Children and Social Work Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Ramsbotham
Main Page: Lord Ramsbotham (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Ramsbotham's debates with the Department for Education
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I draw noble Lords’ attention to four of the amendments in this grouping. If Amendment 57 is agreed, I cannot call Amendment 59 by reason of pre-emption. Similarly, if Amendment 61 is agreed, I cannot call Amendment 62 for reasons of pre-emption.
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendments 57, 58, 64 and 68. I begin, however, by welcoming government Amendment 54, following an amendment that I tabled earlier in the proceedings of the Bill, and hope that it will remain the Government’s position even if, as I hope, Clause 29 is left out of the resulting Act.
I acknowledge the case that the Minister has made for retaining the section headed “Children’s social care: different ways of working”, but each of my amendments seeks to leave out a separate clause, thus removing the whole section. Since we discussed these clauses in Grand Committee, no one could accuse Ministers or their officials of being idle, including as they have—among a deluge of letters, amendments, explanatory documents and offers of meetings—a policy statement on the power to test different ways of working and government Amendments 55, 56 and 59, which spell out the parliamentary procedures applicable to any use of Clause 29 to exempt from or modify existing legislation, and Amendment 61, which introduces the proposal of the appointment of an expert advisory panel.
However, I submit that Clauses 29 to 33 amount to nothing less than the subversion of Parliament’s constitutional position. It is not only wrong but totally unnecessary, in view of existing arrangements, to process proposed innovation because new ways of working can already be tested within the existing legal and regulatory frameworks, as my noble friend Lord Warner will explain. Therefore I contend that, however outwardly reasonable the processes proposed by the Government may seem, they do not alter the need to leave out Clauses 29 to 33 of the Bill for reasons of constitutional and legal principle, as I will attempt to explain.
I emphasise that I am in no way opposed to innovation or a bottom-up approach to it, a lifetime in the Army having taught me that the best way to make improvements is to identify good practice somewhere and turn it into common practice everywhere. I agree that good local authorities often feel frustrated and restricted by legislation, regulation and excessive bureaucracy, but it is of interest that when the Department for Education brought in similar powers for schools they were virtually never sought. That the Government have produced so many amendments to a Bill that was sprung on us at such short notice reinforces the suspicion that, rather than the result of careful consideration, it was in fact a panicked reaction to this year’s report by the Ofsted single inspection framework that the social care work of three-quarters of local authorities inspected either was inadequate or required improvement, which, had they been parents, might have resulted in their children being placed in care.
At Second Reading I quoted the regret of the Constitution Committee of this House that,
“despite the concerns expressed in the past by this and other committees, the Government continues to introduce legislation that depends so heavily on an array of broad delegated powers”.
I also quoted the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, who, referring to this Bill in particular in a debate about the balance of power between the Government and Parliament, said that,
“there are more provisions for the Secretary of State to use regulations than there are clauses in the Bill, including on issues that should be considered matters of significant policy”.—[Official Report, 9/6/16; col. 860.]
I suggest that the mechanism for innovation set out in the clauses amounts to nothing less than the usurpation of the proper parliamentary process and subversion of the rule of law. I am not alone in believing that it is entirely inappropriate for primary legislation to be amended by regulations made by a Secretary of State at the request of, and applicable to, a single local authority.
In addition, all legal duties and obligations placed on local authorities by children’s social care law are ultimately enforceable by the courts, meaning that if a local authority fails to meet its statutory obligations, the young person or family concerned can take legal action to ensure that the protections laid down by Parliament are put in place, but the courts will be unable to enforce the rights of the young person or family concerned if a local authority has received an exemption from acting in accordance with the law. I therefore ask the Minister how the courts are expected to respond where a young person or child in a particular local authority area is clearly disadvantaged by the arbitrary disapplication or modification of the law as it is applied in all other parts of the country.
Clause 29 has been mentioned many times in connection with previous amendments which were tabled because of fears that the Secretary of State might use it to set aside legislation and regulations in a number of specific areas, such as the care of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, whose care status has been adversely affected by the provisions of the Immigration Act 2016.
As I have said many times in this House in connection with prisons, not all local authorities are good, and the Government must always strive to ensure that standards of care for vulnerable children are not a postcode lottery by imposing and overseeing consistency. I suspect that the acknowledged importance of consistency is behind many of the other proposals in the Bill, such as corporate parenting principles, safeguarding arrangements and social worker regulations.
I have been struck by the united opposition to the clauses of so many practitioners, some of whom I shall cite. The Professional Standards Authority states that it has some concerns about the current drafting of the clauses relating to its power to scrutinise and refer fitness-to-practise decisions to the High Court. Together for Children has more than 104,000 signatures to a campaign for their removal. Article 39, representing 43 involved voluntary organisations, sees them as a smokescreen for deregulation which poses profound risks for children. No deregulation is allowed in adult social care, but the clauses could be used to remove transition-to-adulthood entitlements from disabled children until the age of 18, and from care leavers until the ages of 21 or 25.
The Local Government Association has found that councils are struggling to cope with reduced government funding, and that the specialised care that some children need for conditions that we were assured were covered by the very welcome government Amendment 1 is at risk, because the need to maintain a core statutory service leaves little room for discretionary cost savings and efficiencies. In welcoming the powers in Clause 29, subject to the additional safeguards set out in the policy statement, the Local Government Association is, however, concerned that Clause 32 gives the Secretary of State power to remove legislative provisions from a local authority in intervention without any local democratic scrutiny or consultation with local partners. The Royal College of Nursing is concerned that local authorities may use the clauses to water down nationally agreed standards set out in the Children Act 1989, leading to unacceptable local variations in outcomes for children. The British Association of Social Workers points out that there is no detail in the Bill about monitoring or quality assurance of any authorised different way of working, or who is responsible for it. UNISON reported last week that 69% of social workers oppose any exemptions on the ground that they would lead to more children being put at risk, and so on. Such a wide spectrum of opposition inevitably raises the question of whether the Government actually consulted these practitioners before making their proposals.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the careful and considered summing up. I am particularly struck by the remark about Clause 32, which is all about the introduction of the Secretary of State. Before I go on, is the Minister seriously proposing that the Secretary of State should be removed from the process?
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the care with which he summed up and to all those who have taken part in what has been a very thoughtful debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, and the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Farmer, for giving us the benefit of their experience and taking a slightly different line.
The Minister said at the beginning that he was depressed about the attitude he had heard to making improvements. I have to say that I came into the Bill depressed, because there was clearly a great fixed gulf between the Government and the practitioners on the ground. That worried me, particularly as the Bill went on and more and more practitioners wrote to us about their concerns, in particular about these clauses. As I said at the start, I am totally in favour of innovation. I outlined the way in which the Army—I know the other services do the same—processed innovation by identifying it and turning good practice somewhere into common practice everywhere.
I am sorry to go back to my time as Chief Inspector of Prisons, but what worried me about good practice in prisons was that the prisons lacked a structure and a wherewithal for turning good practice into common practice. During my five and a half years as chief inspector, I identified 2,800 examples of good practice, only 40 of which were turned into common practice, because there was no machinery for doing the others. As I said, I am all in favour of innovation and of a bottom-up approach, but I am concerned that there appears to be no system in the Department for Education looking for innovation or improvements and then processing them. If necessary, and if legislation is the reason why they cannot be processed, then surely the initiation of a machinery which can get round that should be investigated.
As I said at the beginning, what concerned me about this was that the Secretary of State was being empowered to take action which might undo the law laid down for social work and therefore affect the rule of law. I do not believe that that machinery has been properly worked out in the ministry, and if it has, it certainly has not got through to the workers on the ground whose understanding and support for legislation is absolutely crucial. I asked at the end of my speech whether the Minister would consider withdrawing these clauses and holding a proper consultation with the people working on the ground—who clearly have no confidence in the clauses in the Bill—out of which could come a machinery for innovation and for identifying initiatives and processing them, which would satisfy everyone and give confidence in the system. If people have confidence in the system, the outcomes will be better for children.
I have listened very carefully to all the arguments and, as I say, am extremely grateful to those who have taken part, particularly because both sides of the argument have been put very clearly. Now the time has come for a decision, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I remind the Minister that he used the word “depressed” in connection with our previous group on improvements. I have to admit that looking at the last committee report of the UN convention and comparing it with the previous committee report, I was depressed at how many in the previous one were still there in this present one. If you are looking for improvements, I suggest that you could start well with the two committee reports because they set out a very clear agenda for improvement.
My Lords, I add a word on how this matter might be viewed in the courts. As many of your Lordships will know, I was a member of the UK Supreme Court; from time to time the UNCR convention was cited and we always paid close attention to what it said. It is plain from a number of our judgments that it did influence the way we approached cases involving children but, more importantly, there was a case called P-S Children in 2013 in the Court of Appeal in England, where it was said:
“The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child has not been made a part of English law but the duty of the court is nonetheless to have regard to it when considering matters relating to it”.
In that case, the question was whether a child had a right to be heard in proceedings relating to him. There was no statutory right, but there was nothing to prevent it. However, the court—having regard to what the convention said—went on to say:
“It should now be declared that the child does have the … important but limited right, that is to say, a right to be heard in the proceedings”.
That is just one example of the way in which the courts today are drawing upon the convention in developing their jurisprudence. It is also well established as a matter of fundamental law that when the United Kingdom has signed up to an international convention, it is to be presumed that this Parliament, when legislating, will legislate in accordance with what the convention provides. Therefore, if you find a provision relating to children, or the duties of authorities relating to children, the courts, if asked to do so, would interpret the legislation in the light of the convention.
We are in an imperfect world so far as England and Wales are concerned, but the courts are doing the best they can to follow the guidance of the convention and it would seem far better that England and Wales should follow the example of Scotland and legislate to put the matter beyond any doubt.