Equality Act 2010 (Public Authorities and Consequential and Supplementary Amendments) Order 2011

Lord Shipley Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Grand Committee

[Baroness Verma]

My Lords, I am delighted to be leading this debate, and to have this opportunity to explain the Government’s approach to this legislation.

The main purpose of this order is to add a number of additional public bodies to the lists in Schedule 19 to the Equality Act 2010, so as to make those bodies subject to the public sector equality duty. Schedule 1 to the order sets out those public bodies we propose to add to Part 1 of Schedule 19, covering general public authorities; Schedule 2 adds a new Part 4 to Schedule 19, relating to cross-border Welsh authorities.

Any organisation performing a public function is subject to the equality duty in respect of that function, but listing bodies in Schedule 19 serves two useful purposes. First, it makes absolutely clear that the body named is subject to the general equality duty, and in regard to which of its functions—in some cases this will not be all of them. Secondly, it enables the Secretary of State to impose specific duties on those bodies, to enable the better performance of the general duty. Only bodies listed in Schedule 19 can be made subject to the specific duties.

Schedule 19 to the Act, as it currently stands, lists broad categories of public bodies which are subject to the equality duty, including central government departments, local authorities, the Armed Forces, and the key health, education, policing and transport bodies. In total, around 27,000 public bodies are covered by these categories. This order adds a number of additional bodies to that schedule. I would like to explain briefly how we arrived at this final list.

The Government’s broad criteria for listing bodies for the equality duty were set out in our consultation document in August 2010. Our intention is to list public bodies which deliver public services, are responsible for regulating or inspecting the delivery of those services, or otherwise influence the way in which those services are delivered. The consultation included a draft list for comments. The Government’s broad criteria met with general approval. However, a number of respondees, and particularly the Equality and Human Rights Commission, suggested additions to that draft list.

My officials and lawyers have considered every one of those suggestions, and met with the EHRC to discuss them in detail. As a result of those discussions, a number of bodies have been added to the final list. I will quickly run through those bodies: the General Medical Council; the General Dental Council; the General Chiropractic Council; the Nursing and Midwifery Council; the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service; the Homes and Communities Agency; the Higher Education Funding Council for England; the Student Loans Company; the Legal Services Board; the Judicial Appointments Commission; and the NHS Business Services Authority.

Where we did not accept the recommendations of the EHRC or other respondees to our consultation, one of a number of reasons applied. First, in some cases they suggested bodies which are in fact already covered by the broad criteria in Schedule 19. For example, Ofsted and the Charity Commission for England and Wales were suggested, but these are technically non-ministerial government departments, and so fall under the listing for all government departments. Secondly, some bodies were suggested whose influence on equality outcomes we doubted—for example, the Inland Waterways Association. Thirdly, and most importantly, some bodies were suggested which we could not say with confidence perform public functions as defined in the Human Rights Act 1998. This is a necessary criterion for bodies to be listed. While there is no absolute definition as to what constitutes a public function for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, in the case of YL v Birmingham City Council in 2007 the House of Lords adopted a narrow approach when addressing this question.

On this basis, my legal advice was that I could not confidently say that certain bodies met the necessary criteria. These include some museums and heritage organisations; some research and advisory organisations, particularly ones where Ministers make the final decisions; and some trade promotion organisations, such as the British Wool Marketing Board. These types of organisation have therefore not been listed. My officials explained to the EHRC which of these reasons applied to which organisations, and I would be happy to discuss individual cases, although I am obviously keen that we do not get bogged down in lengthy debate about each and every organisation this evening.

I must stress that we will keep the list under review. We plan to add certain additional bodies to it through primary legislation, such as we are doing with GP consortia in the Health and Social Care Bill, and it would be possible to make another order such as this at some point in the future. If there are convincing legal arguments that a particular body not listed exercises public functions and has a significant impact on equality issues, I would be happy to consider them.

Moving on, the order also makes a small number of consequential and supplementary amendments to the Equality Act 2010 and other legislation. The purpose and effect of these amendments are explained in detail in the Explanatory Memorandum for the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. In summary, though, the overall purpose of the consequential amendments is to ensure that the amended legislation is up to date and works correctly in relation to the Act. There are four such amendments in Articles 3 to 5 of the order. The first is to Schedule 26 to the Act itself, which deals with amendments to other legislation. This amendment simply ensures that the definition of “disabled person” in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 refers to the Act instead of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which has been repealed.

The second amendment is to Schedule 27 to the Act, which sets out repeals and revocations of other legislation. This amendment adds two new Parts to the legislation, reflecting repeals and revocations of other legislation that are consequential on the repeal of the race duty under the Race Relations Act 1976, which will happen when the new equality duty comes into force.

The third amendment is to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This amendment removes redundant cross-references. The fourth is to the School Standards and Framework Act 1998. This amendment requires school adjudicators, when taking decisions, to have regard to the obligations owed by local authorities and school governing bodies under Section 149 of the Act in relation to all the protected characteristics under the Act—not just race, as is the present position.

The overall purpose of the three supplementary amendments in Articles 6 and 7 of the order is to correct inadvertent omissions or drafting errors and ensure that the Act’s provisions work as intended. The first amendment is to paragraph 20(1)(b) of Schedule 8 to the Act. This amendment puts right an incorrect technical reference relating to cases where a reasonable lack of knowledge of a person’s disability would mean that the duty to make reasonable adjustments did not apply.

The second amendment is to paragraph 14(4) of Schedule 17 to the Act. The Act misdescribes the arrangements for appeals to be made in respect of exclusions of disabled schoolchildren. This amendment corrects the wording in relation to appeal arrangements for exclusions to reflect the actual arrangements in England and Wales respectively where the pupil, the parent or both may bring an appeal, depending on the pupil’s age.

The third amendment is to Section 27(1) of the Equality Act 2006. This provides that the Equality and Human Rights Commission can make arrangements for the provision of conciliation services in respect of proceedings under Section 116 of the Act about disabled pupils in schools. This was the previous position, which was intended to be carried over into the Act. I commend the draft order to the Committee.

[Lord Shipley]

My Lords, I welcome the order introduced by my noble friend. It clarifies the responsibilities of public bodies in successfully delivering the equality duty. It may well be that more will need to be added to the 27,000 now listed, but that can be done with new orders.

I have a general query about the distinction now being drawn between the general duty and the specific duties. The general duty will come into effect very shortly, on 5 April. In terms of the specific duties, though, a second consultation has been undertaken with a closing date of 21 April.

The specific duty relates to what information public bodies are required to gather and to publish. We do not want to over-bureaucratise public bodies, but some of the changes that are being proposed need to be looked at very closely because, as I understand it, the key differences in the new draft regulations from those published following the previous consultation are the removal of the requirements on public bodies to publish the details of the engagement that they have undertaken when determining their policies and equality objectives; the equality analysis that they have undertaken in reaching their policy decisions, and the information they have considered when undertaking such analysis.

As I understand it, it is expected that there will be challenge from the public to public bodies and that that challenge will be the key means of holding public bodies to account for their performance on equality, and that mechanisms are being developed to support organisations and individuals to effectively challenge public bodies to ensure that they publish the right information and deliver the right results.

I do not understand how the public will be enabled to challenge unless the public are clear what engagement a public body has undertaken when determining policies and equality objectives; what equality analysis it has undertaken in reaching its policy decisions; and what information it has considered when undertaking such analysis. In other words, will the public have the information they need to be able to challenge public bodies effectively?

I hope in the course of the consultation that is now being undertaken and in the next stages of the specific duties being finalised, that there will be greater clarity produced as to what it is the public will have a right to expect to enable them to challenge the equality duty being delivered by those public bodies.

[Lord Waddington]

My Lords, I rise not to oppose these regulations, but to put down a few markers and raise one or two questions. I am glad that my noble friend is at the Dispatch Box, not only because I have a great admiration for her, but because I can be sure that she will pass on my concerns. There may not be many to hear them today, but I can rely on her to see that others hear about them.

The point about these regulations, so far as I am concerned, is that they herald very much more significant regulations and developments which are in the offing, namely, the commencement of Section 149 of the Equality Act and the implementation of the Equality Act draft specific duties regulations. In my view the coalition should be congratulated on scrapping the provisions in the Equality Act, which placed a duty on all public bodies at all times to take account of the inequalities of outcome that result from socioeconomic disadvantage. In promoting equality of opportunity, one is trying to extend the freedom of people to make the most of their talents: promoting equality of outcome means allowing the state to try by rules, regulations and bureaucratic means to iron out differences in performance so that endeavour and achievement are not rewarded. I would have thought that that is the last thing that one could possibly want in a free society. The Home Secretary was entirely right to point out in a speech that while people expect fairness, there should be no seeking a world where everyone gets the same out of life regardless of what they put in. Most people were really pleased to hear her say that the Government are moving away from equality of outcome to equality of opportunity.

The question is: how does what the Home Secretary has said fit in with what is in store for us? And, how much mischief by local authorities and public authorities will be encouraged by the implementation of Section 149 and the Equality Act’s specific duties regulations?

I accept that much has been done in the most recent version of the specific duties regulations to reduce bureaucracy, but the regulations will still require public authorities to publish equality objectives which are specific and measurable—and that means, in plain English, targets. They will require them to gather information to show that they are complying with those targets. That sounds to me very much more like equality of outcome as an approach than the one that the Secretary of State says that she now espouses.