Libya

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 1st April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, it seems to me remarkable how often over the past couple of decades names and places that only a short while before we had thought consigned for ever to our history books have come back to haunt us. The Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Tripoli and Benghazi were all rather exotic and ill understood reminders of a colourful and imperial past but we could not conceive how they might relate to our national security as we approached the latter years of the 20th century. How wrong we were. The nature and scale of our mistake must give us pause when anyone seeks to tell us what they think the next couple of decades will look like. However, today we must deal with today’s problems—and Libya is most certainly one of those.

Public debate on Libya so far has been characterised by often rather ad hoc and isolated consideration of individual events rather than by an appreciation of the situation as a whole. The media ask whether Gaddafi should be a target or whether we should arm the rebels, and so on, to which the answer must be, “Well, it all depends”. It depends obviously on the legality of various actions but it also depends on whether and how such actions contribute to the achievement of our goals. What are those goals?

The rationale for the international military intervention was to protect civilians, and the military objectives are set out fairly clearly in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. One understands the political and moral imperative to safeguard civilians, as far as that is possible, and the urgency of the requirement. One understands that in such circumstances it is not always possible to have thought through every single possible consequence before acting. But before committing our forces we should always think about how such commitment would end, the political objectives we are pursuing, and how military force is linked to these. In the case of Libya, it seems to me clear that the political objective has to be the removal of Gaddafi. I say this not because of the nastiness of his regime or because of a desire to spread democracy around the world—we were, after all, quite content to treat with Gaddafi when he seemed secure in power—but because of the logic of the Security Council resolution. It enjoins us to protect civilians. Those civilians need protection because they are under threat from Gaddafi. It seems to me inconceivable that Gaddafi would now forgive and forget those who have come out in opposition to his regime, so they will continue to be under threat, and therefore continue to need protection all the while Gaddafi remains in power. Therefore, our military intervention, although not designed to oust Gaddafi, can end only with his removal.

Since the protection of civilians forms the limit of our military involvement, the removal of Gaddafi—the political objective—must be achieved by other means. What are those means? That is exactly the question that the international community should be—and I hope now is—addressing. I am not able to stand here and set out the answer. It will depend on careful analysis of the power structures in Libya; on the motivations of key actors, particularly those currently supporting Gaddafi; on the various incentives and disincentives that might be effective in such circumstances; and then on the careful application of such means as recommend themselves. Some will work, some will not, and some will work better than others. There will inevitably be an element of trial and error, but each move should be part of a coherent approach to achieving the objective—the removal of Gaddafi. I hope that the recent defection of Moussa Koussa will have helped to deliver some valuable insights on this score and so contribute to the international community's handling of the situation.

One important strand will be the effect of the rebel forces. They form one—but only one—factor in the calculations that are no doubt being made by members of Gaddafi's regime. Not because they are going to take Tripoli by force—that seems unlikely in the extreme—but because their very existence gives rise to the need to choose sides. So what they do does matter. Should we, therefore, give them arms, as some have suggested? The answer, I would venture, depends first, as I said, on the legal basis for such action, but then on the degree to which it is likely to contribute to the achievement of the political objective. It is not, fundamentally, a military question. The rebels have very limited combat power not just because of a shortage of weapons, but because of a lack of training, a lack of discipline, a lack of structure, a lack of command and control, a lack of planning capacity, a lack of logistic support—I could go on. Giving them better weapons will make a difference, but it will not make up for these other deficiencies. The important consideration is what effect such a decision would have on the process of undermining Gaddafi.

Meanwhile, we have to think very carefully about the consequences of our continuing military involvement in Libya. Although Afghanistan has been pushed off the front pages for the moment, it still consumes a great deal of our military capacity. What little we have had left in the locker over the past couple of years for dealing with other contingencies has consisted mainly of air and maritime capabilities. These have largely been consumed by the Libya operation, so that locker is now looking pretty bare. Yet we still face huge risks. To cite just one example, the possibility of an Iranian miscalculation in the Gulf, whether provoked by a third party or otherwise, is something that we must continue to guard against. The potential consequences of such an event could be very severe, in an area where our vital national interests are concerned in a way that they are not in Libya. I am not suggesting that we should never use our military forces just in case we need them for something else: that would be a logical absurdity. What I am saying is that before committing our forces we should always take into account and weigh up the relative risks to our national interests elsewhere. Failing to do so could leave us strategically unbalanced.

This is academic in the case of Libya, since we are now committed there. Once again, our military personnel have demonstrated the courage, skill and thoughtful determination that make them rightly the pride of this nation. But let us be in no doubt: we are spreading our Armed Forces very thin. They will do what is asked of them, but for all their can-do attitude, they are a finite resource—and ever more finite by the month.

Having committed to Libya, we must see the endeavour through to a successful conclusion. However, in view of the risks elsewhere, in view of the grave dangers to us should such risks materialise and in view of the degree to which we have now drawn down on our military account, we have yet one more reason for placing the very highest degree of urgency on finding a political resolution to this crisis as soon as possible.