Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Earl Attlee

Wednesday 27th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, just mentioned Deepcut. I urge anyone who has the slightest worry about Deepcut to read the Blake report, which explains what happened.

I agree with the general thrust of these amendments, particularly the sensible approach from the noble Lord, Lord Touhig. In Committee, the Minister was sympathetic to our concerns but he has rather too much faith in the commanding officer. Yes, commanding officers are extremely experienced and they are specially trained to be commanding officers. There is a course for commanding officers-designate. My experience is that with every level you go up in terms of promotion, you get more information about what your responsibilities are and what the difficulties are.

Nevertheless, the power of the commanding officer can be delegated to more junior officers, so quite often—in terms of discipline, for instance—minor offences can be dealt with by a major or a lieutenant-commander. These cases are exceptionally difficult for the commanding officer to investigate. Clearly he will not be able to investigate them personally. He may even be out of the country when the allegation arises. The commanding officer or the acting or delegated commanding officer will have to appoint someone else in the unit to carry out the investigation, and that person will not be any better trained. Furthermore, the fact that someone else in the unit may have to be appointed to carry out the investigation may deter someone from making an allegation in the first place.

Amendment 5 covers only sexual assault; it does not cover inappropriate contact, by which I mean touching. However, this can also be a problem and it can be a precursor to more serious problems. As I said in Committee, my belief is that the service police should keep records of allegations of sexual assault and inappropriate contact. They would then know whether a person had made this type of complaint before and could ask whether they could be a serial complainant, and they would also have records of someone who had had a similar allegation made against them before and they might even know the MO, so they would understand whether the allegation was likely to be true or malicious. If the service police keep records, investigations can be facilitated, and it is better to achieve this through a policy change rather than through the amendment, which, as I said, has the defect of not covering inappropriate contact.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, referred to the culture in the Armed Forces as a reason for publishing the statistics. She will be aware that the Armed Forces carry out continuous attitude surveys that measure changes. She made the important point, from her own background and experience, about measuring changes. In Committee, the Minister explained what information is already released and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, told us how difficult it is to access it. However, my concern is that the media—particularly the print media—will use these statistics to produce an easy story. It is easy to quote a horrendous number of incidents without comparing them with the number of such incidents in civil society.

In conclusion, I feel very strongly about the need for record-keeping by service police to facilitate investigations. These are very difficult matters for officers and warrant officers in a unit to investigate. Frankly, I do not think they relish it; they would rather hand it over to the service police, who have the relevant experience.

I hope the Minister can say something helpful to us, but I am also happy to join noble Lords later in keeping up the pressure on my noble friend the Minister, because I know that he enjoys getting pressure from me.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Schedule 2 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 lists the offences that a commanding officer is required to report to the service police for investigation. There is a long list of offences, including, in paragraph 12(at), any offence under Part 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003,

“except one under section 3, 66, 67 or 71”.

Section 3 is a very important part of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It relates to sexual assault, which of course can vary from a very serious sexual assault to the sort of touching that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, referred to a moment ago. That provision means that the commanding officer is not required to pass on for investigation to the service police a complaint of sexual assault. I imagine that he most certainly would pass on an allegation of serious sexual assault, but there is a great loophole there because commanding officers differ. Some may have one view on what a sexual assault is and another may have a completely different view, in effect telling the complainant to go away and not be silly. So there is a problem there. At the moment it is an unexploded bomb within the system.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Earl Attlee

Thursday 3rd March 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, in 2006 I moved an amendment in these terms to the 2006 Bill with the support of my noble friend the late Lord Garden. At that time, inquests involving the services were very much a controversial area. There were long delays and lots of families were very concerned about the fact that these inquests took such a long time and seemed to be so unsatisfactory. At the same time, coroners were making some very trenchant criticisms. Lord Garden and I thought it would be right to have a statutory duty making it quite clear that the coroner should have jurisdiction in this area and that cases should be reported to him by commanding officers, in the terms of the amendment that I put forward.

That amendment was not accepted, but after that the Army itself became concerned and set up Project Ajax, and in 2008 the Defence Inquests Unit was formed. It is interesting to note that Mr Mike Venables, the head of that unit, said that,

“the MOD was struggling with how we handled inquests because there was no focus … The families were dissatisfied by the service they were getting and by the way that inquests were working. Many didn’t understand why we were having them or what they were for”.

The unit went to work. It seemed to have a number of aims. On the first aim, Mr Venables said:

“Our role is to support bereaved families”.

Its next role was to train coroners and explain the particular circumstances in which a death had taken place, to identify and locate military witnesses, to furnish reports and information to the coroners and to organise a familiarisation event—annually, as it turned out—so that coroners would know what vehicles and kit were used on operations and what mine clearance drills were, and could experience the weight of packs that troops carried, and so on.

Case officers under the unit read through the Royal Military Police reports, Special Investigations Branch reports and witness statements before handing them to the coroner. Colonel Newell, who was in charge, said:

“We read through everything first and redact them for security—which is something that they do worry about so we explain that … We point them”—

the coroners—

“to what we see as the salient information and suggest who we see as the key witnesses who should be called to the inquest. We provide them with a Rolls-Royce service”.

The next function was to provide support to witnesses. Mr Venables said:

“It can be a hugely difficult experience for some witnesses … we don’t…coach them. All we say is, ‘you’ve got nothing to fear from this, all you have to do is tell the truth’”.

So the unit seems to have various conflicting aims.

The purpose of my tabling this probing amendment today—in identical terms to the one we tabled in 2006—was to inquire into how the system is working and whether it is satisfactory. Case officers under the unit appear at inquests for the Ministry of Defence, so not only are they training and advising coroners, and redacting witnesses’ reports; they are actually appearing for the Ministry of Defence at inquests. That must cause concern to families who wonder whether their purpose is to protect the Ministry of Defence from the sort of trenchant criticisms that, as I indicated, were very much abroad in 2006 when we first approached this problem.

I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response. I may not have expressed quite clearly the full scope of my intention in tabling this amendment—I apologise for that—but I commend it to the Committee.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for raising the issue of inquests. He has raised some important issues.

For many years, I have not been able to give my counsel on this matter because sadly we were taking many casualties on operation and, therefore, the timing was completely wrong. I must stress that I have no intention of pressing any of my own amendments relating to this issue at a later stage—I am merely giving my counsel—but I intend to compete with noble Lords who are lawyers in terms of the amount of detail that I will give. I accept that matters have improved with these inquests, but I am still not convinced that holding detailed inquests into fatalities incurred on operations overseas is likely to reduce casualties or be a good use of resources. I hope the Committee will allow me to explain why before calling for the silken rope.

All members of our Armed Forces should be highly motivated. Most of them will have a secret dream of being able to have strategic effect, even if it involves a significant risk to themselves. By “strategic”, I mean an action they take that significantly alters the outcome of the campaign. That is why many servicemen with particularly good qualities seek selection for Special Forces. Their incentive is that they are very likely to be able to have strategic effect at some point. One can also have strategic effect by denying the enemy’s strategic effect. That is what the off-duty serviceman did in France in that train attack, and it is an issue to which I will return at a later stage.

I understand that, prior to the mid-1980s, it was not necessary to have an inquest into an overseas operational fatality. The law changed, but it did not matter, because there were very few hot operations. If we had ever engaged in conflict with the Warsaw Pact, we would not have been worrying about inquests. I am very sorry, but I think that these inquests into operational fatalities have limited utility. If we think that we need inquests to learn from what went wrong, we are deluding ourselves. As I touched upon in the human rights amendment on the first day of Committee, quite often the deceased, or someone closely involved, made a misjudgment or a mistake. That is the nature of military operations. As I said then, this makes it extremely difficult for the MoD or the chain of command to explain these facts, because we would be shocked if those on the ground at the time were blamed. According to Wikipedia, in Sergeant Roberts’s case, very unfortunately, the soldier who fired the coaxial machine gun on the Challenger tank did not know, or he forgot, that there was a parallax effect in short range. Does anyone seriously think that that error would not have been immediately reported back to the Armour Centre in Bovington and compared with the existing training plans? Of course not.

One inquest that I read about centred on electronic countermeasures. The feedback cycle in this area is extremely fast: days, if not hours. It must be extremely demoralising for the experts—sometimes, I think the term “boffin” is rather more complimentary—at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, to read these unfair criticisms in the press. The reality is that we have a fabulous capability in this area and we should be very grateful. Think how demoralising it must be for the Taliban to take the very real risk of planting an IED, only for the initiation system to fail for some mysterious reason at the crucial moment.

Some argue that we need the coronial system to identify any defects in training and procurement. I touched on this during the first day of Committee and remind your Lordships of my inverse law: the attention and scrutiny applied to a fatality on operations is inversely proportional to the number of fatalities taken. That is why I believe that inquests into operational fatalities have limited utility. I also remind the Committee that they soak up considerable amounts of staff effort that could be better spent on prosecuting the campaign. I fear, however, that this is nothing compared to the negative effect.

In order for the enemy’s leaders to motivate their own side to make a very risky or even suicidal attack on coalition forces, it would be an enormous help to them if they could show that the attack would have strategic effect. We cannot avoid the MoD making the formal announcements of casualties or fatalities: we know perfectly well that it would be deeply damaging to mislead the nation regarding the level of casualties that we are taking on an operation.

What we actually do is have an exercise to publicly blame Ministers and then the chain of command for things that have or are alleged to have gone wrong when, for reasons I explained, they cannot effectively defend themselves without acting improperly and damaging morale. It should also be remembered that service personnel in theatre read newspaper reports and have access to the internet. It must be quite easy to damage confidence, especially that of more junior personnel. Reports of discord can also be shown by the enemy’s leaders to their subordinates to motivate them to make an attack which they can, frankly rightly, claim will have strategic effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, there were specific provisions in the Coroners Act 2009 relating to investigations in Scotland. Sections 12 and 13 provided that the Secretary of State would notify the Lord Advocate if,

“the Chief Coroner thinks that it may be appropriate for the circumstances of the death to be investigated”,

and there would be an inquiry under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976. I think that is the position.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, talked about training fatalities. My view is that all training fatalities, wherever they arise, should be subject to an inquest. I think there is a far bigger problem with training accidents than with operational fatalities. Those occur where the enemy has a better position on you and sadly some servicemen are unlucky, but with a training accident, it is quite likely that something has gone wrong.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Attlee]

I do not really expect the Minister to give me a precise figure, but I am very grateful to him for saying that he will reflect on what I have suggested. I do not expect him to get particularly far, but I am grateful for his attitude to my speech.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, those of us who were around in 2009 will recall the great controversy in the Coroners and Justice Bill about whether we should have a chief coroner. Eventually the argument prevailed that we should have a chief coroner. We have a highly competent, able and experienced person in the shape of Peter Thornton. I am sure he will deal with many problems unless and until the system is overwhelmed, as the noble Earl suggested. I am very reassured, and I am grateful to the Minister for his careful response which brings me up to date on where we stand with the inquest system. I will reflect on what he said to see whether there is any necessity for me to take this issue further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Earl Attlee

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord West, would have added a keel-hauling or something of that nature.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for his support for my amendments. No doubt we will have some fruitful discussion on a way forward. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that an investigation into how court martial panels deliberate would be apposite; it is a good suggestion. There are all sorts of problems around it, and if the public do not have confidence in the court martial system, which is what I believe and the thrust of what I am saying—that although I personally have confidence, the public do not—such an investigation would in one way or the other be very good.

However, the noble Earl may have misread my amendments. I am not looking for leniency. I have no reason to suppose that court martial panels that consisted of other ranks would be more lenient; I rather agree with him that they could well be tougher. What such panels would be is more understanding. They would appreciate things more. I know that the Armed Forces regard themselves as a family and I concede to what the noble Lord, Lord West, has said, but there is a gap in understanding between the other ranks and the officers of what motivates people. That is where an extended panel would be useful, helpful and more just. It is not about leniency at all. The noble Earl should not think that I am a particularly lenient person. I have sat as a judge and prosecuted many times, and leniency is certainly not a part of that.

I tend towards the thrust of the noble Earl’s comments, supported by the noble Lord, Lord West, that it is all about discipline. The fact is that if anyone is convicted at court martial of a serious offence, he is out and he loses his pension rights. It is not a question of discipline for a serious offence. As I indicated at the beginning, I have no objection to the court martial system in relation to Sections 1 to 39 of the 2006 Act, which cover mutiny, absence without leave, desertion and issues of that sort. But where I think the court martial system lacks public confidence is when it deals with other criminal offences which are normally dealt with in the Crown Court. The maintenance of discipline is not particularly apposite, in my experience. People who are convicted of serious offences, as I have said, are thrown out.

Many of the Minister’s remarks were addressed to the issue of sentencing. I do not believe that the sentences of the courts martial are particularly wayward, as we have a very good system of judge advocates who assist them in their deliberations. But the noble Earl will know that the current Judge Advocate-General has argued many times—as he did in 2006 before a committee of the House of Commons—that sentencing should be a matter for a professional judge, as judge advocates are, and not left to a panel of officers for whom it may well be their very first meeting with the criminal law in any context. They are not experts. They are appointed to a court martial board—perhaps the noble Lord, Lord West, has more experience of courts martial than most people, from all points of view—but most who sit on a panel do it perhaps once or twice. The president of the court is a more permanent official, of course, but a judge advocate is a professional judge who goes on training course after training course, sits in the Crown Court when not sitting as a judge advocate and has the fullest experience of sentencing and what is appropriate in a particular case. I do not suggest that he should sentence when uninformed himself, nor does the Judge Advocate-General, but that he should consult the members of the panel, listen to their views and take into account the maintenance of discipline, if that is what is required in the case.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I am not quite sure why the panel should go outside the guidance of the judge advocate. For me, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has not produced a convincing case why it should do that. Why would it not adhere to the advice of the judge advocate because, as the noble Lord told the Committee, it is very good advice?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am not going to recount anecdotes but it is not necessary for the panel to follow the advice of the judge advocate who is sitting in a particular case if it chooses not to do so. Very often when a person is found guilty, the sentence may not be obvious. It may be a choice between various courses such as imprisonment, a sentence that does not involve imprisonment, or sometimes whether someone should go back to Colchester for retraining—a disciplinary approach—so there are different possibilities.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, surely the choice between prison and detention—in other words, “soldier on”—is a purely military one, which means that the officers on the panel are best placed to make that judgment of whether they can keep the serviceman in. In fact, some who go off for a period of detention turn out to be very good servicemen later on, as I am sure the noble Lord recognises. This is a purely military decision.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am not suggesting that the judge advocate should act entirely without the advice given to him by the panel. But where should the responsibility lie? That is the issue. I do not think that responsibility for sentencing—a highly complex and professional job for which people train for years, first as barristers or solicitors and then as judges—should be in the hands of people who have in all probability never been in a criminal court in their lives. Suddenly, they are faced with a particular problem and may have all sorts of views about it. Nor should it be thought that intellect and intelligence rest only with the officer class, as the noble Earl suggested. That is not necessarily so. Sitting on issues of fact, a panel composed across ranks would come to a better and safer conclusion which is more acceptable to the public. We cannot go on having demonstrations outside this House by present and retired members of the Armed Forces against the verdicts and findings of courts martial. You do not see that happening with Crown Courts but you see it with courts martial, and that cannot continue. I am concerned about the reputational damage to the services that such scenes show.

I will read all the detail of the Minister’s speech and come back to him about it but one or two points arose. For example, he stressed that a simple majority means that there is no need for a retrial. That may not be a very good thing. It may be that if a significant proportion of a panel hearing a case are not satisfied with the guilt of the defendant, there should be a retrial. The case should be put before the court and heard again. Retrials happen, not all that often, when juries are unable to reach a verdict in the Crown Court. They do not follow as of law; it is a question of the discretion of the prosecutor. I have stopped prosecutions after a jury had disagreed. “There is no need for a retrial” is not a mantra which sits very well with the Ministry of Defence.