Middle East: Recent Developments

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 13th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, this is a timely and most welcome debate on an issue of great importance to us in this country. We do, though, face a difficult problem of prioritisation. We are considering recent developments in the Middle East. Well, that is a very large area, and it faces a very large range of challenges. We, on the other hand, have somewhat limited resources. While of course we can and should talk about and take a view on developments across the board, we as a country need to think about where we should focus our efforts.

For all the difficulties in Egypt and the unfolding tragedy in Syria, the most pressing problem remains the Iranian nuclear programme. It is the most pressing in terms of the security of this country and its interests, and it is made doubly difficult because, in large measure, the way in which events develop is beyond our direct control. The international community has made valiant efforts to resolve the whole question but without much effect. It is perfectly true that sanctions are having a significant impact on Iran’s economy, but it is also true that affected nations find ways of adapting to and living with sanctions if they must, and there are signs that Iran is doing just that. The talks between Iran and the P5 plus one over the course of this year seemed for a time to hold out the promise of a way forward. However, the only good thing about the Moscow round was that expectations by then were so low that no one was particularly surprised or disappointed when they got nowhere. The ongoing technical discussions at least keep the process alive, but that is about all.

Meanwhile, the Iranians continue to enrich uranium. There has been much debate about when they will have enough material for a sustainable weapon programme, should they choose to continue down that route, and views differ on the timescale involved. However, there is only one clock that really matters on this, and that is the one in Israel. For us, the Iranian nuclear programme is a matter of wider security concerns within the Middle East and the future of the non-proliferation treaty. For many Israelis, it is a matter of their continued existence. It is therefore important that we try to see the question through Israeli eyes, as far as that is possible.

In that context, there are two fundamental propositions that we should seek to bear in mind. The first is: “Don’t try to tell us it could never happen. That’s what people said about the Holocaust”. The second, somewhat related idea is: “You can only rely on Jews to look out for Jews”. It seems to me unimportant whether we think these are sound propositions or not; the important thing is that they underpin the calculus of a number of key Israeli politicians.

It is perfectly true that opinion in Israel is divided on the wisdom or utility of a military attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities. We and most of our colleagues in the United States think that this would be a very bad idea, and some Israelis share that view. But some do not. The latter would certainly prefer a non-military solution but believe that military force should be used if all else fails. They believe that a bombed Iran is a better outcome than an Iran with a bomb. This of course ignores what many of us consider to be a more likely outcome of a military attack, which is a bombed Iran with a bomb. However, again we have to try and see things through Israeli eyes, given that it is their calculus that matters, not ours. That said, it seems likely that even the most hawkish of Israelis would want to postpone an attack for as long as possible to give the maximum time for some other solution to be found.

Therefore, the key question for all of us is: when does the Israeli clock stop? Unfortunately, we do not really know the answer to that question. However, there seems to be a view gaining ground in this country and one or two others that it will not happen before 2013. I hope that that is right, but I am not convinced. It is important that the Government do not allow themselves to be convinced simply because this is the outcome they would prefer.

Some people say that the Israelis would not want to attack in the run-up to an American general election. Why would they not? After all, it is very hard for any presidential candidate, even an incumbent, to take too hard a line against Israel in the shadow of an impending election. In any event, if the Israelis really felt that they had run out of time, I am not sure that they would let such considerations deflect them from securing, as they saw it, the future existence of their country.

I therefore hope the Minister can reassure the House that, whatever assessments are made on this score, we acknowledge the high degree of uncertainty that pervades our knowledge of Israeli decision-making, and that we do not for one moment take our eye off this particular ball. I say that because, for all our lack of control, there are two things to which we could and must bend all our efforts. The first, of course, is to continue to pursue a non-military solution with sufficient vigour and seriousness to offer at least some prospect of progress to the Israelis—and, again, it is their perspective that matters here, not ours. The second is to prepare fully for the potential consequences of failure.

We all hope that the Israelis will not attack Iran. But, as I have said in previous debates, hope is not a viable plan of action and we have to be prepared for the worst. If Iran is attacked, it is likely to blame us to some degree, no matter how loudly we protest our innocence. We should not forget the previous form we have in that country; the Iranians certainly do not forget. They could as a consequence decide to retaliate against us and our interests. The Majlis in Tehran has recently made noises about closing the Straits of Hormuz. I do not think that this is a high probability given that nothing could be better designed to draw in the Americans, which is something that the Iranian leadership would surely want to avoid. However, the scope for miscalculation here is huge, and it would not be the first time in history that a regime did something that in the cold light of day looked irrational.

We have to be prepared for a wide range of eventualities. Following an Israeli attack, our aim ought to be to de-escalate the situation and to restore calm as quickly as possible. That would be in everyone’s interest, including Iran’s, but it might not be an achievable aim, and we have to be prepared to defend our interests and to respond if attacked. I would not expect the Minister to talk about operational issues in this forum, nor would I question him on them. However, I would ask him whether he can reassure the House that the Government are engaged in serious discussions with the Americans on this issue so that we are able to respond at short notice in a co-ordinated way if worst comes to worst.

I also ask him to confirm that the Government have reviewed the status of contingency forces that the UK would have available in such circumstances. By this, I do not just mean numbers of platforms and people. If, for example, we needed to clear the Strait of Hormuz of mines, we would require not just the mine countermeasure vessels that are deployed but sufficient numbers of, for example, the SeaFox systems that those vessels deploy against the mines.

Weapon stocks, logistic support, force protection—all these are essential elements of any capability that we might need, but they are all too often neglected in planning, not least when the contingency for which they would be required is one that the Government would rather not contemplate.