The Ukraine Effect (European Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 21st November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Levene of Portsoken, not just on his thoughtful valedictory speech but on his outstanding contribution to your Lordships’ House over so many years, and of course to the defence of the realm for such a long period as well.

The report on the UK-EU relationship that we are debating today is titled The Ukraine Effect but, as we have heard many times this afternoon, it should now perhaps be called “The Ukraine and Trump effect”, since the result of the US presidential election has thrown the issues raised by the report into even sharper relief. The Russian war in Ukraine has finally opened the eyes of many who, for so long, were oblivious or blind to the threat that Putin poses to the wider safety and security of Europe. Now, the imminent return of President Trump to the White House has thrown into doubt the degree of American military power that might be available for the defence of this continent. Even the less contentious members of the future Trump Administration are very much focused on China and are looking to direct an even greater proportion of their national effort towards the Asia-Pacific region. The more contentious nominees regard the European members of NATO as little more than freeloaders.

The obvious—and by no means new—conclusion is that Europe must do much more to deter aggression and, if necessary, to defend itself. We need a far stronger European pillar within NATO, and we need it quickly. In particular, European nations must now look very carefully at how they might provide more of the strategic capabilities for which we have traditionally been overreliant on the US.

President Macron has talked about the need for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy. That seems to me overambitious, at least in the short term, but there are a number of important military capabilities where European nations need to make a greater contribution and where individual national efforts alone are unlikely to be sufficient—where co-operative efforts will be required. These include the exploitation of space; the provision of command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems; more extensive defensive and offensive capabilities in the cyber domain; and a much more comprehensive approach to cognitive warfare in the round. These are all areas where the UK has considerable expertise and can make a significant contribution to, or even lead, efforts to improve European capabilities.

For example, Scotland is one of the only places in the world which has an end-to-end development chain for small satellites. They can be designed and built there, and launched into polar orbit from SaxaVord spaceport. We also have 53% of Europe’s surveillance UAVs, 42% of its airborne early-warning and control aircraft and 38% of its intelligence aircraft. Our cyber capabilities are extensive and we have the potential to be a force in the developing field of AI. We also have significant capability and expertise in the application of soft power, so we have much to offer.

But if we are to work more co-operatively on such strategic defence programmes within Europe, we must have effective mechanisms for achieving this. We must be able to contribute jointly with partners to the formulation of policies and the development of strategic direction. As the report makes clear, however, existing EU processes and mechanisms make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for third-party nations to play a leading role in its work or influence its direction in any substantial way. Although we should seek to change this, I rather doubt that the EU would be prepared to make an exception for the UK, in which case one potential solution might be to develop new mechanisms outside the existing systems, where the UK’s participation could be built in from the outset. This might apply particularly to areas where we are trying to develop a new field, rather than expand an existing one: cognitive warfare springs to mind.

Failing that, we would have to look for co-operative arrangements that fall outside the EU entirely. Perhaps a distinct European arrangement under a NATO umbrella might be one way forward. The European Commission tends to be protective of its turf and might not look kindly on such ideas, but the scale and influence of the threat ought to outweigh such bureaucratic considerations. Can the Minister confirm that the Government will explore all avenues and innovative ideas to resolve this issue?

There is, however, another complication. Our Five Eyes intelligence arrangement, our other intelligence programmes with the US and our engagement in projects such as AUKUS could create some tension between the needs of our confidential undertakings with the US and greater European security development. If America is serious about Europe doing more to defend itself, there is surely sufficient incentive to find solutions to such challenges, but none of this will be possible without the necessary funding.

Setting out grand aspirations and developing effective mechanisms without providing the necessary resources would be hollow posturing—just so much hot air. It would certainly not persuade President Trump that we were shouldering our share of the security burden, nor would it do much to deter Putin from his programme of aggression. Given the scale, immediacy and seriousness of the challenge, European nations, including the UK, will need to invest 3% of GDP and upwards in defence if they are to meet the needs of such a changed and perilous international situation.

I see no sign that many Governments within Europe, and I include our own, are prepared to acknowledge this. Given the undoubted economic challenges they face, they are making some very modest increases in defence expenditure and hoping that the problem will go away. Well, it will not. Without the necessary expenditure, the strategic capabilities we need within Europe will not be developed. President Trump will continue to believe that the US defence budget is being used to permit greater European spending on social programmes, and NATO’s capabilities and cohesion will both be threatened. Far from learning the lessons from Ukraine, the EU and the UK will have allowed them to pass over their collective heads. Talk is cheap; effective deterrence is not. It is well past time that political leaders in Europe faced up to their responsibilities in this regard.