Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Report stage
Wednesday 9th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

Once the general election genie is out of the bottle, it should stay out of the bottle. The decision lies with the electorate. There is no question of a dodgy scenario. It is then down to the electorate. The ultimate political reprimand is available to them, as my party discovered in 2017. You can go backwards, as well as forward.

I cannot accept the amendments of by my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth for the reasons I explained at length in Committee. He argued that this clause conflicted with the rule of law. The Independent Review of Administrative Law, chaired by my noble friend Lord Faulks, said that it was ultimately for Parliament to decide what the law on non-justiciability should be and for the courts to interpret what Parliament has said. The majority of the Joint Committee agreed that a non-justiciability clause was compatible with the rule of law in a case such as this, where the power is to enable the electorate to make a decision. As my noble friend Lord Faulks said in Committee, unless you reject the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, there is nothing constitutionally objectionable to the clause.

The Government see a strong argument for its principled and pragmatic case that the courts do not have a role to play in the issue of dissolution. That our sovereign Parliament should be able to make provision for this is entirely consistent with the rule of law. For the reasons I gave at length in Committee—and will not repeat here—we believe that the entire wording of Clause 3 is necessary to secure against the risk of an intervention by the courts.

On precedent, I am happy to repeat the reassurance I gave in Committee that we do not see this as setting a wider precedent. Speaking at this Dispatch Box, I repeat that this clause is very specific and has been drafted with a particular purpose in mind, namely, to confirm a widely shared view of the nature of the prerogative powers to dissolve and call Parliament. In this case, it is seeking to ensure the non-justiciability of the prerogative powers for the Dissolution and calling of Parliament, which traditionally the courts have had no role in reviewing—nothing more. It is a bespoke exclusion to address this precise task. I stress again that we are asking Parliament to consider these arguments and endorse this clause in this Bill—nothing more.

In conclusion, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, whom I consider my noble friend, that he cannot have his cake and eat it. He tells us that there is no chance that the courts would intervene, but then puts before us an amendment that would enable them to do so. I am not sure which is his argument. My noble friend Lord Norton of Louth made the same argument: that it is unlikely that the courts would intervene. In that case, why are we having this argument, with this point put forward?

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, told us explicitly that such a challenge might come. So the purported, or in fact actual, intention of this amendment, were it to be passed, would be to procure the circumstances that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, envisaged: namely, that the courts might one day intervene on a Dissolution. That is what I assume the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is wanting: that the courts should have that opportunity—although at the start he said he did not really envisage or like the idea.

I agree very much with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey: it is vital that we maintain this clause. Deleting or altering it, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth, would be, in my submission, like building a fence around a field only to leave the gate open—or having an umbrella with holes in it. It would not be completely effective in the light of past judgments by the courts. Desiring to avoid the involvement of the courts and to secure absolute certainty on this point, and on the basis that this does not provide a precedent for the future, I sincerely hope that noble Lords will withdraw or not move their amendments and join with the other place in supporting this clause.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken. This has been a very valuable debate which indeed shows the value of the House of Lords. I am especially grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, as well as the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Pannick, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their comments.

My noble friend Lord True will not be surprised to hear that he has not persuaded me. For the reasons I have given, I regard the amendment as necessary to remove the words that are either redundant or constitutionally objectionable. This is not about keeping the courts out but about the use of certain constitutionally objectionable words within the clause. My noble friend did not address adequately—indeed, did not address at all—the point that, if we are dealing with a personal prerogative power of the monarch, there is no advice to challenge. I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lady Noakes did not pick up on the distinction between the prerogative powers that are exercised on advice and those that are exercised not on advice. That is the fundamental distinction that has not been recognised or addressed.

I normally agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, but on this occasion I think he is totally wrong. He argued that he was seeking to protect future members of the Supreme Court. I regard it the other way round and consider that we would be protecting future members by removing the provisions in this clause because, although my noble friend Lord True said that this was not intended to set a precedent, the point is that it will be on the statute book. It will be available to parliamentary draftsmen in the future when other measures come along and they will think, “Oh, let’s keep the courts out. There’s a remote chance they might get involved”. Therefore, there are dangers in this.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all those who contributed to what has been an important and interesting debate. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth for bringing it forward, and I also welcomed the opportunity to talk to him about it. What I am going to say on the record is, I hope, a response to that discussion and to matters raised in this debate. I was struck by the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, in an elegant and thoughtful contribution, envisaged circumstances where the reserve power could apply. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said that it was inconceivable. The reality is, as we will discuss later, that the Government’s belief, and the traditional practice, is that the reserve power has an important constitutional role.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, had a little go at another Second Reading speech at the start. I agree, of course, with what he said and with what my noble friend Lord Lexden said. I also agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, said last time around. It is absolutely true that the 2011 Act was, in her words, clearly designed for a specific purpose at a specific time: to protect the coalition Government from instability. I freely acknowledge the wisdom and accuracy of those words.

There is general support for the Bill, and I welcome that. I cannot encourage the noble Baroness opposite to think that all the amendments are clarifying. I think some of the discussions we have had would involve driving a coach and horses through the Government’s intentions on the Bill, as I hope to persuade the House later.

Turning to the amendment of my noble friend Lord Norton, I repeat that I am grateful to him for tabling it. Clause 2 was carefully drafted to put beyond doubt that the prerogative powers relating to the dissolution and calling of Parliament will be revived. As my noble friend Lord Norton outlined, these are prerogative powers that are personal or reserve prerogative powers, meaning that they belong to the person of the sovereign, acting in the sovereign’s individual capacity. The noble Lord has also sought to place on record and beyond doubt that the dissolution prerogative power is not exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister but is instead a request made to the sovereign. I can assure him that that is the Government’s position.

Turning specifically to Dissolution, the Government have recognised in response to the Joint Committee, for whose work we are extremely grateful, that this personal prerogative is exercised by the sovereign on the request of the Prime Minister, not on their advice. I am pleased to reassure your Lordships that the Government fully accept this accurate characterisation and are grateful for the Joint Committee’s considered conclusions on that point and the submissions made in the debate.

I hope that very clear statement on the record will gratify and ease the concerns of my noble friend Lord Norton and others. I therefore thank him again for tabling the amendment as it has given the Government an opportunity to clarify this point in Parliament, and given this Committee the opportunity to debate this aspect of the constitution. I hope my statement has provided sufficient clarity on the nature of the Dissolution prerogative so that my noble friend may feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to everyone who has spoken. It has given rise to a very valuable debate with some very helpful interventions. I take the point of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern that there is an extensive academic argument about whether the prerogative can be revived. I am very much in favour of academic debates taking place, since if they did not, I would be out of a job. From my point of view, the one good thing that came out of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was the number of articles I managed to publish on the subject.

Today, however, is the occasion for that debate about the prerogative being revived. I accept that the Bill achieves what it is designed to do: to provide that the prerogative comes back and to put it beyond doubt because of that academic debate about whether it could or could not. This establishes that it does. That has to be our starting point because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, said, it is designed to restore the status quo ante. Therefore, the purpose of my amendment is to achieve clarity of that purpose and that it is a personal prerogative, the distinction I drew —in response to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate—in opening. It is one of only three prerogative powers that the monarch does not exercise on advice.

I deliberately quoted the report of the Joint Committee, which the noble Lord, Lord Beith, referred to, in relation to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, raised: the practice is that the monarch has acceded to requests for Dissolution. I was also trying to touch on the fact that No. 10 has contacted the palace in advance to make sure that it will be granted. I always think that is a useful deterrent; it makes the Prime Minister think about it. There is now the convention that Ministers do not act in a way that would embarrass the Crown, so there is some restraint there. There is a useful purpose in its existing in the same way that, formally, the monarch does not appoint the Prime Minister. That, again, is one of the powers not exercised on advice. There are certain elements there that remind Ministers that there is a higher authority to which they are responsible. There is a purpose in it and a useful role, but that is a wider debate. My starting point is that the purpose of the Bill is to restore the status quo ante and my amendment is focused on that. It is working within the purpose of the Bill and what it is designed to achieve.

As I said in opening, I was keen to get the Minister to put on record at the Dispatch Box that it is a personal prerogative power. Therefore, that is a necessary condition. I will need to reflect on whether it is a sufficient one, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord True (Con)]

I will come to that particular piece of legislation—definitely—since it has been raised. To complete what I was saying, the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament is the ultimate expression of humility on the part of the Executive, placing its future and power into the hands of the people. We therefore believe that Clause 3 is appropriate and necessary, as judgment on the Government’s actions in such matters should be left solely to the electorate at the polling booth. I stress that we are asking Parliament to consider these arguments and endorse this clause in this Bill—nothing more. The Judicial Review and Courts Bill, by way of contrast, contains an ouster clause to prevent the judicial review of decisions of the Upper Tribunal to refuse permission to appeal decisions of the First-Tier Tribunal.

I turn to the potential consequences of the amendments proposed. Deleting the wording or the clause would undoubtedly make the dissolution prerogative more susceptible to potential litigation. In effect, the decisions in Anisminic, Privacy International and Miller II potentially offer a route for a court, or more precisely a mischievous litigator, to derail an election process by taking the Government to court for calling an election for political imperatives with which they may disagree. The suggestion by noble Lords to delete “purported decisions” is equally disagreeable, for it would arguably provide litigators with a route to try to delay an election through a court case that could examine why an election has been called on one date rather than another. This, I think, we can all agree would be entirely undesirable.

The clause prevents political litigation about the timing of elections; litigation that I am sure your Lordships dread as much as I do and—I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood—I am sure much of the judiciary would dread. Let me emphasise what it is that we are trying to protect: it is nothing less than the legal certainty of our elections, which underpins our democracy. If the courts can vitiate a Dissolution decision, the principle of the legal certainty of our elections is violated and the courts are inescapably drawn, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, into making decisions and weighing political imperatives that they are not equipped to do.

If there is an intervention, is the election timetable then suspended? Are the people to be informed that a court might deny them the right to have their democratic say? If the court process moves slowly, could the situation arise where a court then dismisses or questions an election result? Asking the courts to review a Dissolution decision is to ask them to weigh the political merits and imperatives of the decision; it is inherent in the nature of the question. If the courts can vitiate a Dissolution decision, the principle of the legal certainty of our elections is violated and the courts are inescapably drawn into making decisions and weighing political imperatives.

More practically, we must consider the risk that we might send a signal to mischievous and politically motivated litigators that they can disrupt the process with vexatious and frivolous claims against Dissolution. Even the threat of such a court case would be disruptive to the process, drag our judges into the political fray and cause huge expense and delay and a frustration of the democratic process. There is no surer way of risking the reputation of the judicial system among many sections of the British people, no surer way for the courts to be seen as a political institution, and no surer way to drag the sovereign into politics. These are not scenarios for which your Lordships can possibly wish. It is wise to take all the necessary steps to be absolutely certain, without a shadow of doubt, to ensure that these scenarios do not occur.

Finally, let me directly confront the case put by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, that, by removing a judicial oversight, this clause allows a licence for the Executive—far from it. The exercise of the prerogative power is a question for the political, not the judicial, sphere, and the remedies and constraints are in that political sphere.

Our constitution has for centuries proved well able to avoid extremities and has provided for accountable checks on the Executive, and these checks are both pre and post hoc. In terms of pre-hoc checks, a Prime Minister requests a Dissolution of the sovereign which, in exceptional circumstances, can be refused. In parallel, the core constitutional principle that the sovereign must not be drawn into party politics acts as an important deterrent to improper requests being made. That is an immense latent force in our constitutional arrangements. Furthermore, the Government, in response to the Joint Committee, amended the Bill prior to its introduction to Parliament so that the statutory election period will be triggered automatically by the Dissolution of Parliament. This will ensure that the theoretical possibility of a Dissolution without an ensuing election period is eliminated.

There are also post-hoc checks and incentives on the Executive that have worked for many years, effectively compelling Parliament to be called as soon as feasible after an election. The Government of the day must be able to command the confidence of the elected House. Unduly and unnecessarily delaying the calling or meeting of a new Parliament is not in the interest of any Government seeking to make progress on the mandate it has received at a general election. Most importantly, the Dissolution and calling of Parliament are powers that pave the way to a general election and a new Parliament. Again, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, reminded us, the actions of the Prime Minister and the Government are subject to the judgment of the electorate and, in due course, to that of a new Parliament.

If a Prime Minister acts—as we alleged one might—nefariously, even if a Prime Minister acts contrary to prior expectations and past practice, that will be judged by the electorate. It is also available to that new Parliament to undertake the nuclear option of passing a Motion of no confidence on the new Government, almost immediately, if it wishes, on an amendment to the Queen’s Speech. These practical constraints on the Executive have served us well for many generations. As we see, the checks on Dissolution are practical and political; they should not be legal.

I apologise for speaking at such length, but I hope noble Lords will understand the importance of putting these points on the record for your Lordships to consider between now and Report. If any other points have been raised in the debate, I will, of course, write. I sincerely hope that noble Lords will reconsider their amendments and urge them to join the view of the other place to not permit the entry of the courts and support this clause

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that it has been a very good debate in light of the quality of the contributions that we have heard. I think it demonstrates the value of this House in being able to hear and rehearse these arguments.

I noticed yesterday when the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, was presiding over our proceedings and the Minister was at the Dispatch Box that the Minister resigned. When I saw that the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, was in the Chair this evening and the Minister was at the Dispatch Box I wondered for a moment whether something might happen.

My noble friend Lord True will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with the argument that he has advanced. I retain my points in opening that this clause, particularly the use of the word purported, does not restore the status quo ante and is objectionable on principle. I have previously quoted the late Lord Simon of Glaisdale, who once opposed an amendment being brought forward for the avoidance of doubt on the grounds that there was no doubt to be avoided. I think we may be in a similar situation here. It is quite clear that the courts would not get involved in this, despite what has been claimed about the direction of case law recently. I do not think the issue really arises, in part for the reasons given by my noble friend Lord True. The problems he adumbrated a few moments ago would be reasons why the courts would stay completely clear of entertaining any case relating to this.

My objection is really on the grounds of principle. I do not think it appropriate to try to limit the power of the courts because one disagrees with particular decisions of theirs. It is objectionable on principle. The argument has been advanced that it sets a precedent; my noble friend Lord True said, “No, this does not set a precedent; it is a bespoke solution.” The problem, I fear, is that on future occasions, Governments will find a bespoke solution based on what is included in this Bill.

I maintain my position. I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said about the purpose being to keep the courts out of politics, but my fear is that putting “purported” in is designed to keep the courts out of the law. So I am not persuaded by what my noble friend Lord True said. I am sure that we will come back to this on Report but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Hereditary Peers: By-elections

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I believe that I have answered the last question from the noble Baroness. People get here in many ways, the majority by patronage through nomination by one individual who happens to be the Prime Minister of the time. I respect everyone in this Chamber, however they got here. Indeed, some get here by being right reverend Prelates. We should concentrate on doing our work well and publicising our discontents a little less.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that closing off the by-election option for hereditary Peers and putting the House of Lords Appointments Commission on a statutory basis should not be seen as mutually exclusive options and that, implemented together, they could be taken to constitute stage two of House of Lords reform?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I regret that I do not agree with my noble friend. He will know that the position of the Government is that we do not favour piecemeal reform and that overall reform needs careful consideration.

Constitution Inquiry

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Monday 14th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, within that question there are absolutes and particulars. Having had the honour to be elected by my fellow citizens many times in elections, my own view is that accountability to the people is fundamental, and I also believe that transparency and openness are extraordinarily important. In that respect, I agree with the noble Baroness.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

Given the disparate and major changes to the constitution that have taken place in recent decades, does my noble friend agree that were any body set up to examine the constitution, it should engage in a take-stock exercise, making sense of where we are now rather than embarking on proposals for further change? Furthermore, does he agree that we should look at the union within the context of the constitution as a whole?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that there is an element of taking stock as well as of seeking change. The glory of our constitution is that it is flexible and has evolved, and I am sure it will continue with that strength in the future.

Size of the House of Lords

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

Do the Government agree or not agree with the Motion passed by this House on 5 December 2016 that steps should be taken to reduce the size of the House?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, the Government always respectfully note Motions passed by your Lordships’ House. However, I believe I have answered that in saying that the Government’s view is that this House needs refreshing.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Thursday 22nd April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, all these matters are currently under review. I declare myself guilty occasionally of sending and receiving WhatsApp messages, in common with millions of other people in this country. I wonder which is the way to the guillotine.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

My Lords, my question complements that of my noble friend Lord Grade. Given that the 2014 Act did not increase transparency and was focused not on lobbying but on lobbyists—the people, not the activity—will my noble friend commit to looking at ways to ensure that details of all representations made to government on Bills and ministerial policies are released at the same time that those Bills and policies are published?

[Lord True (Con)]

Again, my Lords, the noble Lord raises a specific point, as have a couple of other noble Lords who have spoken. I repeat that the Government have significantly increased transparency. There is post-legislative scrutiny of the Act and the Government will be going further to review and improve business appointment rules and increase transparency in procurement. We need to maintain high standards in public life—I agree with all noble Lords who have spoken.

Constitution, Democracy and Human Rights Commission

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Thursday 14th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, those concepts are obviously extremely important and are no doubt the subject of continuing discussion in and across all parties. As the right reverend Prelate will know, regional assemblies were proposed by a previous Government and rejected by the electorate.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

My Lords, given the sheer scale of the disparate constitutional reforms that have taken place in recent decades and that derive from no intellectually coherent approach to constitutional change, does my noble friend agree that we need a body that can stand back and make sense of where we are, that is grounded in an understanding of our constitution—qua constitution—and that does not rush in with knee-jerk reactions and ill-thought-through proposals for more change?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure about the proposition of a body. I think that, ultimately, authority to determine must reside in Parliament and in part in your Lordships’ House. I hope that we will have debates and discussion. I agree with my noble friend that a lot of change was ill thought through, but I assure noble Lords that the Government intend to proceed cautiously and with independent advice.

House of Lords: Number of Members

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Wednesday 16th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

Does my noble friend accept that an upper limit on the size of the House would impose a valuable discipline upon the Government in selecting nominees to fill a vacancy, and, combined with the other recommendations of the Burns committee, ensure a House that was not only smaller but more balanced than the existing House?

[Lord True (Con)]

No, my Lords. The cardinal facts of this House—which is unique, and that is one of its splendours—are that it is unelected, its Members sit for life and it cannot be dissolved. In those circumstances, the question of a cap raises profound constitutional questions, which, as the previous Prime Minister said, deserve reflection.

Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord True (Con)]

First, as I hope I indicated in my remarks, I accept the strictures of the noble Baroness on the phrase “part-time House”. It is a House whose expertise derives in part from the presence of people who are here part-time and bring us their expertise, which is a slightly long-winded way of saying the same thing. I think I said specifically that I would not want anyone to run away with that remark and say that that is what I think of your Lordships’ House. I revere it.

With that correction, I will not detain noble Lords further but I will bank the statement by the Leader of the Opposition that this House’s role is not to block legislation. We shall test those words in the coming weeks and months.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who spoke. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, just made two of the points that I was going to make but that will not stop me making them anyway.

The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, supported my case by speaking against the amendment; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, supported my case by speaking for it. I am not whether that means that I am more skilled or abysmal at drafting amendments than I thought.

That leads me to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. She argued the case for a formula linking the size of the House of Lords to the membership of the House of Commons. I agree; indeed, I tried to devise an amendment on that very point but getting it within the scope of the Bill was problematic, which is why I moved the amendment I did. The noble Baroness and other noble Lords will appreciate that sometimes one must go through some contortions to produce an amendment that will trigger a debate. I speak as someone who, a few years back, moved an amendment to the Psychoactive Substances Bill that would have had the effect of banning the manufacture and sale of alcohol. I realise that it was not going to go anywhere—it was not designed to—but it drew attention to a problem in that Bill.

I have four points to make, two of which the noble Baroness just made in response to my noble friend Lord True. One of her points was that the two Houses have different functions. Of course they do; that was precisely my point. Deriving from that is the case for the House of Lords to be smaller than the House of Commons, given the functions that it fulfils. We are a reflective House. We do not have an outward-facing role in the same way that the Commons does, with Members having to deal with constituencies in relation to their role and in relation to the Executive. The functions are very different. We fulfil different roles, and we add value to the political process by fulfilling that reflective role. Deriving from that, we do not need to be quite so big or, indeed, as big as the House of Commons.

Secondly, as was just touched on and as the noble Baroness stressed, this is not a part-time House. It is very much a full-time House, with some Members who work part-time, if you like, because they do their day jobs then come in to provide their expertise. It did a very good job in 1999 when we had more or less the same number of Members as the House of Commons, so unless my noble friend the Minister is going to argue that it was doing a worse job than now, again, there is no case for the arguments that he has advanced in terms of size.

My next point—again one that the noble Baroness touched upon—relates to my noble friend saying that reform should not be piecemeal. Well, the reform that has been achieved has been piecemeal; it has been the grand schemes brought forward by government that have got nowhere. Those piecemeal changes have I think been well considered—I speak as someone who drafted one of the Bills—and have achieved a great deal. Had we not achieved the House of Lords Reform Act 2014, just think what the size of the House would now be. We would be moving in the direction of the size of the House when we had the hereditary Peers and all the problems that derived from that.

Finally, while I am not saying that we should have a statutory number, there is a case for considering it. My noble friend did not really make an argument against that and I draw attention to the fact that it is not at all unusual for nations to have a set number of Members of their second Chambers. There is not really a clear argument against that. I am not necessarily beating the drum for it; I just say that there is no strong argument against it.

So I am not persuaded by any of the points that my noble friend made—he will not be surprised to hear that. I wanted to tease out the stance of the Government and allow us to continue to make the case—as the House has agreed, without a vote—that we are too large and that steps should be taken to reduce the size of the House. We can move towards that; the Burns recommendations create the means for achieving that. We can have a smaller House that fulfils its key functions and adds value. This House fulfils a very important role that is demonstrably different from that of the Commons. That is why it adds value, and that is why we should serve to uphold it. That would, I think, be facilitated by having a smaller, not a larger, House. We should follow Burns and try to reverse the direction of travel when it comes to the size of the House.

So I am, as I have said, grateful to all those who have spoken. I have made all the points that I think are important in this context, and I am extremely grateful for the support I have received from other Members. I am sure that this is something we will continue to pursue but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

House of Lords: Relocation

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Tuesday 14th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord True]

I strongly with the noble Lord. Indeed, he echoed something said by the right reverend Prelate earlier. That is important. I revere this House and the work it does, but it should not present itself as being in a state of shock horror at the idea that some of its proceedings and activities might take place outside London.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

My Lords, moving the House of Lords to York will not bring Parliament closer to the people. Could my noble friend answer my noble friend Lord Young’s question? Has Civil Service time, and hence public funds, been devoted to considering a move of the House of Lords?

[Lord True]

My Lords, I am not in a position to answer that question. However, I will provide information to both the noble Lord, Lord Young, and my noble friend.

Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011

Debate between Lord True and Lord Norton of Louth

Monday 15th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government when they will announce the membership of the committee to review the provisions of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 as provided for by section 7 of the Act.

[The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con) [V]]

My Lords, under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, the Prime Minister is required, between June and November 2020, to make arrangements for a committee to undertake a review of the operation of the Act. Announcements about arrangements for such a committee will be made in due course.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

Given that the Government have a manifesto commitment to remove the Fixed-term Parliaments Act from the statute book, as indeed do the Opposition, and given that one has to put something in its place because the old arrangements are not automatically resuscitated, do the Government agree that the committee that has to be set up on the Act is an ideal vehicle for generating—quickly—a replacement measure to enable the Government potentially to legislate by next year?

[Lord True [V]]

My Lords, my noble friend is an outstanding authority on these matters, and I am sure that all contributions from him will be heard on all sides of the House. He is quite right to say that the Government made a commitment in their manifesto to repeal the Act. However, I can only repeat that detailed announcements about how we will proceed will come in due course.