Army 2020

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I associate this side of the House with the tributes paid by the Minister to the three air crew who were involved in the Tornado GR4 aircraft incident on Tuesday and who were killed or are missing, presumed dead; and with the tributes paid to the three members of our Armed Forces who were killed recently on operations in Afghanistan. We, too, extend our sincere condolences to their families and friends at this difficult time. Our thoughts are also with the fourth member of the Tornado squadron, who remains in hospital.

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made in the other place by the Secretary of State. We endorse the comments about the commitment and professionalism of our Armed Forces. The Secretary of State’s Statement—true to form—contained two references to the financial situation, one near the beginning and one near the end. Claims about a £38-billion black hole continue to be made. However, this figure has not been supported by the National Audit Office; it appears to assume no increase in financial resources over a 10-year period, when even the Government’s SDSR stated that the defence budget would rise in cash terms; and, despite requests from the Commons Defence Select Committee, the Government failed to produce a breakdown of their figure to show how it had been calculated. One can only draw the obvious conclusion that the figure has no substance.

I will raise a number of points in view of the fact that the announcement today was primarily financially driven. As the Minister said, the withdrawals and mergers will hardly be welcomed in the units affected. The Statement said that it was about how we should structure the future Army and support it to deliver the greatest possible military effect with the manpower available. Later on the Statement says that,

“no current Regimental names or cap badges will be lost as a consequence of the changes”.

Can the Minister say which came first in determining the Government’s plans for the future structure of the Army? Was it the need to ensure that the future Army looked at as a whole would have the greatest possible military effect with the manpower available, or was it the need to ensure that no regimental names or cap badges would be lost?

The Statement indicates, as indeed did the strategic defence and security review, that reservists will play a bigger role in future operations, since the number of reservists is rising while the number of regular troops is being reduced to 82,000, which is well below the figure indicated in the 2010 SDSR. Bearing that in mind, the question of how long a future operation could be sustained is highly relevant, not least in the light of the defence planning assumptions referred to in the SDSR. Reservists may be able to be away from their regular employment for a few months, but there may be greater difficulties over their availability if they are required to be away for longer periods or for regular and sustained periods of a few months. It is not just a case of how long an employer might be prepared to accept the absence of an employee, but from the employee’s point of view it is also about the impact that regular and extended absences might have on career development, including progression within the organisation or company where they are employed.

For how long and how frequently do the Government envisage that reservists will be deployed in support of an extended or enduring operation? The Secretary of State’s Written Ministerial Statement today refers to reservists accepting a liability for up to six months’ deployed service plus pre-deployment training in a five-year period. Is that the maximum commitment that will be expected of reservists under the Army 2020 proposals, even if we are involved in the maximum number of operations and interventions at any one time laid down in the 2010 SDSR? If the role of reservists is to be enhanced, what discussions have there been with employers’ organisations on the implications for them? I understand that the answer may well be, effectively, none.

The Statement the Minister has repeated said that it was not about the size of the Army, but it is when compared with what was envisaged at the time of the strategic defence and security review, which announced cuts of 7,000. Since then the Government have announced an additional 13,000 Army redundancies. The SDSR was based on an assumption that we could undertake one major and two lesser operations at any one time. It said that the Armed Forces in the future would be sized and shaped to conduct an “enduring stabilisation operation” at around brigade level involving up to 6,500 personnel with maritime and air support as required, while conducting one non-enduring complex intervention involving up to 2,000 personnel and one non-enduring simple intervention involving up to 1,000 personnel, or, for a limited time and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades with maritime and air support involving around 30,000 personnel. Does this Armed Forces capability set out in the 2010 SDSR still hold in the light of the Statement today about the future shape and structure of the Army and the further reductions in Regular Army personnel announced since the SDSR, and is it still the situation in the light of the higher percentage of our future Army personnel who will be reservists?

What is the maximum length of time for which we could conduct the “enduring stabilisation operation” referred to in the SDSR in the light of the Statement today and statements made since the SDSR about the size and structure of the Army, and is it a shorter period of time than that envisaged at the time of the SDSR? How long is “for a limited time” for the one-off intervention referred to in the SDSR in the light of the Statement today and statements made since the SDSR, and is that now a shorter period than that envisaged at the time of the SDSR?

The Statement lays out the future structure for the Army, but just how resilient is that structure? There is nothing in the Statement to suggest there has been any risk analysis undertaken in the light of developments in the last couple of years since the 2010 SDSR, despite those two years hardly being ones of stability in the world around us. Neither does there appear to have been a risk analysis of the consequences of our Army relying to a greater degree than before on reservists as opposed to regular troops. The Statement gives every impression of simply driving on from the 2010 SDSR without any obvious regard to the impact of changes and developments that have taken place since the SDSR.

The Statement is about the future shape and structure of the Army. What happens if the 2015 SDSR indicates a need for operations to be undertaken by the Army which are radically different from those indicated in the 2010 SDSR and this Statement? Is this new structure for the Army capable of embracing radically different operations? For example, will the split between reaction forces and adaptable forces still be relevant? Would the split between regulars and reservists still be appropriate, or is this a shape and structure that might not survive the 2015 SDSR? It may be that this Statement is, in reality, the beginnings of the 2015 SDSR. Will the 2015 SDSR be based on an assessment of the threats we face to our security and to our interests, with the numbers of Armed Forces personnel and the shape and structure of the Army being determined by the requirements and capabilities needed to meet those threats? Or will it be the case that today’s Statement on shape and structure sets out the kind of operations, in size and areas of capability, that the Army is geared to meet and that the rest of the 2015 SDSR will have to fit round it?

I sense a real risk in the smaller, reshaped and reconfigured Army that this Statement reveals. It appears to be based on an assumption that, with our withdrawal from Afghanistan, our commitments will reduce and remain at a lower level despite the current uncertainty and instability in the world. It also seems that, while a much heavier reliance will be placed on reservists in future, little has been done to consider and address the likely practical problems that will arise and whether, in reality, we will be able to meet effectively the capabilities that this Statement requires of the Army, including the commitments on the number and types of operation that could be conducted at any one time, as laid down in the 2010 SDSR. There is a strong sense that key parts of this Statement are expressions of hope rather than conclusions based on hard and robust evidence. I hope the Government’s gamble pays off, because if it does not it is our country and our people who will be exposed to the potentially very serious consequences.