Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Earl Attlee

Wednesday 27th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I worked out before this evening that Amendments 1 and 2 were, in fact, Amendment 3 in Grand Committee on 1 March. Mindful of the guidance in the Companion, that arguments fully developed in Committee should not be repeated on Report, I took the trouble to read the report of the Grand Committee. At the time, I indicated that I was to some extent attracted to some of the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I said:

“I am putting a burden on the Government, today and perhaps in subsequent meetings and in writing, to argue the case for why we should not move in the general direction of these amendments and make the whole process for the defendant more analogous to that of a civil court”.—[Official Report, 1/3/16; col. GC 48.]

I still cleave to that general direction. The Minister then made a spirited defence, stretching from col. 50 to col. 54, which I read and also found persuasive in the sense that making small changes is likely to have unforeseen consequences which might be difficult. I have heard nothing today to change my general direction of travel. The Government should consider examining in the Ministry of Defence, perhaps in concert with the Ministry of Justice, whether the decision-making process where the citizen is on trial—the member of the Armed Forces becomes a citizen at this point—should not be closer to the civil system.

Moving in that direction would create some significant change and there may well be some significant consequences. I am not convinced that today’s amendments would not have unforeseen deleterious effects. Accordingly, these Benches will not be able to support them. We ask the Government to think seriously about the arguments that have been brought forward in Committee and on Report, and to look at the extent to which there should be some movement towards the citizen when on trial having much closer rights and a similar process to the civilian courts.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I remind the House that I am still a commissioned officer in the reserves, although I am not training. This is my 60th year of life, so I will not be doing it for much longer. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, suggested that both the general public and those in the Armed Forces do not have confidence in the system of discipline in the Armed Forces. My experience is different. I have never had members of the Armed Forces come to me and say that they lack confidence in the system of military discipline. I have to admit that it is a robust system.

I have also never heard a member of the public—someone who is not in the Armed Forces—say that there is something seriously wrong with the system of military discipline, apart from when one reads articles in the Daily Mail, some of which are not very well researched.

One of the problems with what the noble Lord suggests is that we do not understand the dynamics of how the court martial panel works. In Committee, I suggested to the Minister that we need to do research, along the lines proposed by the Opposition Front Bench, to understand what the effect would be. We need to war game it before we start altering the system. I suggested to my noble friend that he keeps this under review and makes sure that we are going in the right direction.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Amendments 11 and 12 were Amendments 15 and 16 in Committee. I have reread the debate and do not note anything, other than Kenya, that has been added to them tonight. They go to the essence of the scope of military law. We were not persuaded to support them in Committee and we will not do so now.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I am relaxed about these amendments but I expect that my noble friend the Minister will have something to say about them. Just to tease the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, slightly—

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Earl Attlee

Thursday 3rd March 2016 Grand Committee

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I share the concerns of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig. I am particularly concerned about putting retired servicemen in the frame again after there has been a judicial inquiry. It might be that a subsequent judicial inquiry comes to a different conclusion, but once you have had a judicial inquiry and no prosecutions have arisen, servicemen ought to be able to carry on with their duties, retire and not worry about further legal action; they should not be worrying about further legal action for the rest of their natural lives. I very much support the general thrust of his amendment, therefore, but perhaps it needs some more tests—in particular, in relation to the case we are obviously talking about but not mentioning, that there has been a judicial inquiry.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, we recognise that there is an issue in this area, but, according to my understanding of the law, this is not the way to address it. As I understand the application of the law to service personnel, they come under both the military law—the 2006 Act—and the general law of the land. This is not generally a problem, as, by arrangement between the two authorities, a decision will be taken about which law someone is prosecuted under.

I understand—I may not be right—that there are statute of limitation provisions in service law but no significant statute of limitations in English criminal law. There is a considerable statute of limitations in civil claims—a great big schedule—but the application of a statute of limitations in criminal law is limited to summary offences only. In practice, from my brief research this morning, that generally seems to mean motoring offences in magistrates’ courts. To introduce a limitation of this magnitude into the normal body of English law, which is what we would be doing, would be a radical change, and I do not believe the Bill is the right vehicle to introduce such a radical change for one narrow purpose.

Many would argue that we should rethink the whole issue and that the prosecution of historical cases is not sound. The only time I have been in court as a witness, my evidence was useless, because it referred to things that had happened at a meeting—one of about 400 I would have had that year—six years before. I was asked for precise details, and my standard, and absolutely honest, answer was, “I cannot recall”. I have trouble remembering most of the details of last week, never mind 10 years ago. So there is a real evidential case for looking at that issue.

Nevertheless, public opinion is, in many ways, the very opposite at the moment. In many ways, public opinion, particularly in the sexual cases coming before the courts at the moment, is in favour of pursuing historical cases—in one case related to this House, even after the death of the supposed perpetrator. There is a real tension between public opinion and the whole “old evidence” issue, which I think has some validity and which I suspect wider society will need to debate in the years to come.

In our view, a change as radical as this—as I understand it—for such a narrow purpose should not be in the Bill and should not go forward without wide public discussion and analysis and a recognition that it would have to flow right through criminal law. It cannot realistically be related to this single, narrow area.

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[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 19 and 20. This group of amendments explores when a reservist and, in some cases, a regular is or is not on duty, is subject to military law and can be expected to be supported by the MoD. When the Minister has replied, I hope the Committee will have a much clearer understanding of the position.

For most of my active years in the TA—now the Army Reserve—my understanding, and certainly my ethos, was that I was subject to service discipline for the full 24-hour period for which I was to be paid. This applied to both my commissioned and my non-commissioned service. On a Saturday morning, I might be in bed until 0600 hours; I might not be on parade until 0800 hours; work on military activities might finish at 1800 hours; and we might be engaged in social activities, on or off defence premises, at 2200 hours. I am absolutely certain that our ethos was that we were subject to service law all the time and that the chain of command was effective. This state of affairs did not seem to deter anyone from joining the TA, even if they were aware, nor did it encourage anyone to leave. Indeed, a reserve unit is a safe place precisely because there is an effective chain of command, with someone in charge all the time.

Nowadays there seems to be some doubt or uncertainty. Now it is being suggested that reservists are not subject to service law after dismissal parade, even though they are still on defence premises. It seems most odd that one would want to collapse the system of command, control, good order and military discipline at some artificial and very uncertain point in the day, which may also have to be moved back at a later point for some good reason.

There is also uncertainty for reservists when travelling to and from their place of duty. It now appears that they are not under service law at that point, but what happens if some reservists are acting in a way that would tend to bring their service into disrepute, but not so badly as to interest the civil police? If an officer, senior NCO or service policeman chanced upon the incident, they could not take any action because the reservist would not be under service law. In this case of any insubordination to a regular or reserve officer, nothing could be done. One of my amendments calls for a defence instruction and notice—a DIN—on the issue, but the Minister can start by explaining the situation to the Committee and telling us exactly when a reservist is or is not on duty. I am sure that is his intention.

My other amendments deal with the related issue about duty, which is about self-tasking in a range of emergencies. The first point for the Committee to understand is that ordinary service personnel never have the powers of a police constable or a firefighter. There is no need and that is not the role of the Armed Forces, but I and a very large proportion of the Armed Forces, both regular and reserve, are hard-wired to intervene in any form of emergency. The most obvious example is any form of transport accident. We would not fail to prevent an emergency situation deteriorating until the emergency services arrive, and we would do all we can to preserve life and limb, and to promote recovery. However, we are trained to assess risk and not become casualties ourselves. Officers and senior NCOs can exercise a fair amount of command and control just through leadership and personality. More junior personnel will find that they can often be far more effective and willing if they are in uniform.

None of this will be a surprise to the Committee, but what happens if there is not a happy outcome arising from the resolute actions of the serviceperson, whether he is a reservist off duty or a regular serviceperson off duty? I will not weary the Committee with a scenario, but perhaps there is some legal issue despite the serviceperson being compliant with the terms of my amendment. My understanding is that if the serviceperson is not on duty, they are on their own. Of course, various press offices in the MoD will lap up any easy and good news stories, so can my noble friend the Minister confirm to the Committee that, in a civil emergency, a self-tasking, off-duty serviceperson is on his own and there will be no “big firm” back-up from the MoD?

My next amendment is closely related to being on duty. The Committee will recall the failed terrorist attack on a train in France near Arras last summer. The attacker was heavily armed with automatic weapons, but there were no fatalities thanks to the very courageous actions of two off-duty US servicemen who disarmed him. It is important to understand that they could have been killed. They did what we expected them to; they certainly did not wait for any orders or rules of engagement. This type of attack is not a hostage situation, where the tactics would be to drag out the situation and try to make friends with the hostage-taker if at all possible. In this case, it is necessary to destroy or defeat the attacker in the shortest possible time to minimise the overall number of civilian casualties. Such an incident is likely to be particularly messy. The amendment is designed to ensure that a serviceperson who is self-tasked in such a situation is on duty, and in the aftermath will be supported by the MoD and HMG in the same way as if they were on a conventional operation.

It would also ensure that he or she knows that the law recognises in this particular situation that there may be collateral damage. I am not suggesting that the proportionality test of the law of armed conflict can be ignored; it certainly cannot.

The counter to my amendment is that it is not necessary because the law already allows for it. That may be the case but why should a serviceperson who has acted courageously and skilfully be put through all the worry? If the worst happens and they are killed, will the pension arrangements and death-in-service benefits be any different from if they were on duty in the normal way? In such a situation, would it not be better for the serviceperson, self-tasking in such a matter, to be considering military matters, such as estimating the number of rounds fired by the attacker rather than worrying about his or her legal position? I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, on Amendment 18, which seeks clarity, we have nothing to add and look forward to the Minister’s response.

Amendments 19 and 20 seem to want to create an individual who is, in terms of rights and indemnities, somewhere between a citizen and a constable, or perhaps a firefighter. That would be a significant new piece of law. It would have to be accompanied by a significant portfolio of training in the management of risk to self and collateral damage. It seems to me that we would end up with the implication that the MoD had some sort of duty of care to make sure that the individual was equipped to behave in some way differently from a citizen, and we would end up in some area of certification whereby individuals would have to be seen to be competent not only in their straightforward military duties but in this self-tasking. There could be almost a proliferation of miniature armies among the citizenry.

I find it difficult to believe—I may be persuaded otherwise—that the complexities and costs of such a concept would justify the benefits. If the Government were to come forward with such a proposal, that would be a different matter. I would expect to see a body of research that looked into the various scenarios in which it might apply. I would expect that research to include an analysis of unintended consequences and how the appropriate ancillary rules would support those consequences, and I would expect extensive consultation. If such a concept were to come forward from the Government, accompanied by that level of analysis and consultation, of course we would have an open mind and treat it on its merits. Introducing such a powerful, new legal concept through an amendment to the Bill is not something we feel we can support.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Earl Attlee

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Grand Committee

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I remind the Committee that I still have an interest as I will be commissioned until October, when I have to retire.

At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, suggested that we needed to look at the composition and operation of the court martial. The Minister said that it would be a big change to alter these arrangements. However, that is why we have a quinquennial review. The MoD can quite easily change the court martial rules but bigger changes are a matter for us in Parliament.

One of the problems we have with some of the suggestions from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is that we have very little idea of how either a civil jury or a court martial board works because research is illegal, except for certain criminal investigations. Therefore, the Minister cannot prove that the system is as good as we can make it, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, cannot show that it is defective—we do not know how the system operates. The difficulty is particularly relevant to the noble Lord’s amendment on majority verdicts. The Committee needs to remember that the board of a court martial is not a jury; it is composed of officers and warrant officers superior in rank to the defendant. My Amendment 11 proposes to permit closely controlled research into how the board works. I envisage that this would take place soon after all normal appeal rights had been exhausted or were time-expired. Members of the board would not be told in advance that they would be contributing to the research, and there would have to be numerous other protections.

In Amendment 1, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, proposes that the board of a court martial be composed of “all ranks”. Presumably, if the amended is accepted, court martial boards would provide that members must be at least one rank superior to the accused. Interestingly, I do not have a problem with his proposal, provided that the noble Lord recognises that he is moving away from a very select panel who have already been chosen as officers and warrant officers on the basis of a whole range of qualities that other ranks do not necessarily possess. If he wants to do that, I think we will need a military jury of 12. They will still understand the military context, which is surely the reason we have a military court martial, and the increased number I am suggesting would make up for any reduction in intellectual horsepower. I would suggest that on average a military jury could be of better quality and more suited to these cases than a civilian one, and therefore an all-ranks military jury could be just as reliable as a civil jury.

However, there are some snags. I suspect that the noble Lord feels that an all-ranks board would be more forgiving and understanding. I am not convinced. For instance, I fear that an all-ranks board could be swayed by the accused appearing to be a rotten soldier when military jury members are sure that they are not. The officers on the board of a court martial would put that to one side and study it with much more intellectual rigour. I suspect that the noble Lord would still have some officers on the board or the jury, but I cannot really envisage a junior NCO asking searching questions to test an officer’s position on a case, even though a large proportion would undoubtedly be able to do so. A warrant officer certainly would, which is why we already have them on the board.

Finally I turn to the noble Lord’s amendment concerning who determines the sentence. If we went for a military jury of 12, this would be merely a consequential change. Again, I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, believes that the judge advocate would be more lenient. I have to tell the Committee that I have heard, although I should not have, that on one occasion the board of a court martial in Germany dealing with an assault case regretted not being able to consider a not-guilty verdict because the accused pleaded guilty. Nevertheless, the judge advocate was recommending quite severe penalties which the board had to resist strongly. In any case, complex though the matters are, the judge advocate tells the members of the board of the court martial what their options are. The sentence is internally reviewed and the case can then be taken to the court martial appeals court, so it is not clear to me what can go wrong.

Lastly, I do not have a view on the noble Lord’s suggestions about which offences should be triable only in a civilian court.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the first two groups for debate today discuss the generality of military law. The first group relates to how an individual is found guilty and sentenced, while the second group deals with the extent and scope of the body of military law. I make the point because I take a very different view about the extent to which we should consider changing the two groups, and hence these groups of amendments. We will come on to debate the second group, but I approach the first group from the point of view of the rights of the citizen who, as a member of the Armed Forces, has become the accused. I find the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, persuasive. With that individual having committed an offence and gone into a process which is now so analogous to that of a civil court, I find quite strong the idea that the individual should have the right to a trial that is analogous to that in a civil court.

The amendments before us would, first, create more of a jury of the individual’s peers and, secondly, produce a voting system that is much closer to that of a Crown Court, which seeks unanimity. The proposals put by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, are close to unanimity in their form. The reforms the noble Lord is suggesting would mean that the rights of the individual who has been accused would become increasingly similar to those of a normal civilian in a criminal case. Since 2006 we have developed the three bodies of law, brought them together and introduced civilian best practice—there is probably a better way of putting that, but it is essentially what we have done—so I find this next step very attractive.

As an alternative or as a supplement, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has suggested a minimum number of 12 on the board. That is an interesting suggestion which again is in step towards achieving similarity, and I would guess that he has suggested the figure on the basis that while such a revolutionary change might not appeal to the Government, there is also the idea of an inquiry to see how courts martial work to see if that could be a step towards reform.

Clearly, and I have sat on that side, these amendments will not work and there will be something wrong with them. However, that is irrelevant. What matters is: should we make steps in this direction using this quinquennial Act? We do it only every five years and I would find unconvincing the argument that it is not appropriate. I am putting a burden on the Government, today and perhaps in subsequent meetings and in writing, to argue the case for why we should not move in the general direction of these amendments and make the whole process for the defendant more analogous to that of a civil court.