Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Wednesday 20th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)]

My Lords, this instrument was laid on 4 July under the powers provided by the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, also known as the sanctions Act. It amends the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to introduce new measures in the financial, trade and transport sectors. These sanctions seek to deter Belarus from engaging in further action that destabilises Ukraine. The instrument has been considered and not reported by both the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. I am grateful to your Lordships for ensuring that these matters are addressed properly. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, for the previous discussions that we have had on this issue.

Since 24 February, Belarus has actively facilitated Mr Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. It has permitted Russia to use its territory to pincer Ukraine, launching troops and missiles from its border and flying Russian jets through its airspace. Mr Lukashenko has also openly supported the Kremlin’s narrative, claiming that Kyiv was provoking Russia to justify Putin’s entirely unprovoked assault. In response to this continued support for Russia’s invasion, we are introducing a further package of sanctions measures. These measures follow actions taken since the invasion of Ukraine, including the designation of over 50 Belarusian individuals and organisations for their role in aiding and abetting this reckless aggression.

These further measures build on the wide-ranging sanctions already imposed on Belarus and Mr Lukashenko, as well as members of his family and his regime, for their role in violating democratic principles and the rule of law, and violently oppressing civil society, democratic opposition leaders and independent media within Belarusian borders. To be quite clear, our grievance is not with the Belarusian people, who are themselves—I am sure all noble Lords accept this premise—victims of intense repression; it is with the actions of the Lukashenko regime and its adherents in supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The measures introduced by this instrument include further financial sanctions, banning more Belarusian companies from issuing debt and securities in London or obtaining loans from UK banks. They prohibit UK individuals and entities from providing financial services to the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus or the Belarusian Ministry of Finance to prevent Belarus deploying its foreign reserves in ways that undermine the impact of other sanctions.

The measures include new trade sanctions, including a ban on the export to Belarus of dual-use goods and technology for all purposes and a ban on the export of critical industry goods and technologies, and components related to quantum computing. This includes high-end equipment such as microelectronics, marine and navigation equipment, and aircraft and aircraft components. It will place further constraints on Belarus’s military-industrial and technological capabilities.

The measures ban the export of oil-refining goods and technology, cutting off access to components required for Belarus’s petroleum-refining industry, one of the country’s highest-value export sectors. They include a ban on the export of luxury goods to Belarus, preventing the elite buying items such as artworks and designer accessories sold by British companies, and a ban on the import of iron and steel from Belarus.

Finally, this legislation introduces new transport measures. It extends aircraft measures introduced in 2021, so that the UK now has the power to detain and deregister Belarusian aircraft. The legislation also introduces new shipping measures, prohibiting Belarusian ships from entering UK ports and introducing powers to detain and deregister ships.

The instrument we are debating today enshrines in law our further sanctions on the Belarusian regime and delivers the commitment made by my right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to issue decisive sanctions against Belarus for its part in this wholly unjustified and continuing war on Ukraine.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these measures, which my party strongly supports. He will recall that, when we discussed the first tranche of the new form of sanctions against Russia, I specifically raised the need to move swiftly to expand the provisions to the Lukashenko regime. It has been the facilitator, host and handmaiden of grotesque abuses of international law and human rights norms.

I support the policy objectives of these regulations, which are to coerce and constrain, and signal to Belarus that the UK stands strongly against its practices. I support all those elements. Just yesterday, the UN aviation agency found that Belarusian officials are to blame for a bomb hoax on a Ryanair flight which forced it to land in Minsk so that they could secure those who are, in effect, journalist freedom fighters. The agency said it was

“an act of unlawful interference”,

which shows the unreliability of the Lukashenko regime. It is therefore right that the aviation, shipping and transportation sectors are covered.

I have a general question on our relationship with the European Union, which is now in its fifth round of restrictive measures against Belarus. When the Minister responds to this short debate, it would help if he could reassure me that we are now in like-for-like lockstep with the EU’s restrictive measures—with the same list of individuals and the same restrictions on services and financial services that are now in our measures. Are we in complete alignment with the European Union? I ask this because one of the elements—which I support—allows for greater co-ordination with the United States, the European Union, Canada and Australia. It would be helpful to know whether our list of relevant individuals under these regulations is the same as the European Union’s list.