Succession to the Crown Bill

Lord True Excerpts

Thursday 28th February 2013 Lords Chamber

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[Lord True]

3A: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Royal marriages: heirs of the body
(1) A marriage is a Royal Marriage for the purposes of establishing the claim of any person to succeed to the Crown as heir to the body if that Marriage is a marriage between a man and a woman.
(2) A person is disqualified from succeeding to the Crown as an heir to the body of a Royal Marriage if they are not the offspring of both parties to that Marriage.
(3) This section does not apply in any case where both Houses of Parliament pass a resolution to the effect that it shall not apply.”

[Lord True]

My Lords, I apologise for not having contributed at Second Reading. I had put my name down to speak but I was unavoidably delayed in coming to the House and rang to withdraw my name. However, I did listen to all the very thoughtful debate that I was able to. A core concern from noble Lords on either side of the argument was that succession to the Crown should be removed from controversy. I share that view and it is in that spirit alone that I have raised the issues in this amendment which were only momentarily touched on in another place.

I must also apologise for the lateness in tabling the amendment. This is because I have been involved in discussions with the Public Bill Office until yesterday morning about the most appropriate form of raising this matter. In some respects, the questions raised here and in Clause 2 are the same and that is whether there is an unintended risk, if certain issues are not addressed with clarity and foresight now, of future controversy over the succession and even of a disastrous unintended consequence of dividing the Queen’s various realms.

Two modern social developments lie behind this issue. The first is the techniques and ethics of the procreation of children and social attitudes towards them which have been fast-changing, still are changing and will continue to change. Secondly, at some time in the future a monarch and his or her consort may wish, where no other course is available to them, to seek to procure a child by use of a donor. That child, the first of whom would have been the heir if born naturally, would become a much loved member of the Royal Family and one whom many might wish to see as their monarch. There are clearly seeds of controversy there. The second issue is that it seems likely that the Parliament of the United Kingdom, although not those of all Her Majesty’s realms, will very shortly legislate to allow same-sex marriage. These measures, taken together, will alter for all time the concept of what a family, including, potentially, a Royal Family, could be.

I must make it clear that I take no view on same-sex marriage for the purpose of this issue. In case anyone should think there is an ulterior motive, I should make it clear that I do not believe that all the consequences of that momentous social change have been thought through and I would not have been inclined to take the step without more notice to the public and wider and more open consultation. Be that as it may, I did not want to raise the issue of the Crown, in any circumstances, in our debates on the same-sex marriage Bill, lest it be seen as an attempt to use the monarchy as a device to debate that Bill. That would be deplorable: I would not and will not take such a step. The issue is, none the less, fast upon us. As we are legislating in this Bill to change the laws on royal marriage and succession, it would be wise to reflect on the potential impact on the Bill also now before Parliament on same-sex marriage and how those two Bills might, in future, interrelate.

The governing phrase as to the conveyance of the right of succession in the Bill of Rights, which is reused in Section 1 of the Act of Settlement and is left unchanged by this legislation is that he or she be the “heir of the body” of the Electress Sophia of Hanover and her successors, being Protestants—which we will discuss later. There is surely scope for contentious argument, if not litigation, over what, in the new circumstances of the 21st century, is the definition of those ancient words “heir of the body”. That phrase does not require that the heir should be the heir of two specific bodies. Indeed, the originating Act of Settlement includes reference to the body of a monarch and a prospective monarch alone. What then if, in the context of either a different or a same-sex marriage—the question is immaterial—the sperm of a King is used to procure a child of his body on a donor woman or, even more directly, a child is born from the body of a regnant Queen by use of a donor? Some might ask whether the child is the heir of the body of that regnant Queen. This is the only method by which an heir of the body could be procured by a same-sex married monarch, and the human impulse of such a loving couple may well be to seek to procure such an heir. Will some not see that child as a legitimate heir of the monarch’s body if that marriage has been accepted by the British people? Might that child not feel that he or she has, in turn, a human right to expect to succeed to his or her mother or father?

I am grateful for the correspondence I have had with my right honourable friend the Attorney-General on this subject. It is not for me to place his opinion before the House but, in essence, I am reminded that the laws governing succession require that the descendant be the natural born child of a husband and wife, that they have been enshrined in our constitution for generations and that they have become part of our common law. Indeed so, but we are about to legislate, specifically and deliberately, to change the law of marriage in this realm. As we are often reminded, what is long enshrined in the common law of England is not necessarily proof against legal challenge, not least in the field of equalities and human rights. I would like to be assured that the common law will continue to be an adequate bulwark against division and controversy.

It has also been put to me that Section 48(7) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 is worth noting. This Act states that nothing in the Act that relates to parenthood,

“affects the succession to any dignity or title of honour or renders any person capable of succeeding to or transmitting a right to succeed to any such dignity or title”.

It may well be that the Crown is encompassed within that definition as a dignity, and the word “dignity” does indeed occur in the 1700 Act. However, it is not so explicitly stated and certainly not in a way that is clear to tens of millions of non-lawyers who are subjects of the Crown. The public rightly see the Crown as separate, distinct, beyond and above. It is, indeed, the fount of all title or dignity of honour. It would be wise to put it beyond all doubt or challenge that the succession to the Crown is engaged by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. Furthermore, are we certain that it is not arguable in a court, in default of a statement to the contrary, that the UK Parliament had decided, in legislating to redefine marriage, to alter the nature of marriage completely and thus that, in the context of a fully lawful same-sex royal marriage, the definition of—I return to the words—an heir of the body in the Act of Settlement might constructively be widened by the courts from the hitherto understood common law definition as it applies to the UK Crown. It might be wise to put the fact that Parliament had no such intention—if it does, indeed, have no such intention—beyond any doubt.

My right honourable friend the Attorney-General and my noble and learned friend on the Front Bench, who has been saying this again today, have argued that it would not be appropriate to go beyond what was expressly agreed by the realm Heads of Government in Perth. I accept that argument but I am not arguing that we should go beyond that: quite the reverse. I am simply suggesting that we should put in the clearest possible stops and stays to ensure that we can never, in this realm alone, be taken by legal process and challenge, rather than deliberate decision of Parliament, beyond what was agreed and where other realms might wish to go.

Our Queen is monarch of 16 realms, in not all of which is the view embodied in the legislation on marriage now before Parliament shared or likely to be shared. In Canada, gay marriage is already legal, the Australian Parliament has recently rejected it. A divergent view on the legitimacy of a royal marriage might, and a divergent view on the legitimacy of an heir would, break the union of realms. In 1837, the dominions of the Crown were irretrievably separated because of differing rules on the succession. Hanover did not allow female succession, so Queen Victoria could not rule Hanover, which passed to her uncle. It seems inherently unlikely that in the present diverse evolution of social policy in the Queen’s realms that any progeny of a same-sex marriage—even same-sex marriage itself—would be accepted in at least some of the existing kingdoms. Is it not important, therefore, that those realms, at this time of change both in the rules of succession and in the UK in the law of marriage, should all be held explicitly to a common understanding of what a royal marriage and, most importantly, an heir of the body means for the purposes of succession?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Elton]

I accept that that is the current position. I hope that we shall be reassured if it remains the same on Report.

[Lord True]

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have participated in this short debate and apologise for the length of my opening remarks. However, this is an issue of profound potential importance, not only as it affects our country but the Queen’s realms as a whole. It is inherent in the Perth agreement that we have an acquis agreed by all the realms, and no door should be left open to the crawling peg of equalities, rights and other challenge by a potential heir who is excluded from the Crown—as they feel, unfairly—against their rights by the existing deposit of the law.

I am not a lawyer, but I am concerned as an historian that the base of the law and the phrase “heir of the body” is a very ancient phrase which is buttressed only by the common law and the doubtful cover, in my view, of the clause from the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act that I cited. I agree with the interpretation of my noble friend Lord Elton that that Act may be deficient in terms of providing protection for the Crown from the kind of challenge that might arise. My right honourable friend the Attorney-General made this point to me also, but I am afraid that I do not find full comfort in the remarks made by the Lord Chancellor at a time when the developments in the technology and science of birth and reproduction, and certainly the developments in the nature of the law of marriage, were far distant in the future and not necessarily conceived of. I say to the noble Baroness that this might be remote, but perhaps people thought before 1936 that certain things might be remote. It is the duty of Parliament, when legislating on something as grave as the succession to the Crown which Her Majesty holds on our behalf, to think about the future. It may, of course, be no more remote than that the child whom we all so fondly expect may be born gay.

I will return to the matter and would be grateful for further discussion with my noble and learned friend on the Front Bench to see if we cannot find a way of clarifying this. I am not going to go beyond the Perth agreement, but I think it is important that we have “awful clarity”—in the old language—on this very great matter. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 3A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

This is not leaving it to chance. The law as it stands at the moment is quite clear that a Catholic cannot ascend the throne.

[Lord True]

My Lords, the problem was articulated at Second Reading, and I do not wish to extend this debate too much. The problem ultimately will be a human problem, as it was in 1936. That human problem, if it arises, will concern a child who is an heir, either the heir presumptive or a child who by some accident becomes the next in line, a popular expectant heir to the throne, who, whether from birth or by proximity to the Catholic faith when being brought up, believes that they cannot take up the duties of a monarch without the support of the church that they love. That might well be the Catholic Church.

The problem with the halfway house that we have before us is that it opens the door to such a crisis without resolving all the complexities that my noble friend quite rightly said lie at the end of that path. That human drama will be played out in the 21st century through all eyes of the media and television as almost a piece of spectacle—it was in 1936. That is the danger that many Peers sought to point out at Second Reading. I could not support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Cormack; equally, I think that the amendment of my noble friend Lord Trefgarne is flawed, because I agree with my noble and learned friend on the Front Bench that there are things that a regent could not undertake.

There is a danger in the lack of clarity inherent in this Bill, for well meaning reasons, opening a door to a place we know not where. Not all discrimination in this matter lies on the Anglican side—I speak as one who lives the most happy of mixed marriages but who is never permitted to go to the altar table to share communion with my wife. Let us go forward with caution. It is not right for the Government so readily to detach the opening of the door by the legitimisation of a marriage from a proper and serious contemplation of the potential consequences if a human drama comes to be played out when an heir believes that they can proceed only with the support of the Catholic faith, whether they professed it previously or profess it at the time when they become heir to the Throne.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, before my noble friend Lord Trefgarne replies, perhaps I may pick up on a point where I do not believe that the argument of my noble friend Lord True holds. Under the law as it stands—and there is no proposal here, nor do the Government have any proposals to change the law—the sovereign may not be, nor have been, a Roman Catholic. Therefore, the situation which my noble friend Lord True suggested, where the sovereign comes to the Throne having to agonise as to whether to renounce the Catholic religion, just would not arise, because, having been a Catholic, he or she would not be eligible to ascend to the Throne.

I entirely concur with my noble friend’s opening remarks: these are very much human matters at the end of the day. There is a human dimension to it, and that is why, in response to the earlier debate, I sought to reflect the discussions which I had with representatives of the Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales so that this is looked at at a pastoral, human level, which seeks to reflect the importance of the union of a partnership and the indissolubility of marriage. It is against that background that decisions should be made and advice given with regard to the upbringing of a family. I accept that there is a human dimension to this, but I should perhaps clarify that the dilemma that my noble friend was suggesting cannot occur because the position is that the sovereign must not be, or have been, a member of the Roman Catholic Church.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, pointed out that families tend to be smaller, but we live longer. For instance, the reigning monarch is about to become a great-grandmother. Taking an average of two to four children, which is three, when there are three children in the first generation and three sets of three children in the second generation, we have already reached our figure of 12. The next generation will go beyond 12, yet we are still looking at the first line. It would be only too easy for a disaster to happen to one line, so the noble Baroness proved the case that six is too few, and we should forget about longevity.

[Lord True]

My Lords, my name is on the amendment but all the arguments were made in a compelling speech by my noble friend. The remarks of my noble friend Lord Forsyth were also conclusive. Perhaps the Minister will consider the following: once the child for whom we are rushing out this legislation is born, how will the Deputy Prime Minister explain to one of the daughters of the Duke of York that she will have to seek permission but her sister will not?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord True]

My Lords, as I said earlier, is it not the case that in the early 1830s Augustus d'Este, the son of the Duke of Sussex by a marriage unapproved under the Royal Marriages Act 1772, did in fact posit documents in Chancery to challenge the legitimacy of the action? Furthermore, in 1843 papers were put before the Committee for Privileges of this House, and the case was heard by this House in 1844. There is certainly an historic precedent and, as I mentioned in passing, a challenge. Some of the issues that came up today are perhaps rather wider than Clause 3. To my mind, this goes to reinforce the points made by a number of noble Lords about the need for absolute clarity, and the fortification of what we are doing against potential challenge in the courts that now exists.

[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, I hope that between now and the next stage the noble and learned Lord may on reflection be able to offer a more forthright assurance than that which he has been able to give so far, if I may say so. The fact is that the process for judicial review in this country is a comparatively new one. It has only been going for the last 15 or 20 years. Therefore the fact of there being no precedent is not much of a comfort to the noble and learned Lord, if I may say so. I would be grateful if he would consider this further before the next stage and perhaps take into account the case referred to by my noble friend Lord True.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I shall certainly reflect on it further. It will not come as a surprise to my noble friend that this has already been the subject of some reflection. However, if he indeed wishes to return to this at Report, we will do so. To take up the point made by my noble friend Lord True about the Sussex peerage case, my understanding is that this case was not about whether consent had been refused unlawfully. I think the issue was that consent had not actually been sought.

[Lord True]

I do not wish to detain the House, but I think the contention of the gentleman concerned was that the marriage had been celebrated outside the country and was therefore outside the jurisdiction. That case was not caught by a potential forfeit.

[Lord Trefgarne]

If I may say so to my noble and learned friend, there is clearly scope for some further reflection on this matter. I will raise this at the next stage of the Bill. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Northbrook]

My Lords, my queries actually applied to Amendment 17, which I think is grouped with this one.

[Lord True]

My Lords, what has been said about the Deputy Prime Minister, for whom I share respect, is valid: specifying that particular Minister is a slightly questionable way of proceeding. Will my noble and learned friend confirm that it is not part of the Perth agreement that the Deputy Prime Minister should be personally responsible, so that we can look at that matter at a later stage?

To be fair to the Deputy Prime Minister, he has taken a major part in pushing this forward, and I think that that is acknowledged, but we must not be seen to be getting into a position where a young couple whose child is to be born are exploited in any way politically. We do not want grand press conferences by any particular Minister saying, “This is all happening, if this baby is a girl, because of what I have done”, and so on. I am sure that the Deputy Prime Minister would not fall into that temptation, but perhaps if Parliament, in its wisdom, slightly depersonalised the amendment on Report, as my noble friend Lord Trefgarne proposes, there might be wisdom in that.

[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, I would like to say a few words about Amendment 17, which I believe is grouped with this one. That is a slightly separate point, if I may say so. I am picking up the point that my noble friend Lord Northbrook has made, that the parliamentary approval process in many of the Commonwealth countries includes a referendum and is over and above whatever Ministers may have agreed over lunch, as my noble friend Lord Forsyth put it. The fact is that parliamentary approval is required in most, if not all, the Commonwealth countries concerned, and in some of them a referendum is also required. Presumably that cannot be done overnight, so it would be better if the Bill came into force when all the Commonwealth countries had consented to it.

We have a problem if some of the countries approve and some do not. You would not have to think too tortuously to conceive of a situation at some future point where the late sovereign’s eldest child in one country was to be their head of state and the second child, who was a boy, was head of state of another. That is clearly absurd, so we need to speak with one voice on this matter as far as the Commonwealth is concerned. It might therefore be best to wait until they have all agreed.