NATO

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, it is with some reluctance that I speak today. On seeing that I was to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Inge, and after hearing the kind remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, that reluctance has grown to simply fearsome proportions. I am still new to your Lordships’ House and very much in the process of learning the ropes. That has certainly been expedited and made much less difficult by all the support that I have received from the wonderful staff here—before my introduction, on the day itself and subsequently—and by the warm reception that I have had from your Lordships. I am most grateful for all this.

I had fully intended to take a little time to find my feet before getting up on them, but the noble Lord, Lord Addington, has introduced this important subject today. As I have spent the better part of the last five years on NATO’s military committee and participated in the alliance’s deliberations over that period, you will understand why I feel under some obligation to speak.

This is an important debate because NATO is important. It is perhaps the most successful military alliance in history but, as we all know, it faces significant challenges today. The fundamental issue remains the same as that which confronted the alliance two decades ago after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union—can an organisation created to deal with a specific threat in a particular set of circumstances remain relevant let alone thrive when that threat and those circumstances have changed so dramatically? We now have the experience of the past 20 years to help answer that question. My involvement over the last five years has led me to a couple of key conclusions which I will lay before your Lordships this afternoon.

First is the basic question of what NATO is for. Is it essentially an alliance to defend against physical threats to the territorial integrity of its member nations? In other words, should NATO concern itself with Article 5 of the treaty and little else, or should it seek to deal with more complex security issues further afield, as it is doing today in Afghanistan? This has been the subject of considerable debate among the member nations, and their views on this point have varied considerably. For my part, the answer seems clear; it has to be yes to both propositions. I am in no doubt that Article 5 must remain the bedrock of the alliance. Without it, NATO would soon cease to exist. Even those who see no immediate or near-term physical threat to their territorial integrity—as some member nations do—cannot be sure that none will arise in the future.

On the other hand, if NATO is of little relevance to the current security concerns of its members, they will be tempted to neglect it in favour of arrangements that meet what they see as their most urgent and pressing needs. In these circumstances, there is a real risk that, should NATO at some stage in the future face a threat under the provisions of Article 5, it will no longer have a credible and coherent military capability with which to respond. NATO’s continued vitality, and perhaps viability, depends on it providing at least some response to the problems with which its members are grappling today.

As we know, these problems are complex and often far removed from the alliance’s boundaries. As this is a north Atlantic alliance, not just a European one, it must be relevant to the security concerns of the United States of America and Canada, and not just to those of Europe. This is not about trying to be all things to all men; it is simply the alliance having to do what so many of the individual nations within it, including the United Kingdom, are having to do—deal with the problems of today while guarding against and preparing for those that may arise tomorrow and the day after.

Secondly, on the effective functioning of NATO, the alliance works on the principle of political consensus—or, as some would have it, fails to work because of that principle. They have a point. Consensus was hard enough to achieve in an organisation of 16 nations facing a monolithic threat across the inner German border. With 28 nations seeking to deal with the kinds of complex security issues that I have suggested must be confronted, consensus might seem a vain hope, so some argue that we should abandon the principle. I understand their frustration, but seeking to abandon the need for consensus would threaten NATO’s very existence, and in practical terms I see no realistic prospect of such a change being agreed. On the other hand, to subject every decision at whatever level to this requirement simply leads to deadlock and stagnation, so we need to be much more nuanced about what consensus actually means.

This may seem rather a technical point, but I have seen situations in which the ponderous decision-making process that results from the need for consensus at many levels has affected our military personnel deployed on operations. I am afraid that the tempo of bureaucracy in Brussels is ill matched to the tempo required by the people the alliance puts in harm’s way. This has to change. NATO has made some progress in this regard, but it needs to do much more. Not all nations yet share that view, but many do. The urgency of operations in Afghanistan gives us both the spur and the leverage to make much needed progress.

I have touched on the key issues of purpose and effectiveness, but I started by saying that NATO is important. It is perhaps worth reflecting on why this is so. The United Kingdom long ago abandoned the concept of national defence in favour of collective security. Yes, we retained the capability to conduct certain limited operations on our own but, as is the case for all member nations, the physical security of these islands is underwritten by NATO. The renationalisation of defence within Europe seems to me an unattractive prospect in theory and probably unachievable in the light of financial reality, so we continue to need NATO, and therefore need to keep it fit for purpose. The corollary is that we must continue to invest in NATO to sustain both the alliance’s capability and our influence within it. Yes, NATO must become more responsive and more efficient. Certainly, in these straitened times, the organisation should reduce its overheads and streamline its structure, but we should guard against unilateral decisions that reduce and undermine our national voice in this crucial arena. Therefore, I urge the Minister to ensure that our investment in NATO—of high-calibre people as well as money—remains commensurate with the importance of the alliance to the future security of this country and its people.