Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for introducing Amendment 18A. On Monday, in the previous day of Committee, we looked at the list of conduct requirements—both the obligations placed on designated undertakings and the capacity to set conduct requirements preventing designated undertakings doing certain things. The noble Lord is asking whether we have covered the ground sufficiently, and so am I.

In Amendment 31, I come at it from the position that I took in earlier amendments, but I wanted to separate this out because it is in a different case. The train of thought is the same: to look at the detailed obligations included in the EU’s Digital Markets Act and to say that we are approaching it in what I hope is a better way that sets broader, more flexible definitions and looks to see how they will be implemented in detail by the Digital Markets Unit. That is fine; I am okay with that, but we need to be sure that the powers are there. For example, Amendment 18A is about whether the requirement to trade on fair and reasonable terms in Clause 20 comprises this power. It is a simple question: would it be possible for such conduct requirements to be included by the DMU under that heading?

Mine is a different one. In paragraph (6) of Article 5 of the Digital Markets Act, the European Union sets an obligation for gatekeepers—that is, its comparable reference to designated undertaking; in this sense it is dealing with platforms—that:

“The gatekeeper shall not directly or indirectly prevent or restrict business users or end users from raising any issue of non-compliance with the relevant Union or national law by the gatekeeper with any relevant public authority, including national courts, related to any practice of the gatekeeper”.


For our purposes, I have rendered that in the amendment as something slightly simpler in our language—that is to say, that an obligation may be placed on designated undertakings that they shall not seek

“directly or indirectly to prevent or restrict users or potential users of the relevant digital activity from raising issues of non-compliance with any conduct requirements with any relevant public authority”.

It is not just the CMA, of course; there may be others involved, such as the Information Commissioner and other public authorities.

For this purpose, I looked at the conduct requirements laid out in Clause 20 to find where this might be covered. I do not think it is covered by the material about complaints handling processes. This is not about whether you can make a complaint to the designated undertaking; this is about whether one is subject to the provision, as a user or potential user, such as an app seeking to complain about the non-compliance of a designated undertaking to the Digital Markets Unit. That is not the same as having a complaints process in place.

Do we think this could happen? Noble Lords will make their own judgments about that. All I am assuming is based on the fact that, for example, in April 2021, in the Judiciary Committee hearings on competition in app stores in the US Senate, Senator Klobuchar said, to paraphrase, that a lot of providers of apps were afraid to testify. They felt that it was going to hurt their business and they were going to get intimidated. So I am not having to invent the proposition that there may be a degree of intimidation between the providers of apps, for example, and the platforms that they wish to use.

In a sense, we do not actually need to know that it is happening to know that we should give the power to the Competition and Markets Authority to set conduct requirements as and when necessary to prevent such a thing happening. I do not think that it is comprised within the existing text of Clause 20.

I hope that my noble friend will take this one away, with a view to thinking positively about whether it is required to be added to the conduct requirements in Clause 20 at Report.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Lansley, for raising this point. Clause 20 is very important, as has been mentioned, as it puts flesh on the bones of what we have been talking about for most of the first and half of the second day in Committee—which is whether we have in place the ability to deal with the important firms likely to be designated as SMS and the challenger firms. We have said before, and I am sure that we will repeat it, that this is a very innovative approach to regulating. We are very much trusting those who are appointed to take this forward with a great deal of power and not a lot of overarching scrutiny —or, if it is, it will be retrospective and not prospective.

Therefore, we have to understand that the CMA must have the ability to do all this and have the range of functions that are important. The noble Lord, Lord Clement- Jones, raised one in particular—a very important one to consumers—around seeing on the internet the goods of your dreams and then finding a payment system that siphons your money away but does not deliver the goods; that is not a palliative one for any Government to propose. I hope that the Minister has some reassuring words about the points raised by the noble Lord.

I had to read the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, three or four times to understand what he was getting at, so I am very grateful to him for his brief introduction. It was only on this occasion; normally, he is as a lucid as we would wish—and sometimes as pellucid. He raises a very subtle question about whether the measures that are not sufficiently exposed here will cover the question of those who have innovative lawyers thinking about ways in which they can avoid some of the very broad measures in Clause 20.

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[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Lansley for bringing these important amendments. It is enormously valuable and important to kick the tyres of Clause 20 and understand or assure ourselves that it works.

Amendment 18A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would create a new permitted type of conduct requirement, allowing the CMA to require an SMS firm to provide users with a way to pay for products and services that would provide consumer protection. I thank him for the amendment; it highlights the vital issue of ensuring that consumers are protected when using online marketplaces.

We feel that conduct requirements are already able to require that SMS firms have effective processes for handling complaints by and disputes with users or potential users. This will allow the CMA to intervene when competition issues arise in this area. My noble friend Lord Offord will be talking to the consumer provisions in Part 4 in a later sitting, and I will not tread on his toes here. However, those provisions put it beyond doubt that, where platforms promote or facilitate consumer transactions, they must act with professional diligence, in addition to more specific duties such as refraining from misleading omissions or actions or aggressive practices.

We recognise that public understanding of the requirements of professional diligence could be clearer, and we recently consulted on how price transparency and product information for consumers can be improved. The Government’s response to that consultation was published this morning, and, in the light of this, we will be undertaking further work with stakeholders to ensure that platforms’ obligations to consumers are more widely and easily understood. I would of course welcome the noble Lord’s input during that process.

Amendment 31, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley proposes to add a new permitted type of conduct requirement to deal with the issue of SMS firms attempting to stop third parties raising possible non-compliance with the CMA. I thank my noble friend for tabling this amendment and highlighting the importance of this issue, on which I have also received representation from affected firms.

Alongside information gathered through its own monitoring, the CMA will rely on information from third parties that will have direct knowledge of market conditions. It is therefore crucial that third parties have the confidence to speak to the regulator. I can provide assurances that the CMA will have strong powers to tackle discriminatory or unfair behaviour seeking to frustrate the regime or interfere with enforcement, where it occurs within the scope of a designated activity. Both conduct requirements and PCIs will be available to combat such behaviour, supported by the usual robust enforcement powers and penalties. I draw my noble friend’s attention specifically to Clause 20(3)(a), which, in addition to the conduct requirement

“on fair and reasonable terms”

in Clause 20(2)(a), can be used where relevant.

The CMA will also be able to intervene outside the designated activity, but not in an unconstrained way: it can use conduct requirements to prevent leveraging, or a PCI to address an adverse effect on competition in a designated activity.

Input from third parties will be crucial in ensuring the success of this regime. However, some stakeholders may have concerns about sharing information or experiences for fear of retaliation. The CMA has well- established processes for handling information and maintaining the anonymity of those providing evidence, whether informally or as part of an investigation. Recognising the importance of engagement, the CMA has also announced plans to expand this approach; for example, by establishing representative panels—one for consumers and civil society, and one for businesses and investors. This will facilitate input from third parties, which in turn will support the design and implementation of interventions.

I therefore hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

The Minister mentioned in his address—I was grateful to him for doing so—that there was a recent announcement from the department about sneaky hidden fees or drip prices that are unavoidable, and the press report that I am reading says that they will be banned. Does not this bear directly on points made during this debate, and in particular on Clause 20? Does this mean that the Minister will bring forward amendments at a later stage?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My preference would be to consider so doing once the Committee has had a chance to debate later sections of the Bill which go directly to consumers.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

So it is not ruled out at this stage.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am ruling nothing out at this stage.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

The Minister is very generous.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I think there is quite a lot of meat in what the Minister said just now, both in respect of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and my amendment.

I appreciate that we have a set of moving parts here, including the response to the consultation on smarter regulation, improving consumer price transparency and product information for consumers, which came out this morning.

The answer to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, was quite interesting. However, if what the Minister said about the conduct requirements in Clause 20 is to be put into effect, I suggest that he has to bring forward amendments on Report which reflect the response to the consultation. I do not think this can be done just as a sort of consumer protection at the back end of the Bill; it has to be about corporate conduct, and at the Clause 20 end of the Bill.

Obviously, we will all read the words of the Minister very carefully in Hansard. It is interesting. I have written down: “Why are we kicking the tyres on Clause 20?” As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said, this is absolutely central to the Bill. Basically, it could not be more important; getting this clause right from the outset will be so important. This is why not only we but the CMA will be poring over this, to make sure that this wording absolutely gives it the powers that it needs.

I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. These are very important powers, and we have to make sure that they are used properly, but also, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said, that the powers are there. Otherwise, what are we spending our time here in Committee doing, if we are going to put forward a Bill that is not fit for purpose? We have to make sure that we have those powers. I like what the Minister had to say in reference to the Clause 20(3)(a) provision. Again, when people look at Pepper v Hart and so on, that will be an important statement at the end of the day.

We have certainly managed to elicit quite a useful response from the Minister, but we want more. We want amendments coming down the track on Report which reflect some of the undertakings in the response to the consultation on consumer price transparency and product information for consumers.

The only other thing to say—exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has said—is that comments about the consultation are that it was half a loaf. There is a whole lot more to be said on drip pricing. We have a discussion coming down the track on that, and we will reserve our fire until then.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 13th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it is very good to see the full team back on the trading standards amendments. I congratulate all three noble Lords on their championing of trading standards. They need the powers that are being argued for in these amendments; they are the unsung champions of the consumer, and we should support them.

My main purpose in rising is to speak to Amendments 69, 91, 92 and 152. As regards Amendment 69, on misleadingly similar parasitic packaging, it was encouraging to hear the Minister confirm in Committee that the prohibition of misleading actions in Clause 224 and the banned practice in paragraph 14 of Schedule 19 will address the long-standing unaddressed practice of misleadingly similar packaging.

However, those provisions matter little if they are not enforced. During consultations and the debate on the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, the then Government stressed that public enforcement would be effective and efficient. This has not proved to be the case, with just one enforcement action by trading standards in 2008—albeit a successful one. If shoppers are to be protected from this misleading practice, there must be a realistic expectation that the Bill’s provisions will be enforced.

Historically, the Government have placed the duty on public enforcers. That is unrealistic, as trading standards face diminishing resources. The CMA stated clearly that misleadingly similar packaging is a consumer protection, not an IP, issue, following its investigation of the groceries market in 2008. Yet is has undertaken no hard or soft enforcement and did not include it in its recent scrutiny of the grocery sector; there is no sign that it will take a different approach in the future. There are no other realistic public enforcement options available. For the Bill to make a difference, it is essential that affected branded companies are granted powers to bring civil cases using the Bill’s provisions on the specific practice of misleadingly similar packaging alone. It has been ignored by public enforcers for the last 15 years, despite the many examples that appear year on year. Granting affected brand owners such powers would mean that shoppers would have the protection envisaged by the Bill, and affected brand owners would have more effective redress at no cost to the taxpayer.

Amendments 91 and 92 concern an area of concern for the retail industry, expressed by its representative body, the British Retail Consortium, in which I was an active participant more years ago than I care to remember. The well-established and well-used primary authority system enables a business to request assured advice from a primary authority that it has appointed. Provided that the business follows the advice, it cannot be prosecuted by any local authority for its actions. Under the Bill, the CMA will receive additional powers on consumer protection, whereby it will move to administrative fines that are potentially very high. I am informed that the CMA currently refuses either to provide assured advice of its own or to accept primary authority advice. It says that it may not agree with the advice and that it would be too costly, ignoring the fact that it is at a cost to the business. That undermines the primary authority system and will do so even further when the CMA receives its new fining powers because businesses will feel unable to rely totally on primary authority advice for what they are doing in the overlapping areas.

The amendments attempt to deal with that, either by requiring the CMA to provide assured advice itself, as set out in Amendment 91, or, perhaps more practically, by accepting primary authority advice as binding up to the point that it may be repealed if it is shown to be inaccurate, as set out in Amendment 92. That would mean that a business could rely on it for anything it does up to any repeal. It should also be remembered that the CMA can, if it wishes, act as a supporting regulator, whereby it can be called on to provide its view to a primary authority when that authority is looking at providing advice in an area of relevance and overlap to the CMA.

Finally, it should be noted that the CMA has decided to provide what is, in effect, assured advice on competition matters in the sustainability area; namely, it has agreed not to prosecute a business that seeks its advice and follows it in a small area on the competition side. This means that, in principle, the CMA does not seem to be opposed to such an approach. Green claims on the consumer side are a key area of uncertainty for business, an area where assured advice would in fact be most useful.

I turn to my final amendment, Amendment 152. As I explained in Committee, standard essential patents are patents that are necessary to implement an industry standard, such as wifi or 5G. Because the market is locked into a standard, and to prevent abuse of the market power that this situation conveys, SEP owners are required to license their SEPs on fair terms. Unfortunately, there is widespread abuse of this monopoly power by SEP holders. The principal issue raised with me by the Fair Standards Alliance is the threat of injunctions; the costs to many businesses can be ruinous. This tactic not only threatens innovation by UK businesses but represents a strategic risk for UK priorities, such as 5G infrastructure diversification and smart energy network security, by limiting the competing players. The availability of injunctions for SEPs gives foreign SEP holders the ability to prevent others in the UK from entering, succeeding and innovating in those markets.

The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Offord, gave a somewhat encouraging response in Committee—I keep using the word “encouraging” about his responses, although I keep hoping for better—to the effect that the Government would set out their thinking in the very near future, and that that would include the question of injunctions.

After many months of consultation, the IPO has published its 2024 forward look on this issue. It has reported its findings to Ministers and has agreed key objectives concerning SEPs. Those are

“helping implementers, especially SMEs, navigate and better understand the SEPs ecosystem and Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) licensing … improving transparency in the ecosystem, both pricing and essentiality; and … achieving greater efficiency in respect of dispute resolution, including arbitration and mediation”.

Although the IPO has confirmed that SMEs are especially disadvantaged by the current SEP regulations, it states, disappointingly, on injunctions that

“we have concluded that we will not be consulting on making legislative changes to narrow the use of injunctions in SEPs disputes”,

with very limited justification for the decision, saying simply that it was taken after

“careful consideration of the evidence, operation of relevant legal frameworks and international obligations”.

The Coalition for App Fairness has pointed out to me that a day after the IPO announcement, the European Parliament voted by a large majority to approve its own SEP regulation. The EU framework will include the creation of an SEP register, database and essentiality checks; a defined maximum total royalty for an SEP; and an independent, expert-led conciliation process to establish the fair price for SEPs, which, crucially, will block the use of injunctions while the process is taking place. That seems entirely appropriate. The EU has proved that such a regulatory regime can be delivered; why cannot the UK Government, with all the freedom of Brexit? What is the basis for the IPO decision? What evidence, legal frameworks and international obligations prevent it from dealing with and legislating on injunctions? Why cannot the IPO likewise establish a truly fair SEP licensing ecosystem?

The least the Government can do is give more detail to the many SMEs affected by this decision. The forward look states, rather lamely:

“The IPO will continue engagement with relevant industry and institutions to continue to inform our ongoing policy development and implementation of those actions set out above”.


What on earth does that entail? That is pretty mealy-mouthed. What benefit will there be from that?

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a wide-ranging group; there is good news hidden in the middle of it, and bad news—we will have to wait for the Minister to respond to get a full picture. Others have spoken in some depth and so I will not try to repeat what has been said. I certainly will not try to follow the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, whose expertise exceeds the combination of everybody’s in the Chamber at present. On SEPs, I can only stand back in amazement that he has been able to understand what is being recommended by the IPO, let alone to have come forward with a plan that might take us a bit further down the track that we clearly ought to have gone down.

I turn first to the questions the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, raised, which cut to the heart of what, is in some senses, the purpose of the Bill. I am afraid that she rather weakened her case at the end by saying that it was a much broader basis for debate and discussion than could be encompassed within this Bill; I think she saw it primarily as a way of continuing a much larger battle, and I wish her well with that. In that sense, we do not need to take this forward. However, I hope that the Government are taking note of the impacts that some of the provisions in the Bill are having, in the sense that it is not achieving the aims and objectives, which I think we all share, of making sure that we reduce carbon and try to meet targets which have been set for us in the long term on this. Therefore, greenwashing will continue, but we hope that it will be better in scope and that the focus will be more across the range of government activity.

On imitation packaging, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement- Jones, said, we have also been discussing this for a number of years in various Bills as they have come forward, and it is good that the assertion now is that in Clause 224 and Schedule 19, there will be help. However, the question is, of course, enforcement. I would be grateful if, when the Minister comes to respond, he could give us a bit more information about how that might happen in practice.

The questions raised by the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, and supported by “the team”, as it was described, are a continuation of debates and discussions we have been having in this House for as long as I have been here—and I certainly have participated in them. It is good to see the government amendments in as far as they go, but the three remaining questions, as raised in Amendments 99, 100 and 101, need answers. I hope the Minister will expand on where the Government have taken us so far and give us some assurances.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am not sure that the Minister has a full brief about the nature of the available enforcement. Will he write to me to provide a few more particulars and give more assurance in this respect?

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, it is important that we unpick the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which I think was touched on but not addressed by the Minister. If we rely on civil remedies, we are not really addressing the problem that there is, in effect, an opportunity, for those who wish to, to exercise criminality; this surely cannot be left to the civil courts.

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

As some clarification is required, I am happy to write further on the matter.

Amendments 70, 71 and 93 to 98 are technical government amendments. The Bill empowers the courts to impose monetary penalties for a breach of consumer law and procedures. To accommodate the different processes by which court orders are served or enforced in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the amendments provide that prescribed penalty information may accompany an order in a separate notice, as well as being contained within it.

On government Amendments 72 to 90, on online interface and the powers of consumer law enforcers to tackle illegal content, I thank noble Lords who have contributed on this important issue. I am pleased to bring forward government Amendments 72 to 90 to give all public designated enforcers take-down powers to tackle infringing online content. The amendments enact the commitment made by the Government in their recent consultation response.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for Amendments 91 and 92. Amendment 91 would require the CMA to provide advice on a business’s compliance with consumer law on request. It would also prevent enforcement action by any enforcer if the advice were complied with. The CMA already provides general guidance and advice on compliance. It is businesses’ responsibility to comply with the law, referring to guidance and seeking independent legal advice where necessary. It would not be appropriate to transform the CMA into a bespoke legal advice service. The amendment would also drain CMA resources from much-needed enforcement activity. Moreover, Amendment 92 compels the CMA to accept primary authority advice received by a business where that advice has been complied with. It is common practice for the CMA to consult the primary authority before taking action; this strikes the right balance and avoids binding the CMA to such advice, thus inappropriately neutering its discretion. I hope the noble Lord will agree that the purpose of a direct enforcement regime is for the CMA to enforce faster and more frequently; these amendments would diminish this objective and remove the deterrent effects of the regime.