Health and Care Bill

Lord Rooker Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, particularly on his robust defence of fluoridation in Birmingham. I am going to concentrate on one clause, one schedule and one issue: Clause 144, Schedule 17 and part of the Government’s plan for tackling childhood obesity.

I have lost count of the reports from Select Committees and the National Audit Office on this vital issue, which, irrespective of the damage to health, is on course to bankrupt the National Health Service. I am informed that, since the early 1990s, there have been 14 reports containing 700 recommendations. No Government have done enough. When the coalition came in in 2010, there was a flurry of activity. The outcome, a serious plan, was effectively squashed by Theresa May in 2016 under pressure from the food industry. I was at a meeting of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee when I heard officials—I shall not name them as I had worked with one of them before—spell out what was planned, but it did not come about.

So, it is better late than never that the Government are acting. There is increased political will to act; this is to be welcomed and actively supported. We have moved on from the “nanny state” arguments nurtured by the food industry. Besides this Bill, though, I would like to know what the Government have been doing since September 2020, when the National Audit Office published HC 726, its report on childhood obesity. Its key findings were worrying, and the five recommendations were a serious plan of action. I have looked but, to be honest, I have not been able to get the detail.

The figures on childhood obesity are startling and on the move. They are not static—we are getting fatter. The National Audit Office’s report pointed out that 20.2% of 10 to 11 year-old children were obese in 2018-19. That figure rose to 26.9% for children in the most deprived areas. The brief from the Obesity Health Alliance gives more up-to-date figures. The last year has shown the fastest increase in child obesity on record. More than 40% of children are obese by the time they leave primary school; for year 6 children, the figure is up from 21% in 2019-20 to 25.5%. It will be really difficult to reverse this trend.

I am about to make my only politically incorrect point. I could not help but notice, in recent years, the astronomical size of some teachers in primary schools. Emerging evidence shows that, besides a 1% year-on-year growth in obesity, the Covid pandemic’s impact is likely to have accelerated the pace of increase in childhood obesity, so there is even more reason to be concerned.

I will support the Government’s action and spur them to do more. They could do a lot worse than adopt the 10-year Healthy Weight Strategy published by the Obesity Health Alliance in September this year. “Healthy weight” is a good way of describing the desired outcome. It does not conjure up too much negativity. I will be watching to ensure that there is no watering down of the modest proposals by the men who made us fat. In this respect, I prefer the evidence from the National Audit Office to that from the food industry on the effects of advertising.

Talking of the men who made us fat, the BBC should show again the 2012 BBC Two documentary “The Men Who Made Us Fat”. The science and methods, both physical and behavioural, that the food industry uses to get us to eat more are eye-watering in their lack of concern for the consequences to public health. I commend the Government and urge them to do more, and I will oppose any watering down.

As an aside, exactly two years ago this week I lost two weeks of my life without warning, with clots, sepsis, pneumonia and a lump. The staff at Hereford County Hospital stopped me going over to the dark side. So far, so good, and I am very pleased to say that I am part of a clinical trial to check the effect of the booster on those who have had leukaemia and lymphoma —a trial called “Prosecco”.

Health and Care Bill

Lord Rooker Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 31st January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak briefly in support of this amendment and, in doing so, I apologise that I was not here at the Second Reading, although I have followed the progress of the Bill carefully.

Last Thursday at Oral Questions, in response I think to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, the Minister spoke of the importance of examining the provenance of health equipment that comes to the UK. He said his department was working

“to ensure that it is not from regions where there is slave labour, or where the Muslim Uighurs are being persecuted by the Chinese Government.”—[Official Report, 27/1/22; col. 439.]

We must of course ensure that the products and equipment in our supply chain are ethically sourced. Last week, my noble friend acknowledged that we need to do more here, and this amendment gives us the opportunity to do just that. Noble Lords speaking before me clearly and comprehensively laid out why we should avoid procurement from such areas.

All UK government departments need to do more to look carefully at their supply chains, but we must start somewhere. The DHSC, with its scale of procurement, and the reports we have seen of the prevalence of Uighur forced labour in PPE and healthcare supply chains during the Covid-19 pandemic, seems to be the right place to start.

The issue of genocide has been subject to lengthy debate in your Lordships’ House, not least during the Trade Bill last year. While a form of compromise was reached, it is limited to countries with which we will be entering free trade agreements. That is not a solution for procurement for many of the countries with which the DHSC does business. Importantly, this amendment would create a process, a mechanism, through which the UK Government could be required to assess regions for “serious risk of genocide”, and indeed publish their assessment. That process is, so far, sadly lacking in this country.

The UK has a responsibility to do all it can to protect against human rights violations and genocide. We also have a responsibility to our NHS workers and those who use the health service to make sure that we give them ethically sourced products. As my noble friend Lord Blencathra said, UK taxpayers do not want to be part of genocide.

We need to see deeds, not words. This amendment will significantly reduce the likelihood that the Government will procure goods or services from regions where there is a serious risk of genocide. It will bring the UK a step closer to developing a comprehensive framework in responding to allegations of genocide, and will meaningfully engage its obligations to prohibit, prevent and punish perpetrators of genocide. It does so in a limited, proportionate, reasonable and modest way.

I hope the Government will properly consider this amendment, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, and I know that he will have heard support for it from all sides of your Lordships’ House.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government should embrace this amendment. I want to concentrate on the traceability argument of goods, and in particular cotton imports. Without good traceability, the genocide convention obligations cannot be met.

To date, I have had two very poor replies on cotton traceability from the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone of Boscobel, at Question Time on 21 October, and a Written Answer on 24 January. Of course, as has already been said, we are miles away from the policies of the United States Government, who have taken a proactive approach to imports from regions of China where we know human rights abuses take place. As has been said, on 23 December, President Biden signed the legislation into law.

It simply cannot be left to commercial companies to satisfy themselves. It is crucial to understand the geographic origins of products and conditions of production. The two things are intertwined and they both need to be dealt with. There has to be a robust methodology that is reliable even when working with partners that may be untrustworthy or unco-operative. The use of middlemen such as commodity traders and the practice of blending fibre from multiple sources create additional difficulty.

Traceability—both what is termed as upstream, starting at the farm, or downstream, to map products back to their origins—is currently used. However, full visibility of the supply chain using these methods is impossible, and especially so in restricted areas such as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It is just impossible to do in the normal way you would look at traceability. If the Minister is in doubt about this, his department should read the report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies of November last year entitled:

“New Approaches to Supply Chain Traceability (implications for Xinjiang and Beyond)”.


My conclusion from that is that paper-based traceability and supplier information is a non-starter for effective due diligence.

In addition, there is abundant evidence that the Chinese Communist Party, which owns China, actually launders Xinjiang cotton, either semi-finished or blended, into international supply chains. This is set out in considerable detail in the November 2021 paper by Laura T. Murphy of Sheffield Hallam University entitled:

“Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton is Obscured in International Supply Chains”.


In 2019, it was established that 85% of Chinese cotton was from Xinjiang. That means that cotton from the Uyghur region of China accounts for 22%—a fifth—of cotton worldwide. What was once grown or reared retains details of its origins—in a way, this is the test. However, it takes more than a paper trail to identify as such. It requires forensic work; chemical, isotope and genetic tracing and other methods that I will not list here are all crucial.

I will give a good example. From 1,000 garment samples collected across the world in high-street fashion shops involving nearly 50 brands, Oritain Global Ltd detected that in Vietnam, Cambodia and Bangladesh, the cotton in the garments had a mixture from Xinjiang of between 6.5% and 25%. Chinese cotton was 41% consistent with Xinjiang. Some 10% of samples of products tested in the UK were consistent with Xinjiang cotton. The UK has a high rate of imports from Bangladesh, where 25% of the cotton was from Xinjiang. It is worth pointing out that India has zero consistency with Xinjiang; India has cleared out Chinese cotton fabrication.

As to the practicalities for the health service, in 2019, the UK imported furniture, bedding and mattresses from China to the tune of £2.3 billion and imported apparel and clothing accessories to the tune of £3.7 billion. Has the NHS used beds and mattresses containing cotton from China or from suppliers using connections with China or other countries known to have a mixture of Xinjiang cotton? Where did all the Nightingale equipment appear from so quickly? As I asked last week, without any warning, how much China cotton is involved in NHS uniforms and accessories? Others have mentioned face masks, but as I pointed out last Thursday, more nurses means more uniforms.

Has the NHS supply chain used Oritain’s element analysis to check, or is it just relying on suppliers’ paperwork to check what would be only part of the supply chain? Companies and Governments need a degree of independence in assessing traceability and to not rely on companies doing it themselves. Some of the supply chains are five or six levels removed, so they cannot possibly have faith in each level and know the details from manufacturers, middlemen, traders, and agents. With the best will in the world and good corporate responsibility, checking the paper trail of five, six or seven levels will not work.

As I said earlier, the way to do it is to work on the basis that a product that was once grown or reared holds signs of its origins, and today’s advanced technology can do it. The technology of element analysis used by Oritain claims that it can tell the difference between two tea estates with a dirt road between them—it is so good and effective. For those who want more, I suggest the long read in the Guardian of 16 September 2021, which is where I came across the use of the technology. I have since met with senior reps of Oritain Global Ltd to better brief myself. Modern forensic technologies must be used, as is now required in the USA. The United States is using these technologies. Why are they not being used in the UK? The NHS, as the largest employer in Europe, should have a leading role.

It is not normal for the origin of cotton to be stated on labels. Of those 1,000 products which I mentioned were checked by Oritain last year, only 3% had the information on the label and, as a warning, the higher quality a product which attracts higher prices is more likely to be consistent with Xinjiang than cheaper items, so you must be really careful what you are looking at. Non-disclosure is almost the norm and of those who do disclose there is a high percentage of non-compliance, so labels and paperwork are not the answer.

Technology is the answer, and the ball is in the Government’s court. The old-fashioned gentlemen’s agreements and systems we are used to will not work. Modern technology is thought to be 95% accurate in identifying where an item was grown or reared. Only with that degree of information can the NHS satisfy the convention obligations. Otherwise, it will not work. The Government ought to embrace the amendment and then the new technology.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lady Hodgson, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for tabling this important amendment. My noble friend Lady Sugg referred to last Thursday. That was 27 January, when the world came together for Holocaust Memorial Day in memory of the millions murdered under Nazi persecution. Members in the other place stood up and pledged “Never forget, never again”, while we in your Lordships’ Chamber sadly did not find a way to mark the day. Today, I repeat that promise.

Since the start of the pandemic, it seems that millions of pounds-worth of healthcare equipment have been procured from Xinjiang, despite the reports of the appalling treatment of the Uighurs. Will the Minister tell us whether our pandemic response benefited from procured equipment exported from Xinjiang?

Health and Care Bill

Lord Rooker Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 5th April 2022 Lords Chamber

In a letter today to Peers, the Minister says that we can have a review—a point he made earlier—but we have been offered reviews on countless occasions. The road to hell is paved with reviews and good intentions. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, offers us something much better, and I hope that the House will vote for it, as Sir Iain has asked us to do, to give the House of Commons a chance to incorporate a measure that enjoys widespread support across all Benches and across both Houses.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, in our debate on 31 January, I made the point at some length that it was not possible to trust accreditation of products based on paper and supply chains. I assume that the Minister has been briefed on this. After that debate, on 3 March, he wrote a long letter to me and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and towards the end of it raised my point about the supply of cotton-based products.

I had explained that it is possible, using the techniques of element analysis, to take a product and find out where the cotton was grown. You do not need paperwork to do that, or trusted supplier chains. The technique and the technology are there. You can find out whether it was grown in Xinjiang, another part of China, or another part of the world. The Minister said in his letter that bidders to the NHS supply chain will have to certify that they are better-cotton-initiative certified. That is the very thing that we need to avoid. You cannot trust paper-based systems of supply. You must use the technology to find out where the cotton is grown.

In the government amendment that has come from the Commons, paragraph 3 specifically refers to cotton-based products—so, given the final paragraph of the Minister’s letter, saying that the NHS supply chain does not have a contract to use the element-analysis services supplied by Oritain, what has happened since? Has there been any contact between the Department of Health and the NHS supply chain with the company that has the technology? I have no interest to declare here. I made it absolutely clear in the debate that this came out of a “long read” in the Guardian way back in September. The technology is there, not just in cotton but in other issues. Here I am just using it for cotton—the uniforms, the mattresses and the products. In subsection (3) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 48A, the Government are going to assess cotton. Have they done anything since our debate in Committee to make arrangements to use the technology, on the basis that you cannot trust paper-based supply chain accreditation? It is a simple question, and I would like an answer.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to support Amendment D1, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. Last night I was part of a BMA web conference mounted by the Ethics Committee, of which I am an elected member, looking at the powerful evidence coming out of Xinjiang province in China. The concern is that, if we are purchasing products from there, we are complicit in the appalling human rights abuses that we were shown evidence of in this webinar. Therefore, I hope the House will support that amendment.

I return to the very important Amendment B1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. This is not just a static situation. It is worsening. All that we have done is not just more of the same; we are actually sliding downhill rapidly. I want to give a little bit of data to the House to support that statement. There are now 1,565 fewer GPs than in 2015, meaning that there is a shortfall of 2,157 against the target that was set by the Government in their manifesto promise, in terms of where we are tracking to date.

The number of fully qualified GPs by headcount has decreased by over 600, so there are now just 0.45 fully qualified GPs per 1,000 patients in England, down from 0.52 in 2015. This means that each GP is responsible for about 300 more patients than previously. In terms of physiotherapy—I declare an interest as president of the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy—the model shows that 500 new physios are needed each year for multiple years to meet demand. There needs to be a trebling of the 6,000 NHS physio support workers. In nursing, the district nursing numbers have dropped from 7,055 in 2009 to 3,900 in 2021, which is a 45% drop. This is all going in the wrong direction. From the data that I could obtain, it looks as if three-quarters of nursing vacancies are filled by temporary staff.

This amendment, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, is crucially important. It would be a dereliction of our duty to ignore supporting that amendment, given all that we know and all the work that has gone on. That is not to be critical of the Minister and his team at all, because I am sure that it is not his personal wish that we do not have this in place—but we certainly do need a completely new approach to workforce planning.