Lord Russell of Liverpool
Main Page: Lord Russell of Liverpool (Crossbench - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Russell of Liverpool's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(2 days, 15 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeI am grateful to the noble Lord for the clarification. That is what I had assumed on reading the Bill, but I wanted to make sure that that was absolutely right.
The Minister has pre-empted Amendment 21 in some ways. It is simply a request for some clarification on the timeframe. We say in the amendment that the Secretary of State should publish an agreed timetable within one month. I suspect the Minister might find a reason why that should not be the case, but can we have a little more clarification on the timeframe? Will it depend on the individual appointed, or are His Majesty’s Government committed to the commissioner being in post on, say, 1 January 2026?
My Lords, I will briefly speak to the two amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, to which I have added my name. We spent quite a lot of time during Second Reading and—I just checked—the first part of the Minister’s response from the Front Bench on the question of what difference this will make. I think all noble Lords who took part at Second Reading agreed that that is the essence. To that extent, Amendment 3 is quite important, because it goes to the heart of the question of what difference it will make.
The reason why the German system works the way it does is that the German armed forces commissioner is very clearly the servant of the Bundestag; he or she sits in the Bundestag alongside the clerks and, indeed, if the Bundestag wishes it to happen, it can request that the armed forces commissioner can participate actively in debates around the armed forces in the Chamber. So it is a very different model, and it really does make a difference, because it is markedly different from what we are suggesting.
This is the third attempt by us to try to get a form of ombudsman or Armed Forces commissioner to be more effective. We had the first one in 2008, the second iteration in 2016, and this is the third bite of the cherry to try to get it right. Clearly, if this is the third time we are doing it, it ain’t that simple. For all sorts of excellent reasons, the Armed Forces are a very particular culture and ecosystem, which they need to be to do what they do, but the flip side of having a really effective and disciplined military is that, for all sorts of reasons that it may not completely understand itself, it may be quite resistant to attempts that it sees as coming from outside—from people who do not really understand the culture and history and the things that are so important. The things that are not said are often more important than the things that are said.
The problem is that, at the moment, some of us feel that, while this is very well intended, it is very cautious indeed. For the Secretary of State and the Ministry of Defence to retain as much ownership and control of this as will inevitably be the case is unlikely to make the sort of step change that I think a lot of us were hoping and aspiring to believe this new role could actually make. I think that this needs to be looked at—it is a probing amendment—and I ask the Minister and his colleagues to look very carefully.
As part of my research for this proposal, I asked an individual who is actively involved in teaching in Shrivenham to take a poll after talking to a few people about this Bill. The first thing that this person found was that almost everybody spoken to in Shrivenham—this was last week—was not actually aware of this Bill. I do not know how well publicised this Bill is within the Armed Forces, but you would expect and hope that the flagship or leadership organisations of the Armed Forces would be aware of it and indeed might even perhaps been talking about it a bit. However, apparently this was not the case—but this was not a professional Sir John Curtice-type opinion poll but just somebody going around and talking to other people at Shrivenham.
The other experience that this individual had, after a brief explanation of what this role was going to be, was an almost immediate response from everybody; people felt that what they described as the “rigidity”, with a small “R”, of the armed services culture would find it pretty easy to resist the type of role that is being envisaged.
The bottom line is whether this is going to make a difference. It is important to be able to step back from this Bill and perhaps to take some more soundings from within the Armed Forces just to try to understand how likely they feel this will make a real difference. One senses that the onus of this Bill is coming primarily from the Ministry of Defence itself, and there is slightly less pull, if you like, from those parts within the Armed Forces and the extended family members that we were talking about. I am not sure how clearly their voices and experiences are being heard, because what we have at the moment clearly is not working.
I shall move quickly to Amendment 5 and term of office. The German term of office is five years. It can be renewed; it usually has not been renewed. Almost every time a new commissioner is appointed in Germany, it is an ex-Member of Parliament—usually an ex-member of the defence committee that is the equivalent of our Defence Select Committee. So they come with some live experience and with a network within Parliament that they are easily able to access; they can be quite influential behind the scenes. That system works well but, again, I come back to what we asked earlier: will this measure make a difference?
The aspiration is that this new role will make a discernible difference. In order for it to do that, clearly, it needs to do a lot of things differently to the way in which things have been done to date; and to find an effective way of doing things differently that works better. One will not get it right first time every time. It will be an iterative process: there will be successes, failures, brick walls and elephant traps. All sorts of things will be happening. Building up the types of resource and knowledge that will be required to gain momentum to carry this new role forward into the term of whoever follows the first commissioner will require giving the first commissioner the leeway and resources to make a difference.
I just feel that things are a bit timid at the moment. If we focus on the complexity of the task that we are asking this new function to do—in particular, if we try to think, “What should this look like 10 years from now? What do we hope would be happening? How would this be working?”—and know both where we want to get to and where we are now, we can then gauge the complexity of the task of getting from A to B. That might result in looking at some of these aspects in a slightly different, perhaps more beneficial, way.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 3, not because I agree with it but because I agree very strongly with it. When my noble friend the Minister introduced the Bill, I remember him saying—quite rightly—that one of the important aspects of this Bill is that it puts this commissioner on a statutory footing. He was referring to the fact that he wanted this new post to have the weight of statute behind her or him. I simply support Amendment 3—if I refer to it again, I shall say “very, very strongly”—because it would give this post the authority of Parliament, in addition to being in statute, which would be a very good thing.
I am interested in everything said by people who know far more than I do about the German system but, clearly, that is not particularly appropriate to a British political setting. Amendment 3, however, is absolutely perfectly suited to our political system. I know that, sadly, Governments do not tend to like amendments such as Amendment 3. If I were on the other side of the Room, I dare say my noble friend might have been arguing for Amendment 3. I understand that, in his current ministerial position, he may be guided by the officials behind him and say, “Well, it is too complicated”, but it is not complicated at all. It is a question of whether Parliament should be involved, which it should be. This is a major new post that we are creating. The process of confirming the appointment of whoever is put forward is something that Parliament should do. Incidentally, it is not just because Amendment 3 applies to this particular Bill; I would support Amendment 3 in every piece of legislation where this type of question arises.
That is all I have to say on this matter. I do hope that, when he replies, my noble friend the Minister will at least acknowledge the, I would say, widespread feeling that Parliament must be involved in the appointment of this person; and convey it internally to his colleagues in the Government who would be resistant to an amendment of this kind. When it comes to the balance of power between the Executive and Parliament, I try always to be on the side of Parliament.
Without saying whether that is a good or a bad idea, what I have said is that—although this is not actually in the Bill, as my noble friend said—clearly, our view is that going through the Defence Committee is the appropriate parliamentary involvement. We have said that we can consider the points that have been made in Committee, and I have said that we can meet to discuss them. Alongside that, we can discuss the length of term.
The Minister will recall that, in the last few years, there has been a degree of disquiet, particularly on his Benches, about the view that certain appointments that should have gone through a fairly balanced process have veered slightly off course due to political interference. It just so happens that, about three hours ago, I was talking with a distinguished Cross-Bench colleague who is currently involved in two very senior independent appointments, helping the Government. This colleague had a discernible frustration that, in both of these cases—which are completely current and took place last week—a ministerial colleague of the Minister, not in the same department, overruled the recommendations of the advisory panel on who should be appointed or who the best candidates were. A completely different individual has been inserted from outside.
All I can say in response to the concerns raised by the noble Lord is that we believe that the appropriate way for Parliament to be involved is through the Defence Select Committee. I have heard the points that noble Lords have made with respect to that. The appointment of the Armed Forces commissioner will be subject to the full public appointments process, overseen by the office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments, so we would expect it to be a rigorous and open recruitment process. We expect the Defence Committee to be involved in the recruitment process and to consider the appointment once it has been made. Of course, the Secretary of State is ultimately the final decision-maker, but, as the noble Lord said, he will carefully consider what the chair of the House of Commons Select Committee says.
I point out to the Minister that the two processes that I was talking about were run under precisely the rules that he has just laid out.
All I can say is that our belief, understanding and intention is for it to be an open and transparent process, subject to the scrutiny of the House of Commons Select Committee, which we would see as having a role. Of course, in the end, the Secretary of State ultimately has responsibility for the decision whether to appoint or not. We in this Committee all know the power, influence and significance of the Select Committees of both Houses. They are powerful and significant committees that carry a huge amount of influence and weight and, as I say, the Secretary of State will fully take them into account before making a final decision.
When I saw Amendment 6 from the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, I put my name down in addition to his because of what I am holding in my hand: a fact sheet that was given to us at the very helpful briefing given by the Minister at the Ministry of Defence. I will read from the fact sheet; I ask your Lordships to look for the word “may”, because I cannot find it. It says:
“Although funding for the Commissioner will be provided for from the MoD budget, the Bill contains several safeguards to ensure the Commissioner can operate independently of government”.
It says “will” instead of “may”; that is on the fact sheet. I say this to whoever prepared it; it may have been one of the gentlemen or ladies behind the Minister. A slip of the verb may have produced it, but it does say “will”.
We were talking in the previous group about allowing Parliament to have more ownership of, and more skin in the game with, this new role. Can I just suggest as an idea that, on an annual basis, the Defence Select Committee of another place has a session devoted to talking to the Armed Forces commissioner about the work that he or she is undertaking? In addition, I suggest that, on an annual basis, there should be a session held with the commissioner in camera specifically to discuss funding, resourcing and some of the issues that one may not necessarily wish to be aired in the public domain but which could be shared on a confidential basis with members of the Select Committee.
My Lords, I will be brief. The Government set great store by the independence of the commissioner. We all agree that that is vital, yet this amendment is necessary because the possibility is left open that it will not be properly funded. I find that remarkable. As my noble friend said in moving his amendment, this would detract from the independence of the commissioner.
I do not see why the Government should be allowed to say that they are fully committed to this new post and to giving it the resources that it needs—this was on the fact sheet, which I also picked up; I should have brought it with me—while, at the same time, they will not guarantee this funding in the Bill, which will become an Act. That is all I have to say. I am afraid that I cannot quite imagine what my noble friend the Minister will say in response because this is so clearly something that will set in stone the importance of the work and independence of the commissioner.