The Ukraine Effect (European Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Thursday 21st November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I will start with a couple of bits of good news. As Members of the House may have heard, last year, for the first time, the European side of NATO collectively spent 2% of its GDP on defence. Eight nations did not, but at least we got to that threshold. As other noble Lords, including the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, have said, it will certainly not be enough for the future, but that progress perhaps shows a seriousness of intent, not least in Germany. The other particularly positive thing was the attendance of our Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, at the EU Foreign Affairs Council last month. I hope that will continue on some sort of basis. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on that.

One of the biggest obscenities in the Ukrainian-Russian war is that, in Putin’s vainglorious intent, he has already sacrificed at least 70,000 to 80,000 of his citizens, who have been documented as killed in action. Realistically, we can probably double that to 140,000. Something like 400,000 Russian citizens and others involved in the war on the Russian side have been permanently injured or killed in action. Sacrificing his citizens through propaganda and war for his own purposes is an obscenity in Putin’s leadership. The damage in Ukraine has been equal to and even worse than that, but we should take note of those human statistics in this war.

I chaired the EU security sub-committee in the term before the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat. I was really surprised that, particularly in the UK, we look so suspiciously between the EU and NATO when it comes to defence areas. It is ironic that I, like many other noble Lords, used to visit Brussels fairly regularly, where we had two headquarters in the same city that seemed so far removed from each other in many ways. However, it was very clear at that time—pre the Ukrainian war—that the EU did not see itself in terms of territorial defence; it saw NATO as that, and it still does. It saw itself in terms of the Petersberg tasks from the 1990s, and was very clear about its involvement in defence security training and mixed civilian/military areas. In fact, it even had the Berlin Plus arrangement in 2002, under which it would agree to share resources between the EU and NATO where NATO did not want to intervene. All that was able to happen even then, although Turkey often got in the way of the process.

Of course, when we get to 2014 and then 2022, all that started to change—I think quite rightly. The one thing that was never understood by Governments in the UK, particularly perhaps Conservative Governments, was that it was not about having different resources for EU defence and NATO defence. They were the same platforms and personnel, so it was not a question of having to divide the budgets; it was one area of defence that could be applied to either of them. All that did change in the European Union, where we now have PESCO, the European Compass and all those areas where the EU has started to get involved. As has been said already, we are about to have a defence commissioner as well, focused very much on the defence industry.

I find it somewhat ironic that Members here have—maybe quite rightly—talked about the protectionist area of the EU and the defence industry, but I rather look at that as us having decided to get outside the tent, then looking back and saying, “That’s not fair”. I think that, if it heard that message from us, the European Union would look upon us rather sarcastically. We should welcome a robust European defence industry—and, sure, we should try to be a part of that and participate, although I understand that might be difficult.

We now move on, post Ukraine, into a different situation entirely with the Trump Administration. I rather agree with the commentator Phillips O’Brien that Trump is probably not anti-NATO, he just does not see it as very important. Rather, he sees it as an encumbrance on the United States where it spends money unnecessarily and the Europeans should look after themselves. I do not see the Trump Administration coming out of NATO, but the corrosive effect is that they will make it very clear that, in terms of Article 5, they cannot be relied upon any more. That is, if you like, the killer of that side.

We should also be aware of the European side of NATO. We have President Macron being proved wrong over NATO being brain-dead, but we often forget that France only became part of the military structure of NATO in 2009 and, if we have a Marine Le Pen presidency in France, will we be at risk of having a withdrawal again?

In my final seven seconds, what I want to say is that we have to be practical. The reality is that we should make sure those fuzzed boundaries between EU and NATO come closer together, and work in reality.

The fact is that—in terms of European Union defence—heads of government, heads of state and heads of defence departments meet far more regularly in the EU than they do in NATO. It means that, practically, we need to be a part of that working together.

The report did not talk about the European Political Community in any way. I would be interested to understand how the Minister sees that playing a role in this defence mosaic as well.

Lastly—I know I have gone over time—my noble friend Lady Suttie was absolutely right that Ukraine must have the final decision on everything that is decided. We cannot go through Munich a second time in a second century.