FCA’s response to the consultation, to which I referred earlier, in full, but if she were to go back and look at it, she will see that it has been effectively closed down for all but exceptional cases. It is that opportunity to have a private conversation with the RDC that is so greatly valued—I see the noble Lord who served on the RDC is agreeing—on both sides: on the RDC side and by firms. The RDC dose a very difficult job and does it very well, but it needs more empowerment. I regret that the Government are getting in the way of that.

My last substantive point takes us right back to where we started. Frankly, we have not heard a substantive argument against this proposal from the Front Bench just now, for the simple reason, I think, that there are not any. We have heard the suggestion that firms can still go to the Upper Tribunal, but there was no response to the points made that the Upper Tribunal is not a practical option for a very large proportion of the regulated community, both on grounds of cost and on reputational risk grounds, because it is held in public. I find the arguments adduced for not doing it to be frankly incomprehensible.

The only real opponent of this left is the FCA itself. I would like to end just by drawing one conclusion from that point. It is very concerning that, when a regulator has a vested interest in an issue such as this, it can succeed in knocking down a sensible proposal with scarcely any explanation, and can persuade the Treasury that it should be knocked down and that the advice of that regulator should be taken without challenge. At that point, we are into a self-reinforcing spiral of ever more powerful regulation. That is exactly why, in so many different ways, Members on all sides of the House have come to the conclusion that we must have better accountability of the regulators, particularly the financial regulators, if we are to carry on handing them more powers, as is intended in the Bill.

Having said all that, seeing as I do not have the troops just now, I will withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.