United Kingdom Internal Market Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Stirrup
Main Page: Lord Stirrup (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Stirrup's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to support all the clauses that deal with the Northern Ireland protocol. I am very much aware that this House is full of lawyers; I declare an interest in that I am not a lawyer—perhaps that is a good thing sometimes. Over the four years since the referendum, I have been surprised and shocked by some of the ignorance spoken about the Belfast agreement. I sometimes wonder whether people have actually read it. It is a fact that many who disliked the referendum result used the Belfast agreement to try to make it more difficult for the Government by continually promoting the idea that the agreement said that there could be no trade checks at the border. Of course, this was wrong; the agreement made no mention of trade borders.
Unfortunately, whether by accident or design, or because of the pressure from the Irish Government, the people of Northern Ireland have, in plain words, been sold out. I believe that the way in which the fears of a hard border were deliberately escalated meant that the EU was delighted. Michel Barnier himself was seen on camera and quoted as saying that the border argument was a good way of punishing the United Kingdom for leaving.
How can any of your Lordships think that creating a trade border down the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom is protecting the Belfast agreement when the one border—the key and crucial border—recognised in the agreement is that between Northern Ireland, as part of the UK, and the Republic of Ireland, as a foreign country? How can one go against the Belfast agreement while we all have to accept the other and say that it is wonderful?
Creating a new border, cutting Northern Ireland off from the rest of the UK, is already breaking the Belfast agreement, unless Northern Ireland consents to being cut off. The principle of consent, which we hear very little about in the Belfast agreement discussions now, is central to the agreement, and it is shattered by this protocol, which I did not support in the House of Commons. It is worth stating that the “Constitutional Issues” section of the Belfast agreement says that, as
“the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland … is to maintain the Union … it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people”.
However, this is precisely what is happening. The protocol itself is a blatant breach of the Belfast agreement and international law.
I believe that the Bill is trying to improve this in some way, and, clearly, I have no trust whatever in the good faith of the European Union on this issue. Quite rightly, Her Majesty’s Government need to be one step ahead, and this is what the clauses that some noble Lords seek to remove are doing. They do not violate any laws but merely create a mechanism to be used in trying to make less damage come from parts of the protocol if the European Union decides to play games.
If parliamentary sovereignty means anything, it must mean that Parliament can enact legislation that breaches international law on some occasions. Ministers must be free to recommend this to Parliament. I know that lawyers hate this, but the sovereignty of Parliament is supreme, and no country can be bound for ever by an international law. Political judgment has to be used as to when it might be necessary, but I would have thought that standing up for part of the United Kingdom when an action is going to harm it is such a necessity.
The protocol sets out the principle that:
“Northern Ireland is part of the customs territory of the United Kingdom”.
Therefore, goods should be able to flow freely, but the EU judging the risk of goods crossing into the Republic is worrying, as there are strong incentives to insist on a very wide definition of “goods at risk”. Let us be honest, it has a strong economic incentive to make life as difficult as possible for British-based exporters of goods into Northern Ireland to give an advantage over them to the EU’s own exporters in the Republic and elsewhere.
The problem is that, if the UK refuses to agree a wide definition and insists on a more limited class of goods genuinely at risk of onward sale into the EU, the default position, if there is no agreement, appears to be that all goods passing from GB to Northern Ireland would be subject to duties. This would create huge extra administrative costs and bureaucracy to move goods from one part of our country to another. I do not believe that that can be allowed. I feel that my duty here is to speak for those who just want to see your Lordships’ House stand up for our country against the bad faith, or the likely bad faith, of the European Union. Arbitration would take a long time and, in the meantime, the people of Northern Ireland suffer.
To take out these clauses now would be a further stab in the back of the people of Northern Ireland. To say, as some noble Lords have, that we must remove them to please the new US President is something I believe will shock decent people in the real world outside this House. First and foremost, we must stand up for our own country. Noble Lords can show today that they genuinely care for Northern Ireland and the union, and that they have read the Belfast agreement. I am not surprised about the position of the opposition Benches on this, as the Opposition do not even allow people in Northern Ireland to vote for their party. To noble Lords on the government side, I say: remember those true unionists of your party over the years who gave their lives—Ian Gow, Airey Neave—and do the right thing. I hope tonight that noble Lords will show that they really care about Northern Ireland and will leave these important clauses where they should be.
My Lords, the Good Friday agreement was made possible, at least in part, by the fact both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland were members of the EU. The common rules and procedures under which we both operated, enabled unionists and republicans to claim that the agreement went some way to advancing their political agenda. It was in many ways a classic deal—fully satisfactory to neither party but acceptable enough to allow agreement. The UK then voted to leave the EU. It was not the option I preferred, but I accepted the result. Having accepted it, I was clear that the best course for us was to leave the single market and the customs union as well. Anything else might well have had some economic advantages but would have left us in the worst of all worlds politically.
That meant that there would need to be border of some kind between the UK and the EU. The nature of the border would depend on the future relationship between the two parties, but a border there would be. This was foreseen and foretold. However, a border that separated Northern Ireland from the Republic to the south, might well have implications, both practical and political, for the Good Friday agreement. The protocol for the EU withdrawal agreement was designed to deal with this and the Government were content with it when the agreement was approved by the UK Parliament. The Government now say the EU might apply the protocol in a way that was never intended, and that Part 5 of the Bill is necessary to protect the position of the UK.
Quite why we should assume the EU would behave in such a way, no matter what ill-advised comments might have been made in the heat of argument, is not clear to me. In any event, a dispute resolution mechanism already exists to tackle any problems of interpretation and application that might arise. If this were tried and found wanting, and the Government believed the UK’s national interests were seriously at stake, they could introduce emergency legislation to Parliament at that point. They would then be responding to a breach of faith, not creating one. This would place us in a position far preferable to that which would result from accepting the provisions in Part 5. Acting in self-defence—it seems to me and, I suspect, to many others—is entirely different from getting one’s retaliation in first.
There is no reason why the Government could not have an oven-ready Bill sitting in their political refrigerator for this purpose. If it were appropriate, and proportionate, we would, I suspect, have a great deal of international sympathy and I would certainly support it. What I cannot support, however, is a Bill that authorises Ministers to break the law based on some hypothetical event and damages our power to exercise strategic influence in the wider world. I am persuaded by many of my noble and learned friends that to do so would be wrong in law. I am quite certain in my own mind that it would be wrong in principle, for all the reasons I set out in my speech on Second Reading and that I need not repeat this evening. This is not a disagreement on matters of policy; it is a question of law and principle, which we have a duty to uphold.
I am not a remoaner. I have said that I accepted the result of the EU referendum. Indeed, as I said, having accepted it, I argued for our withdrawal from the single market and the customs union. If my voting record were to be checked, it would be found that I support the Government in the Division Lobby far more often than I oppose them. I do not believe I am what the Government might regard as one of the usual suspects. However, I oppose Part 5 of the Bill and will vote accordingly in any Divisions on its clauses standing part.
I acknowledge that the Government have a difficult task in reconciling the potentially contradictory aspects of the withdrawal protocol and the Good Friday agreement. That perhaps became inevitable once we left the EU but, given the breadth and depth of the dissatisfaction with Part 5 that is evident across this House, I urge Ministers to think again about the course that they are following. It is not too late for them to adopt an approach that can command support across the United Kingdom but that maintains our hitherto exemplary status as a law-abiding and trustworthy member of the community of nations.