European Union (Future Relationship) Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

3rd reading & 2nd reading & Committee negatived & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee negatived (Hansard) & Committee negatived (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

As there is now no alternative to this deal, except no deal, there is one brief point I wish to make for the future. There we do have an alternative: implementing the deal in a way that rolls back the growth and supremacy of the executive branch of Government, which this Bill seeks further to strengthen, in ways described by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Anderson of Ipswich. That alternative requires the restoration of the position of Parliament, adherence to the devolution arrangements and ensuring the continued independence of the other branches of Government.

I will take one illustration: state aid, set out in part 2, heading 1, title XI of the treaty. Its proper implementation and operation are essential to our prosperity, and to a strong relationship with the European Union. One central provision again suffices: article 3.9 within that title, which requires the UK and the EU each to establish

“an operationally independent … body with an appropriate role in its subsidy control regime.”

There are at least five defining tasks that we must carry out in relation to this one article alone. First, consensus is needed with the devolved Governments for, although state aid control is now a reserved matter, state aid is devolved. Secondly, proper registration, dealing with all the detail, is needed, not framework legislation with delegated powers. Thirdly, the independent authority that is to exercise the control over subsidies must have independent decision-making powers, and not be some sort of quango advising the executive branch of government. Fourthly, there must be no attempt to curtail proper judicial review or appeal, by independent courts or tribunals, of the decisions. Finally, the working of these arrangements in the UK, and the way the corresponding arrangements work in the EU, must be scrutinised by a properly resourced parliamentary committee.

That is the task in relation to one article, but if it is achieved for that article in relation to state control, and there are similar achievements in the countless other new arrangements necessary, we should be able to ensure that, as the UK regains control, that control is exercised through parliamentary sovereignty, under the properly balanced operation of our constitution, and not under executive supremacy.