Lord Teverson
Main Page: Lord Teverson (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)My Lords, this is a very noble cause. I myself tried to introduce a similar amendment to the first of this Government’s energy Bills. I first came across the real problem with it when I tried to draft an amendment that would make block tariffs work. They are incredibly difficult, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, on having got as far as he has. I must admit, though, that at the end of the day this was one of the few instances where I was actually persuaded by DECC officials that the idea was not possible and would not work—much to my regret. One of the reasons was the fact that my noble friend Lord Ridley mentioned: namely, that poor people are the ones who use a lot of electricity for their heating. It is an irony that people in fuel poverty have to use electricity for heating, so block tariffs are very difficult to use in order to get the outcomes that we want. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s arguments about this amendment, because I suspect that they will be exactly the ones that persuaded me that this scheme was not practically possible.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this amendment and for his pursuit of this issue in other fora. It is correct that the way that electricity is priced at the moment is illogical: the more we consume as a whole, the higher the cost of producing the electricity. Once our demand rises, we have to bring on marginal plant, which is less efficient and more costly, pushing up the wholesale price for everyone. The people who consume the most therefore cause us to carry a cost that we should not have to bear.
It should therefore be logical that we disincentivise the bringing on of marginal plant by tariff pricing and tariff structures. However, although the idea has been raised on many occasions, the moment has never been found to make it a reality. I hope—and I think that this will be the case—that once smart metering comes into play, this will become an absolute no-brainer. At that point, when we have detailed information about each individual household’s demand across a given period of time, this will become enabled. At present, though, it is a very difficult thing to bring into practice.
Noble Lords have touched on some of the issues. One of them is the question of the variance in demand between households. It can be perfectly true that you have two identical semi-detached houses with very different energy bills, because of different socioeconomic circumstances. Someone who is at home all day will have the heating on and that will increase their bills. If you have a high occupancy rate—if you have children, for example—your energy bills will go up. It is quite difficult to identify the right point at which to say, “This is a fair use of electricity and after this we are going to increase the price”.
That said, though, it is not impossible. It should not be the case that electricity companies incentivise greater usage and reduce the rate of tariffs after a certain point of consumption. If we are not yet able to get to a fully comprehensive rising block tariff system, then at least the Government could perhaps make it clear that tariffs should not have such a regressive effect that the highest price would be for the first units of consumption and then there would be a reduction in the unit price—that should be ruled out. The Prime Minister has indicated that he has a desire to make tariffs simpler. The simplest thing would be to have one unit price for everyone and for everything. Let us start there, and if we can establish that principle and stop the incentivisation of greater consumption, that will be a step in the right direction.
I still think that there is something in this idea. We need to look at it, although it is possibly true that now is not the time. I am sure that that will disappoint my noble friend; one can always say, “Now is not the time”. However, with the advent of better technology such as smart meters and a greater understanding of demand with better data, we will be able to get there. The way that the system is currently structured is illogical, and I am sure that something like this will be introduced within the next decade. I congratulate my noble friend on being so prescient and ahead of the curve.
My Lords, this amendment and the next concern the Electricity Act 1989. I have not yet read it all but I have not once come across the word “decarbonisation” in it. It shows how we have moved forwards—or backwards, depending on how one looks at it—over the years.
Amendment 106 relates to a decision made only a few weeks ago concerning Viking Energy, which was looking to obtain a consent under Section 36 of the 1989 Act for a wind farm in Shetland. There was a judicial review of that decision, which was upheld by the Outer House of the Court of Session. That has done something that this Energy Bill is trying to prevent —that is, it has increased uncertainty for investors—and changed completely the view within Scotland of what is needed to obtain a Section 36 consent for a major power project over 50 megawatts. The judgment laid down that the people who were applying needed a generating licence before they could obtain that consent. That is not always the case and I suggest that it should not necessarily be the case.
These schemes tend to be joint ventures involving generating companies that already have licences—in this case, Scottish and Southern Energy was one of the major shareholders of Viking—and which try to obtain their Section 36 permission for the generating station to go ahead; it could be wind power or any form of power. But clearly there has to be a licence to operate before the project can go ahead and generate electricity, so there is no question about the organisation that gets the consent being competent and being able to move forward. Indeed, given the amount of investment that is required for these projects over 50 megawatts—in this case, one-third of a gigawatt—clearly there would be no financial backing if the organisations were not seen as competent.
The decision north of the border has introduced a great deal of uncertainty into the system and made the progress towards investment in power generation far more difficult. It has also put into question those Section 36 consents that perhaps were granted when the operators did not have a licence. I would be very interested to hear how my noble friend the Minister sees the status of those past consents now that this court ruling has taken place.
I understand that the Scottish Government have appealed against that decision to the Inner House of the Court of Session, and that the appeal will take place in February and March. Once again, that causes a hiatus in investment. It means that there is great uncertainty over future investment in power in what is a particularly important part of the UK for renewables. Therefore, I have tabled this amendment in order to bring clarity and ensure that the way in which this system was always thought to operate is reinstated. I should add that within England and Wales this is not an issue, as I understand it, because there has been consequent legislation, either primary or secondary, since the Electricity Act 1989. South of the border, the position is quite clear. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very disappointed that my noble friend Lord Stephen is not here tonight. This issue first came to my attention because of some very unfortunate publicity in the Daily Telegraph, where he was accused of promoting his business interests through this amendment. Quite rightly, he withdrew his name and made it clear that his name had been added to the amendment in error.
My Lords, perhaps my noble friend will allow me to intervene. I absolutely endorse that and make it clear that the name of my noble friend Lord Stephen was added to this amendment completely by error and without his permission at the time.
Whatever one’s views on wind farms—I confess I am not an enthusiast for them—it is absolutely essential that the process by which permissions are given and projects are undertaken are seen to be fair and take account of all objections and environmental and other interests. This example is about a particular wind farm development in some respects, but it is also about the rule of law and our attitudes to the rule of law.
The fact of the matter is that this whole saga arose because of the Viking project in Shetland, with over 100 turbines, where there was considerable local opposition. The project is being promoted by the Shetland Islands trust, which has got the oil money—and a large number of the trustees are councillors in Shetland—together with Scottish and Southern Energy. They are the people who are promoting this project. There was very considerable local opposition to this project, but the council decided that it was not conflicted, even though the Shetland trust was a party to the development. As a result, there was no public inquiry. The Scottish Ministers in the Scottish Government gave the project the go-ahead. Some local opposition sought judicial review of that decision, which went to the Court of Session, which is the equivalent of the High Court in England.
Former law officer, Lynda Clark, after three months of deliberation and a well argued and clearly very considered opinion, which I have read and is freely available, concluded that this proposal was unlawful because it did not meet, as my noble friend has said, the requirements of Schedule 9 to the Electricity Act 1989, which makes it clear that anyone who is planning on producing a power plant which includes a wind farm should have a licence from Ofgem before planning approval can be granted. When the judge asked the parties to the development who had the necessary consent, none of them had, and the project had to go back to square one.
When I was a Secretary of State—and for as long as I have known—the principle has been that when a judge reaches a conclusion as to the state of the law, that is the law until such time as it is subject to an appeal. What happened next is an absolute scandal. The Scottish Government then decided that they disagreed with the judge in her opinion and that they would go ahead anyway. In a letter signed by Catherine Cacace to John Campbell QC, the Energy Consents and Deployment Unit said:
“Scottish Ministers note that the Court has found that an application for consent under section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 can only be made (and so granted) where the applicant at the time of making the application either holds a licence to generate electricity or is exempt from that requirement”.
It goes on—wait for it:
“Scottish Ministers’ position is that they disagree with, and have appealed, the decision … The decision on the legislative interpretation runs contrary to the established practice relating to the handling of applications for consent which has been in place both north and south of the border for many years … Our intention is therefore to continue to operate in accordance with the practice … and to deal with current applications on that basis”.
In other words, “We will ignore the law”. It goes on to say:
“Scottish Ministers consider that the balance of public and national interest is in favour of continuing with the current approach until the appeal has been determined, in particular because of the need to continue to support the economy and our renewable energy ambitions”.
So their renewable energy ambitions trounce the law of the land. That is very undesirable and unprecedented —as far as I know; I see a noble Lord sitting on the Front Bench who is familiar with both the law and Shetland. I can think of no other case. The normal practice would be to stay any development until such time as an appeal had been considered. What I very strongly object to about the amendment is that it would take away the legal position that has been established for many years, and which has been confirmed by the court, in a retrospective manner. It would create a situation in which any Tom, Dick or Harry could apply for permission to establish a wind farm—or, I guess, any other form of generation. Those tests about their ability to meet environmental and other requirements under the legislation would then be applied to them.
This is an undesirable development, by both the Scottish Government and my noble friends. The proper procedure here would be to at least wait for the appeal. It is certainly quite wrong for the Scottish Government to continue in this way. If you look at it from the point of view of the objectors, they have gone to a judicial review, won their case—and everyone knows how difficult it is to win a case on judicial review—and the Scottish Government are just saying that they are going to ignore that. Should this House to seek to overturn the effect of that judgment, when people are talking in terms of the need to support “our renewable energy ambitions”? Our renewable energy ambitions must carry public consent. This is no way in which to proceed. I have strong objections to the amendment, and I hope that my noble friend will reject it.
My Lords, I will repeat what I have said, which is: let us wait to see what the outcome of the appeal is.
My Lords, this was tabled as rather a probing amendment, given the situation that has arisen, and I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions. I do not wish to detain the House on this for too long but I will say that this has nothing to do with retrospection; I absolutely disagree that someone who develops a wind farm or any other energy-generating station over 50 megawatts is necessarily going to be the operator. It is a fact in industry in Britain and worldwide that the developer is often not the operator, in whatever industry we may talk about—they are two entirely separate processes. If you took the view that they had to be the same legal person then you would probably have to go back to 17th-century economics, let alone 21st-century ones. It does not work that way any more. It would also bring the practicalities back into line with the English and Welsh situation. In no way does this amendment make any judgment about whether people should be able to judicially review such decisions; clearly they should be able to do so. I would hope that such actions would not be vexatious, and I am sure that this one was not. Indeed, there was a judgment parallel to the licensing one concerning the wildlife directives, on which I make no judgment at all. It might have been completely valid in terms of their application.
With this amendment I was simply trying to bring the situation back to some certainty and to the situation that was understood prior to this judgment. That is not in itself retrospective. However, I am persuaded by the Minister that perhaps the right course is for this to go through the appeal process—I certainly do not think that it is a good idea for Parliament to interfere with that—and then the situation should be looked at. I am highly persuaded by the argument put forward by my noble friend Lord Forsyth about the reaction of the Scottish Government, in that clearly the rule of law is the rule of law wherever we are within the United Kingdom, and I would never wish to pull the carpet from under that important principle in how we live our public life. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.