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Lord Thomas of Gresford
Main Page: Lord Thomas of Gresford (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Thomas of Gresford's debates with the Cabinet Office
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI beg your pardon—it is grouped with this on the paper I have here. I will not make that point now but will deal with it when we get to that group. I beg to move Amendment 129A.
My Lords, I speak in support of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on Amendment 129A. I also speak, as a member of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, to express our surprise that there was no provision even for consultation, with the Welsh Assembly, when proposed changes to an Act or secondary legislation are made. As I understand it, if it is an Act, there would normally be a legislative consent Motion; if it is secondary legislation, a consent Motion. That was the original provision, and I assume it is still the same. The noble Lord, Lord Bourne, fortunately, is an expert in this field.
I can only assume that this is an accidental omission, as I cannot see any policy in it. It seems to me ludicrous that a Secretary of State could, with a stroke of the pen, without any consent in Wales and without any consultation, simply amend the Act. I shall speak further on the clause stand part debate in a moment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for moving this amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for speaking in relation to this issue as well. To deal with the situation in its entirety, I will need to look back to the provisions in the Wales Act 2017. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, may recall that we had a similar issue there—I think he was in his place when we discussed it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will certainly recall it
To put this in context, first, I make the point that any amendments here—this anticipates what we will be discussing in the next debate—have to be consequential, which limits it to matters that arise in the legislation and are consequential. Secondly, in these cases there are always minor issues. I think this has universally been the case—I have yet to be shown an example otherwise, and I have checked quite a few. In the context of the Wales legislation, it was anticipated that occasionally the wrong terminology would be used. For example, parish councils exist in England, but they are community councils in Wales, and this is about things of that nature, which one would not wish to have to bring back for primary legislation. That is not the sort of issue that should be in primary legislation.
In the context of the Welsh position, it is also worth noting that not only is there power in the Wales Act to amend legislation in the National Assembly for Wales, but it also operates in the other direction, giving the National Assembly—effectively, Labour Welsh Ministers —the opportunity to amend our legislation. I appreciate that not all noble Lords were steeped in the process of the Wales Bill. In practice, as is confirmed by an exchange of letters between the Secretary of State for Wales and the First Minister, Carwyn Jones, on which I hope to expand in a letter to noble Lords summing up what has happened in today’s Committee, where we identify an issue that needs a minor amendment, we notify both the First Minister and the Presiding Officer, the Speaker in the National Assembly, who, if she wishes —it is a she at present—can draw it to the Assembly’s attention. Of course, under devolved arrangements, it is a matter for her and the National Assembly as to what they do. So it is a reciprocal arrangement.
I anticipate that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will say that, from a legal purist’s point of view, that is not ideal, but from a pragmatic point of view of dealing with minor amendments—if noble Lords can find anything major that is dealt with in legislation of this nature, I should be very interested to see it, because that would be an outrage. It is a tidying-up exercise. I hope that we can translate this to the Bill. I am happy to look at this point and deal with it in correspondence, but it is a common-sense approach to what is a relatively minor issue. With that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. I am happy to discuss it with him and other noble Lords afterwards, but I put the substance of how this operates in the context of Wales, because I think there is a read across, and we would do something identical, mutatis mutandis, under the Bill.
My Lords, if that is the case and it is the practice to write to the First Minister and Presiding Officer of the Assembly, why not have that in the Bill so that there can be no slipup, if that will inevitably happen and is required to happen? It seems common sense that it should be in the Bill. An exchange of letters outlining a practice is in no way a safeguard against the arbitrary use of the power by the Secretary of State, widely drawn as it is.
My Lords, the noble Lord knows as well as I do the difference between convention and provision in statute. If everything that had been discussed in Committee on the Bill will put in statute, it would be a much longer and more complex piece of legislation. This is about finding the appropriate place to deal with it. As I said, I am happy to share the correspondence and discuss it further, but I do not think it should appear in the Bill.
My Lords, with respect, it is asking not for that but for an obligation to consult, and I have said that that is a reasonable request. It is effectively what is happening under the Wales legislation. I have said that we anticipate doing exactly the same, mutatis mutandis, under the Bill, so that, via the Presiding Officer, we are consulting.
Can the Minister tell us whether there is any provision in a Welsh Bill intended to amend English legislation, or legislation at Westminster, where no consultation is required, in the same way—mutatis mutandis?
It is the lion that represents Millwall, is it not? I shall be brief, but not as brief as perhaps I should be because, with respect, this clause is totally flawed. I shall not go over the debate I had with the Minister over what is now the Wales Act, but we still have to face the fact that under the clause as it now stands following the debate on Amendment 129, the Secretary of State in London will be empowered to overrule the legislation of the elected Assembly. There is no arguing; that is what it says, and that is what it means. I understand that the Minister would have no intention of telling us anything other than how he envisages this power being used, and of course I accept it from him, but the power is being given to wipe out the enactments of the National Assembly for Wales without so much as a reference to it.
In my respectful submission, it is subsection (2) of this clause that is so unacceptable: the Henry VIII clause, the legislation that will set aside the legislation. It will give power to the Secretary of State to say, “I don’t like this legislation any more” or “I don’t like this part of this legislation any more, I’m going to get rid of it”. That is what we are empowering if we allow this to go through.
With Henry VIII clauses, you have to ask whether they are justified. Here, you ask the question: how is it justified? The answer to that question is that it is not justified. I looked through the Explanatory Notes. They state:
“Part 3 Final Provisions … Clauses 37-40”—
that covers Clause 38—
“and 42 are self-explanatory”.
That is it. No doubt the clause is self-explanatory, but, with great respect, so what? Self-explanatory is no sort of justification. It is not even an attempt to justify.
Assiduously, I hunted further and found what the department’s memorandum tells us the clause is for:
“There are a number of consequential changes being made by the Bill, particularly those flowing from the addition of a new procedure for modifying neighbourhood plans, restricting the imposition of planning conditions, and amendments to compulsory purchase legislation”.
That is a very neat summary of a very complex piece of legislation, but this is the justification that the department advances:
“It is possible that not all such consequential changes have been identified in the Bill. As such it is considered prudent for the Bill to contain a power to deal with these in secondary legislation”.
Is that any sort of justification?
Going back to the wording, if,
“the Secretary of State considers appropriate”,
is an entirely subjective discretion, entirely uncontrolled in any way by the legislation. Is that really what the department wants? Well, the department may want it, but we are being invited to give powers to a Secretary of State years down the line to repeal an Act of Parliament, the whole Act, the Act that noble Lords have spent four days working on in this Committee. By this provision, if it comes into force, it can all be wiped out. That is what Henry VIII means.
I repeat that I totally accept the good faith of the Minister, I accept it completely and utterly, but he will not be the Minister 10 or 20 years from now, and the list of legislation that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, gave us reminds us of how long this legislation could last. So because the department thinks there is a vague, undefined possibility that may arise in the future, I respectfully suggest that we are being landed with a hugely dangerous piece of legislation because it is totally unjustified. Of course the future is unsure. We all know that; Shakespeare told us that. It is the most important line he wrote. We know that the future is unsure, but it is not a justification for giving literally sweeping—sweeping away—powers to the Executive. That is not how we should operate.
I wholly support everything that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, just said, and what the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, said in introducing this debate. The matter that concerns the Delegated and Regulatory Reform Committee is on page 9 of its report, at paragraph 54. Not only is the power “very wide” in scope, but it,
“is to make whatever provisions—including ones amending and repealing Acts of Parliament … We note that it has become standard practice for provisions of this type to be included near the end of a Bill”.
This is appearing all the time. It is really an insurance policy: “We might make a mistake, and if we make a mistake we do not want to have the trouble of admitting it; we will just get some secondary instrument through Parliament, and that will be all that we have to do”. That is not a sufficient justification for such a wide power.
The committee suggested that at the very least, the power could be restricted by some type of objective test of necessity: to where it is necessary—to “where we have made a mistake” if you like—or to where something important has been omitted. We need something that gives substantive limitation to such a widely expressed power.
My Lords, I will speak briefly, although I feel rather rash in doing so after the compelling interventions we have heard. As I understand it, this power applies to any enactment, not just, as the noble and learned Lord said—I am sure misspeaking—to what is in this enactment. My position is as a lay person, but also someone who was for a long time in the usual channels, interested in the drafting of legislation and how that was done by a Government whom I opposed for 13 years. I have to say that we would have looked a little askance at this sort of thing in those years in opposition. I understand the innocent intent and perfect integrity of the present Ministers involved, but the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, rather anticipated my thought: if clear drafting instructions are given on what is required to be enacted and a Bill is properly drafted by expert draftsmen, there should be no need for the sweeping brush to be around afterwards. That is really how legislation should be presented to Parliament.
This is the second piece of planning legislation we have had in a year. I submit that there has been time to think through these things, but it is the wider point that concerns me. This is not an ad hominem, or a criticism of Ministers here, but this will become a practice—I was struck by that paragraph in the Delegated Powers Committee report. It will become part of the constitution if Parliament continues to accept, in Act after Act, that Ministers of the day can be given power to change any other enactment as a result of something that arises out of their further ruminations or representations on it. I hope that my noble friend will consider this carefully.
The other thing I would say, in the broader context of planning and the challenge of getting more housing and more things done, is that there is immense distrust out there—anyone who lives with the planning system knows the distrust and fear that people have that the system is loaded against them. The system is actually fair, and bends over backwards to try to be fair, but if government arms itself with powers to change the rules if something does not quite work out as might have been intended in the first place—instead of building that consent for new planning and new development that I want, and which I know the Government want—it may add to the sense, so eloquently expressed by my noble friend Lady Cumberlege, that the system is loaded. That must be something to avoid. Although my main objection is on the wider constitutional principle, as a practitioner—a local authority leader who has to stand between the forces of government and popular feeling—and as a layman, I argue that we should be particularly cautious in the context of this legislation.