Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Beith

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I share many of the reservations expressed already and the analysis given on both the provision and the circumstances which have led to it. I ask the Minister, in his response to the debate, to deal with one of the points raised by the noble Viscount, which is the discretion that might be available to the judge in deciding what tariff accompanies the sentence, as opposed to the provisions of proposed new subsection (2), which give slightly more power—I refrain from defining it as a wider power—in exceptional circumstances to the judge to impose a different sentence altogether.

One thing the Minister did not cover in his helpful introduction was the extent to which the tariff provisions interact with this. I would be grateful if he could explain that, in case he can give us any reassurance about what seems to be the danger of making general law out of a particular case.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, if I may, I will add a point that follows on from what the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said. To require a life sentence is pure deception because we all know that life sentences are not life sentences, and there is a strong feeling that the life sentence for murder is a deception. Other than in the most exceptional circumstances, the person concerned will be released, and the judge pronounces, in open court, a tariff. I entirely understand why the Government wish to give comfort to the unfortunate relatives and friends of those heroic emergency workers who suffer this appalling treatment and die in service of the country, but it is a gesture—a misleading gesture. We really should not be perpetuating more and more life sentences when the reality is that people receive a term of years.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Beith

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Dubs, asked: these amendments are so simple, why waste time debating them? Well, of course, the law already proceeds on the basis that these amendments propose. Section 230 of the Sentencing Code already says that the court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offence was so serious that a fine or community sentence is not sufficient for the offence. Any court that passed a custodial sentence without stating the reasons for doing so would find that the sentence was overturned in the Court of Appeal. Any sentence in court that fails to consider and address the impact of a custodial sentence on a child or unborn child would not be upheld on appeal. So I entirely support these amendments, but I think we should be realistic about the current state of law.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I do not intend to fall into a bit of disagreement with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with whom I worked happily in the Constitution Committee, but the present state of the law has not really solved the problem, has it? Very large numbers of very short sentences are given, and the consequence is that prison places are used, costs ensue, and the least effective way of dealing with individuals seems to be the one that is chosen. If there is some way in which we can strengthen the presumption the sentencing guidelines already carry, that would be good. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is a complicated alternative way of doing it, but it does appear that something needs to be done.

The argument often used for short sentences is that courts have a problem in dealing with persistent repeat offenders and persistent repeat breaches of conditions of community sentences. There is a popular myth that if offenders do not respond to other measures, a taste of prison will soon put them right. There is absolutely no evidence to support this principle. Indeed, all the evidence points the other way.

I used to chair the Justice Committee in the House of Commons, and that has had a continuing interest in this problem. Its report in 2018 recommended that the Government introduce a presumption against short prison sentences. The Government welcomed this and said they were exploring options. In a follow-up report, the Justice Committee noted the Government’s stated intentions to move away from short custodial sentences.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Beith

Report stage & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 6th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, last but I hope not least, Amendment 32 is in my name and in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

Amendment 32 addresses a very odd provision in paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 1. As currently worded, it states that provisions of the EU regulation on free movement for workers cease to apply if

“they are inconsistent with … the Immigration Acts”

or

“capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of any such provision.”

I suggested in Committee, with widespread support from all sides of the Committee, that the parliamentary draftsmen could and should do better than that. Paragraph 4(2) as currently drafted defies the need for legal certainty. The Bill should set out which provisions of the workers regulation will cease to apply.

The Minister promised to look at this matter, and she indicated that she would discuss it with me. Faithful to her word, as she always is, she has discussed the matter with me—for which I am very grateful—and has now tabled Amendment 32A, which satisfactorily addresses the point. I am very grateful to her. Amendment 33 addresses a similar problem, but sadly it has not received a favourable response from the Minister.

Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1 tells us that

“EU-derived rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures cease to be recognised and available in domestic law”

in two circumstances—that is if

“they are inconsistent with, or … capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of,”

a provision of the Immigration Acts, or if

“they are otherwise capable of affecting the exercise of functions in connection with immigration.”

I simply do not understand how advisers on immigration law, far less those individuals who are the subject of immigration law, are supposed to work out what their legal rights and obligations are. Legal certainty requires, in my view, that the schedule should set out those EU-derived rights et cetera which are disapplied, or those which are retained. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, criticised the legal uncertainty in our 11th report of this Session published on 2 September.

I think the only answer the Minister could possibly give to the concern I have identified about legal certainty is that Ministers and parliamentary draftsmen do not now know which provisions of EU law survive and which do not. That rather makes my point, I think. However, I do not intend to divide the House on this matter, troubling though it is. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my name is attached to the noble Lord’s Amendments 32 and 33 because they address two long-standing concerns of the Constitution Committee. The first is the broad and unjustified use of Henry VIII powers. The second is the confusing and counterproductive complexity of immigration law, which we believe needs to be clear and consolidated. That is why I support these amendments. I welcome the fact that the Government have addressed the first of these issues by tabling Amendment 32A, which makes more specific the scope of the power, confining it, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, to Articles 2 to 10 of the workers regulations.

I would have welcomed a similar willingness to move on the issues that the Constitution Committee has raised in relation to paragraph 6 of Schedule 1, which nullifies EU-derived rights and remedies. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has quoted some parts of paragraph 6 and they are really extraordinary: rights should disappear because

“they are inconsistent with, or are otherwise capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of, any provision made by or under the Immigration Acts”

and, even stranger, because they are

“otherwise capable of affecting the exercise of functions in connection with immigration.”

I can think of all sorts of functions that people might consider were “in connection” with immigration, but we really need laws that are clearer than that.

Adrian Berry, chair of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, said when he gave evidence to us:

“How is the ordinary person, never mind the legislator, to know whether the law is good or not in a particular area if you draft like that?”


I know that parliamentary draftsmen have had a pretty heavy diet of work lately, not least with Covid-19 orders, but it is possible to do better than that, unless the instructions given to them were so unspecific as to leave things so wide open that they had to draft the legislation in that extraordinary way.

Paragraph 69 of the Explanatory Notes tries to explain why this is necessary, but fails to do so—at least I find it completely unpersuasive. I did learn a little more about Chen carers than I knew previously, which was almost nothing. I am sure that my noble friend Lady Hamwee thinks of little else at some stages of the Bill than the quite obscure provision that resulted from the Chen case before the European Court of Justice. However, I certainly found the argument unpersuasive.

The committee says:

“The statute book requires clarity rather than obscurity and provisions such as these threaten to frustrate essential ingredients of the rule of law.”


An essential ingredient of the rule of law is that it is on record and visible and capable of being understood, particularly by those who practice it professionally, but preferably by a wider range of people as well, including those who may face either a penalty or, in this case, the inability to have a right to which they believe they are entitled as a consequence of wording as vague as this.

There is still time to improve this: the Minister could come back at Third Reading with an amendment that makes clear the purpose of this paragraph, and I am only sorry that she has not done so thus far.