Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2023

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Wednesday 28th June 2023 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)]

My Lords, this statutory instrument was laid on 8 June under the powers provided by the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. It amends the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 by broadening the designation criteria and introducing new financial and trade measures. These enhanced sanctions reflect, and are designed to disrupt, the ability of Belarus to support Mr Putin’s war and are designed to deter it from engaging in actions that further destabilise Ukraine.

The Government introduced their previous package of sanctions against the Belarusian regime almost one year ago. It included a range of financial and trade measures, and our trade with Belarus has subsequently dwindled. However, Belarus has continued to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It allowed Russian forces to use its territory as the launch pad for the illegal invasion of Ukraine. It trained Russian soldiers, supplied materiel and continues to provide logistical support to Russia.

Mr Lukashenko’s cronies continue to spread Mr Putin’s poisonous propaganda and disinformation, and there is evidence to suggest that Belarus could be providing a route to circumvent the unprecedented suite of targeted sanctions that we and our allies have imposed on Russia. I know that that has been a cause of specific concern for all Members of your Lordships’ House. We condemn the actions taken by Mr Lukashenko and his regime in support of Mr Putin’s and Russia’s illegal war on Ukraine. In response, we are absolutely determined to scale up our sanctions package against Belarus. The measures in this latest package seek to block circumvention routes and broaden our designation criteria, while adding new powers to constrain propagandists.

I will take each aspect of the package in turn. The instrument contains new trade sanctions, including a ban on UK exports to Belarus of banknotes and on a wide a range of machinery, as well as chemicals that could be used in the production of chemical and biological weapons. It will prohibit the export of precursor chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. This instrument also bans the import of Belarusian cement, wood, rubber and gold. This will help to further clamp down on revenue streams for the regime.

These new trade sanctions on cement, rubber, wood and machinery will align us with previous EU sanctions and, in the case of precursor chemicals and gold, they go further. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has often focused on this issue, so I thought I would share that with noble Lords. At this juncture, as we have said before, while we are moving in a co-ordinated fashion, there may be occasions when we are ahead of our allies or our allies are ahead of us, but the alignment continues to work well.

The measures also include further financial sanctions to prevent Belarus using money markets or transferable securities instruments. Again, noble Lords have raised this issue regularly. Belarus has sought to use such instruments to raise revenue. Thus, by taking these measures, we will be constraining its ability to support Mr Putin’s invasion.

Another key aspect of this amendment is the broader range of designation criteria, which is extremely important. It will allow us to sanction a wider range of the regimes’ facilitators, including government aides, advisers and Ministers. Where appropriate, it will also enable us to target family members of individuals already designated to prevent them benefiting from asset transfers designed to circumnavigate the bite, effect and impact of UK asset freezes.

This instrument also provides the UK Government with powers to prevent designated Belarusian media organisations spreading propaganda in the UK, including over the internet. These measures provide powers to restrict the reach of Russian and Belarusian disinformation, and go some way further to reduce the impact of the disgusting practice of posting forced confessions online.

These strategic and targeted measures will sit alongside the wide-ranging sanctions that we have already imposed on more than 100 individuals and entities for their role in the violent oppression of Belarusian civil society, opposition groups and the media. I know that this point has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Collins, among others. We are targeting individuals including Mr Lukashenko and key members of his regime.

To conclude, as noble Lords recognise, the instrument we are debating today is part of our broader efforts to target Mr Lukashenko’s Belarusian regime for its continued support of Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine. It is important to be clear that the UK Government have no issue with the people of Belarus. They deserve leadership that does not oppress them or ignore the interest of the Belarusian people in preference for or in support of President Putin.

We reserve the right to introduce further measures in co-ordination with our international partners. Again, I am grateful for the strong support that we have received from noble Lords, particularly the Front Benches. Should Mr Lukashenko’s regime continue to prop up Mr Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine, we will seek to act further. I beg to move.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing these regulations. He knows of the Liberal Democrat support for these sanctions, which has been consistent and wholehearted. He is absolutely right that the direct focus of these measures should be the regime supporting this illegal conflict, not the people of Belarus.

I am grateful for officials’ work on the very comprehensive impact assessment. Perhaps other ministries could learn from the thoroughness with which the impact assessment was put together, so I commend the officials for that. It is incredibly important that impact assessments are there and are clear, because these measures mean nothing unless they can be enforced. What level of enforcement is now anticipated?

I read the Hansard of the House of Commons’ coverage on this measure and the new financial sanctions. A question was put to the Minister’s counterpart on the resources, capacity and ability of the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation to enforce these measures properly. If I may say so, this issue has been consistently raised by the noble Lord, Lord Collins, in previous debates on these issues. The Minister there said that the Government’s view was that £20 million had been used as penalties for Russian sanctions but there has been little information. I would be grateful if the Minister here could clarify what the impact has been already. The benefit of co-ordination, and the area of focus, has to be on ensuring that UK-based law and consultancy firms are not being used to circumvent these measures.

I am grateful to the Minister for referencing the issue that I have raised on a number of occasions: working with our allies on gold. I will return to that point in a moment.

These measures now have a heightened sense of importance, given the very recent developments. If it is the case that the Wagner Group is now effectively based in Belarus but will still operate via Moscow in many of the countries, as we are seeing, this means that these measures will be even more important.

Before I close, I want to ask the Minister about discussions with our allies. He has heard me referencing the UAE before when it comes to financial relationships. My understanding is that the Wagner operations are now likely to be based out of Minsk, although there is uncertainty about the location of Mr Prigozhin. Let us take that as a fairly reasonable assumption that the operations will still be in place.

The Minister knows about my interest in Sudan. My understanding is that the Kush project, a gold project in Sudan that has been part of the source of the Rapid Support Forces there, has been a joint project between Russians and Emiratis where the Wagner Group has been operating under contract. That has provided—the concern is that it continues to do so—a revenue stream for one of the warring parties in Sudan. My understanding is that the Kush project and investments are, in effect, still being banked through the UAE.

When it comes to restrictions on transferable securities or money market instruments, I would be grateful if the Minister could be clear that this is on the radar of the FCDO in our discussions with our friends in the UAE. These measures will not be effective at directing targeted measures towards the Belarus officials—and now, the Wagner Group—if they are still able to operate with impunity, in effect, in crisis areas such as Sudan. I know that the Minister will not be able to respond to me in detail today so I would be happy for him to write to me with specific regard to the Kush for Exploration and Production Company.

The Minister knows my view on the proscription of Wagner. I will not ask him about that because I know what he will say in response but, now that Belarus is at the eye of the internal issues in Russia and given the impact in Africa, these points will be of heightened importance. I would be grateful if the Minister could respond to them. In the generality, breadth and widening of the scope, he knows of our support.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, welcome the Minister’s introduction to these regulations. Like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I reiterate our continued support for the Government’s efforts to bring this war to an end. I repeat the sentiments that we expressed during the debate on the Statements made on Monday. I certainly welcome the Minister’s response on alignment and co-ordination; these are vital elements to the success of any sanctions regime. We cannot act alone.

I make just one small point: the SLSC drew attention to these regulations because it was

“surprised to learn that—16 months into the conflict—the FCDO is only now prohibiting the export of precursor materials for chemical and biological weapons to a conduit country known to”

supply these things to the Putin regime. I would appreciate some sort of response on that particular point.