Ukraine

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Friday 31st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, as we look to the future of what is happening in Ukraine, it is important to bear in mind, as the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, has just done, the extent of the Ukrainian achievement so far. We talk about victory and defeat but, when one thinks of what Putin was setting out to do and what he has achieved, there is no doubt that, so far, Ukraine has achieved a considerable victory. It has withstood the Russian invasion; Russia has acquired only some 20% of the territory; it has banished the Black Sea fleet from the Black Sea; and it has made the Russian economy largely dependent on China, a very humiliating situation for Mr Putin. It has done extremely well, and we must pay tribute to that.

However, to put it mildly, the outlook is not so good. Like World War I after the first battle of the Marne, the war has settled down into a war of attrition but, unlike the two sides on the Western Front, Russia and Ukraine are far from equally matched. They are much more like the rivals in another great war of attrition, the American Civil War, when the resources of the north were so much greater than those of the south.

If war, short of some devastating Napoleonic coup, is largely a matter of resources, the outlook for Ukraine is becoming increasingly difficult and it is important to be realistic about that, as indeed are many Ukrainians. A Gallup poll in July showed 69% in favour of a negotiated peace as soon as possible, versus 24% for continuing to fight until victory. The Economist recently reported that the independent Ukrainian polling organisation the Rating Group found that 59% of Ukranians would accept a loss of territory if that brought about peace.

More eloquent than these figures is the number of Ukrainians who have fled their country. In September this year—not so long ago—the UNHCR estimated that to be 5.7 million. We have heard about the problems facing Russia and people leaving Russia, but that is a very substantial drain of the Ukrainian population. Many of those people, I realise, went in the early months, but the drain has continued, and it has continued of men of military age as well as other people. Not many have returned. This exodus and its implications must be borne in mind as we admire the guts, resourcefulness and stamina of the Ukrainian front-line troops and the heroism of the civilians who put up with bombing and bombardment of every sort.

Against that background, it is no wonder that Russia believes that it is in its interest to squeeze Ukraine like a python squeezes its prey. Russia must believe, against the background I have just outlined, that it may yet force a military collapse. Failing that, it must believe that the longer it goes on, the more Ukraine will be left in a devastated situation when peace eventually comes. That will, of course be bad for Ukraine, but it will be bad for us and our European allies too, because it is we who will have to support the recovery of Ukraine and the revival of its civic society, economy and armed forces.

So we must continue to support Ukraine militarily and financially, as other speakers have said, and through sanctions on Russia, with the twin aims of bringing Russia to the negotiating table if possible, and certainly of preventing a Ukrainian collapse. But we must also align ourselves with those elements in the Ukrainian Government and society that want to seek ways to end the war by negotiation on terms that Russia can accept, if that is possible. That way lies the best hope of rebuilding Ukraine’s economy and society after the guns have fallen silent.

We must continue our support of Ukraine at war, but we must bear in mind that, in the long run, what we want is a prosperous, free and democratic Ukraine, and we want it to emerge from the war with the ability to create a society of that kind.