Post Office (Horizon System) Compensation Bill

Lord Sikka Excerpts

2nd reading & Committee negatived & 3rd reading
Tuesday 16th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a rare occasion on which I agree with everything that has been said. No amount of compensation can compensate these people for the pain they have suffered—not only them but also their families and friends. I have a number of questions for the Minister, and I will take this opportunity to put on the record some other matters that will hopefully be helpful for later debates.

First, can the Minister confirm that there will be no upper limit on the amount of compensation?

Secondly, paragraph 14 in the Explanatory Notes states that the scheme will be

“administered by the Post Office”.

Why? Who on earth could have any confidence in it being fair? Surely the entire board needs to be sacked and a new board needs to handle this, or an independent body needs to be created. I do not think many people will have any confidence in the current board’s ability to handle this matter in a fair way.

Thirdly, there are press reports—the Minister may have seen them—that one postmaster got compensation of £15.75. Could he look into this please? I have looked at the 14-page form that this sub-postmaster filled in, and I would not like to complete it. It effectively asks them to give up their rights for any future claim. That is utterly inappropriate, and it is another reason why the Post Office is not a suitable body to handle the compensation claims. I hope the Minister will attend to that as a matter of urgency.

A number of comments have been made about accountability, and directors and auditors have been mentioned. I will put some matters on the record in relation to that. I checked the Companies House filings today and, between 2002 and 2023, there were 83 directors of the Post Office. Despite full inside knowledge, not one of them went on the public record to say that something was wrong. They were complicit, they lied and they committed fraud—83 of them.

The Post Office also had several non-executive directors, who are supposed to challenge what the executive board does. None ever spoke up, despite some also being heads of the audit committee and the risk management committee. There has been a conspiracy of silence, injustice and fraud, and they all need to be held to account.

Noble Lords asked what on earth happened to the money extracted from sub-postmasters under fraudulent pretences. It may interest them to note the Second Sight report from 2015, paragraphs 22.11 and 22.12 of which say that

“for most of the past five years, substantial credits have been made to Post Office’s Profit and Loss Account as a result of unreconciled balances held by Post Office in its Suspense Account … It is, in our view, probable that some of those entries should have been re-credited to branches to offset losses previously charged”.

That was in 2015. The Post Office did not do so. Directors on performance-related pay were very keen to boost the bottom line; they directly benefited from this fraud. They all knew for years that something was wrong but continued in exactly the same way.

There were also violations of the Companies Act 2006 requirements by directors of the Post Office. For example, Section 386 requires directors to keep “adequate accounting records”. In view of the flaws of the Horizon system, it must be doubted that the company did so. Failure to keep adequate accounting records is a criminal offence, so what exactly have the Government been waiting for? Why have they not charged anyone? Is it because we do not have a central enforcer of company law in this country? We are almost unique in the western world in that respect.

Section 172 requires directors to

“act … in good faith … promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard … to … the interests of … employees … suppliers, customers … the community”

and have

“high standards of business conduct”.

Anyone looking at the 300 pages of the High Court judgment would conclude that the directors totally failed to do that. Unfortunately, we do not have an enforcer of company law, so the onus is on the Government to act. What action has been and will be taken? I have no confidence in the Insolvency Service being able to do anything—we would be waiting another 10 years.

I turn to auditors. Ernst & Young was the external auditor of the Post Office from 1986 to 2018—the entire period of the scandal. As part of their statutory duties, an auditor is required to state whether in their opinion

“adequate accounting records have not been kept, or … returns adequate for their audit have not been received from branches not visited”.

The company did not keep proper accounting records, as I said earlier. Despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Ernst & Young said that it was satisfied—how could it not be, having picked up £1.8 million in fees in the previous two years? Was it all to do with money? This is not the first time we have talked about the role of auditors; there are numerous scandals, and I have published a lot of academic and other research on them.

Ernst & Young knew that the accounting system was deficient. That much is clear from a publicly available, 36-page Post Office report titled Horizon—Response to Challenges Regarding Systems Integrity, dated 2 August 2010. It was written by a gentleman called Rod Ismay, the head of product and branch accounting at the Post Office. He joined the Post Office in 2006, after 11 years working for—guess who?—Ernst & Young, and was now liaising with the auditor. The report is very concerned about the court cases and adverse press reports. I first became aware of this scandal in 2009 from an item in an accountancy magazine, and I have followed it and noted with considerable dismay that nobody actually honed in on auditors or corporate governance. It was all about the systems and everything else.

On page 19 of the report, there is a paragraph that we need to take note of:

“Ernst & Young and Deloitte”


—it has been involved in some capacity—

“are both aware of the issue from the media and we have discussed the pros and cons of reports with them. Both would propose significant caveats and would have limits on their ability to stand in court, therefore we have not pursued this further. The external audit that E&Y perform does include tests of”

Post Office Limited’s

“IT and finance control environment but the audit scope and materiality mean that E&Y would not give a specific opinion on the systems from this”.

Another paragraph is most damning:

“It is also important to be crystal clear about any review if one were commissioned—any investigation would need to be disclosed in court. Although we would be doing the review to comfort others, any perception that POL doubts its own system would mean that all criminal prosecutions would have to be stayed. It would also beg a question for the Court of Appeal over past prosecutions and imprisonments”.


That is an internal document—a report of the Post Office—which is publicly available, and auditors have discussed all of this.

The point is that Ernst & Young had considerable awareness of the issues, systems and internal failures. On 27 March 2011, it wrote to the management of the Post Office. I will read two paragraphs from that letter:

“The outsourcing of Post Office Limited’s … IT function to a third party … provider (Fujitsu) creates a degree of complexity and difficulty for POL in gaining assurance that”


these

“are adequate … We noted that POL are not usually involved in testing fixes or maintenance changes to the in-scope applications; we were unable to identify an internal control with the third party service provider to authorise fixes and maintenance changes prior to development for the in-scope applications”.

It knows that Fujitsu is pulling the strings, having unauthorised access to anything and everything. None of this ever gets mentioned in the accounts and the audit report—none. That is the state of audit that we have in this country.

Ernst & Young knew the failures of the system and the cover-up. It knew that the company did not keep adequate accounting records, and adequate returns were not received from branches not visited by it. Post Office profits were inflated by the amounts fraudulently taken from postmasters.

I have questions. I taught auditing for many years as an accounting academic. The first thing you teach students is that if management asserts something, you try to independently corroborate it; the more that you are able to corroborate something, the more confidence you can have in it. How on earth did Ernst & Young corroborate what the management told it, or did they simply rely upon it? How did it verify income and profits, with millions, possibly—I do not know how much—in loss of money given by innocent sub-postmasters and simply taken by the Post Office?

E&Y knew the Post Office had suspense accounts. The existence of prolonged suspense accounts is an indication of accounting misstatements and possibly fraud—I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, would agree with that. It should have been put upon inquiry that something was wrong. That went on for years and years. How did Ernst & Young test any corporate reconciliation of those suspense accounts? How was it persuaded to believe that no provisions needed to be made for any contingent liabilities, given that it had access to all the press clippings and everything?

There is an issue. Every year, Ernst & Young gave the company its customary clean bill of health and, as I indicated, in the final two years it collected £1.8 million in fees. As a sole shareholder of the Post Office, the Government need to sue Ernst & Young, because it owed a duty of care to the company at the very least —if not to anybody else. It has been utterly negligent and a party to a cover-up. The Government need to have the Ernst & Young audit investigated from 1999 onwards—not just one year, the whole period. What exactly was it doing? I hope that the Minister will say, “Yes, that will begin tomorrow, next week or next month”, because we need to be very firm on this.

Finally, I fully support the Bill and I await further Bills to reform corporate governance and auditing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

Shorter arms, yes. There has been quite a big overhaul in terms of organisation, some of which is pretty obvious when you look at it. There is now a huge amount more central support and training given to postmasters. There are 100 new area managers, creating a buffer zone between the manager and the board. Two postmasters have now been appointed to the board as non-executive directors. There is an appointment of a current postmaster in a director role concerned with the day-to-day relationship with the postmasters. All of it should have been done a long time ago.

As we look at public bodies, those of us who have been in the private sector understand how boards work. We understand the role of non-executive directors, which is to challenge management. It is not to nod and pass, or to wave through. It is to be intellectually curious and, if you find something that does not stack up, to probe it and question it. That has not happened here. We have had an organisation that looks and feels like a plc. It has renumeration committees, audit committees, auditors, a board of directors, non-executive directors and a non-exec chair. All of these, when they are put into businesses, are put in for checks and balances, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, said. What we have had here is a mirror image of this architecture without any checks and balances. I think this requires us to look quite hard across quite a wide range of arm’s-length bodies.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I am glad that the Minister has clarified that relationship, but my concern is that, for as long as I can remember, the Government have been preaching shareholder activism. What happened to that when it came to the shareholder—the Government —in the Post Office being active? Did nobody notice the pile of newspaper clippings about the cases? I do not remember any Minister standing up and saying “Right, we’re going to look at this” until after the High Court judgment. Why did the Government fail on their own so-called shareholder activism?

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for that searching question. Of course, this covers about three or four different Governments and more than half a dozen Ministers; that is just a fact. The reality is that the shareholder of the Post Office is the taxpayer. The share is owned by the Secretary of State for the Department for Business and Trade. Under the current structure, that is effectively subcontracted to an independent board. If that independent board had acted on an independent basis, this would not have happened. In fact, if Ministers had slightly more inquiring minds, this would not have happened.

I look at myself in my role as a Minister. I look at the advice that I am given and at the decisions I have to make. There is a lot coming through on a daily basis. I ask myself this question: if I had been in this role and prior to Horizon there had been an average of, say, 10 convictions per year in a bad year—maybe five on average—and that went up to 80, even though I was very busy, doing a lot of things, and even though I said I had an independent board looking at this for me, would not that raise some inquiry? This fundamentally is the shocking scale—we are all embarrassed about this—of the abuse here. The accountability piece of this will absolutely come through the Wyn Williams inquiry. That will then move us to the next stage of the lessons that we learn from it.

Next is the theme of legal process, brought up by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, as well as the noble Lords, Lord Forsyth and Lord Weir, and also in relation to the Scottish angle. The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, says that the lawyers have some disquiet about the idea of Parliament overruling courts, but we have had the counterbalancing argument from William Blackstone. I think the House agrees that that overrides that particular issue.

In Scotland and Northern Ireland we have different jurisdictions. There were 77 prosecutions in Scotland and 24 in Northern Ireland. To speak from a Scottish point of view, those prosecutions were brought not by the Post Office but by the Crown Office. That is a separate legal jurisdiction in Scotland. Yes, we are one United Kingdom, but in the UK we respect the legal jurisdictions of the devolved nations. The Lord Advocate has reported today to Holyrood, the devolved Parliament in Edinburgh, saying that she is not currently in favour of a blanket rescinding of convictions because, she says, not every case involving Horizon will be a miscarriage of justice. She wishes to go through the appeal court—the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission. From a legal point of view, she is saying that these convictions were made by a court and therefore should be undone by a court.

We are at an early stage of that dialogue. There are letters and communication going between the MoJ in London and the Lord Advocate and the Crown Office in Scotland, and there is communication between the First Minister and the Prime Minister on this. That just highlights that there are some legal complexities here. The reserved matter remains reserved. Compensation will be the same for all jurisdictions, but there are some issues to be resolved regarding the actual legal process—certainly north of the border.