Queen’s Speech

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 11th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, many things have changed in the 11 months since last year’s debate on the humble Address. Some things have improved, such as the UK’s broader economic outlook. Some have loomed larger and grown more intense, such as the debates on Europe and the proposed separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom. However, for those of us interested in security and international order, things have become markedly worse.

This time last year we were hoping, against all our instincts, that Secretary of State Kerry might make some real progress on the Middle East peace process. The pessimistic angels of our nature, alas, proved only too right on that particular issue.

This time last year there was some hope that inclusive governance in countries such as Egypt and Libya might gain a firmer footing. In 2014 that hope has grown fainter.

I cannot claim that we had many realistic hopes for progress in Syria last year, but the outcome has been even worse than our fears. Meanwhile, the political and security situation in Iraq has continued its downward spiral, as we have seen most recently with the events in Mosul.

On a slightly less gloomy note, negotiations continue on the Iranian nuclear programme, and while many obstacles remain, we still have the chance of a deal. However, lest we become too cheerful, events in Pakistan serve to restore our sense of gloom. There, Government hopes of political progress with the Taliban have proved illusory. The recent attack at Karachi airport demonstrates vividly how seriously the internal security situation has declined in that country.

In Europe we face the prospect of a major power ignoring state borders and international agreements to which it is a signatory. Whatever provocation Russia may feel it suffered, nothing can justify its actions in the Crimea and subsequently.

Further afield, frictions continue over the South China Sea, and both the United States and China raised the temperature considerably at the recent Shangri-La dialogue. North Korea remains as dangerously delusional as ever. I could go on, but time does not permit.

What can we conclude from this tale of woe? For my part, I believe that we are witnessing two major strategic shifts, both of which could pose serious challenges to our future security and prosperity. The first, and most obvious, is the rising economic might of China and its use of increasingly sharp elbows on the international scene. The major points of friction may be far removed from us geographically but, in this globalised world, the consequences will certainly be felt here. The second development is the continued unravelling of the Sykes–Picot agreement, and the subsequent post-1918 arrangements that were intended to tidy up the detritus of the Ottoman Empire. The most malign consequence of this is the growth of an ungoverned space straddling the Syria-Iraq border, and the emergence there of extremist Islamic groups, such as the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria.

This is the backdrop to the rapidly approaching general election, and the subsequent security and defence review. It is not a pretty picture and, on the assumption that the United Kingdom still has the strategic intent to contribute to the international order and stability that are so important to this nation, it will require some serious thought. There has already been debate over the lessons we should draw from Russia’s actions in Ukraine. No doubt there are many, but for me there is one that stands out above all others, the lesson that the Athenians taught the Melians during the Peloponnesian war: the strong do what they can; the weak suffer what they must. In a number of ways, we in Europe have grown weak.

The foundation of nearly all power is economic strength, and it is right that over the past few years we should have concentrated on this. We also have in this country a very useful range of soft power tools, and I look forward to the coming debate on the Select Committee report on that issue. But hard power is a key element in the mix, and we are approaching some hard choices on this score in the next defence review. The 2010 defence review sacrificed a degree of strategic coherence in support of economic and fiscal retrenchment but, as the Prime Minister acknowledged in announcing the results of the review, restoring that coherence, in Future Force 2020, would require real-terms increases in the defence budget in each of the years from 2015 onwards. The Chancellor has already made it clear that further belt tightening will be required after the general election. This may be so, but a failure to fund defence as envisaged in the 2010 defence review will fatally undermine the plans for Future Force 2020, and lead inevitably to further capability and manpower reductions in the Armed Forces. We must ask ourselves whether that would be a wise response to the massive challenges to international order that I have outlined. This is a serious question about a crucial issue, and it deserves serious debate. I hope that over the next 11 months we will have the chance, within your Lordships’ House and elsewhere, to conduct just such a debate.

Ukraine

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

I hear what the noble Lord has said, but the legitimate and natural interests of the Ukrainian people surely come before the legitimate interests of any other peoples. It must of course be right that the Ukrainian people are free to decide their future. I do not think that the European Union, or indeed the US, are forcing the Ukrainians to go down any path; I was at the Vilnius conference where these discussions in relation to the association agreement started. I refer the noble Lord right back to when these debates were being held at these Dispatch Boxes; we were incredibly careful with our language, constantly asked for matters to de-escalate and constantly spoke with the Ukrainians to ensure that the issues being raised by the Russians were being addressed.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the outgoing Secretary-General of NATO has made clear his concerns about the trends in defence expenditure within the alliance, particularly in light of the international situation. The United Kingdom used to set an example in this regard and thus was able to speak from a position of moral authority. Given the fraught international situation and the issues that we are discussing today, does the Minister not believe that it is time that the United Kingdom resumed its rightful place in this regard?

[Baroness Warsi]

This question has arisen on a number of occasions when we have discussed Ukraine. The noble and gallant Lord will obviously always make a strong case for defence spending. I assure him that in relation to the resources required, certainly to step up the Baltic air-policing mission, the necessary Typhoons were deployed.

Ukraine

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble Lord makes an important point. Although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it has a long-standing relationship with NATO and contributes to NATO operations, and has done so for many years. I am, with my wide portfolio in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, responsible for sanctions and therefore have spent some time considering what we call smart sanctions: well judged and well targeted sanctions that have impact. Sanctions should not be to make us feel better; they should be put in place so that they work and have an outcome. It is exactly in that vein that we consider them.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister accept that we should be cautious about being quite so dismissive about the military implications of what has happened in Ukraine? I am not referring to military intervention in Ukraine by this country or other members of NATO, but about current members of NATO. Some of our most recent members have a memory that does not need to stretch back very far to create a great shadow of fear of Russia. Having worked very closely with some of these nations, I can assure your Lordships that that fear is very real and very existent. Some of these nations have Russian-speaking minorities. Will the UK Government do everything within their power to ensure that in the ongoing negotiations and discussions, NATO takes every possible action to demonstrate unequivocally to Russia its commitment, its capability and its will to defend all of its members under Article 5?

[Baroness Warsi]

I think I probably dealt with some of those issues in answering a previous question. I understand the sentiments that the noble and gallant Lord expresses. I do not think I was being dismissive in relation to potential military action; I was trying to say that it is important that we do not hypothesise about whether certain things—for example, if defence spending had been done differently or a certain decision on another foreign policy issue had been taken differently —would have had an impact on Russia’s intentions. I think it is probably better for us to try to understand the Russia psyche on Crimea and Ukraine, which may give us a slightly better perspective on the thinking behind Russia’s actions.

Syria and the Middle East

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 27th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, as we debate Syria and the Middle East today, it is clear that we have witnessed and continue to witness a significant degree of political and social upheaval across the region. To that extent, the cards are up in the air, but we can have little control and less certainty about where they will eventually fall. This naturally poses some serious challenges to the formulation of a coherent UK policy in the Middle East. If we are to develop and maintain a credible strategic approach to the dynamic and complex challenges of the region, we need first a comprehensive analysis of the context and then a clear focus on those issues that are most important to our own security and prosperity. I do not mean to diminish the importance of moral and humanitarian concerns—we should continue our efforts in this regard—but as a nation we have limited resources and influence. It is therefore crucial that we identify our own policy priorities.

The context is surely an unravelling of the post-1918 settlement that was intended to tidy up the detritus of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France, of course, have their fingerprints all over this settlement. Consider Syria. The Ottomans ruled it for just over 400 years until 1918. The San Remo conference of 1920 placed Syria-Lebanon under a French mandate while, incidentally, putting Palestine under a British mandate at the same time. Syria became independent in 1946 but had no settled constitutional or political base. Between 1946 and 1956 the country had 20 different Cabinets and four different constitutions. The turmoil in Syria today is only the latest episode in a drawn-out process that has its roots in the end of Ottoman rule in 1918.

We now see long-buried fissures reappearing across many parts of the region. We see tribe pitted against tribe, Muslim against non-Muslim, Arab against non-Arab, authoritarian against libertarian and, perhaps most significantly, Sunni against Shia. Indeed, the last division is one of the most polarising and potentially one of the most dangerous. Overshadowing all this is the regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This, of course, encompasses some of the fissures that I have mentioned—Sunni/Shia and Arab/non-Arab—but the degree of national animosity and the pursuit of regional political dominance take the problem to a new level and the competition is increasingly being played out in Syria.

The political upheaval in Syria is different in nature from many of the others that we have seen elsewhere in the region. In places such as Libya and Egypt, the impetus for change came from, or quickly gravitated to, those in the cities and centres of population. In Syria it came from those on the periphery, particularly the impoverished and drought-ridden agricultural communities, and was directed against those at the centre. So change was more difficult to achieve, particularly since survival of the military leadership was more closely tied to the survival of the regime. Even so, it looked as if Assad could not last, but the intervention of Hezbollah changed the outlook.

Given the support of Iran and Russia, it is now hard to see how Assad could be removed in the near term. Given the support of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and to some extent at least the United States, it is hard to see how the regime could achieve a decisive military victory over the opposition groups. The most likely outcome in Syria is either degeneration into a Somalia-like failed state or division into a number of warring baronies. Neither outcome is palatable from a wider security perspective and both are likely to perpetuate large-scale human tragedy. Without substantial international intervention, for which there seems little or no appetite, it is hard to see a plausible alternative.

At the same time, two key sets of negotiations continue: on the Middle East peace process and on the Iranian nuclear issue. Both are likely to reach some sort of conclusion, whether satisfactory or not, later this year.

These then, are some of the key features of the regional context. With so many challenges and so little clarity on the likely outcomes, where should the UK place its own policy priorities? I should like to propose three areas. Top of the list, I suggest, should be the Iranian nuclear issue. The consequences of failure on this front for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and for long-term security within the region are likely to be extremely serious and to have a lasting effect on the UK’s own security. The ongoing negotiations are therefore critical. Of course, we have to negotiate well if we are to achieve the right outcome and, of course, we must take nothing on trust. Any agreement has to be verifiable. There will inevitably be different views on what constitutes a bad deal or a good deal.

I want to focus on two short-term issues that seem to me of fundamental importance in this whole process. The first is the sustainment of the agreed sanctions regime. As negotiations continue and some restrictions are lifted, there is a clear risk that sanctions as a whole will start to unravel. There will be a temptation for some countries or companies to jump the gun in order to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. That risk cannot be entirely eliminated, so it will have to be managed. It will require strong and obvious resolve on the part of the major economic players to take firm and painful action against transgressors. The UK and the EU more generally will have an important part to play here.

The other issue concerns the question of where we go if negotiations fail. What is plan B? In such situations there is often a reluctance to consider plan B at all in case this is taken as a belief that plan A will not work, but such precautionary thinking does not need to be public. We can and should be discreetly considering what options are open to us if it proves impossible, even with more time, to reach a comprehensive settlement. This will involve some difficult decisions, but leaving them to the last minute risks making the difficult impossible. Of course the implicit existence of a plan B could help to focus minds on reaching a satisfactory agreement in the first place.

The second policy priority, I suggest, should be our relationship with Saudi Arabia. This has suffered over recent months, not least because of divergent views over Syria and concerns about the negotiations with Iran. However, Saudi Arabia remains the pivotal country in the Gulf region and is of considerable economic importance to the UK. Given the differences in our societies and cultures, the relationship is never going to be an easy one. It will require hard work, a degree of tolerance on both sides and, above all, constant and clear communication. The relationship is too important to the UK and its interests for us to neglect it. How closely are the Saudis being consulted on the negotiations with Iran? What we might consider a satisfactory outcome might look very different to Saudi eyes. Although we cannot give them a veto over the process, attempting to deal with or mitigate their concerns must be a key policy objective for the international community as well as for us.

The third priority should be to contain, as far as that is possible, the wider regional consequences of a Syrian conflict. Jordan matters to us as an old friend and it matters to Israel because of the latter’s concerns over strategic depth, so it is key to wider regional stability. However, Jordan is being weakened and undermined by the conflict in Syria. As others have mentioned, the large number of refugees is putting great stress on the already weak economy. There is no doubt that the social impact of what is going on in Jordan as a result of the conflict in Syria is having enormous repercussions for the regime there. Therefore, support for Jordan, for its economy and for its political development should be a key part of the UK’s policy in the region.

There are of course other malign international repercussions of the war in Syria. The Lebanon is being seriously affected. Perhaps one of the most worrying consequences is the growth of an ungoverned space straddling the Syria-Iraq border and the implications for radical Islamist terrorist groups. For example, the recent activities of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant demonstrate the risk of such an ungoverned space. The group poses serious dangers to the future of both Iraq and Syria and potentially further afield. Containing this risk will require some sort of governance over the affected area. For this reason, if no other, the feuding baronies outcome in Syria that I described earlier, while unpalatable, would certainly be preferable to a Somalia-like failed state. Another wider consequence of the Syrian situation is the return of radicalised and battle-hardened jihadis from the conflict zone to their home states. Saudi Arabia is increasingly concerned about this issue and the implications for its own security. It also affects us here in the UK. In many ways, this is a challenge for domestic rather than foreign policy, but it is a challenge nevertheless.

There are, of course, other important issues, such as the Middle East peace process, that I do not have time to cover, but many of these, while crucial to the UK, are beyond our power to influence directly. As I said at the outset, the proliferation of challenges within the Middle East and the limits on our ability to confront them should force us to a clear-eyed analysis of UK priorities. Naturally, some may disagree with those that I have proposed, but in my view such an analysis is essential if we are to take a coherent and strategically informed approach to the many dangers that we face, rather than simply wringing our hands about them.

Iran and Syria

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 11th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble Baroness comes to these matters with great experience and expertise. She has made valid points about the different seats of power within Iran. At the moment, we feel that the Foreign Minister and President Rouhani have a mandate under which they are operating. We have had a number of meetings with them; the Foreign Secretary has met the Foreign Minister on three separate occasions, and we genuinely feel that progress was recently made in Geneva. The offer on the table now being considered by the Iranians is something that they will have to come back to discuss; it may well be that on 20 November we will be much clearer about how committed all aspects of the Iranian seats of power are in taking this matter forward. At this stage, however, we feel that progress has been made and that there is an acceptance that this is in Iran’s interests.

In relation to Syria, the noble Baroness made an important point. It is why the statement from the national coalition issued only yesterday said clearly that the transitional council must not include al-Assad or others who have blood on their hands. I think those are exactly the kind of individuals to whom the noble Baroness refers.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is of course right that we should negotiate with Iran, with a clear eye and a suspicious mind. Surely the point of the sanctions in the first place is to get the Iranians to the negotiating table so that we can find some diplomatic solution to their nuclear programme. We should, therefore, be enthusiastic about the process, while being very suspicious about the detail. With that in mind, the Minister has emphasised the united front that our negotiators put up to Iran. That is not the perception one gains from the media. Does the Minister agree that that is very unhelpful, particularly as regards people such as the Israelis and the US Congress, who are already suspicious of the process, and that unhelpful and unguarded remarks made by people, such as those made by the French Foreign Minister to journalists, are likely to damage our cause rather than help it?

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble and gallant Lord will be aware that a number of tracks—sometimes bilateral and at other times multilateral—usually take place before these negotiations are finally concluded. It was important that the E3+3 came to the same place and that they presented a united front. I assure the noble and gallant Lord that that offer is now clear and that the E3+3 are all behind that united position. On sanctions, we are clear that Iran needs to take concrete steps which give assurance and build trust; by that I mean not words but actions. Once we see that change in actions we will be ready to act proportionately and respond.

Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 10th October 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Luce, for securing this debate. The UK has long had important relationships with the Arab states of the Gulf Co-operation Council, and our interests remain as heavily bound up in that region as ever.

Our relationships are, of necessity, conducted largely on a bilateral basis with the states involved. The Gulf Co-operation Council, despite its name, is as much a vehicle for competition and rivalry as it is for co-operation. Nevertheless, it fulfils an important function and deserves our full support.

There are many dimensions to the UK’s relationships with the GCC states, but at the moment two issues seem to me to stand out from the rest. The first is the domestic situations in those states and the concerns within them over the continuing political developments within the region. I am thinking here less of the member states’ reactions to the events around them and more of their own political pressures although, of course, these are closely linked.

The status of the Shia majority in Bahrain—which the noble Lord, Lord Luce, has covered—is the most obvious example but the other states are experiencing their own pressures to varying degrees, as we have already heard this afternoon. The question is whether and how these internal political issues should shape our approach to the various states concerned.

We could adopt a boisterous, cheerleading approach and wave the flag for democracy. This would be a mistake, for many reasons. First, democracy can take many forms and mean different things to different peoples. After all, we cannot even agree between ourselves quite what it means. Secondly, too heavy a hand when dealing with the internal affairs of another nation can have unintended and quite counterproductive consequences. We need to tread warily. On the other hand, I do not accept the argument made by some that democracy, even in its loosest definition, has no place in certain societies and cultures. If, by “democracy”, we mean a stake in and some degree of say in the governance of a country, it seems that this is a near universal aspiration in developed and developing societies.

The shape of that democracy, however, is quite another thing. Anyone starting with a blank sheet of paper would not come up with our model. It works for us—after a fashion. Any system needs to grow from and be rooted in the culture it serves. Our understanding of the cultures of the Gulf states can be rather superficial.

It seems that we can best serve both our interests and the interests of the international community by being supportive rather than condemnatory; by being gently persuasive rather than hectoring; and by focusing more on long-term progress than on short-term moralising.

I am not suggesting that we turn a blind eye to repression and to abuses of human rights. However, I am suggesting that our responses should be more nuanced than has sometimes been the case. To those who would say that such an approach ignores our moral responsibilities, I would reply that it is about ways and means. Do we want to achieve our strategic objectives in the region, including our hopes and aspirations for the peoples concerned, or are we just interested in scratching tactical itches? For my part, I vote for the strategic approach.

The second issue, which is external to the GCC states, is their concern—their very real concern, I believe—over Iran. The status of Iran’s nuclear programme is very much in the news, and is certainly the wolf closest to the sledge. It is, however, a symptom of a wider regional tension over the perceived development of a Persian hegemony. Religion plays into this and increasingly manifests its role through a burgeoning Sunni-Shia cold—and sometimes not so cold—war. However, that is not the only fissure between Iran and the GCC. For the regimes in the smaller states it is an existential issue. For Saudi Arabia it is more about regional dominance.

We are all concerned about Iran, but the GCC countries see the issue through a different prism from us—and, indeed, in many cases, from one another. It is important that we understand this. We all hope that recent developments within Iran, and between Iran and the international community, will produce positive results—although we would be wise not to get carried away by the more acceptable face that Iran is seeking to present to the world.

In all of this, however, we should remember our partners in the Gulf and recognise how much more closely all of this touches them. I hope that we are talking to them regularly on these developments and, more importantly, listening to them. We have expended much effort over recent years in trying to persuade our friends in the region that we have their interests at heart, that their security matters to us and that we take seriously their concerns over Iran and its nuclear programme. Those reassurances will ring somewhat hollow if we neglect their views and opinions on recent and future developments.

There are many other issues on which we should be, and frequently are, engaging with the GCC countries. However, the final point I should like to make takes my earlier plea for a more strategic approach to political development into the wider arena. It probably seems quite clear to most of us that our crucial national interests are not only closely engaged in this region today but have been so for a great many decades. But if we were to examine the practical handling of our relationships within the region over those decades, would we reach the same conclusion? Far too often we have sent conflicting signals in this regard. We have engaged, disengaged and re-engaged. We have busied ourselves, distanced ourselves, and then dived in again. Is it any wonder that some of our friends in the region get a bit confused about where we actually stand?

If we are serious about the region, and I think it is in our national interest that we should be, then we must take a more strategic, longer-term view of our relationships within the region. Just as important, we must give such an approach practical effect on the ground. If we want to have real presence, to have real influence, then our friends must believe that we are not only there, but there to stay.

Piracy

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, I am delighted that we are able this evening to be able to debate such an important topic. I, too, thank and congratulate my noble friend Lord Luce for his persistence in securing us the opportunity. We have already heard a number of wise and powerful contributions, which have made many of the points I might myself have made but will not now seek to repeat. I would, though, like to say a few words about the maritime security mission and about Operation Atalanta in particular. It has been a great success. It has been demonstrably successful in contributing to a reduction in pirating. Not all of that reduction can be attributed to naval activity alone, of course, but Operation Atalanta has, nevertheless, made a significant contribution. It has been successful in fostering maritime co-operation with nations that have little experience in working with partners and with little previous incentive to do so. The most significant example of this is China.

We must not make too much of China’s participation in anti-piracy operations. It remains, after all, a difficult and uncomfortable bedfellow on a great range of international issues. Nevertheless, the role that China has played is, to my mind, a healthy and positive development in the context of wider global security. A China that plays its part in multilateral efforts to foster peace and security must be a good thing. The longest journey starts with one step.

Operation Atalanta has also been successful in demonstrating that the EU can have an important role in certain kinds of military operations. I spent too long sitting in EU military committee meetings to be under any illusion about the organisation’s capacity for the harder, more complex kind of operations. Too often, discussions were dominated by political manoeuvring and demarcation disputes with NATO. Unlike NATO, the EU has no proper, effective military strategic organisation or process. Nevertheless, when it works in concert with NATO, when it makes use of shared resources rather than trying to duplicate structures, and when it focuses on operations that make use of its political strengths and avoid exposing its military weaknesses, then the EU can be a very valuable player on the global security stage. Operation Atalanta has clearly demonstrated that.

Having said all that, we must remember that, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, Atalanta was set up with a very limited objective: to protect World Food Programme shipping. Anything else it might be able to do to counter piracy more widely was subject to it having the spare capacity, and there is not very much of that.

The area of sea space that has to be covered is immense, particularly when wide-area surveillance capability, such as that provided by maritime patrol aircraft, is so scarce. Of course, the pirates inevitably react to and counter tactics that are employed successfully against them. They have ranged ever further from shore, for example, through the use of mother ships. We should therefore expect further innovation from them. It would be dangerous to assume that any reduction in the number of successful pirate attacks will necessarily be permanent.

The military operation is an essential tool in addressing piracy but, as other noble Lords have observed, it will not provide a lasting solution. It is a truism that in the long run piracy is dealt with not at sea but on land. That is why the wider issues of Somali governance are crucial. The fact that Somalia as an entity does not really exist makes the problem even more challenging and reinforces the need for us to continue our efforts to understand and influence, for example, Puntland, which is home to so many pirates.

Finally, this is not a problem that will be resolved quickly. It has been with us for a number of years already. Operation Atalanta itself has been running for four years and we must expect that the need for the current multi-strand approach to security in the region will continue for some considerable time. That will require patience on our part and it will require persistence, but it will also require sustained investment in the kind of diplomatic and military effort which is often taken too much for granted but which does not happen by accident.

Middle East: Recent Developments

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 13th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, this is a timely and most welcome debate on an issue of great importance to us in this country. We do, though, face a difficult problem of prioritisation. We are considering recent developments in the Middle East. Well, that is a very large area, and it faces a very large range of challenges. We, on the other hand, have somewhat limited resources. While of course we can and should talk about and take a view on developments across the board, we as a country need to think about where we should focus our efforts.

For all the difficulties in Egypt and the unfolding tragedy in Syria, the most pressing problem remains the Iranian nuclear programme. It is the most pressing in terms of the security of this country and its interests, and it is made doubly difficult because, in large measure, the way in which events develop is beyond our direct control. The international community has made valiant efforts to resolve the whole question but without much effect. It is perfectly true that sanctions are having a significant impact on Iran’s economy, but it is also true that affected nations find ways of adapting to and living with sanctions if they must, and there are signs that Iran is doing just that. The talks between Iran and the P5 plus one over the course of this year seemed for a time to hold out the promise of a way forward. However, the only good thing about the Moscow round was that expectations by then were so low that no one was particularly surprised or disappointed when they got nowhere. The ongoing technical discussions at least keep the process alive, but that is about all.

Meanwhile, the Iranians continue to enrich uranium. There has been much debate about when they will have enough material for a sustainable weapon programme, should they choose to continue down that route, and views differ on the timescale involved. However, there is only one clock that really matters on this, and that is the one in Israel. For us, the Iranian nuclear programme is a matter of wider security concerns within the Middle East and the future of the non-proliferation treaty. For many Israelis, it is a matter of their continued existence. It is therefore important that we try to see the question through Israeli eyes, as far as that is possible.

In that context, there are two fundamental propositions that we should seek to bear in mind. The first is: “Don’t try to tell us it could never happen. That’s what people said about the Holocaust”. The second, somewhat related idea is: “You can only rely on Jews to look out for Jews”. It seems to me unimportant whether we think these are sound propositions or not; the important thing is that they underpin the calculus of a number of key Israeli politicians.

It is perfectly true that opinion in Israel is divided on the wisdom or utility of a military attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities. We and most of our colleagues in the United States think that this would be a very bad idea, and some Israelis share that view. But some do not. The latter would certainly prefer a non-military solution but believe that military force should be used if all else fails. They believe that a bombed Iran is a better outcome than an Iran with a bomb. This of course ignores what many of us consider to be a more likely outcome of a military attack, which is a bombed Iran with a bomb. However, again we have to try and see things through Israeli eyes, given that it is their calculus that matters, not ours. That said, it seems likely that even the most hawkish of Israelis would want to postpone an attack for as long as possible to give the maximum time for some other solution to be found.

Therefore, the key question for all of us is: when does the Israeli clock stop? Unfortunately, we do not really know the answer to that question. However, there seems to be a view gaining ground in this country and one or two others that it will not happen before 2013. I hope that that is right, but I am not convinced. It is important that the Government do not allow themselves to be convinced simply because this is the outcome they would prefer.

Some people say that the Israelis would not want to attack in the run-up to an American general election. Why would they not? After all, it is very hard for any presidential candidate, even an incumbent, to take too hard a line against Israel in the shadow of an impending election. In any event, if the Israelis really felt that they had run out of time, I am not sure that they would let such considerations deflect them from securing, as they saw it, the future existence of their country.

I therefore hope the Minister can reassure the House that, whatever assessments are made on this score, we acknowledge the high degree of uncertainty that pervades our knowledge of Israeli decision-making, and that we do not for one moment take our eye off this particular ball. I say that because, for all our lack of control, there are two things to which we could and must bend all our efforts. The first, of course, is to continue to pursue a non-military solution with sufficient vigour and seriousness to offer at least some prospect of progress to the Israelis—and, again, it is their perspective that matters here, not ours. The second is to prepare fully for the potential consequences of failure.

We all hope that the Israelis will not attack Iran. But, as I have said in previous debates, hope is not a viable plan of action and we have to be prepared for the worst. If Iran is attacked, it is likely to blame us to some degree, no matter how loudly we protest our innocence. We should not forget the previous form we have in that country; the Iranians certainly do not forget. They could as a consequence decide to retaliate against us and our interests. The Majlis in Tehran has recently made noises about closing the Straits of Hormuz. I do not think that this is a high probability given that nothing could be better designed to draw in the Americans, which is something that the Iranian leadership would surely want to avoid. However, the scope for miscalculation here is huge, and it would not be the first time in history that a regime did something that in the cold light of day looked irrational.

We have to be prepared for a wide range of eventualities. Following an Israeli attack, our aim ought to be to de-escalate the situation and to restore calm as quickly as possible. That would be in everyone’s interest, including Iran’s, but it might not be an achievable aim, and we have to be prepared to defend our interests and to respond if attacked. I would not expect the Minister to talk about operational issues in this forum, nor would I question him on them. However, I would ask him whether he can reassure the House that the Government are engaged in serious discussions with the Americans on this issue so that we are able to respond at short notice in a co-ordinated way if worst comes to worst.

I also ask him to confirm that the Government have reviewed the status of contingency forces that the UK would have available in such circumstances. By this, I do not just mean numbers of platforms and people. If, for example, we needed to clear the Strait of Hormuz of mines, we would require not just the mine countermeasure vessels that are deployed but sufficient numbers of, for example, the SeaFox systems that those vessels deploy against the mines.

Weapon stocks, logistic support, force protection—all these are essential elements of any capability that we might need, but they are all too often neglected in planning, not least when the contingency for which they would be required is one that the Government would rather not contemplate.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 17th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, it is quite clear and quite right that the Government’s main effort over the coming Session will be on the economy, in particular the search for growth. I intend to speak today about the wider security concerns that were touched on last week in the gracious Speech, but I am in no doubt that in the long run our ability to respond to those concerns depends very much on our economic strength, and that is likely to be slow in building, given the continuing levels of public and private indebtedness. Nevertheless, there are some difficult near-term challenges that loom large on the international scene and, despite our straitened circumstances, we must be prepared for them.

In many cases, the press of events is likely to deny us the luxury of delaying our response until more prosperous times. First, there is the unfinished business of Afghanistan. The next two years will see a decline in our contribution to combat operations, with the Afghans assuming the lead across the country by 2014. This is in my view still the best option for achieving long-term stability. It was never possible for us to solve Afghanistan’s problems. The only people who can do that, if anyone can, are the Afghans themselves, and the sooner they take on the responsibility, the better.

However, I am concerned at the growing sense, not just here but more widely in the international community, that after 2014 we will pretty much be able to wash our hands of Afghanistan. This, I think, is wrong on two counts. First, the Afghans will continue to need expert support in many areas, not least militarily. We may end our direct combat role in 2014 but that does not mean that the Afghan national security forces will be able to operate entirely unaided. The number of people we have deployed will of course reduce dramatically, but we must be prepared for a long-term engagement with the Afghans. We will have brought them to the start line, but they have a long race yet ahead of them, and they will need our help in running it.

Secondly, and even more importantly, we have to resolve the issue of long-term funding for Afghanistan. People often talk of the collapse of Afghan governance following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, but what they sometimes miss is that the Najibullah Government managed reasonably well after the withdrawal of the troops. It was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of foreign aid that brought about the regime’s downfall. If the international community fails to put Afghan funding on to a sustainable basis post-2014, I suspect that a similar collapse will be inevitable.

It will of course be difficult to persuade many nations that they should go on footing the bill for Afghanistan when their own financial position is so uncertain. That will no doubt be true here in the UK too. However, having expended the lives of so many of our own people and so much of our national treasure in Afghanistan, it behoves us to sustain the necessary financial commitment to turn that sacrifice into lasting benefit. I would not say that if I thought that progress in Afghanistan was a lost cause; I do not. Indeed, I think that progress will become slightly less difficult once we disengage from combat operations and the Afghans become ever more responsible for their own destiny. It will not be pretty, and it may follow political paths that we did not foresee or would not have chosen, but continuing economic development and increasing levels of education will, in the long run, be good for Afghanistan and good for the region.

That means that they will also be good for us because although we might just feasibly be able to ignore Afghanistan, we cannot ignore Pakistan. The ties that bind us—and there are nearly a million of those ties in the form of UK citizens with family links to Pakistan—are simply too strong. Pakistan’s future is connected, inter alia, with that of Afghanistan. The challenges in Pakistan are to my mind even greater than those in Afghanistan, but neither can be viewed in isolation from the other. So Afghanistan will remain a long-term security interest for the UK, and we must treat it accordingly. With that in mind, I hope that over the coming months the Government will bend every effort to get international agreement on adequate long-term financing for Afghanistan.

The other issue that I want to address is Iran. I do not know whether the ongoing diplomatic efforts to persuade the Iranians to forgo highly enriched—that is, weapons-grade—uranium will be successful. What I am sure of is that a military attack on Iran’s facilities is unlikely to delay the programme for very long and that the consequences of such an attack are unpredictable but likely to be extremely unpleasant for everyone. I know that the Israelis see the issue through a rather different prism, and I have some sympathy with their concerns, but many Israelis would agree with the assessment that I have just put forward. I am also clear that sanctions against Iran are having a real and serious effect, and that this stick, if combined with suitable carrots, may just be enough to cause the Iranian regime to change course. Therefore, I hope very much that we see some substantial progress coming from the imminent talks in Baghdad.

However, in the line of business that I have followed for most of my life, we always reminded ourselves that hope is not a plan of action. No matter how much we might be against an attack on Iran, such a decision is not in our hands, so we need to be prepared for all eventualities. We need to remember that Iran views us with considerable suspicion, which is not entirely unreasonable given our previous form in that country, and that, if attacked, it could retaliate against us and our interests, no matter how loudly we protest our innocence. We must be able to respond if challenged in this way, and the more obvious it is that we are able and willing to respond, the less the chance that we will actually have to do so.

There are of course many other serious challenges to international order and stability, such as in the Yemen and the Horn of Africa, that could affect us here in the UK. Our first response in each case should be through diplomacy and aid. Indeed, I would resist strongly any suggestions that we should increase our military involvement unless such an option were inescapable. We should always be cautious about committing forces, bearing in mind that the outcome of such commitment is always unpredictable.

Nevertheless, the use of military force is sometimes necessary. Our military capabilities have been stretched very thin in recent years, and continue to be so. Of course, at present the Armed Forces are putting a lot of effort into containing costs and managing redundancy programmes. I do not deny the need for this. Balancing the MoD’s books was a necessary task, but defence does not exist merely to keep the books balanced. It exists to serve the nation in times of need, and this requires not just the right equipment and numbers of people but commensurate levels of training for the wide range of contingencies that those people may be called upon to face, none of which can be secured quickly or at no cost.

So, even at a time of such financial stringency, it is crucial that the Government keep their eye very firmly on the international scene and the risks that we face, on the responses that we may have to make to those risks and on the capabilities that we will require to underpin those responses.

Syria

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

That is absolutely true. My noble friend is completely correct that both Governments have problems—shall we put it like that—with certain areas that are seeking either secession or a degree of autonomy that they do not want to accept, and they have this fear of fragmentation of their own national boundaries. That is a very strong motivation. On top of that, as I said earlier, Russia has huge interests in Syria, including its colossal naval base at Tartus.

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, the terrible events in Syria may have consequences well beyond the borders of that country. Can the Minister say what discussions the UK has had, both internally and with its international partners, on the potential implications for the Lebanon, and how these might be mitigated?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Yes, we keep in very close touch with partners, and indeed the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr Najib Mikati, over the situation. It is a delicate and very difficult one for the Lebanese Government, who have problems internally with Hezbollah and with their relationship with Syria, which is complex and has been in the past extremely difficult. These matters are under very close review at all times.