Police National Computer

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 19th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

I thank the noble Baroness the Minister for being here—unlike the Home Secretary yesterday in the Commons—as the senior government Minister in the Lords covering the Home Office, to be accountable to this House for the worrying events detailed in the Statement.

The Statement says that it is estimated that up to some 400,000 offence, arrest and person records have, due to human error, inadvertently been deleted from the police national computer. There will be an internal investigation. Something described as human error can hide a multitude of failures covering, for example, inadequate training or supervision, previous warnings of the likelihood of an incident occurring being ignored, people working under pressure, out-of-date or unreliable equipment and lack of provision of readily available safeguards to override the consequences of human error—all factors for which responsibility should ultimately lie at the highest level within the department. Yet the Commons Minister yesterday stated:

“Sadly, human error introduced into the code has led to this particular situation”.


The Government appear to have already determined the outcome of the internal investigation. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, who speaks for the Government: why is this investigation not going to be independent and, secondly, will the full report of the investigation be placed before Parliament? Can the Government also say whether Statements would have even been made to Parliament if reports of this serious loss of data had not appeared in the media?

The police national computer and the police national database are due to be replaced by the national law enforcement data programme. However, the assessment by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority is that successful delivery of the project is in doubt. The Policing Minister admitted in the Commons yesterday that the replacement of the PNC

“has had its fair share of problems, it is fair to say we have undergone a reset. There is now a renewed sense of partnership working between the Home Office and the police, to make sure we get that much needed upgrade in technology correct.”—[Official Report, Commons, 18/1/20; col. 624.]

When a Minister uses those kind of words, one knows that there have been big problems with the replacement of the outdated PNC, from which up to 400,000 records have been deleted, not because it is no longer fit for purpose but apparently due solely to human error. How could up to 400,000 records be deleted without apparently there being a proper back-up system in place? Was that lack of a proper back-up system also due to “human error”?

Is it true, as was asked in the Commons yesterday, but without a reply being given, that Ministers were warned many months ago that their approach to the police national computer and database posed a significant risk to policing’s ability to protect the public, and that the databases were “creaking” and operating on

“end of life, unsupported hardware and software”?—[Official Report, Commons, 18/1/20; col. 627.]

If so, what did the Government do about that?

In the Commons, the Government sought to say that, first, the data deleted might be available on other systems or databases and, secondly—because the data related to people arrested and in respect of whom, for the specific matter for which they were arrested, no further action was taken—it really is not that serious that this data has been deleted. The National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for the police national computer has said that the deleted DNA contains records marked for

“indefinite retention following conviction of serious offences.”

Is it still the Government’s view that this deleted data is not important? If so, could the Government explain why this data is retained at all, and may be on other systems, if it has no real value in preventing crime in the first place, in the fight against crime and in bringing criminals to justice? In the absence of a credible answer to that question, clearly the data deleted is of significance. In responding, could the Government set out the potential damage that could be done, or has perhaps already been done, as a result of these inadvertent deletions?

We need greater openness and frankness from the Government, now and in promised further updates, about what has happened—merely

“technical issues … with the police national computer”

according to the Statement—and why. We do not need an attempt to brush it all off as down to a “human error” with consequences of little significance.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, let me try to bring some clarity to what has happened. The records that have apparently been deleted are those of people arrested but not charged, or charged but not convicted. These are sometimes, but not always, deleted. If someone is arrested but not charged or not convicted for one of more than 200 serious offences, their fingerprints and DNA can be retained for up to five years. If they have previous convictions for a serious offence, their fingerprints and DNA can be retained indefinitely. It may be that there are no fingerprint or DNA records for any of these people, other than those taken when there was no conviction. These are the records that have apparently been deleted. Meanwhile, some that should have been deleted have not been.

Although the people whose records have been deleted may not have been charged or convicted on this occasion, their DNA or fingerprints may be found at crime scenes in the future. If their fingerprints and DNA have been deleted, there is no way of proving forensically that they were at these crime scenes.

Some 213,000 offence records, 175,000 arrest records and 15,000 person records have potentially been deleted. Some 26,000 DNA records, 30,000 fingerprint records and 600 subject records may also have been deleted. This mistake could result in criminals who would otherwise be convicted of serious criminal offences not being identified, arrested, charged or convicted.

The Statement says that other databases such as the police national database can be checked, but my understanding is that the script run on the PNC deleted records on linked databases. Can the Minister confirm that?

Because of the variety of records that have been deleted—offence records, arrest records, person records and DNA and fingerprint records—it will be very difficult to put the jigsaw puzzle back together by collecting the pieces from different databases where the data may still be recorded. Is that the Minister’s understanding?

The first question, which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked, must be: why was there no back-up? In October, senior police officers wrote to the Home Office to say they had “lost confidence” in its ability to complete big IT projects. What evidence is there to support this view?

Work on the national law enforcement data programme is in serious trouble, as the noble Lord said. This replacement for the police national computer and the police national database began in 2016 but is not expected to be completed until 2023, significantly delayed and overbudget. That is despite the existing systems running on obsolete hardware, using obsolete software.

To take another example, the new emergency services network was due to replace the system of radios and other mobile communications used by the police, the Motorola Airwave network, by 2019. That Home Office IT project has been delayed, meaning the existing Airwave system has had to be maintained for at least three years beyond its planned end of life, which is costing an additional £1.7 million a day. The final total is expected to reach close to £2 billion.

The facts are that the Government not only cut police officer numbers by over 20,000 between 2010 and 2020 but failed to invest in the systems that the police rely on to be effective. They have committed to recruiting 20,000 new police officers—dressing the window—meanwhile allowing what is unseen but vital to fall apart.

Following the end of the transition period on 1 January, the police lost real-time access to the European Union Schengen Information System, SIS II, meaning that front-line officers no longer have real-time access to data on 40,000 fugitives and dangerous criminals. It is now clear that these officers, who put their lives on the line for us every day, cannot rely on UK systems either. What are the Government going to do, not just to retrieve the lost data, but to ensure that the Home Office IT systems that the police rely on are fit for purpose? At the moment, it is absolutely clear that they are not.

Extradition Arrangements: European Union Member States

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I will have to get back to the noble and learned Lord because I do not know where that is up to.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

As the Minister said, our trade and co-operation agreement with the EU makes clear that extradition can be refused where a person’s fundamental rights are at risk or where

“they are likely to face long delays of pretrial detention”.

What are the Government going to do to ensure that delays, particularly in the current situation, and an overreliance on detention do not prevent extradition or the pursuit of justice?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The pursuit of justice is paramount but so are the issues of fundamental rights. There is no reason why the new system should not be as swift but, as my noble friends have outlined, it is very important that some of those fundamental rights are upheld.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and to express my support for the amendment she has just moved.

I have to say that I am wholly unconvinced by the argument that adherence to the Human Rights Act is all that is needed. The fact is that the convention rights set out in the schedule to that Act were not designed for this situation at all. Their purpose is to define the rights of individuals against the state, as represented by public bodies. It is not a catalogue of what individuals may or may not do to each other. Of course, the sources that the police may use must have these protections against those who use them. But to use the convention rights in the Human Rights Act to define what the sources may do to other people or may be encouraged to do to other people is to take those rights completely out of context.

Furthermore, reference to these rights lacks the precision and clarity that is needed to deal with what a source may or may not be authorised to do. If you look at Article 2 of the list of convention rights—the right to life—what is really dealt with there is the right to life as against the things that a state may do: depriving the individual of his life except in circumstances where that may be absolutely necessary; and the circumstances are set out there. Article 3 deals with the prohibition of torture, although I notice that it omits the word “cruel” before “inhuman”, which is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the UN convention against torture. Therefore, if one was trying to define the prohibition or the control against the misuse of sources, one would want to put in the word “cruel”, which is more easily understood than the word “inhuman”. Article 4 deals with the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, which is drifting far away from what we need to have as reassurance in the matter we are dealing with here. So it is with Article 5, which is the right to liberty and security, and which really deals with the circumstances in which an individual may be arrested or detained by the police. Furthermore, there is no mention in the convention rights of rape or other sexual offences, no doubt because that is what people do to each other, not what public authorities do to their citizens.

That said, I have to confess, if the noble Baroness will forgive me, that some of the wording of amendment 15 troubles me. The criterion we must apply is that what we have asked to be set out in the statute should be clear and easily understood. Proposed new subsection (8A)(b), which is given in Amendment 15, refers to

“an attempt in any manner to obstruct or pervert the course of justice.”

That is a very wide-ranging crime, and I am not sure that it would be sensible to include it in this list because very often it may be a relatively minor thing to do, with no psychological or physical consequences to anybody; it is just obstructing the interests of justice. Paragraphs (d) and (e) refer to the Human Rights Act, but for the reasons I have given, I would prefer that that reference was omitted. The Canadian example to which the noble Baroness referred is clearer in its wording. For example, when dealing with obstructing or perverting the course of justice, it includes the word “wilfully”, which would be wise if one is trying to strike the right level of balance in dealing with these matters. It refers to the torture convention when defining what is meant by torture, which I would support, particularly because it includes the word “cruel”. As for paragraph (e), when the amendment refers to depriving a person of their liberty, it really means detaining an individual, which is what the Canadian example gives. The Canadian example adds another point: damaging property. It might be wise to think of including something along those lines too. To take the example of committing or participating in arson, that would give rise to a serious risk to individuals who are in the building and it would be as well to include that along the same lines and for the same reasons as the others in the list. I suggest that some matters might have to be looked at again if the amendment is to be taken further.

I wish to emphasise one thing, as I did at Second Reading, which is that great weight must be given to the obligation in the torture convention. That convention does not merely require states to abstain from torturing people. It requires them to do more than that; it requires them to do everything in their power to avoid torture in any circumstances. I would therefore support an amendment which particularly includes the reference to torture as something that would never be authorised in any circumstances whatever.

Despite these misgivings, and extending again my apology to the noble Baroness for criticising her carefully drafted amendment, and because I believe the Government must think again, I support Amendment 15.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Speaking for the Opposition, I reiterate our appreciation of the work that our police and security services do on our behalf to keep us safe and our country secure. We know only too well that what they do makes a real difference.

Amendment 15, so ably moved by my noble friend Lady Massey of Darwen and to which my name is also attached, would put limits in the Bill on the crimes that could be authorised under a criminal conduct authorisation. The serious crimes that could not be authorised would cover murder, grievous bodily harm, torture and degrading treatment, serious sexual offences, depriving someone of their liberty and perverting the course of justice.

The Government have given an assurance that the Bill

“would not allow the public authorities named in the Bill to grant CHIS unlimited authority to commit any and all crimes. To allow this would breach the Human Rights Act 1998”.

In that context, I note the comments that were just made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, about the Human Rights Act 1998. However, the Bill itself contains no explicit limit on the types of criminal conduct that can be authorised. The Government say that to have a list of offences excluded from being given a criminal conduct authorisation would lead to covert human intelligence sources being tested against that list. But placing no explicit limit on the types of crimes that can be authorised is not the approach that has been taken in other jurisdictions, where the same risks of CHIS being tested would apply. As my noble friend Lady Massey has said, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act contains a power to authorise criminal conduct similar to that proposed in the Bill, but the legislation provides that nothing in that Act justifies many of the serious crimes also excluded under this amendment.

The FBI in the USA operates under guidelines that do not permit an informant to participate in any act of violence, except in self-defence. In Australia, the legislation provides protection from criminal responsibility and indemnification for civil liability only where the conduct does not involve the participant engaging in anything likely to cause death or serious injury to, or involve the commission of a sexual offence against, any person. The Government maintain that countries which have lists of such offences do not have similar criminality to us, but it is not clear what the established basis is for that assertion.

The Government then say that such a list of serious offences is not necessary, because the Human Rights Act provides all the protection needed against such serious crimes being given a criminal conduct authorisation. But if a criminal or terrorist group was sufficiently conversant with the terms of legislation excluding specific offences from being authorised to be able to test a CHIS, it would almost certainly also be sufficiently conversant with the protections against serious crimes being authorised in the Human Rights Act to test a CHIS if, as the Government presumably believe, those protections are clear-cut.

However, the Bill does not preclude specific criminal conduct being prohibited through a list, since it gives the Secretary of State the power, through secondary legislation, to prohibit the authorisation of any specified criminal conduct. Since it would be secondary legislation, Parliament would not get the right to amend what was put forward by the Secretary of State, as it would with primary legislation. Since the Government, presumably, do not believe that whatever criminal conduct might be prohibited from being authorised through such publicly available secondary legislation could be used by criminals as a checklist against which to test a covert human intelligence source, and put such sources at risk, it is not clear why explicit limits cannot also be set out in primary legislation.

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If other ways of identifying journalistic sources covered by the 2016 Act require this level of protection, there is no reason why the granting of criminal conduct authorisations should not also be covered. We will vote for this amendment if the noble Baroness divides the House.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

As has been said, Amendment 42, moved so succinctly by my noble friend Baroness Whitaker, requires a judicial commissioner to give approval for authorisations that would identify or confirm journalistic sources. It also requires the commissioner to have regard to both the public interest in protecting a source of journalistic information and the need for there to be another overriding public interest before a public authority seeks to identify or confirm a journalistic source.

As others have commented, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 introduced a requirement for prior authorisation from a judicial commissioner when any application is made to identify confidential journalistic sources. The concern is that this Bill creates a means to access confidential journalistic material and sources without any prior judicial oversight. Statutory provisions in a Bill such as this on criminal conduct authorisations which might allow a way round the existing legal protection of journalistic sources would deter those sources from coming forward in future, at the potential expense of journalists being able to expose illegal, corrupt, exploitative or anti-social activity—a vital role in a democratic society.

The current Secretary of State for Justice has previously said that the ability of sources to provide anonymous information to journalists needs to be protected and preserved. That will not happen if those sources are liable to be exposed by the activities of covert human intelligence agents authorised to commit criminal conduct with no prior judicial oversight.

We need to ensure that the current protections for whistleblowers and journalists are maintained and cannot be weakened or compromised by this Bill. This amendment, requiring prior judicial approval for authorisations relating to journalistic sources, would achieve that objective. We support Amendment 42.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Clark, outlined by her noble friend Lady Whitaker, would require prior judicial approval for a criminal conduct authorisation seeking to identify or confirm a source of journalistic material. I set out earlier in the debate why the Government do not consider prior judicial approval to be a workable option for any CHIS authorisation, so I shall not repeat those arguments. However, I will say again that where an authorisation is likely to result in the acquisition of confidential journalistic material there are already greater safeguards in place which are set out in the CHIS code of practice.

There will also now be notification of every single authorisation to IPCO soon after they have been granted. That will of course include any authorisations that are likely to result in the acquisition of confidential journalistic material. Judicial commissioners will therefore be able to consider the necessity and proportionality of an authorisation and check that the proper safeguards have been followed. I hope that provides the noble Baroness with the necessary reassurance and that she can withdraw the amendment.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who is next on the list, has been replaced by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, speaking for the Opposition, we support the essence of this Bill. As noble Lords from all sides of the House have said in earlier debates, this Bill addresses a necessary—if at times uncomfortable—reality, which prevents crime and keeps us safe. We pay tribute to those in our security services and elsewhere for the work they do on our behalf.

There has been much discussion in this House on the detail of what is before us. I very much respect the strongly felt concerns raised by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I take what she said, as I do all her contributions, in the constructive spirit in which I know it was intended. However, we have reservations about the effect of the amendments she has tabled. The current status quo is that criminal conduct authorisations are given without formal accountability, and prosecutorial discretion becomes a factor only if a CHIS is caught and arrested for the offence. For the overwhelming majority of cases, prosecutorial discretion never becomes relevant. In the circumstances that a CHIS, having been authorised, is caught carrying out that criminal act, the CPS will be made aware of the authorisation and will not prosecute, on the basis of overriding public interest. The CHIS does not now, and will not under this Bill, have immunity for committing an unauthorised offence.

We therefore believe that the Bill reflects the status quo in practice. We feel that putting this on a statutory footing, with authorisation conferring immunity—with appropriate safeguards—is the best way. We seek to add provisions into the Bill on immunity plus safeguards, including on the function of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, looking at every authorisation and possible prior judicial authorisation—to which my noble friend Lord Dubs referred—which will preserve the use of CHIS criminal conduct authorisations in the national interest while ensuring that there are safeguards for every authorisation.

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[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendments 33, 37, 44 and 46, which are also signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Rosser, I first pay tribute to the Minister and the Bill team, who offered to co-operate with me on these amendments and have been as good as their word. They now give more complete effect, in language approved by parliamentary counsel, to the homemade amendments that I moved in Committee. The lead amendment is Amendment 33; Amendment 37 mirrors it for Scotland; and Amendments 44 and 46 are consequentials.

The amendments provide, in summary, not for prior judicial authorisation but for judicial scrutiny of another kind: the real-time notification of authorisations to a judicial commissioner, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event within seven days. That should be seen very much as an outer limit for notification that should, so far as possible, be in real time. It will be open to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to encourage not only prompt notification but pre-notification for informal guidance, as already occurs in some other surveillance contexts. This might be particularly useful for bodies that do not make frequent use of the power.

The case for real-time notification, as I shall call it, has been put most persuasively by those who signed the equivalent amendments in Committee—the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Carlile. I shall summarise it as briefly as I can.

My immediate reaction to this Bill was to support prior judicial authorisation. I championed the use of prior judicial approval for other investigatory powers in my report A Question of Trust, and was delighted to see this in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. I accept that it might also be feasible in this context, given sufficient judicial training, yet I have reservations about prior judicial approval in this Bill, not only for the pragmatic reason that the Government have so firmly set their face against it. Handling and authorising a CHIS is a highly specialised function that requires a close and dynamic understanding not only of the details of the operation but of the characters of those involved. That is not something that a judge, let alone a Secretary of State, will necessarily have the capacity to pick up. It differs considerably from the classic judicial exercise of weighing the benefits of tapping a phone or an undersea cable against the associated intrusion of privacy.

The person who tasks a CHIS, including by authorising criminality, effectively takes on a long-term duty of care, not only towards any potential victims of that crime but towards a CHIS for whom exposure could result in injury or death. Perhaps it is for that reason that the American and Canadian models of prior judicial authorisation, both of them inspirations for A Question of Trust, are not applied in either country to the tasking of a CHIS to commit crimes.

The main objection offered to these amendments in Committee was to the insufficient sharpness of their teeth. It is true that real-time notification may mean that the judicial commissioners are powerless to stop a particularly rapid deployment. It is also true that criminal deployments of this kind cannot just be turned on and off like a tap, but I say three things in response.

First, precisely the same result may arise under a system of prior judicial authorisation, for such a system, like its equivalents in other areas of investigatory powers, will inevitably involve an urgency procedure: deploy first, seek authorisation later.

Secondly, there is an existing precedent for real-time notification—the deployment of undercover police under the so-called relevant sources order of 2013, which, judging from IPCO’s annual reports, works well. The knowledge that a CCA will go straight before a senior judge is a useful discipline for authorising officers. My experience of IPCO, and my own work until last year as Investigatory Powers Commissioner in the Channel Islands, is that the prospect of an interrogation, investigation, recommendations and a possible serious error report are, from the police’s point of view, striking enough to encourage a high standard of conduct, but not so intimidating as to encourage the concealment of honest error. Further assurance would be given by Amendment 34 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, which I will leave him to develop but which I support for making this explicit in the modern practice of undercover policing.

Thirdly, though the precise mechanism may still be in dispute, it is clear that neither RIPA nor this Bill provides for complete immunity from prosecution for those who authorise criminal conduct. I mentioned earlier the assurance of the Bill team, which the Minister repeated just now, that nothing in the statute prevents the prosecution of an authorising officer for misconduct in public office—for example, a corruptly obtained authorisation. She has also accepted that such immunity as provided by Section 27 of RIPA will be removed if an authorisation is found by a competent civil or criminal court to be either not necessary or not proportionate.

I propose to move these amendments on Wednesday, subject to one point on Amendment 37, the Scottish one. The Minister updated us on engagement with the Scottish Government during the first grouping. Were the Scottish Government to indicate before Wednesday’s debate that they would not recommend a legislative consent Motion, with the result that Scotland is carved out of the Bill, I would not wish to move Amendment 37.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Amendments 5 and 23, tabled by my noble friend Lord Dubs, provide for prior judicial oversight. They have the Opposition’s support. A criminal conduct authorisation would not have effect until approved by a judicial commissioner, unless it was urgent, in which case it would come into effect immediately but with the proviso that it must receive judicial approval within 48 hours.

Amendment 17 provides that, where a criminal conduct authorisation is granted, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be notified of certain details, including the purpose and extent of the deployment, before the CHIS can be deployed. In urgent cases, notification can be given afterwards—as soon as reasonably possible, but within seven days. We will support Amendment 17 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It provides a further form of prior oversight to help ensure that the criminal conduct authorisation will not be used in an inappropriate manner.

We support Amendment 33 in the lead name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which provides that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be informed of an authorisation as soon as reasonably practicable, and within seven days at the latest. It also represents a significant improvement in the Bill, in which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has played a key role. It enables an effective and powerful independent and impartial check on the use of criminal conduct authorisations, which will help to ensure that the bodies being given the power to authorise criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources use that power appropriately and lawfully, in the knowledge that they will be held to account, albeit probably afterwards, by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Amendment 34 would make it explicit in the Bill that, if the Investigatory Powers Commissioner thinks an authorisation should not have been granted, the authorisation will be cancelled. We support that. However, there are benefits from prior independent oversight that post-notification oversight does not provide: namely, the opportunity to prevent something out of order occurring before it happens. Prior judicial consideration is about approving or otherwise beforehand what is said needs to happen, and why. Post authorisation, it is about what actually happened and why. Both forms of consideration are important.

The absence of prior independent scrutiny for criminal conduct authorisations under this Bill is not in line with procedures that apply to other investigatory functions, although I appreciate that it has been argued that these investigatory functions are not similar to the authorisation of a CCA. Police search warrants require a magistrate to be satisfied that there are objective reasonable grounds for them. Targeted interception of communications or phone tapping must be approved by the Secretary of State and authorised by a judicial commissioner before being carried out—a double lock which the Investigatory Powers Commissioner says ensures that all investigatory powers warrants issued are necessary, proportionate and lawful. The power to require telecommunications operators to retain communication data for investigatory purposes can be used by the Secretary of State but must be approved by a judicial commissioner.

If these requirements for prior judicial approval, including in some instances a double lock of independent scrutiny, are needed for search warrants, phone tapping and retention of data, surely they are even more necessary for the potentially more damaging human rights violations, including physical violence, that could arise from the authorisation of criminal conduct by a covert human intelligence source.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn. I call the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Before I comment on these amendments, I am told that there was a tweet earlier today from the Commons Minister on this Bill, James Brokenshire, saying that he has had a recurrence of a tumour in part of his lung and that he is taking leave for curative surgery. I am sure that I am not alone in wanting to extend best wishes to him for a full recovery.

I will be brief, because everything that needs to be said on Amendment 6 has already been said. It requires a person authorising a criminal conduct authorisation to reasonably believe that the tests for authorisation are met and are necessary and proportionate. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, referred to what the Solicitor-General had said at Second Reading in the Commons, to the effect that the code of practice sets out that there does need to be a reasonable belief that an authorisation is necessary and proportionate. As we have heard, there is wording in part of the code of practice that is not—let us say—quite as strong as the words of the Solicitor-General in the Commons.

Crucially, once again, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said in Committee, the notion of reasonableness is completely absent from the Bill, which the courts would treat as the authoritative source. Like others, I see no reason why the Government are not prepared to put the word “reasonable” in the Bill. We certainly support Amendment 6.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I heard earlier today that my right honourable friend James Brokenshire had to go in for some more surgery; I pay tribute to him. He is one of the most decent people in politics and an extraordinarily capable Minister. He has never been far from my mind this afternoon, as not only has he mentored me but we discussed and worked closely on every aspect of the Bill. I wish him a very speedy recovery.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to add an explicit requirement for an authorising officer’s belief that the conduct is both necessary and proportionate to be a reasonable one. I have already explained why the Government cannot support this proposal. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, almost spelled out the reasons I was going to give, which are a bit of a repetition and with which I am not sure he will be entirely satisfied. However, since Committee I have updated the CHIS code of practice to make it clearer that it is expected that the belief should be a reasonable one.

I caution against an amendment seeking to include this wording in the Bill, as it would cast doubt on the test that is expected to apply to other authorisations. In particular, it could have unintended consequences for a Section 29 use and conduct authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. Including the need for a reasonable belief here, creating an inconsistency in the legislation, would create uncertainty over whether the same requirement exists for the underlying Section 29 authorisation. As I mentioned earlier, as a matter of public law, a decision made subject to a discretionary power must be reasonable; that is, the decision must be rationally open to a reasonable decision-maker in possession of the facts in the case.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has also called for the length of authorisations to be reduced from 12 months to four months, with a formal requirement for a monthly review of the authorisation. As I have said, the current authorisation period of 12 months is consistent with the authorisation for the use and conduct of CHIS, which will need to be in place before criminal conduct can be authorised. Keeping the Bill consistent with the powers laid out in Section 29 will ensure that this power remains operationally workable for the public authorities using it.

While the code of practice is clear that an authorisation must be relied on for as short a duration as possible, and in many cases an authorisation will not last longer than four months, reducing the maximum length risks unintended consequences; for example, a shorter duration could mean that activity is rushed through in a shorter period of time, to avoid renewal or to demonstrate the value of a deployment to support a renewal. This clearly may not be the most effective or safest way of carrying out that conduct. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness is sufficiently reassured to withdraw her amendment.

Law Enforcement: Brexit Impacts

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 6th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

There will be continued scrutiny of the effectiveness of the new arrangements. The noble and learned Lord is right that these things need to be swift and efficient but, as I said in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, they also need safeguards built into them. I have every confidence that the new arrangements will work well.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

If there has been no weakening of our security arrangements as a result of the new agreement with the EU, why, in the negotiations with the EU, did the Government seek to retain access to all the existing direct real-time data-sharing arrangements, including the Schengen database, that we had as EU members—not all of which we have retained?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord is right that we have not retained everything. We have not got everything we wanted, which was always going to happen in a negotiation. But we believe that we have a set of agreements that protect our citizens and keep people safe.

Antique Firearms Regulations 2020

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 6th January 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

We are certainly not opposed to these regulations, but there appears to be some doubt on the Government’s part as to whether they will have any impact on the serious issue they are intended to address.

As the Minister said, the regulations seek to resolve concerns about the increased use of antique firearms in crime by providing a statutory definition of antique firearms. In so doing, the regulations set out to provide certainty on which firearms can be possessed or traded as an antique and thus be exempt from the need for a firearm certificate and the provisions of the Firearms Act 1968, as amended by the Policing and Crime Act 2017. The Minister gave the figures. The number of antique firearms recovered in criminal circumstances was four in 2007, reached a peak of 96 in 2016 but was still at a figure of 68 in 2019. Since 2007, six fatalities have been linked to antique firearms.

The lack of a statutory definition of an antique firearm, as opposed to Home Office non-statutory guidance, has enabled criminals to obtain old but still functioning firearms without the control provisions and licensing requirements under the 1968 Act being applicable. As has already been commented on, in 2015 the Law Commission recommended defining “antique firearm” in legislation to remove ambiguity over what was meant and provide greater clarity for the police and other criminal justice agencies in enforcing the law and prosecuting offenders. That recommendation was accepted by the Government and the Policing and Crime Act 2017 provided for a statutory definition, which led to a public consultation that year on the detailed aspects of the statutory definition.

Like the noble Lord, Lord German, I ask the Government to say in their response why it has taken more than five years to implement a Law Commission recommendation on a matter impacting on serious violent criminal offending at a time when violent crime has risen, and why it has taken three years from the conclusion of the public consultation on the detail of the statutory definition to bring these regulations forward. This might suggest a somewhat laid-back attitude to the incidence of violent crime, unless the Government say that the reason for the delay is that they still do not think that the regulations will actually have any impact on violent crime involving antique firearms.

If that is the case, such a stance would appear to be in line with the statement in the impact assessment—if I have understood it—that

“there is no robust evidence to indicate that re-classifying antique firearms in this way will reduce criminality involving antique firearms, serious violence, wounding or homicides.”

Does that statement represent the Government’s view of the effect, or rather non-effect, on public safety of these regulations, which have taken more than five years to appear following the Law Commission recommendation and have a net cost to business of £500,000 a year on top of set-up costs of £6 million? In their response, a clear statement is needed from the Government on not only the reason for the time it has taken to bring these regulations forward, but, in the light of the statement in the impact assessment, which I accept I may have misinterpreted, whether and why the Government think that these regulations will address two specific government issues.

The first issue is the concern mentioned in paragraph 7.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum:

“Law enforcement has raised concerns with the Government about the increased use of antique firearms in crime.”


In the light of the statement in the impact assessment, do the Government think that the regulations will address that concern?

The second specific issue arises, once again, in the light of the statement in the impact assessment that

“there is no robust evidence to indicate that re-classifying antique firearms in this way will reduce criminality involving antique firearms”.

The issue is whether, and why, the Government believe that these regulations will deliver on their stated primary objective, as set out in the impact assessment:

“The primary objective is to preserve public safety by strengthening firearms legislation to prevent the criminal misuse of antique firearms.”


Again, in the light of the statement in the impact assessment, do the Government believe that these regulations will deliver on that primary objective?

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 5th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

There are some 2.4 million adult victims of domestic abuse, in all its many forms, a year. We are told two-thirds of these are women and one-third men. That figure does not include those victims aged 75 and over, for whom up to now there have been no available figures. Many query the basis of those ONS figures and the extent to which they reflect reality—the reality being that it is women, who are not specifically mentioned in the Bill, including in the definition of domestic abuse, who are far and away the ones who are most disproportionally affected by such abuse. Some 92% of defendants in domestic abuse cases that come to court are men.

It is emphatically not a minor crime. For women in particular, it is a crime that often savagely ends their life. For many more, it destroys their life, and for even more, it leaves both physical and emotional scars that can last for years, if not a lifetime. What the next annual victim figure will be, we do not know, but the available evidence to date indicates that, as a result of Covid-19 restrictions on movement and more working from home, domestic abuse in its many forms has risen sharply—not least because domestic abuse also works from home.

We welcome this Bill and the much-needed opportunity it provides for real, positive and meaningful change for the prevention of domestic abuse in all its forms and the provision of support for victims. We welcome the way the Government worked during the passage of the Bill through the Commons, many months ago. A number of changes improving the Bill were secured; for example, preventing “rough sex” being used as a defence for serious harm, and providing that domestic abuse victims will automatically be eligible for special measures in family court proceedings and for the statutory definition to recognise children who see, hear or experience the effects of domestic abuse as victims of domestic abuse.

We are grateful for the briefings and meetings that have been offered and taken place with organisations and stakeholders with expertise and first-hand, front-line knowledge in this field, which have highlighted how far there is still to go. I would also like to pay tribute to the Joint Committee of MPs and Peers who carried out pre-legislative scrutiny, not least to my noble friends Lady Armstrong of Hill Top and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, who served on that committee—many of its recommendations were accepted in whole or in part by the Government. On Report in the Commons, we pursued a number of issues, which we will be raising again.

The Bill puts a duty on local authorities to provide support for victims in accommodation-based services. This is a major step forward, as long as the accommodation provided is appropriate and that small, specialist providers—particularly of services for black, Asian and minority-ethnic victims—are not overlooked in favour of larger providers. However, most victims—nearly 70%—access support services in the community rather than using refuges or other accommodation-based services. To address this reality, we also need a duty on public authorities to commission specialist services in the community for victims of abuse.

It is crucial that this Bill works for children affected by abuse and keeps them safe. We strongly welcome the change agreed to in the Commons to recognise children who witness and are affected by domestic abuse between adults as victims of that abuse. However, between 2006 and 2019, at least 21 children were killed during contact with fathers who were perpetrators of domestic abuse. We believe there should be a change to the existing legal presumption of contact for parents with their children where there is evidence of domestic abuse. We also consider that unsupervised contact should be prohibited for a parent awaiting trial or on bail for such abuse offences, or where there are ongoing criminal proceedings for domestic abuse.

In our view, the Bill does not do enough to protect migrant women who suffer abuse. They are a particularly vulnerable group, whose abusers are able to use their immigration status—or rather lack of it—to prevent such victims reporting or escaping from their abuse. There should be recourse to public funds for these victims, and safe reporting by ensuring that the data of a victim who reports abuse cannot be shared to be used for immigration control purposes, and there should also be leave to remain. The system should help women when they need help and not see some as an immigration case first and victim second.

Currently, victims of domestic abuse who are on a spousal visa and who leave their abuser are granted three months’ grace in which they can apply for leave to remain in the UK and access financial support. This period of time has often proved too tight. This protection should be extended to six months’ grace and cover women on all visas, not just spousal ones.

We believe there should also be a non-discrimination clause that would specify that all victims, regardless of status, must be given equal protection and support, reflecting the language of Article 4 of the Istanbul convention, which provides that women must be protected equally, regardless, for example, of immigration status, disability, sexual orientation or religion.

There are many other issues that are likely to be raised during the consideration of the Bill and I am not going to even try to refer to all those of which I am already aware. However, one issue is that the new domestic abuse orders should be extended to cover the workplace. Other key issues include making non-fatal strangulation a specific stand-alone offence instead of it being covered, as has been argued, as a summary offence under the Offences against the Person Act 1861. We have surely moved on, in both attitude and approach to this crime, since 1861. There is also a need to ensure that disabled victims are protected by the Bill in relation to abuse in care relationships.

There is a need to look further at the welcome provision in the Serious Crime Act 2015 of the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour, but which currently applies only where the victim is still in an intimate relationship with, or still living with, the perpetrator. We want to look at extending the offence so that it covers coercive control that can often drag on for years after separation—through, for example, control of shared finances. While prevention is better than cure, we are nevertheless short of a detailed national strategy for perpetrators, which, among other things, would focus on changing perpetrators’ behaviour and preventing further abuse. That deficiency should be addressed.

Finally, while the Bill rightly recognises that economic abuse is a key means used by perpetrators to coerce and control victims, we also need to provide a safety net for those victims who find themselves economically powerless and unable to afford to escape abuse. Welfare reforms over recent years, such as universal credit and the two-child limit, have restricted the financial resources that women have access to, but need, to enable them to be independent of their abuser. All future welfare policies and policy changes should be specifically impact-assessed for their effect on domestic abuse survivors.

The Bill, with the further improvements we and others want to see included, will not deliver on its objectives unless the necessary resources, financial and human, are also provided. It is no good giving extra statutory powers and additional statutory responsibilities without all the necessary resources needed to deliver, since that simply results in having to make cuts to other, often crucial, complementary services. Ensuring that the needed resources to deliver on this Bill can be fully financed is the Government’s responsibility, and we will want to be satisfied that it is a responsibility the Government accept and intend to meet in full.

To deliver, we also have to make sure that we have a criminal justice system that not only protects victims but provides justice in a way in which those who are victims of domestic abuse not only can have confidence but actually do. That means a culture, across the board, of zero tolerance of domestic abuse, with a determination that offences will be fully investigated, perpetrators brought before the courts, existing and new orders fully monitored and enforced, and the required resources to do all this made available. It also means that all necessary and effective support for all victims must be provided in practice and not just in theory—in other words, a culture in future on domestic abuse that, where it cannot be prevented, results in victims knowing, and perpetrators fearing, that justice will be done.

Immigration Rules: Supported Accommodation

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 17th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

In their Statement, the Government said that they will bring forward a Bill

“to fix the immigration and asylum system once and for all.”

What will an immigration and asylum system that has been fixed “once and for all” by this Government look like, and how will it differ fundamentally from the present system? Secondly, are there at least minimum standards that must be, and are, met at all times for the accommodation in which a total of 60,000 asylum seekers—some three-quarters of the size of our prison population—are housed? If so, do those minimum standards include at all times for all those housed the provision of electricity, heating, hot water and mains running water?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question, which pertinently asked what a firm but fair asylum system would look like. The whole premise of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary’s ambition for the future immigration system is to give refuge to those who need it—some of the most vulnerable people in the world—and to seriously clamp down on some of the criminals who facilitate some of the dangerous crossings across our waters. The accommodation will meet minimum standards: there is no question of a diminution in standards for anybody who finds themselves in our accommodation.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 (Consequential, Saving, Transitional and Transitory Provisions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 10th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

The Explanatory Memorandum for these regulations says that their purpose is to amend or revoke a range of some 80 or so existing pieces of domestic primary and secondary legislation, using powers primarily under Section 5 of the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020, which ends free movement at the end of this month. The Section 5 powers can be used to modify, by regulations, Acts of Parliament—Henry VIII powers—statutory instruments and retained EU law. Nobody could accuse the Government of being shy about using this power, which diminishes the role that Parliament can play in amending, challenging and questioning the detailed changes to the laws of this land which the Government are making in some 55 pages of amendments and schedules in these regulations.

There does not appear to be anything in these regulations that would be different depending on whether there was a deal or no deal, so all of this will have been known to the Government months ago. Why then are these regulations, all 55 pages of amendments and schedules, including involving the use of Henry VIII powers taking away rights and protections, being brought forward for approval by the Government so late in the day? I ask them in their response to give a clear assurance, on the record, that the legislative changes in these rushed regulations will work as intended and are in scope of the Section 5 power, and that further amendments, which could and should have been in these regulations, will not be needed. I will wait to see whether they give that clear assurance on the record and, if they do, whether it is caveat free.

I will raise a few specific points. Will the Government say whether all the detailed legislative changes in these regulations arise from the ending of free movement? I ask that because there is a change to the Immigration Act 1971 which widens the power to exclude people arriving from the common travel area—Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man—so that exclusions on “conducive to the public good” grounds need no longer solely be on a national security ground but on a much wider basis, and also that notice of exclusion need no longer be in writing. This does not appear to be a necessary consequence of the withdrawal agreement, so why is a Henry VIII power being used here to make a non-Brexit related change, and why is the change being made?

Further, there also appears to be an amendment to the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, replacing “a qualifying CTA entitlement” with

“the relevant status as an Irish citizen”.

That language suggests that the CTA covers only the UK and the Republic of Ireland, as it omits the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. Will the Government comment on the significance of the wording to which I have referred?

There is also an amendment made to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Fees Order 2011, which would omit the paragraph saying that there is

“no fee payable for an appeal against a decision made under section 5(1) of the 1971 Act (a decision to make a deportation order).”

This would appear to have the possible effect of making it more costly and difficult to appeal a deportation order. Once again, this would appear to be a change being made, this time to an SI, which is unrelated to our leaving the EU and the ending of free movement. Will the Government confirm whether this is the case, and what the real purpose is behind the amendment to this particular SI? Will they also say how many, and which, of the amendments and schedules, in whole or in part, in these regulations are not directly related to our leaving the EU and the end of free movement?

The amendment to the Aliens’ Employment Act 1955 leaves EU citizens and family members with leave to enter or remain on a basis outside the EU settlement scheme—for example, as family members or as skilled workers—with restricted access to Civil Service jobs, as has already been mentioned. This issue was raised in the Commons, when the government answer was that it was right that someone who works in the Civil Service has the appropriate immigration permission for the UK. That does not answer the question, though, of why the Government are placing this restricted access on people who are lawfully resident. I would be grateful for a response from the Government to that question.

The regulations relating to changes to marriage and regarding sham marriage come into force on 1 July 2021, as the Minister said. In the Commons, the Government said that this will make it easier for those conducting legal ceremonies, since the grace period for the EU settlement scheme will have ended by then. Was this delayed coming-into-force date the result of representations to the Government, or was it a delayed date that the Government decided to introduce off their own bat? I ask that since there has been no public consultation on these regulations—apparently not even with the Law Commission—so organisations or bodies that might, for example, have been able to make a credible case for a later introduction date for some of these regulations have not been given the opportunity by the Government to do so. In reality, this was presumably because of the way these rushed regulations have been brought forward so late in the day.

Finally, what views did the devolved Administrations express on these regulations? I await the Government’s response to the questions raised in this debate.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

There are a number of amendments in this group relating to human rights. They variously provide that a criminal conduct authorisation: may not authorise activity that would be incompatible with convention rights; may not authorise murder, torture or rape, or a person under the age of 18 to engage in criminal conduct; cannot authorise causing death or grievous bodily harm, sexual violation or torture; and cannot authorise causing death or grievous bodily harm, perverting the course of justice, sexual offences, torture or depriving a person of their liberty.

There is also an amendment in my name and that of my noble friends Lord Kennedy of Southwark and Lord Judd, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that would also put explicit limits in the Bill on the types of criminal behaviour that can be authorised. These limits cover causing death or bodily harm, sexual violation, perverting the course of justice, torture, detaining an individual or damaging property where it would put a person in danger. There is an amendment to my amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, the purpose of which, as he has explained, is to explore whether the proposed regulatory regime provides adequate safeguards for operations carried out overseas.

The amendments all follow a similar theme, namely, wanting to include in the Bill clearer and tighter wording in respect of the criminal conduct that can be authorised by a CCA, so that there can be no doubt over what is a permissible criminal conduct authorisation and, more significantly, what is not. The Government’s position appears to be that criminal offences that are contrary to the Human Rights Act are already precluded, given that all public authorities are bound by the Human Rights Act, and thus authorising authorities are not permitted by the Bill to authorise conduct that would constitute or entail a breach of those rights.

Interestingly, the Bill states in new Section 29B(7) in Clause 1(5), on criminal conduct authorisations:

“Subsection (6) is without prejudice to the need to take into account other matters so far as they are relevant (for example, the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998).”


But what are the words “to take into account” meant to mean in this context as regards adhering to the requirements of the Human Rights Act? One can, after all, take something into account and then decide that it should be ignored or minimised in whole or in part. What do the words,

“so far as they are relevant”,

mean in relation to the requirements of the Human Rights Act? In what circumstances are those requirements not relevant in relation to criminal conduct authorisations?

Turning to an issue that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, addressed, the Government have maintained that specifying in the Bill offences that cannot be authorised places at risk undercover officers and agents on the grounds that to do so would place into the hands of criminals, terrorists and hostile states a means of creating a checklist for suspected CHIS to be tested against. However, as has been said, the Canadian Security Intelligence Act authorises criminal conduct similar to that proposed in the Bill, and my amendment reflects the wording in the Canadian legislation on the type of serious criminal conduct that cannot be authorised.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has pointed out that the Bill gives the Secretary of State power to make orders prohibiting the authorisation of any specified criminal conduct and that, in line with the Government’s argument, whatever might be prohibited by such an order could presumably also be used by criminals as a checklist against which to test a covert human intelligence source. The JCHR comments in its report:

“If limits can be placed on authorised criminal conduct in publicly available secondary legislation without putting informants and undercover officers at undue risk, it is unclear why express limits cannot also be set out in primary legislation.”


The JCHR report also states:

“If a criminal gang or terrorist group was familiar enough with the relevant legislation to test a CHIS against it, they would presumably be equally able to test them against the guarantees and protections set out in the”


Human Rights Act.

Perhaps, in their response, the Government could say whether they are still committed to the Human Rights Act, since following their 2019 election manifesto commitment to ensuring that there is a proper balance between the rights of individuals, national security and effective government—which suggests that the Government do not think that is the present position—they have announced that there is to be a review into the operation of the Human Rights Act.

If the Government intend to argue that the Human Rights Act will provide protection in the years ahead against unacceptable use of the powers in this Bill, there needs at least to be a clear statement from the Government that they are committed to the Act and will not be altering its provisions.

It could be claimed with some justification, however, that the Human Rights Act has not prevented previous human rights violations connected to undercover investigations or covert human intelligence sources. I await the Government’s response to this group of amendments and to the contributions that seek more specific wording in the Bill, to put clear limits on the type of criminal behaviour that can be authorised.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their very thoughtful contributions to a discussion of the upper limit of what can be authorised by a criminal conduct authorisation.

I will first address comments—because they have been the most numerous—that propose to replicate on the face of the Bill the limits that the Canadians have set in the legislation governing their security service, and Amendment 42, from my noble friend Lord Cormack, which prohibits murder, torture or rape. I totally recognise why noble Lords want to ensure that this Bill does not provide authority for an undercover agent to commit any and all crime. It does not. I reiterate once more: there are already clear limits on the criminal activity that can be authorised and they can be found within the Human Rights Act—which, by the way, was not in place when some of the activities that noble Lords have described were carried out.

Nothing in this Bill undermines the need to comply with that Act, as is made clear by new Section 29B(7). Further limits are placed on the regime by the need for the authorising officer in all public authorities to confirm that there is a demonstrable need to authorise a CHIS by making a clear case for its necessity and proportionality. I understand questions about why we cannot place explicit limits in the Bill, as they do in other countries, notably including—as noble Lords have said—Canada, and I will explain our reasoning.

We think that placing express limits on the face of the Bill is not necessary. The Human Rights Act already provides these limits and the amendments that replicate the limits in Canadian legislation do not prohibit any criminal conduct which is not already prohibited by the ECHR and HRA, as encompassed by the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made a point about undercover police who have sexual relationships: if gangs knew that that was unlawful, would they then test against it? I would say that although that behaviour would be unlawful in that context, it is very distinct from rape. I have been trying to talk to my noble friend who is a QC and perhaps I will set my answer out in more detail in writing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I share the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about seeking clarity as to who is covered not just because a criminal conduct authorisation authorises somebody to commit a crime, but because they have, as a consequence, both civil and criminal legal immunity. As we and other noble Lords have argued, immunity from prosecution should be decided after the event by the independent prosecuting authority—disagreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. However, these amendments raise important questions, not least about legal immunity.

The first person covered, without doubt, is the agent or informant—the covert human intelligence source. If the CHIS is asked or ordered to participate in crime then if anyone is to be given legal immunity, it should be him. The question then becomes: is a handler who asks or orders a CHIS to commit crime, whether or not the request or order is legitimate, also covered by legal immunity? This arises from the fact that he can request or order a CHIS to commit crime only if he, in turn, has been given authority to issue such a request or order by the authorising officer. If the authorising officer has told the handler that he is permitted to request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the handler also have legal immunity, in that it is then the authorising officer’s decision, not that of the handler? Then, if the authorising officer has agreed that the handler can request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the authorising officer too not be covered by legal immunity?

What the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, was aiming at with his amendment came as something of a surprise. I do not understand how, under the terms of the Bill, a corporation can be authorised to carry out crime. Surely, it has to be an individual—the covert human intelligence source himself or herself—who is authorised, not a corporation. While I accept that some work of the police service, for example, or the security services may be outsourced, surely that corporation would have to be listed as an authorising authority in the Bill if that were the case.

There would be unintended consequences of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, if the only person who can be authorised to commit a crime is an undercover police officer or a James Bond-type character in the security services, and not a criminal who is helping the police or, indeed, somebody in a foreign country who is simply an employee of an organisation that interests the security services and who passes information back, not an employee of the security services. That would surely leave a big hole in what the Bill attempts to achieve. We cannot support Amendment 53. However, I am very interested to hear the Minister’s response to my question, and that of other noble Lords: who is covered by the CCA? Is it the CHIS who commits the crime, the handler who tells him to commit the crime, the officer who authorises the handler to tell the CHIS to commit the crime, or all three?

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 39 in the names of my noble friends Lady Massey of Darwen and Lord Dubs removes from the definition in the Bill of authorised criminal conduct the words

“by or in relation to”

the specified covert human intelligence source. It replaces those words with a more detailed definition; namely, that it is conduct by

“the covert human intelligence source”

or by a person who holds a rank, office, or position in the public authority that is granting the authorisation and is assisting in the behaviour of the covert human intelligence source. As my noble friend Lord Dubs said, this amendment was recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Under the terms of the Bill, authorised conduct is not limited to the conduct of the covert human intelligence source. The code of practice says that a criminal conduct authorisation may also authorise conduct by someone else in relation to a covert human intelligence source, with that someone else being those within a public authority involved in or affected by the authorisation.

If the Government do not accept Amendment 39, they need to set out in their response the reasons why they consider it necessary to provide for the authorisation of criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source; the parameters of that criminal conduct by someone other than the CHIS that can be so authorised; and the safeguards in the Bill to ensure that the person authorised to commit criminal conduct—who is someone other than the covert human intelligence source—is not also involved in any way in the authorisation process to which that criminal conduct relates.

I shall listen with interest to the Government’s response to Amendment 39 and to the pertinent questions raised by my noble friend Lord Sikka in speaking to his amendment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.

Amendment 39 seeks clarification on who can be authorised under the Bill. The intention behind the Bill is to provide protection both to the CHIS themselves and to those involved in the authorisation process within the relevant public authority. There are a range of limitations on what can be authorised under the Bill, including the conduct being necessary and proportionate. This means that it would not be possible to grant an authorisation for criminal conduct unless that conduct was by a CHIS for a specific, identified purpose, or involved members of the public authority making, or giving effect to, the CHIS authorisation.

Amendment 53, from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to restrict those who can be granted a criminal conduct authorisation to employees of the public authority. The Government cannot support this amendment as it would significantly hamper our public authorities’ efforts to tackle crimes and terrorism. While CHIS are often employees of the public authority, they also can be members of the public. The real value of CHIS who are members of the public is in their connections to the criminal and terrorist groups that we are targeting. This is often the only means by which valuable intelligence can be gathered on the harmful activities which we are seeking to stop. Employees of a public authority will not have the same level of access. I reassure the noble Lord that the authorising officers within the public authority set out clearly the strict parameters of a criminal conduct authorisation. Were a CHIS to engage in criminality beyond their authorisation, that conduct could be considered for prosecution in the usual way.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether the CHIS and their handler could be prosecuted. Obviously, every situation will be different, but if the CHIS acted beyond their authorisation, they would have to answer for that. Equally, if the CHIS handler acted inappropriately or in a way that might endanger the CHIS, they could also be liable for that conduct.

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, talked about security guards being undercover operatives. The noble Lord will know that we have published the list of bodies that can run undercover operatives. In addition to this, the criminal injuries compensation scheme is not undermined by this Bill, and I understand that anyone can approach the IPT if they feel they are due civil compensation. I think that is right, but I will write to noble Lords if that is wrong.