Energy Bill [HL]

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2015 Lords Chamber

To return to Amendments 19 and 21, which I am sure noble Lords from the Lib Dem Benches will speak to, what can we do to ensure that we are not simply rushing to decommission, and that we have a planned strategy? What can the OGA do and not do? Ultimately, I suspect that the hardest question will be: who pays? I look forward to hearing from the Minister and from other contributors to the debate.

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the meetings that we have had. I found one of them particularly useful because we had a wide range of representatives, from both the department and the OGA. One of the issues that came up, which perhaps I should have understood more but did not, was that oil and gas infrastructure, particularly in the North Sea, was of particular importance, as well as the importance of managing that infrastructure in terms of decommissioning and making sure of other uses, such as CCS. What came out was that a lot of this infrastructure could well be critical to the nation, not just in the context of carbon capture and storage, but even in how the oil and gas market might move.

The question then came down to: if there was critical infrastructure and this decommissioning took place, what happened if the commercial sector— the industry—decided that there was no way that it wanted to keep particular assets operational and they should therefore be decommissioned, but the Secretary of State, the Government and the nation had a different view? Who carries the financial can for that in the future? If industry was not there, who else would step in?

I ask the Minister to forgive me for this: in a way our amendment is a probing amendment, which of course we should not really do on Report, but it is an important point to understand. My question is a fundamental one: if we have critical infrastructure in this industry—in the North Sea, say—and it is to be decommissioned, yet the OGA sees it as critical for future development, whether with greenhouse gases or the future of oil and gas itself, what happens when the private sector will no longer pay for that asset to remain operational, or at least be mothballed? Our amendment asks that question, but it also lays down that the OGA should have a specific responsibility to bring it to the attention of the Secretary of State, should such a situation arise. To solve that, the Secretary of State should be able to pay out of public funds for that critical infrastructure to remain.

I am not completely naive in this area. Clearly, if the private sector sees that the taxpayer is likely to underwrite an asset into the long-term future, perhaps not surprisingly people in that sector might be rather quicker to decommission, move out of these assets and move that cost across to the taxpayer. There is clearly that risk. However, we on these Benches seek through this amendment to obtain clarity on how we defend and preserve the national interest in terms of these assets while at the same time making sure that any taxpayer commitment will be protected—namely, that we keep these strategic assets when the OGA and the Secretary of State believe that they are critical for the nation’s future.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Energy and Climate Change and Wales Office (Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for these amendments. I wish to speak to the non-government amendments before addressing the government amendments. Following discussions held during the dinner break, I am happy to revisit Amendment 72, which we looked at before the dinner break.

Amendment 19 seeks to amend Clause 5 to give the Secretary of State the power to direct the Oil and Gas Authority to postpone or prohibit decommissioning of infrastructure until such time as she determines that a carbon capture and storage operator is in a position to utilise the infrastructure. I must first clarify that it is not the intention that the Bill will give the OGA the power to prohibit or postpone decommissioning. The ultimate power to approve, or disapprove as necessary, a decommissioning plan lies with the Secretary of State under Part 4 of the Petroleum Act 1998, and will continue to do so.

In any event, taking a power to delay or prohibit decommissioning on an open-ended basis for the purpose suggested would appear to require an owner of relevant infrastructure to pay for the ongoing maintenance of the infrastructure on an indefinite basis until the CCS development is ready. These would be significant costs, running to tens of millions of pounds for ongoing maintenance every year, simply to keep the relevant infrastructure safe until such time as it might be reused for CCS. When, as we all hope will quickly become the case, CCS is a proven technology, we can be certain of how and when relevant infrastructure can be reused for CCS and a commercial deal is viable, preventing decommissioning of existing assets to make way for CCS may be sensible and permissible under the current proposals the Government have made. However, as we debate the merits of this amendment today, we cannot say with any certainty when or how such infrastructure could be reused for CCS. I fear that this amendment risks making the United Kingdom continental shelf less attractive to investors and jeopardising the vital investment we need for the future of the basin. This would put us in significant conflict with the recommendations set out in the Wood review, and would be perilous given the challenging economic realities in the United Kingdom continental shelf today.

I hope that this explanation is helpful in setting out why this amendment is not workable from a structural perspective, since it will be the Secretary of State, not the OGA, who will hold the key power to decide whether to approve or reject an abandonment programme. In addition, as I will outline shortly, the government amendments brought forward on Report today aim to strike the right balance between keeping the continental shelf open for business while putting rigorous checks in place to ensure that the preservation and reuse of North Sea infrastructure, including for CCS, is appropriately considered before any decommissioning can take place.

The Government’s proposals would allow the Secretary of State to ensure that decommissioning takes place in accordance with an approved decommissioning plan, enabling her to ensure that alternatives to decommissioning are taken into account and that the costs of plans are kept to the minimum reasonably practicable. The intention is very much to bring consideration of such reuse to the forefront of the process and ensure that opportunities are identified early, allowing for adequate commercial arrangements to be made between parties and preventing situations requiring a party to maintain an asset against their will.

I turn to non-government Amendment 21. This amendment seeks to insert a new clause after Clause 7. The new clause would require the Oil and Gas Authority to report to the Secretary of State if the operability of any element of critical oil and gas infrastructure is at risk due to the financial condition of the owner, or for any other reason. It would also enable the Secretary of State to provide financial support to maintain such assets, if she considers the asset is at risk of closure or becoming inoperable, and it is in the national interest for it to remain in operational order.

I, too, am concerned to ensure that critical oil and gas infrastructure is properly identified and safeguarded in the national interest. This is an area already being addressed by the Oil and Gas Authority. Its recent Call to Action: Six Months On report highlighted actions being taken to protect critical infrastructure. However, we will continue to monitor this work and provision in this Bill will already enable the Secretary of State to require action from the OGA if necessary.