UK Defence Forces Debate

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Department: Ministry of Defence

UK Defence Forces

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts
Thursday 23rd November 2017

(6 years, 12 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Tunnicliffe Portrait Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
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My Lords, I, too, thank my noble friend Lord Soley for procuring this debate. It seems to me that the essence of the debate is the question: are the Government maintaining United Kingdom defence forces at a sufficient level to contribute to global peace, stability and security? I put it to your Lordships that at least 12 of the noble Lords who have spoken so far have answered that question with a no, but obviously the Government will try to persuade us that the answer should be yes.

I have investigated what the essence of that claim will come from, and I assume it will come from Command Paper 9161, the racily titled National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, which was published two years ago. Delving among its pages, its reference to defence is to be found on page 29 under the heading “Joint Force 2025”. It says:

“We will ensure that the Armed Forces are able to tackle a wider range of more sophisticated potential adversaries. They will project power, be able to deploy more quickly and for longer periods, and make best use of new technology. We will maintain our military advantage and extend it into new areas, including cyber and space. We will develop a new Joint Force 2025 to do this, building on Future Force 2020”.


The Government committed at the time to produce an annual review of that paper. The first annual review came out in December 2016 and essentially reiterated that Joint Force 2025 would be the answer to its commitment. En passant, I ask the Minister whether there is going to be a second annual review, because if there is, it should be presented next month, in December.

If Joint Force 2025 is the answer to the question, let us look into it. Essentially, defence is made up of equipment and people; 40%-plus of the expenditure is on equipment. The equipment for Joint Force 2025 is covered by the Defence Equipment Plan 2016, published in January 2017. The Government were bullish about this plan. Harriett Baldwin MP, Minister for Defence Procurement, said in the introduction:

“This built robust foundations for the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review which now sets the vision and future structure for our Armed Forces, taking us from Future Force 2020 and on to Joint Force 2025”.


I do not find this credible. The plan is a 10-year £178 billion programme that assumes £14 billion—by my calculations, because the numbers are all over the place—of unidentified savings. All history says that that will not happen.

I am not alone in my pessimism. The National Audit Office simultaneously produced a report on the plan, published, once again, in January this year. Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office—a moderate person—said on the publication of the plan:

“The affordability of the Equipment Plan is at greater risk than at any time since its inception. It is worrying to see that the costs of the new commitments arising from the Review considerably exceed the net increase in funding for the Plan. The difference is to be found partly by demanding efficiency targets. There is little room for unplanned cost growth and the MoD must actively guard against the risk of a return to previous practice where affordability could only be maintained by delaying or reducing the scope of projects”.


The Joint Force 2025 equipment plan is simply not credible.

Let us now turn to the other side of any force: the people side. The people plan for the future, according to the Library Note, has a 2020 target for the military to have a full-time trained strength of 144,200. The latest figure is 137,720—4.5% down on that 2020 target. One might feel that margin could be built up over the period, but history says that over the last two years our net full-time trained strength has gone down by 3,670 individuals.

Further, according to the UK Regular Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey,

“Satisfaction with Service life in general has decreased since 2009, especially for Other Ranks”.


The figures are frightening. In 2009, the satisfaction level recorded in that publication was 61%; it is now 42%, which is a reduction by almost a third. Elsewhere in that report, it says:

“The proportion of personnel who perceive Service morale as being low has increased since 2016”—


one year before—

“driven by the Army (up 12 percentage points)”—

up meaning worse—

“and changes in the Royal Marines (up 15 percentage points)”.

I contend that despite the Government’s statements, Joint Force 2025 is failing. There is not enough money to fund the equipment programmes; there are not enough trained military personnel to populate it; sadly and worst of all, the morale of the personnel is declining.

However, I wonder whether the Government agree with me, for on 20 July 2017 the Cabinet Office—not the Ministry of Defence—produced a statement which said:

“The government has initiated work on a review of national security capabilities, in support of the ongoing implementation of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review … The work will be led by Mark Sedwill, the National Security Adviser, with individual strands taken forward by cross-departmental teams, and will be carried out alongside continued implementation and monitoring of the 89 principal commitments”,


in those plans. What does this mean, and how is it to be done? Is it just code for more Treasury-forced defence cuts? Will foreign policy be taken into account? As my noble friend Lord Soley said, in the final analysis defence is the kinetic element of foreign policy, so when will the report be published and how will Parliament be involved?

Labour’s position on defence is straightforward. We said in our manifesto:

“As previous incoming governments have done, a Labour government will order a complete strategic defence and security review when it comes into office, to assess the emerging threats facing Britain, including hybrid and cyber warfare”.


Elsewhere in our manifesto, we committed to the 2% and to ensuring that we,

“have the necessary capabilities to fulfil the full range of obligations”.

We also committed to the nuclear deterrent. Sadly for the nation, and particularly for the wonderful people work who work in defence, defence is in a mess. We look forward to the challenge of putting it right.