(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I regret that I was unable to speak at Second Reading. I promise that I shall not make up for it this afternoon; I shall be very brief.
With the clauses before us this afternoon and evening, we have reached a truly load-bearing piece of the Bill. In my more anxious moments I sometimes think that the very weight of the kingdom is resting upon it, and that, if it is misjudged, the chances of the union eventually crumbling would be worryingly greater.
I do not doubt the Government’s good faith in the negotiations within the Joint Ministerial Committees but, as other noble Lords have already mentioned, the devolutionary spirit of 1998 needs to suffuse the discussions in those committees’ deliberations, and, indeed, ours in both Houses of Parliament.
If the European question infects and envenoms the union question, the country will suffer a self-inflicted blow of immense proportions. Of course, there is a need to retain an effective internal market within the UK. That is absolutely crucial, but the sustenance of the union—the essential quiddity of our nation—is paramount, which is why I express my wholehearted support for the thrust of the amendments in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead.
My Lords, first, I both echo and reaffirm what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said: there must be respect for the devolved Administrations. I emphasise that as emphatically and cogently as I can at this Dispatch Box, and I confirm that the Government are wholly committed to demonstrating that respect.
As a number of your Lordships observed, the Government have tabled amendments to Clause 11, and we will give them our full consideration shortly. We have to acknowledge that the position we ultimately reach on Clause 11 will have implications for related policy on devolution in the Bill. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, acknowledged that. I can reassure your Lordships that we are mindful of the need to revisit the approach we have taken for the Schedule 2 powers in the light of that forthcoming debate on Clause 11. I therefore thank the noble and learned Lord Hope for instigating this debate on whether the devolved Ministers should be permitted to sub-delegate their Schedule 2 powers.
Amendments 266 and 278 would remove this restriction from the correcting power and the international obligations power for Scottish and Welsh Ministers and for Northern Ireland departments. Amendment 292 relates to the withdrawal agreement power and would have a wider effect, but I understand that the intention is the same. I should be clear that we do not oppose in principle the idea that these powers should be able to be sub-delegated to and by devolved authorities where appropriate cause is shown. This is already evident in the Bill. Noble Lords will see that this restriction—for instance, in paragraph 1(4)(b) of Schedule 2—is already qualified to allow for the sub-delegation of a power to make rules of procedure for a court or a tribunal. This ensures that the power can be sub-delegated where appropriate to ensure judicial independence. We have invited the devolved Administrations to offer any examples of where sub-delegation would be needed, and we have made clear that where they identify such examples we shall consider drawing further exceptions to the restriction. So far, no examples have been given.
It has been our intention—this may surprise the Chamber—not to make the powers in this Bill any wider than is appropriate. Opening up the possibility of sub-delegation by devolved Ministers in all cases where no prior need has been demonstrated does not align with this intention. However, I have listened to the contributions made this afternoon and have heard the concerns that your Lordships have expressed today. I have taken particular note of the question of respect as it relates to the perceived unfairness of a possible disparity between the devolved ministerial powers and the corresponding powers for UK Ministers.
I do not understand the expression “sub-delegation” that the Minister uses. Does she suggest that when powers are given to Ministers in the devolved Administrations, that is “sub-delegating”? I do not think that is the appropriate term.
It is merely a generic description of the power to exercise delegated power-making by regulation, as encompassed by these provisions in the Bill.
I reiterate that I accept that these are serious points. They deserve serious consideration, and I can confirm that the Government are prepared to look again at where such a change may be merited for the use of the powers by the devolved Administrations in this way.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for raising two important points. On the question of referring all serious cases to the civilian police and courts, as he will be aware, the service justice system is capable of dealing with the most serious offences, and has done so. It has been held to be compliant with the ECHR for investigations and prosecutions both within the UK and abroad, but we are keen for the review to take a strategic look at all aspects of the service justice system, and this is one issue to be explored. He also raised the important issue of majority verdicts. We are aware that views have been expressed about this, particularly in this House. Although the system has been held to be compliant with law, the Government recognise that there are differing views about the system of majority verdicts, and this is one issue to be covered by the review.
My Lords, I, too, welcome the Minister’s Answer and the prospect of a review. I want to ask her about the United Nations’ 2006 Decaux principles. On 7 June this year, the United Nations special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, in his report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, called on states to ensure that the jurisdiction of military tribunals is limited to military offences committed by active members of the military, in order to protect an individual’s ordinary rights to fair trial and due process. Does the Minister agree that Section 42 of the 2006 Act, which provides for military tribunals trying civil cases, is inconsistent with principle 8 of the Decaux principles: that military courts may try military personnel only for offences of a strictly military matter?
I thank the noble Lord for raising a very interesting point, which we will all take away and consider in detail before attempting to reply in detail. It is genuinely an interesting issue. One key aspect of Section 42 is the fact that it imports into service law any offence that is also an offence in civilian criminal law. That is extremely important when service personnel are serving abroad and commit civilian criminal offences that the civilian courts here do not have the power to deal with. I thank the noble Lord for raising a very important point.