European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to make clear my unequivocal support for the last three speeches. The critical issue that my noble friend Lord Adonis raised on the interplay between the various clauses that deal with the timing and the possibilities of how that could go wrong and the points made by my noble friend Lord Hain and also the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, on the sovereignty of Parliament seem to me to be right at the very heart of what the whole process in this House is about. It is either about us assuming the responsibilities that we are supposed to have and display, or it is about giving Ministers what they have plainly wanted throughout, which is the ability to take decisions irrespective of what Parliament might wish. I hope that Ministers will not be tedious enough to get up and deny that this is what they have been trying to do. At every key stage of this process, whether in front of the Supreme Court or elsewhere, it has been essential to force out of the Government an understanding of the role of Parliament and that Parliament will not be set aside.

Like everybody else, I have of course thought hard about why anybody would put a hard date into a clause of a Bill of this kind. Why would you do it? The answer is that it is a party management issue—and only a party management issue. I am sure that many noble Lords on the Government’s side of the House will recognise that there are costs and disadvantages alongside what they might regard as advantages in taking the steps that they have taken. But the advantage they perceive—which seems to outweigh everything else—is that they can say with conviction to the people who are determined that we leave, crash out, or go any which way out of the European Union that they have set a hard date and have in some sense given certainty by virtue of that. I believe—and I think in this debate the House overall is likely to believe—that the complexities with which this country and this Parliament are faced in trying to deal with this absolutely massive constitutional, economic, security and every other kind of issue means that the setting of a hard date is about as arbitrary a thing as you could conceivably do in the circumstances.

In his response to the last debate, which I regret I found very limited, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said of a number of the amendments that they required reports to be made and the dates for many of those reports were arbitrary. There could scarcely be a more arbitrary date than this date, when almost nothing has been learned so far about the Government’s intentions and when there is absolutely no certainty that we will learn any more about those intentions. The fact is that setting a date makes it more or less impossible to conceive of all the different elements being drawn together with sufficient coherence for any of us to exercise that final act of parliamentary authority that we have all been promised.

I recall just three, four or perhaps five weeks ago, the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, spoke on industrial strategy. He made the telling point that, whenever we deal with people from other countries who have strong industrial strategies, strong industrial histories and a great deal of success in all those, we go about it believing that our native wit and wisdom is so superior to all of them that we can constantly get exactly what we want from them and they will never have a presentable argument to put to us. The noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, quite rightly said that if you look at the countries where we tend to take that view—Germany, Japan, China now and the United States—you come across people who are extremely competent at developing industries and strategies, who have views and will argue for those views and who may very well prevail. In this discussion about what future trade will be like, those arguments will be displayed with great ability and, I have no doubt, will not be the pushover that many on the Government Benches seem to think they will be.

I suspect that one argument that will be made about having a hard date is that it focuses negotiation and is a means of drawing a negotiation to some sort of conclusion. I have said before in your Lordships’ House—and I do not say it to cause offence—that my experience is that, by and large, politicians are not the best negotiators that you ever come across. Many of us have spent parts of our lives as trade union negotiators or general secretaries of trade unions, have done negotiation in government, in the Foreign Office—in my case—and so on or have spent a great deal of their lives negotiating in business and in industry. I say without any doubt in my mind that if I wanted to make my life more difficult in any negotiation, I would say, “Here is the deadline”, and let everybody else stretch me out across the rack that I had made for myself, because that would be the easiest thing that they could conceivably do—and they will do it. If you are in a position of enormous strength, I guess you could say, “Well, we have set a date, we are going to push everybody else along”. But if you are not in a position of enormous strength and if, peradventure, you are in a position of enormous weakness, everybody else will take the maximum possible advantage and they will succeed.

I have heard some of the comments made by others who have business experience, and I draw attention to my entries in the register as well. In business, I have never once seen the weaker party in a negotiation have any advantage out of a fixed deadline. If we ever needed to learn that in spades, we would look at what is happening in Northern Ireland now and the constant setting of deadlines—which has happened in the past—only to find that the people of violence, or the people who have been prepared to allow people of violence to push the envelope further, have always been those who took the greatest advantage of it and made it more or less impossible for anybody else to make real progress.

I hope that we will not trap ourselves in that way. These amendments give us a means of not trapping us in that way, and I urge all noble Lords to give us the best chance we can have, rather than the worst.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I do not wish to emulate either the forensic skill or the eloquence of those who have already contributed to the debate but rather ask the Minister a very specific question. He will be aware that in Clause 14—the interpretation clause—there is a specific reference to exit day, which is spelled out in subsection (4):

“A Minister of the Crown may by regulations—


(a) amend the definition of ‘exit day’ in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom, and


(b) amend subsection (2) in consequence of any such amendment”.


As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said, that is secondary legislation. The Minister will be only too well aware that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, on which I serve on behalf of your Lordships’ House, is already very critical of the number of powers that Ministers are taking under this Bill, not least because it sets a precedent for powers that will be expected by Ministers under subsequent Bills in the series that relate to Brexit. Therefore, it is important for your Lordships’ House to be told very clearly at this stage by what process the Government intend to put that secondary legislation before the two Houses of Parliament. Will it be by the negative resolution, the affirmative resolution or, indeed, the super-affirmative resolution, as that completely changes the way in which Parliament will be able to exert its control, as noble Lords have suggested? If the process is to be undertaken by negative resolution, that is very limited and the powers of the two Houses of Parliament would be so undermined as to be laughable. If it is to be done by the affirmative resolution, there is more opportunity for discussion and either House can decide what should be done in those circumstances. However, I suspect we will be told that this has to be done with such speed that it will have to be done by an accelerated process, which will inevitably mean that there is no proper opportunity for either House to decide whether we agree with this process.

The super-affirmative process may well be selected. The Minister may be better informed than most Ministers on the Government Front Bench but I defy him to spell out to the House this evening which of these options will be put in place. This is of critical importance. We should not just sweep away this opportunity to take this decision. As all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate have said, it is an extremely important one which will colour the views of your Lordships’ House when we look at some of the other powers that Ministers seek to take under the Bill. Again, I refer to the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. If we really are taking back control, here is an early opportunity for the Government to show who exactly is taking back control.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, I am somewhat confused by this debate because it has been suggested that the Government have taken a hard line in saying that a decision should be reached on our future relationship with the EU by 29 March next year. It is not the Government’s date; it is the Article 50 date as drafted—as the noble Lord, Lord Hain, acknowledged —by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, one afternoon in his garden in Brussels, when he decided that it should be two years from the moment when Article 50 was moved. Therefore, it is not our date, it is the EU’s date, or, more precisely, the date of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. I do not quite know why we are now saying that somehow this is the Government taking a hard line. When the House of Commons voted by an overwhelming majority to move Article 50, surely that was on the understanding that the negotiations would be completed in two years from when it was moved. Therefore, we now seem to want to go against the other place and tell it that it has decided on the wrong date.

On top of that, the EU has made it clear that it wants the negotiations to be completed not by 29 March 2019 but by October or November this year, so it is bringing the date forward. I do not accept the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, on deadlines. Perhaps he found deadlines inconvenient when he was a trade union negotiator, but it strikes me that they are the only thing which works when you are negotiating with the EU, and that everything seems to be decided at the last minute. It is important that we keep to 29 March next year and I would be very unhappy if that were changed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

I am sorry to disappoint the noble Baroness, but we will be having a number of Brexit Bills, not least of which will be the withdrawal agreement and the implementation Bill, once we have reached agreement. I shall endeavour to respond to all the questions that I have been asked.

Repealing the European Communities Act is an important step to ensure that there is maximum clarity on the law that will apply in the UK after we leave the EU. I cannot see the sense in needing a separate Act to repeal the European Communities Act. This repeal in Clause 1 is front and centre of the Bill; indeed, this Bill was originally called the great repeal Bill. To prevent this Bill from repealing the European Communities Act would undermine perhaps the most important part of it.

I suspect that I have read the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, correctly when I say that he would prefer the European Communities Act to be repealed in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that was announced by the Secretary of State in November. That Bill would then deal with the implementation period and our relationship to EU law during that period. This may be founded on the misconception that, if Parliament does not repeal the European Communities Act and appoint an exit day, that will somehow prevent the UK exiting the EU. If that is the case, I am sorry that I have to disappoint the noble Lord: our leaving the EU is a matter of international law, and we are leaving no matter what is or is not done to the European Communities Act.

I will address the noble Lord’s question about exit day and procedure. What will become Section 14(4)—currently Clause 14(4)—could be used to change the exit day in the Bill only if the Article 50 period were to be extended; it could not be used to prevent us leaving the EU. That is a matter of international rather than domestic law. The exercise of Section 14(4) to alter the exit day in domestic law in accordance with Article 50 would be subject—in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler—to the affirmative procedure in both Houses. I will give more detail on that in a minute. We do not expect to use this power and we are leaving the EU on 29 March 2019.

The noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked further questions about our exit day and the amendment. In the other place we tabled an amendment which set exit day in order to provide certainty and clarity, and we accepted further amendments on the issue, again to provide further clarity. The amendments set the exit day in the Bill as 11 pm on 29 March 2019, while retaining the technical ability to amend the date at a later stage. As I said, that can happen only if the European Council—including the UK, of course—unanimously decides to change the date on which the treaties cease to apply to the UK, as set out in the famous Article 50. We do not intend this to happen.

I will give the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, more detail on his point. Any change to exit day in domestic law under the power of what will become Section 14(4) will be by the affirmative procedure, guaranteeing a vote in both Houses. The affirmative procedure in this instance is provided for in paragraph 10 of Schedule 7.

Providing for the date of the repeal of the 1972 Act in the Bill that implements our withdrawal agreement might seem tidy in certain scenarios, but it would put the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse in what I feel would be quite a dangerous way. Both the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period are, of course, still matters for negotiation. This Bill, being agnostic on the negotiations, is designed to prepare the statute book for our withdrawal. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that there will be additional legislation to implement our withdrawal agreement. As I said a moment ago, this Bill is designed to implement the clearly expressed will of the British people to leave the EU, and therefore the date of repeal is set at the point that the UK will fall out of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

There are many demands on parliamentary time, as we know to our cost, and this is the Bill that will prepare our statute book for exit. The amendment would force the date of repeal into the agenda of another Bill. This is the right time and place for the debate on the repeal of the ECA, and the debate should incorporate all the additional context and provisions necessary for a smooth exit. Indeed, if we did not reach an agreement and the second of the noble Lord’s amendments were agreed, we would be in a state almost of paradox. To repeal the ECA, the Government would be compelled to enact a statute for the purposes of Clause 9(1) of the Bill— a clause which itself is predicated on the existence of a withdrawal agreement. So we would be forced to enact a statute enabling us to approve the final terms of the withdrawal agreement and set the date of the repeal of the European Communities Act without such a withdrawal agreement existing. That is too much of a logical conundrum to ask any Bill to bear, and not an acceptable way to go about legislating.

Clause 1 will provide certainty to businesses and individuals that the European Communities Act will be repealed on exit day. Any attempt to change this while negotiations are ongoing would lead only to a lack of clarity on the law that will apply in the UK after we leave the EU. This would run counter to the primary aim of the Bill, so I hope that the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Tyler]

I am grateful to the Minister for seeking to clarify the point about process, and I take on board what he said about paragraph 10 of Schedule 7. But will he give an absolute undertaking to the Committee that there will be no attempt to accelerate the process? I think he would accept that, if the Minister in this case were seeking to do something at speed, for expediency’s sake—surely that would be the only circumstance in which it would be necessary to change the date—it would be extremely difficult to give both Houses of Parliament advance notice and the usual time for consultation. Is the Minister giving us an absolute undertaking that the normal process and timescale will apply and that there will be no attempt to accelerate the process?

[Lord Callanan]

Yes, I am giving the noble Lord an assurance that the normal timescale of the affirmative procedure for statutory instruments would apply in this case.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and I shall speak to Amendment 126, which is in my name and those of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. Amendment 126 would bring Clause 8 into line with Clauses 7 and 9.

Taxation matters can be dealt with by statutory instrument. For example, they can restrict relief from Customs and Excise duties or VAT under the Customs and Excise Duties (General Reliefs) Act 1979. But taxation, as it is normally and properly understood, is undoubtedly a matter for primary legislation. What is troubling here is the potential width of these powers and the lack of indication of how the Government intend to use them.

The Delegated Powers Committee’s 12th report says:

“At committee stage in the House of Commons, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Mr Robin Walker) indicated that the power to tax by statutory instrument in clause 8 was needed because the power was not available under clause 7”—


that is true enough. It continued by saying that,

“furthermore, taxation might be needed to ‘comply with international arrangements’”.

The committee then pointed out, and I entirely endorse what it said:

“The question which remains unanswered is why taxation by Ministers in statutory instruments is an acceptable alternative to taxation”,


approved by Parliament, with the normal rigour of the process, in primary legislation.

The Minister will need to give your Lordships some very hard examples of why a statutory instrument would be used and not primary legislation. If that is not known at this stage, the withdrawal and implementation Bill we are promised might well be the vehicle for making those changes in primary legislation, if the precise requirements are known at that stage. But this potentially wide power to tax by statutory instrument is, as I say, more than troubling. I am not suggesting that indications of how a power is expected to be used will in themselves suffice, although they should give your Lordships a clue to why the power is required, which is perhaps a more important question to address. What matters, of course, is what ends up in the Act. The use of the power then will not be trammelled by reassuring indications of how, at this stage, it is expected to be used.

Perhaps I may finish by enlarging on my noble friend Lord Turnbull’s masterly catalogue of fees and charges and their various characteristics, to add another category. In the financial procedure of the House of Commons, a fee that is levied and then applied for the good of the industry as a whole is not treated as a tax, so it does not require ways and means cover. As I say, that is merely a footnote to my noble friend’s excellent speech.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I am a co-signatory to Amendment 126, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, said. I want to underline a couple of the points he has made. This amendment derives, as he said, from the work of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House, which, I remind the House, is cross-party and non-party. It is entirely devoted to advising the House on important issues relating to the way we handle secondary legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has been characteristically modest in not quoting the committee’s specific comment, which is very powerful. It said at paragraph 20(c):

“The Government should demonstrate a convincing case (if one exists) before the supremacy of the House of Commons in financial matters gives way to taxation by statutory instrument”.


This may be only a minor incident, but it is part of a much bigger pattern. I worry—I am getting old, I think—that Ministers and civil servants do not seem to have spent quite so much time with their history books as I used to when I took a degree in that subject. The power of Parliament to hold the Executive to account in matters of taxation goes back beyond even the 300 years to which the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, referred. It could be said to go back to Magna Carta or Simon de Montfort’s Parliament, or indeed to the decision of our colonial cousins to declare independence: “No taxation without representation”.

This is very sensitive territory. We are surely entitled to demand a full explanation of why the regulations under Clause 8, unlike those under Clauses 7 and 9, may impose new taxation or increase taxation, allowing the supremacy of the House of Commons in financial matters to give way to taxation by secondary legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, referred to some discussions that took place in the other place on 13 December, when the Minister, Robin Walker, sought to explain why the provisions of Clause 7 could not apply and why Clause 8 was necessary. I shall quote him in detail because I think it is important:

“In addition, there are restrictions on the use of clause 7 relating to, for example, taxation that might, in some circumstances, prevent important changes to comply with international arrangements from being made. We need this power because we need to be prepared for all eventualities”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/12/17; col. 557.]


There are three triggers there: “taxation”, “important changes”—this is not just trivial stuff—and “all eventualities”. Throughout discussion on the Bill, we have constantly been told that Ministers require a great deal of room for manoeuvre and flexibility; they need to be able to move fast. In this case, they have made the case themselves for proper discussion and consideration. Matters relating to taxation in these circumstances require the most composite and careful care. We should be seeking comprehensive scrutiny, not the usual approval of SIs.

If any noble Lords on the Conservative Benches think these are trivial issues, I invite them to consider how a future Government of a distinctly different colour might choose to use these unprecedented powers in relation to taxation. The very important role of Parliament is here before your Lordships’ House today. I know we will be told of the need for speed, flexibility, expediency et cetera, and that all the usual excuses for slipshod legislation will be trotted out, but this is an issue of considerable principle and of considerable responsibility for your Lordships’ House and the other place, and we must do what we can to assist it to fulfil that responsibility. Whether or not Brexit actually happens, these amendments to this clause are of huge long-term importance. We could be establishing a precedent for taxation being treated as a secondary issue, rather than as a matter that should always come in the form of primary legislation.

I was disappointed not to have been able to be here last Wednesday for the Committee, but I noted with admiration the range of expertise from all over the House and the eloquence with which it was deployed. This is not an area we can simply wave through as though it were just some small technical question. This goes to the very heart of the balance between government and Parliament. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, who last week quoted the late Lord Hailsham warning of a slide towards “elective dictatorship”. We are back there again this afternoon, and I say amen to that.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, before the noble Baroness leaves the issue of fees, it was fairly clear earlier that the House probably would not accept that fees could be charged without primary legislation: we do not accept that the power to do that should be by secondary legislation. Assuming that we win on that, which I think we might, when we come to Report, I think it unlikely that the House will want to accept the idea that those fees could then be hiked by a Minister without coming through the affirmative procedure. Given that the Minister said that she would look at this in the broader context that this is a new power to set up fees for new functions being brought over, raising them without an affirmative procedure is perhaps a step too far.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

Further to that point, am I not right in thinking that the reference back under the amendment to Part 1 of Schedule 4 means that we are talking about public authorities, not just Ministers? Will the Minister comment on the number of organisations that may fall into this category? I recall a previous discussion where it was clear that literally hundreds of organisations might be making such modifications to taxes or charges. So this is not, in her words, a small, technical matter; it could apply to a large number of organisations which could impose considerable increases in taxes and charges.

--- Later in debate ---

The amendments in this group are intended to help us find a way of doing both those things.

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, I am an eternal optimist, which somehow goes with the territory of being a Liberal.

What a wonderful thing it would be if out of this dismal, divisive, deceptive process we could achieve a modest but beneficial change to the way in which Parliament works. This group of amendments, all of which I enthusiastically support, offers a very timely, perhaps even unique, opportunity to improve the co-ordination between the two Houses in our joint scrutiny of secondary legislation proposed by the Government of the day.

Long after Brexit has been forgotten and we cannot remember what it was all about, we could still benefit from a rebalancing of the power between the legislature and the Executive as promoted by this group of amendments. Your Lordships will have noted the formidable supporters and signatories.

I have been involved at both ends of this building in attempts to improve the quality of secondary legislation. It has been a very difficult task and a cross-party task, and it has taken place under different Governments, but at every stage I have been reminded that, if Parliament did not have an unchallenged monopoly in the manufacture of regulation, our customers would cheerfully take their business elsewhere because, frankly, the quality of our product is pretty variable. A succession of investigations and reports carried out internally, and by very professional external observers such as the Hansard Society, have come up with two perpetual areas for criticism and need for reform.

First, the interface between the scrutiny work of the two Houses has been rightly identified as at best disjointed and at worst counterproductive, and Ministers in successive Administrations have been able to divide and rule. Amendments 237 and 237A address this very important issue. They draw on the analysis of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and the principal architecture for the improved, co-ordinated sifting system, which is set out in Amendment 237, is signed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who was here earlier this afternoon and is chairman of that committee.

The second weakness in the present system is even more profound. In essence, Parliament—both Houses individually and together—is faced at present with a dangerous false choice: either to accept an obviously inadequate addition to the law of the land, perhaps with a devastating impact on individuals or interests, or, as my noble friend Lord Sharkey said, to take the nuclear option and reject an SI outright. I remind those who claim that the latter option is “unconstitutional” that the Joint Committee on the conventions of the British Parliament, on which I served, reported as follows in 2006. Recommendation 15 read:

“Neither House of Parliament regularly rejects secondary legislation, but in exceptional circumstances it may be appropriate for either House to do so”.


That recommendation was endorsed unanimously by both Houses.

At the time of that committee and its assessment of the conventions that apply to the two Houses of our Parliament, I was very struck by the evidence given by the Conservative Party—indeed, by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to whom reference has already been made. He said:

“The fundamental view of the Conservative Party is that the executive in the UK has become too strong and Parliament is too weak. We wish to see both Houses strengthened. We do not believe strengthening of scrutiny in either House would be to the detriment of the other House”.


Of course, it was the Leader of the Opposition in your Lordships’ House speaking at that time rather than a government representative.

Ingenious attempts to get round this false dichotomy have led us to all sorts of mealy-mouthed Motions. However powerfully advocated or well supported in the Division Lobbies, regret Motions, for example, can be conveniently ignored by Ministers, even in a minority Government. As my noble friend Lord Sharkey said, the most persuasive case for a “middle way” was argued, perhaps rather unexpectedly, in the report of the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, produced for the Government in 2015. As my noble friend has referred to it and it is just past midnight, I do not think that I need make further reference to it, but I recommend to Members, particularly on the other side of the Committee, the logic that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, used in arguing for the middle way that we are now promoting.

It is absurd that, unable to express an intelligent, practical and positive view as to how an SI could be improved, both Houses continue to face this destructive dilemma. Amendment 239A, devised by my noble friend Lord Sharkey and supported by the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Norton of Louth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, rides to the rescue, as has already been explained. The reconsideration procedure is carefully crafted to achieve all that the Strathclyde report seemed to be searching for.

I believe that the adoption of this amendment, for this Bill, for all other EU Bills and as a precedent for all future secondary legislation, would be a hugely beneficial step forward. Popular with MPs and Peers alike, in time I suspect that it would soon be seen as a major improvement in our working mechanisms by Ministers and civil servants themselves. While not abolishing our established right in the Lords to reject an SI outright, I doubt that that would happen any more often than it has in recent years. However, the major advance would be that the regret, the delay and the complicated conditional Motions would surely become almost completely redundant. Instead, the reconsideration option set out in this amendment would be far more effective and would improve the eventual legislative product. Perhaps we should refer to it in future as the Strathclyde solution.

Meanwhile, whether or not Brexit actually happens, here is a golden opportunity in a previously unbalanced area of lawmaking for this House to enable the British Parliament to take back control.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, we can already see this evening what will be the Government’s formula to get these statutory instruments through: they will produce them at 12 minutes past midnight, put forward the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, to propose them, and then they will go through on the nod with nobody daring to protest and us all thinking that it was the best possible thing that could happen.

The real danger facing us is not the procedure; I think we can get too hung up on that. In particular, I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, when he said that there was great constitutional tension caused by the rejection of the tax credits orders. The crucial thing to remember about that rejection is that the Government accepted it immediately—they did not seek to reverse the rejection in the Commons because they knew that they did not have the majority for it in the Commons. It was a legitimate use of your Lordships’ role, which is to require the House of Commons to think again. What in fact happened, under the smokescreen of the Strathclyde report, was that the Government were forced to think again, they did not have a majority and they backed down.

The real issue with these regulations, which no one has an answer to because we are in such unprecedented circumstances, is not the precise procedure—although it is better to have an affirmative procedure than a negative one for issues of consequence—but the volume of orders that will hit us. It is going to be colossal, given the scale of law that has to be transposed and the amount of consequential legislation that is going to follow in the process of transposing it. Nothing that I have heard in our consideration so far gives me any reassurance at all that we are going to be able to cope with the sheer volume of it—unless the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, with his great skill in these matters, manages to ensure that all these orders come before the House between midnight and 4 am, when they will be proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and will all go through without us really realising what has happened, under a kind of parliamentary anaesthetic, which she does such a good job of imposing on us all.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Committee: 10th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Tyler]

305: Clause 11, page 7, leave out lines 37 and 38

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and at his request, I will move Amendment 305 in his name and speak to the other amendments which he has tabled in this group.

The noble Lord is chairman of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, on which I also serve. He is involved today in important discussions in Edinburgh in that capacity and very much regrets this clash of commitments. He had anticipated that the group would be reached last Wednesday but it was not to be. My role as the nominee from the substitutes’ bench enables me to emphasise two points in support of the amendments. First, although they may seem primarily concerned with the devolution implications of the Bill in its current form, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, might have referred to his Scottish connections, these issues are in fact of more general UK constitutional significance. As a Cornishman and fellow Celt, I agree with him. Secondly, his request to me—I hope other members of the DPRRC enthusiastically endorse his suggested amendments—underlines the unanimity with which this non-partisan, cross-party committee advises the House on these important issues.

Although the amendments in this group refer to the proposed treatment of retained EU restrictions in devolution legislation in Clause 11, and to executive competence in Schedule 3, it is the strong contention of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the DPRRC, that wider constitutional precedents are in play here.

To reinforce these points I refer Members of your Lordships’ House to the main arguments we advanced in our third report of this Session, but since it was published as long ago as September 2017 and others may not recall all the detail, I wish to refresh some memories. The Government’s delegated powers memorandum described Clause 11 as a transitional arrangement to provide certainty after exit day and allow intensive discussion and consultation with devolved authorities on where lasting common frameworks are needed. As regards the power to prescribe exceptions by Order in Council, the memorandum asserted that its purpose is to provide an appropriate mechanism to broaden the parameters of devolved competence in respect of retained EU law. It adopts a similar approach to established procedure within the devolution legislation for devolving new powers: for example, Section 30 orders in the Scotland Act 1998. Without the power, it would be necessary for the UK Parliament to pass primary legislation to legislate the consent Motions from the relevant devolved legislatures in order to release areas from the new competence limit.

Our committee doubted the validity of those precedents and whether that was the best way to deal with them in any case. We said in our report at paragraph 54:

“We doubt whether the powers in clause 11 and Schedule 3 are analogous to existing procedures in the Scotland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006 (as amended in 2017)”.


The lists of reserved matters in the devolution enactments are, for the most part, relatively straightforward, but this is not the case with the concept of retained EU law, which is defined in Clause 6, as follows:

“anything which, on or after exit day, continues to be, or forms part of, domestic law by virtue of section 2, 3 or 4 or subsection (3) or (6),

of Clause 6,

“(as that body of law is added to or otherwise modified by or under this Act or by other domestic law from time to time)”.

I think all Members of your Lordships’ House will agree that that is complex, obscure and something of a moving target in view of the words in brackets at the end of that definition. Therefore, there may well be significant potential for disputes after exit day between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations about what does or does not constitute retained EU law. It might ultimately require resolution by the Supreme Court. There is a warning note for us all.

The committee was also puzzled by the memorandum’s description of Clause 11 as a transitional provision. It is not drafted in those terms and could remain indefinitely. The Government in their advice to the committee and to the House appear to envisage that the Order in Council procedure will distribute competences returned from the EU to the devolved institutions, following negotiations with them, but the memorandum gives no convincing explanation as to why it is considered appropriate to implement any agreement following these negotiations by delegated legislation rather than by primary legislation—a separate Bill. Revisions to the three devolution settlements in the light of EU withdrawal will be of considerable constitutional significance. The committee anticipates that both Houses of Parliament would wish to closely scrutinise proposed legislation amending the settlements and to have the opportunity to amend it, as has happened with all major changes to devolution since 1998.

I quote paragraph 59 in full. It states:

“On an issue as important as this, we regard it as unacceptable for Parliament to be presented with a draft Order in Council and given a simple choice of ‘take it or leave it’. The Government should instead bring forward a separate Bill. It is, of course, not for us to express a view as to which competencies returned from the EU should be devolved to Belfast, Cardiff or Edinburgh. We are concerned only with the issue of whether it is appropriate for this to be done by delegated powers. In our view, it is not”.


Then our recommendation at paragraph 60 states:

“The Order in Council powers in clause 11 and Schedule 3 are inappropriate and should be removed. Separate Bills should be introduced in Parliament to provide for the conferral on devolved institutions of competencies repatriated from the EU”.


The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has been forthright in arguing the case presented by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. He asked me to say:

“I am totally committed to the amendments and my absence should not be regarded as any lack of support for them … whatever the powers are then they should be in primary legislation as were all the devolved settlements”.


I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

I thank noble Lords for a useful discussion on this issue but, in the light of the undertakings I have given about the specific and the generality, I appeal to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, to withdraw the amendment at this stage.

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, I apologise to the Minister that the news that I was the nominated understudy on this occasion did not reach him. I thought I had informed everyone who needed to know.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will be delighted not only by the views expressed by other noble Lords but by the fact that the Minister is listening regarding the way this important matter should be treated. I am particularly grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. Given his experience and expertise, when he says that something is so complex in this sensitive area that it is doomed to failure—I think I quote him correctly—his colleagues on the Government Front Bench should listen carefully to that advice.

The Minister accepts that there is some merit to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s argument. The committee will welcome that and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and those of us on the committee will be pleased to enter into discussions on the issue. However, we need to do it quickly because the matter should be dealt with on Report: we do not want it dragging on to Third Reading. All parts of the House want these matters to be considered carefully and quickly so that the other House can see where we are taking this important issue in the context of devolution, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said.

There is unanimity in the House, as there was in the Delegated Powers Committee. I am grateful for the responses today—not least from the Minister—and in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 305 withdrawn.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Committee: 10th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I was not able, for unavoidable reasons, to be here when the issue of tertiary legislation was addressed in the course of the debate on this Bill, so I want to add something. I do not think that even those who do not see eye to eye with me would accuse me of being an ardent advocate of secondary legislation: I am not. I spoke about this at Second Reading and have been extremely reticent on the issue in Committee, but I shall return to it in much greater detail on Report.

I support my noble friend Lord Lisvane. The provision we are considering—I will take it quite slowly, because this is how I see it—would vest powers in a Minister to use secondary legislation, with negligible proper scrutiny, if any, to bestow lawmaking powers on a public authority, with even less scrutiny. It amounts, in effect, to scrutiny being diminished to extinction. In that process, we as lawmakers are not doing right. We are simply handing power over to people who should not have it. This tertiary form of legislation is, therefore, even more questionable than secondary legislation, for the same reasons and—I add, at this time of night—with knobs on.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I endorse the contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and draw attention to the work of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, on which the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and I sit. One of the things the committee found most uncomfortable was the extent to which Ministers have played games with words in their explanatory memoranda. We were particularly critical of the reference in Schedule 4 to tax-like charges. The committee stated:

“A ‘tax-like charge’ means a tax. Taxes and tax-like charges should not be allowed in subordinate legislation. They are matters for Parliament, a principle central to the Bill of Rights 1688”.


It is not so late and therefore I shall indulge in some further remarks. My only really respectable connection with your Lordships’ House is that of my ancestor, the great Bishop Jonathan Trelawny, the Cornish folk hero who was one of the seven bishops to defy James II’s attempts to impose rules upon this country without Parliament’s acceptance. His portrait is in the Peers’ Guest Room—he is the one at the end with the Beatles haircut.

I make that point because I am amazed and ashamed that Members of the House of Commons have not seen the dangers in this part of the Bill. I speak as a former Member of the House of Commons. This issue goes back to not just the Bill of Rights and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, but far earlier. Reference was made to the Bill of Rights in previous exchanges in Committee. The short-circuiting of the most basic responsibility and role of the House of Commons of approving taxes seems to me an extremely important issue. We should not allow this precedent to be pursued in this Bill. It is the historic role of the House of Commons. I recall that when we had exchanges about tax credits, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr George Osborne, sought to short-circuit and get round the normal process by which the House of Commons decides financial matters. I remember at the time that the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, referred, I think, to ship money and Charles I, saying that the last time a member of the Executive sought to short-circuit Parliament, he lost his head.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I shall add a very quick word because so much has already been said. There is an irony in Schedule 4 which may interest the Committee: namely that the power to provide for fees and charges has been handed to Ministers by means of either secondary or tertiary regulation, depending on which part of this measure you are looking at. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 states:

“A Minister of the Crown may only make regulations under paragraph 1 with the consent of the Treasury”.


The irony of that is, frankly, extraordinary because it shows where the Government intend the power of the land to lie. We have always suspected that the Treasury is handed some of the greatest powers that are denied to Parliament. If it is considered fit for the Treasury to be able to intervene in fees and charges, then surely it is Parliament’s right to be able to intervene, scrutinise and monitor those fees and charges.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

The noble Lord is right—I am sorry.

I will try to give a relatively detailed explanation. For any policy to be complete, it must have a practical answer to the question of how it will be funded. Clause 12 and Schedule 4 are that answer here. I hasten to add that they are not the answer to all money matters in relation to Brexit. The withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will provide the statutory underpinning for paying our negotiated financial settlement with the EU and any other financial matters related to the withdrawal agreement. Before I proceed, I make it completely clear that I have heard the principled and eloquently expressed concerns about the powers in Schedule 4 and their scrutiny, and we will look closely at this ahead of Report. I regret to say that I am unable to provide too much detail on that at the moment, but we will carefully consider this issue.

Clause 12 and Schedule 4 provide that all the money which might flow into and out of the Exchequer as a consequence of the Bill is made “proper”, in line with the rules governing public expenditure and as laid down between the Commons and the Treasury in the PAC concordat of 1932—which I assume even the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, was not around to take part in. Maybe his maiden aunts were around at the time to take part—who knows? These are obviously provisions relating to spending and charges on the public and were closely examined by the other place, which has privilege in financial matters, before the Bill reached us.

It is evident that the process of taking on new functions from the EU, and in the future running them, will cost money. Some of this will be public measures funded from general taxation—and, I hope, more efficiently than they were funded at the EU level. Some will be paid for by users of services to ensure that taxpayers, both corporate and individual, do not end up unfairly subsidising specialist provision. Where the line will fall is clearly a matter for debate in some cases, and I expect that as SIs come before Parliament for scrutiny, that question will, in a handful of cases, be relevant to the discussion. These provisions of the Bill, however, are key to ensuring that the rest of the Bill can be given real-world effect. I hope noble Lords will agree that without funding, the essential EU exit preparations enabled by the Bill could not be put into practice.

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Tyler, for Amendment 348. The Government, as has been said at other times and in other places, are aware of the risks and concerns posed by any legislative sub-delegation to public authorities, but we remain convinced that conferring powers on public authorities other than Ministers to allow them to make provisions of a legislative character can be an appropriate course of action. I stress that, like any other form of sub-delegation under this Bill, any transfer of legislative power must be approved by both this House and the other place following a debate. It will not be possible for an SI to pass through this place, under the eyes of noble Lords, without a thorough and reasonable explanation of how any sub-delegation will be exercised in practice.

In this exceptional Bill, it is right that, although we must address all the issues that we discussed at Second Reading and which will arise under the Bill, Parliament also keeps a close and strict eye on all matters where any financial burden can be imposed on individuals and businesses. However, I remind noble Lords that this power is only available if the public authority is taking on a new function under the Bill and that the fees and charges must be in connection to that function. This is not a general power for the Government or any other public authority to raise moneys as they please.

The Government envisage sub-delegating this power in limited circumstances—for example, where Parliament has already granted to a public authority the power to set up its own rules for fees and charges of the type envisaged by this power, and, for good reasons, made it independent of the Government.

[Lord Tyler]

Will the Minister clarify one point? As I understand it, the affirmative procedure would apply to secondary legislation under Schedule 4 where there is a new fee or charge, but only the negative procedure would apply in subsequent regulations modifying those fees. That is an important qualification of the assurances he was giving to the Committee just now.

[Lord Callanan]

The noble Lord makes a good point. I will answer his question later. In line with the Bill’s aim to provide continuity, Parliament should have the option of approving the ability of authorities such as the Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England to independently make fees and charges for firms that will, after exit and under this Bill, fall under their regulatory remit.

Amendment 349 comes to the heart of the purpose of these powers and I thank the same noble and learned Lords for tabling it. This power is designed to ensure that those using specialist services transferred from the EU to the UK pay for them. This involves providing for fees and charges which, though not taxes in the common sense of the term, are at least tax-like. For the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, let me clarify what we mean by tax and tax-like charges in this context. Under the guidance laid down by the Treasury, although fees and charges for services that are set on a strict cost-recovery basis are not taxes, any fee or charge that goes further than direct cost recovery is likely to count as taxation or to be tax-like. This would be the case if it cross-subsidises to construct a progressive regime between large multinationals and small enterprises, if it is a compulsory levy in a regulated and surveilled sector, such as banking, or if it funds the broader functions of an organisation not directly part of the cost of providing a service, such as enforcement.

I hope we can all agree that, as part of providing continuity, this Bill should enable the Government to continue to fund public services in an appropriate manner. Because the Government have directly prohibited the increase or imposition of taxation, including tax-like charges of the type I have just described under other relevant powers in the Bill—particularly Clause 7(1)—we require the ability to do so under this power. To give an example, without this the Bank of England would not be able to bring trade repositories—a vital piece of financial market infrastructure currently supervised at the European level—within the scope of its levy-based funding regimes. This House approved the creation of those delegated regimes through the relevant legislation and I hope that, with the proper information before it, it will approve the relevant power in this Bill, subject to the use of the affirmative scrutiny procedure.

Having said all that, let me repeat what I said at the start. We are looking closely at this matter ahead of Report. We will try to see how we might provide appropriate reassurance to a number of the fairly reasonable concerns that have been raised by noble Lords. Even with that caveat, I recognise that noble Lords may still have concerns but I hope that I have given some insight into the Government’s position and satisfied the House of the honourability of the Government’s intentions. I hope that noble Lords will agree, therefore, to not press their amendments or object to Clause 12 standing part.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, as a co-signatory to the amendment, I want to make a short contribution in support of the reference by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, to the work of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and to pay tribute to our legal advisers, who are not only expert and experienced but amazingly diligent. The noble Lord referred to the committee’s work on the Bill, but he did not make direct reference to paragraph 93 of our third report to the House, the last sentence of which reads:

“The Statute of Proclamations 1539, which gave proclamations the force of statute law and later gave rise to the term ‘Henry VIII power’, was repealed in 1547 (after the King’s death earlier that year)”.


I have not been able to do the necessary follow-up research but, as I understand it, our 16th-century predecessors put around the statute of limitations some additional restrictions that are not in this Bill. As a former Member of the other House, I think that it would be extraordinary if the two Houses of Parliament allowed this to go through. It may seem a minor matter, but in terms of precedent it is extremely important. If we let it through, it seems that we will not have done our job as well as our 16th-century predecessors.

The work that is done by the Delegated Powers Committee is well respected in your Lordships’ House and I am delighted that that is the case. In saying that, I want to make sure that Members of the House know that we have the advice of some extremely assiduous lawyers. I think that the advice that we give the House usually benefits from that. I am not always a huge fan of lawyers, but in this respect I think that we are very well served.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, we come to the next stage of the slow journey of this Bill through the House. I shall look at Clause 9 again and address the issue of what the Act of proclamations provided, but just as a footnote I remind the House that the statute provided in categoric terms that a proclamation could not overrule a statute. One tends to overlook that. Everyone is absolutely riveted, are they not? Schedule 5—what an exciting topic to come to first thing in the morning. The problem, though, is that tucked away in this schedule, as frequently happens, is an issue of principle. That issue is, simply, and I support what the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, says, that we are giving an unnecessary, or inappropriate—I do not mind which word we use for these purposes—surrender of power to the Executive. We really must break that habit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie]

If we can set to one side any concept of malevolence or malign intent on the part of the Government or a Minister, perhaps we can accept that this is a genuine attempt to provide simplicity. If a Minister in a department perceives that an instrument or one of the elements of EU retained law is no longer applicable and is not going to fit in with the new body of law, it is desirable that clarification can be provided in the swiftest possible way and that it should not make its way to the Queen’s printer. I appreciate that there are deeply felt views about this, and I am certain that we will come to this again on Report. I am merely trying to indicate to the Committee what the Government think is not just a sustainable position—

[Lord Tyler]

I am full of admiration for the way in which the noble Baroness appears to be trying to avoid the suggestion that it is executive expediency that is going to determine how this issue is going to be addressed. I think she knows that if she had used that phrase, people all over the House would have said: “We are not into that business”. Perhaps she could be a bit clearer about what considerations she thinks would be in the Minister’s mind to take this particular action.

[Baroness Goldie]

It is a little difficult to predict specific examples. Many of your Lordships have had experience of ministerial positions. I imagine that if an anomaly were brought to the attention of the Minister that something was not going to apply; it was no longer relevant; it did not fit in the new framework of what will be a body of UK law, the Minister would be reasonable in trying to ensure that that element, whatever it was, did not appear to make its way via the Queen’s printer on to what is perceived to be the body of law for the UK.

Some may argue that that is inherently flawed and a deeply suspect way for any Government to behave. In the extraordinary situation in which we find ourselves— I suggest that outside of wartime this situation is unprecedented—common sense has to be applied. There has to be a proportionate way of balancing legitimate interests in the constitution with the practical need to make sure that we do not create nonsense in the statute book.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, as a signatory to this amendment and the others in this group, I encourage Members to look at the words of the amendment and how they will alter the Bill. The Bill currently reads:

“A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister considers appropriate to prevent, remedy or mitigate”,


and so on, so the Minister still has the initiative. It is the criteria by which he takes that initiative that are important. Our amendment would simply take out a phrase so the Bill would read: “A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as is necessary”.

I shall go back to where the Government led us at the beginning of this process in a moment, but, first, when the Minister responds to the debate, which in Committee and to some extent this afternoon has been characterised by some support for this group of amendments, I plead with him not to rely on the rather flimsy arguments contained in his correspondence with our Delegated Powers Committee. Frankly, they are not worthy of him.

The same goes for his justification in Committee for government Amendments 83C, 83F and 83G to Schedule 7. We will deal with them in detail later, but they are an attempt to derail the formidable arguments for insisting on the relatively objective “necessary” instead of the blatantly subjective “appropriate” throughout Clauses 7, 9 and 17, which are the subject of this group.

As the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, set out when moving this amendment, all the amendments in this group would replace “the Minister considers appropriate”—what could be more personal than that, where the Minister personally decides that something is appropriate?—with the strictly more objective test of “necessary”. That is the salient difference. That was the subject of much discussion in Committee, and other speakers have emphasised it this afternoon.

Frankly, the Minister’s arguments in his correspondence with the committee do not face up to this issue. For brevity, at this stage I will confine myself to just one or two examples. He asked us to explain “necessary for what purpose?”. The answer is to be found in his Bill. In Clause 7(1), by substituting “is necessary” for the phrase “the Minister considers appropriate”, it is clear what the regulation would do and why it would be necessary. I shall read it in full,

“such provision as the Minister considers”,

necessary,

“to prevent, remedy or mitigate … any failure … or … deficiency arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU”.

It is absolutely clear. Instead of asking why we think something is necessary, he should look in his Bill. That is precisely what Amendment 31 would secure.

The Government have further suggested that there is no material difference between “appropriate” and “necessary”. Why are we having this discussion if there is no difference? Our cross-party, non-partisan committee, which is answerable to your Lordships’ House, has unanimously disagreed. “Appropriate” means suitable, proper and apt, and other words which could be used; “necessary” means that it is judged objectively to be needed.

We should recall that the original position of the Government, when they set out what they intended to do with the Bill, was that only changes needed to make retained EU law work after exit day would be implemented. This amendment fulfils their promise. When it comes to the belated attempt to block these amendments, the Government’s reliance on a statement of “good reasons” for subjective ministerial decisions is totally inadequate, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has already said.

I return to my original point: the Minister has failed to persuade the cross-party, non-partisan Delegated Powers Committee, which looks very carefully at these issues on behalf of your Lordships’ House, and which has now reported to this effect to your Lordships’ House. So far, it would seem that many Members are similarly unpersuaded.

I hope I will be forgiven for sounding a little bit like Little Lord Echo, but speaker after speaker, at every stage of the Bill, has emphasised that this must not be used as an opportunity to turn the Executive into an elective dictatorship. It is the British Parliament that must take back control, not a minority Government. As a former Member of Parliament, I hope that the Commons will concur with your Lordships’ House and the Delegated Powers Committee on this point. Are the Government really going to go into the last ditch in defence of this apparently indefensible position?

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I am trying to clarify what the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, said. I think the issue is not “appropriate” versus “necessary” but “the Minister considers”. I believe the point the noble Baroness was making is that, if something has to be “necessary”, that leaves it open for a court to say whether or not it was necessary. If you say “the Minister considers it”, then the issue is whether the Minister genuinely considers it.

--- Later in debate ---

I understand—and can tell from some murmurings—that these examples might not sound like life or death issues, but the point I would stress is that this kind of policy outcome will be happening on many hundreds of occasions across the statute book as corrections are made. While they might not be critical in every single circumstance, the sum total of all such instances would be a statute book in a far worse state. I am proud of this House’s reputation as a promoter of good public policy, and I urge noble Lords to give serious thought to the consequences of the amendments.

[Lord Tyler]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. How can what he is arguing be reconciled with the White Paper, which stated that,

“legal and policy changes would be made under the Bill only when it was necessary to ensure that the law continues to function properly after exit day”?

[Lord Callanan]

I think I have addressed that in my remarks, but I have some more comments to make which I think will address the noble Lord’s concerns.

However, as we have said throughout the passage of this legislation, we will give due consideration to all amendments that do not undermine the fundamental operation of the Bill. That is why we have accepted the recommendation of the Constitution Committee and tabled government amendments to ensure that, where the powers in Clauses 7(1), 9 or 17(1) are used, a statement must be made as to why there are good reasons for the instrument and the provision made is a reasonable course of action. Of course, we are going further with Clause 8 and propose to remove it from the Bill in its entirety. These amendments will be dealt with in a later grouping on Schedule 7, but they are key to set the context of this debate. They demonstrate the Government’s willingness to accept additional scrutiny if that scrutiny is appropriate.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate, which is way above my pay grade, but in answer to the question asked by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—which I invite the Minister to get briefed on—about how this has been allowed to happen and when, I say that it would not have happened in David Renton’s time. He was the Member for Huntingdonshire in the other place and was still active here at 92, taking parliamentary draftsmen apart on a weekly basis, under the Government of whom I had the privilege to be a member. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, recalls this. He was meticulous. He chaired a report in the other place in the late 1970s on the drafting of legislation. It was his life’s work. He could pick apart these issues. No one is doing that these days and it is allowing slipshod work by parliamentary draftspeople to get on to the statute book, and it is about time we did more about it.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I am a signatory to Amendment 53, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, said, and I want to contribute one very small thought to your Lordships. Many of us will recall that at the outset of consideration of this Bill by your Lordships’ House, there were many attacks in anticipation that we might amend it. But the very fact that the Minister has signed our amendment indicates that your Lordships’ House is doing its job. That is the whole point of our presence in the legislative process.

Ministers were egged on and convinced by the more incendiary Back-Benchers in the other House, and the tabloid media, that it would be outrageous if your Lordships’ House amended in the tiniest detail this wonderful Bill that was going to be put in front of us. The Minister has now helped us do some amending. We have already had seven changes, I think, improving the Bill, with a large majority in some cases. So I plead with the Minister to recognise in future that we are doing our job when we improve this Bill. It did not come to us perfect. It will go back to the other place a great deal better than when it came to us. I hope that there will not be so many incendiary attacks on your Lordships’ House in future by curious Back-Benchers in the other House.

Incidentally, I yield to nobody in wishing to reform your Lordships’ House, as some noble Lords will know to their cost. I was a strong supporter of the agreed Cross-Bench 2012 Bill. I now find it rather odd that the people who want to reform this House, or indeed to abolish it, are the very people who stood in our way on that occasion.