Armed Forces: Future Size

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 8th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, it is late. Perhaps because of that, the interest shown in this debate in terms of the number of speakers is limited. Nevertheless, the issue raised is one of real interest and importance. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Empey, for giving us the opportunity to have this debate.

Relationships between countries and continents, strengths of countries and continents and their levels of influence change over time. For example, it will not be long before the size of the Chinese economy will exceed that of the United States. China’s military capability is also expanding fast and, with it, the confidence in wielding influence and greater political dominance that that brings. The United States, for its part, has made clear that it will be devoting more of its attention and resources, not least military ones, to the Far East and China, which will become its new strategic priority, and fewer to Europe. The United States ambassador to NATO has recently been quoted as saying that the NATO allies need to find the money to spend on military equipment to maintain the organisation’s strength. The US itself accounts for 75% of NATO’s budget and spends 4% of its GDP on defence. The ambassador asserted that the campaign in Libya had exposed what he described as “worrisome trends” in Europe’s ability to act without US help, that some European stockpiles had run out and had to be replenished by the United States, and that there were a,

“number of other critical capabilities that the US provided in spades”.

The future direction for the Middle East, in which we have considerable interests, is far from clear. Significant change, which was not predicted, has taken place in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. We have seen the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as an international phenomenon and the Gulf States, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, becoming more active players in events. The Sunni/Shia sectarian animosity in the Middle East continues to be a telling factor. Syria is in a state of turmoil and that is having repercussions in the Lebanon and Jordan. It remains to be seen in which direction Syria goes once President Assad has left the scene, and in particular the impact that this has on the Iranian Government and stability in the region, since the Iranians back the current Syrian regime.

Presidential elections are due in Iran in June and the current president will have to step down after two consecutive terms in office. Iran continues to face pressure over its nuclear intentions and its economy is in trouble. Israel also has elections later this month, though a significant change in government direction does not appear to be likely. The peace process between Israel and Palestine appears at present to be going nowhere, and there continues to be speculation on whether the Israeli military will strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.

On top of this the growing strength of al-Qaeda in parts of Africa, the rise of new powers in Asia Pacific, weak states outnumbering stable states by two to one, and new threats in cyberspace, which have been the reality in the Middle East in recent months, are all matters to be taken into account in assessing future developments and priorities. Even though we may not have predicted at least some significant events that have taken place, forecasting what is going to happen in the future is likely to become more, not less, difficult. Today, energy security, climate change, demographic shifts, and the spread of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials are threats, alongside state-on-state warfare, or contorted religiously inspired terrorism.

The global economic downturn that we face means that we and the majority of our allies are making spending cuts, with unavoidable consequences for capability and global reach. In the UK the situation has not been helped by the fact that decisions taken by the Government have not yet stimulated domestic growth and austerity is set to be extended. Budgetary restraint is unavoidable, however undesirable. If we are to realise our intentions and ambitions for our forces they will have to be affordable, and the profile of the defence budget will be an expression of our priorities.

Carrier strike and improved ISTAR are vital. Strategic warning capabilities and intelligence will be crucial in providing early indicators of threats and potential crises. Two state-of-the-art fighter fleets, advanced unmanned vehicles supporting all three services and strategic air lift are also key components. That our Armed Forces personnel will continue to be our most important asset and skills must also be a strategic capability. We need highly trained service personnel able to use higher technology platforms and exploiting to the full the opportunities new technology presents, reservists using niche civilian skills in military contexts, not least in the field of cyberspace and cyber security, and a high-skilled, broad-based defence industry. Remote surveillance, manoeuvrability in cyberspace, better communications and acting at distance with accuracy are all necessary features for our future forces.

Alongside this must also be a greater focus on international alliance-building. Shared threats and financial challenges demand that we pool resources and expertise. The UK/France accord may lay the ground for multiple discrete bilateral or regional arrangements between nations. NATO, though, is the primary military grouping through which action will be taken, and Europe’s focus should be on greater deployability and burden-sharing within the alliance.

It is vital that European nations work together towards meeting military objectives. European NATO nations are making deep cuts to defence budgets in isolation of each other and the consequence could be cross-alliance shortfalls or duplication, which would certainly not be the best use of available resources overall.

We also need to consider the opinion of the British people when considering our defence posture in protecting and furthering British interests and ideas. The public are wary of interventionism, following recent conflicts and the financial crisis. We have to make the case for strong, proactive defence postures, with our goal being prevention before intervention, and early intervention before conflict.

Diplomacy can be more effective than the painful cure of military action, albeit that a key function of our Armed Forces is to deter and be a credible threat to those who wish us and our allies harm. Whether in tackling climate change, investing in civil society and governance or diplomatic engagement, the spectrum of soft-power capabilities at the UK’s disposal to defend our interests and promote our ideas in the world should be capitalised on.

Defence is becoming more intricate and complex while the world is becoming more interdependent, and we need a policy response as broad as the threats that we face. We must aim to have flexible forces with whole-spectrum capabilities, able to respond rapidly whether through preventive measures, reactive disaster relief or multilateral interventions, and we must ensure that our intentions and ambitions for our forces are affordable and can be financed, with the needs of the front line being matched to those of the bottom line.