Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Hope of Craighead

Thursday 3rd March 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, there is one aspect of this amendment to which I think I should draw attention. It arises because of its scope. The amendment applies to every violent or unnatural death of every person subject to service law within the United Kingdom. The coronial system does not apply in Scotland. I do not know whether it is the intention that we should extend the coronial system to Scotland in the case of every violent or unnatural death, but the system which applies in Scotland is very simply this: every death of that kind is reported to the procurator fiscal of the area in which the event occurred. There is then an exercise of discretion because it does not follow that every death is subject to an inquiry. It is a matter for the procurator fiscal, possibly with the advice of a law officer or his counsel, to decide whether it is in the public interest that there should be an inquiry. If there is such an inquiry, it goes not to a coroner but to a sheriff, who does indeed determine by what means and in what circumstances the death occurred. It is there that the public interest is served because if there is something to learn from the event, the opportunity is taken through the accident inquiry to determine the circumstances and in some way to improve practice or inform the public about how events of that kind could be avoided in future.

As I listened to the debate I wondered whether that system applied in the case of persons subject to service law. I think I am right in saying that when one reflects on the tragic events on the Mull of Kintyre, when a Chinook helicopter flying from Northern Ireland to Scotland with a number of very senior people on board crashed and everybody was killed, that event was dealt with under the Scottish procedure. I would have thought that that procedure is perfectly adequate to cope with all that one would expect from events of this kind and the need for the circumstances to be inquired into.

There are two features that need to be stressed. First, not every death of this kind is the subject of an inquiry because it is only if the public interest requires it. On the other hand, where the inquiry is resorted to, it is a full inquiry, with the results that I think the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is looking for; that is, the lessons to be learned from the evidence that is laid. I wonder whether he really does intend that every death—even a road accident, for example—occurring north of the border should be subject to this system; or, to take another example, whether training exercises in the Highlands, where unfortunately deaths do occur due to the very severe weather on mountains, should be subject to the coronial system. I think the Scottish prosecutors—the procurators fiscal, I should say—would rather that they retained control of these events and dealt with them under the Scottish procedure, which they would believe is perfectly adequate to provide the lessons that people need to avoid these events occurring again.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, there were specific provisions in the Coroners Act 2009 relating to investigations in Scotland. Sections 12 and 13 provided that the Secretary of State would notify the Lord Advocate if,

“the Chief Coroner thinks that it may be appropriate for the circumstances of the death to be investigated”,

and there would be an inquiry under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976. I think that is the position.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Hope of Craighead

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I would add a word to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has said, mainly because he mentioned my name at Second Reading. I am afraid that this is one of two judgments for which I was responsible. He has been kind enough to say that this judgment is not subject to criticism on the grounds on which it was made. He summarised it quite accurately as the case of a civilian, a 17 year-old boy in Germany who was, I think, the son of a serviceman, and because of that was subject to military discipline in Germany. The noble Lord has narrated exactly the circumstances whereby the civilian spent time in Colchester. I think that he was sent back for trial by court martial in Germany.

My point—and the Minister may already have this in mind—is that one is dealing with a crime committed in another country. In the case of Germany, there is a very active and much-respected criminal justice system. The Germans might well have wanted to assert themselves, as this was a crime committed on their territory. However, under arrangements which we had in place, it was possible for us to say that this was a military matter which could be dealt with under our court martial system. The Germans were prepared to concede jurisdiction to the system which we had under military law.

I suspect that the situation is quite different in Iraq. I do not know what the criminal justice system is like there, but I have no doubt that we would insist that we bring people home. We do not have the same problem of maintaining a diplomatic dialogue there, which we certainly would have with the Germans if this amendment were to be carried. We must be rather cautious with this amendment in considering the various jurisdictions in which offences may be committed abroad. We would need be absolutely sure that these jurisdictions were prepared to concede jurisdiction to us under the extraterritorial system, when they could perfectly well assert their own right to try a case before their own civilian courts.

I dare say that the Minister has this carefully in mind but it seemed, recalling as best I can the circumstances of Martin, that that was part of the background. Of course I cannot take anything away from or add anything to the judgment which I wrote, but I think that it is proper to say that when I first saw the case I was taken aback by the fact that this boy was going to be tried by a court martial. It seemed to be a rather extraordinary thing to happen. However, having studied the legislation and been informed about the background, in the end I was satisfied that it was proper that the court martial should be allowed to proceed. There is this additional element to the issue, which I do not think that the noble Lord touched on in his address but which I respectfully suggest we should bear in mind in considering whether the line that he is urging us to take is a sound one.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Does the noble and learned Lord agree that Martin could have been tried in this country and that it was not just an arrangement between the German authorities and the British military authorities that caused his trial to be in Germany? I think that it was a decision of the Attorney-General.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Of course we had extraterritorial jurisdiction, but the fact that the crime was committed in Germany was an important factor in deciding the proper course for bringing the case before a tribunal to try the boy for the offence. One has to be careful about the local jurisdiction; I seek to emphasise that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I would be grateful if I could speak first because the noble and learned Lord might wish to comment on what I say. I do not think the issue is the liability of the military commander in the field directing operations. As I recall, the cases were about the provision of equipment which would have prevented the firing of one tank upon another—the “friendly fire” that caused the injuries—and, in the other, the use of Snatch Land Rovers in a situation where it was unsafe to use vehicles of that type. The Ministry of Defence, which really must promote something like this, should not get away with the provision of inadequate equipment of one sort or another. You would not expect a soldier to go into action in Arctic conditions wearing a tropical uniform that had been provided to him. It is a question of procurement, not of the decisions that are taken in the field.

I seem to recall the noble Lord, Lord West, saying at Second Reading that when you are in the field you have to get on with it and do what you can with what you have got. The fact that you have to do so does not mean to say that those who have provided you with inadequate equipment—who fail to give a steel helmet to a Tommy in the trenches, for example—should escape all liability or blame for what occurs by amendments to the Human Rights Act in this way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. One cannot invent cases. The trouble with the courts is that you simply have to take what you are given. That is the real problem, which I think the noble Lord correctly identified.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Does the noble and learned Lord think that a way forward—