Scotland Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 22nd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Turnbull (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 75A moved by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on debt and borrowing. The amendment is founded on the principle that the UK is a union, constitutionally and financially. There is a common currency, single monetary policy, single exchange rate and a banking union. We have some banks that pretend their headquarters are in Scotland, but they are not really. The public finances of Scotland and the rest of the UK are inextricably intertwined. A large part of public services has been financed—even under the new arrangements, when they are unveiled—by grants from the UK or assignment of revenues. Departments of Her Majesty’s Government have large budgets that they spend directly in Scotland.

The SNP may not like the fact that the union exists, but it does, and certain consequences follow. When the Economic Affairs Committee took evidence on post-referendum arrangements, there was little appetite by then for full fiscal autonomy. It was always an illusion, but it was thoroughly punctured by the gaps in the oil price. Some witnesses argued that, in addition to sensible arrangements to deal with short-term fluctuations, Scotland could operate a separate borrowing regime, financed by borrowing in its own name. In effect, that would be policed by financial markets and underpinned by a no bail-out rule. As noble Lords have mentioned, debt issued by the Scottish Government would have its own credit rating with its own risk assessment, and if debt issuance was thought to be excessive its cost would rise and the Scottish Government would be forced to respond. However, most witnesses did not believe this model, given the extent to which the two economies are interlinked, and no one really thought that a no bail-out clause was plausible. Most notably, the noble Lord, Lord Darling, told the Committee that the eurozone has a no bail-out rule that we can see “works very well”. I think he was being ironic, but I cannot be absolutely sure. He thought that a no bail-out rule would be,

“unnecessary and downright provocative and actually sound very patronising … I am part of the UK as well; do not tell me I cannot be bailed out by a country that I happen to be a citizen of”.

That was strongly endorsed by the Committee.

During the course of the referendum, there was some loose talk that said, in effect, “Vote for us and we will put an end to austerity”, but even now in Holyrood there is a recognition that although borrowing policy does not have to be identical to that of the UK, it nevertheless has to be consistent with it and supportive of policy for the UK as a whole. Two things follow from that. First, the amount of borrowing year by year cannot be such as to undermine the Government’s overall borrowing objective. Secondly, the stock of debt, relative to some measure of capacity to repay, cannot be such as to raise the spectre that the UK Government might have to intervene. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, stated, this amendment does not seek to specify what those various ratios should be. They should rightly be in secondary legislation. Why, then, is the amendment needed? It is needed to entrench the principle that Scottish fiscal and debt policy cannot be decided unilaterally in Scotland. It has to be related to the policy of the UK as a whole and the limits must be set by the Treasury, after consulting the Scottish Government, and should be approved by Parliament. In that way, the amendment fills one of the holes in the Bill, although many are left.

The noble Lord, Lord McFall, mentioned an article, “Sleight of Hand”, by Jim Gallagher, who, as many noble Lords will know, is a former Scottish civil servant and is now a professor. However, the noble Lord did not read the last paragraph:

“So I wonder if this is less about fiscal formulae and more about nationalist politics. It’s becoming pretty clear that the SNP won’t promise another referendum after the next Holyrood election. They think they’d lose. But without it they’ll have nothing to talk about. So maybe their aim is to reject the fiscal framework, whatever is offered and so derail the new powers in the Scotland Bill. Then they can spend the next five years arguing about power, not exercising it”.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I feel obliged to intervene for Wales for a moment, because there is a very solid Welsh dimension in this. I also feel that I can do so because I was married for 39 years to a lass from West Lothian and I have always known the answer to the question—which is, “Yes, of course, dear”. The point that really concerns me is that a deal is being done in secret in Scotland, involving the fiscal framework, which will have implications in Wales. As the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said, the Welsh deal on the Barnett formula is rubbish. Every political party in Wales recognises that. The Welsh Labour Government refuse to exercise their tax-raising powers until that formula, or some formula, is revised. I fear that this secret formula or framework that is being arrived at in Scotland will be used as a precedent in Wales when we come to deal with tax-raising powers under the draft Wales Bill, and that we will be stuck with the same sort of system, arrangements and mechanisms as there are in Scotland—but it will be entirely different.

Therefore, I urge Ministers, as my noble friends have done, to allow transparency, so that we may actually have some input. Many speakers in this debate have said that it is unfair on other parts of the United Kingdom. Certainly, it may very well be unfair on Wales: the impact of this fiscal framework in Scotland could devastate Welsh funding for the future. I hope that your Lordships will excuse me for putting in a Welsh voice.

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 76 and 79G. Like many other noble Lords, I have found much that is attractive in many amendments in this debate, but I am confining my remarks to those two. I note that all the amendments and speeches have been wholly consistent with the Smith commission report.

I support Amendment 76 totally, of course, but I fear that it is something that is needed more than once; in fact, I would repeat it every five years. I see it as part of what, in commercial terms, one would call a feedback loop, which I think one needs to set up for every single devolved Administration. It could be well-structured and formal and allow for a frank examination of every aspect of devolution between Westminster and those devolved Administrations. If we do not set up a feedback loop now, as sure as eggs are eggs, when things go wrong we will set one up in the future. I feel strongly, and I think this will come back in further debates, that a feedback loop is required.

Secondly, I was much attracted by the thinking behind Amendment 79G. However, I would not in fact set up a Scottish fiscal commission; rather, I would expand the OBR to include this. As we expand the number of devolved deals, the problem is that we could potentially end up with a massive number of these commissions, all of which would essentially be umpires and all of which, one assumes, would umpire according to slightly different rules. There would be a great advantage to having one umpire in the UK—it has been pleasing to read today in the press how the OBR has resisted political interference in the recent past—which used one set of rules to examine figures and to report generally to the United Kingdom.