Criminal Justice and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Pannick
Main Page: Lord Pannick (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Pannick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(10 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Part 4 of the Bill contains proposals that have the purpose, and will have the effect, of impeding judicial review in performing its essential role of ensuring that public authorities, including Ministers, act lawfully. In opening this debate, the Minister suggested that judicial review began in the 1970s. That uses as much poetic licence as Philip Larkin’s suggestion—the noble Lord recalls the quote—that,
“Sexual intercourse began
In nineteen sixty-three …
Between the end of the ‘Chatterley’ ban
And the Beatles’ first LP”.
Judges have, of course, been examining the legality of government action since the 17th century.
I have been in practice at the Bar since 1980, representing claimants and government departments in hundreds of judicial review applications. During that time, each and every Government have shown signs, perhaps understandably, of being irritated from time to time by the power of the judiciary to identify and remedy unlawful conduct. When they calmed down, however, Ministers recognised the value of what is central to the rule of law. They also had in mind a more pragmatic consideration—that they would not be in power indefinitely and they would wish their successors to be subject to the same proper constraints of the rule of law.
The current Secretary of State for Justice, Mr Grayling, is different. He has brought forward legislative proposals to control judicial review, and helpfully explained why he was doing so in an article, which I commend to all noble Lords, in the Daily Mail on 6 September 2013. This is what he said:
“The professional campaigners of Britain … hire teams of lawyers who have turned”,
judicial review “into a lucrative industry”. Judicial review, he said, is a promotional tool for countless left-wing campaigners and therefore needs to be reformed. It is a tribute to the sense of humour of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that in opening this debate he emphasised the need to avoid legislating by reference to newspaper headlines.
The Lord Chancellor repeated the thrust of his complaints when he spoke to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee in March. I am aware of no evidence whatever to support his basis for legislating, and, more importantly, nor is the judiciary which hears these cases five days a week. The response of the senior judiciary to the Ministry of Justice’s consultation last November was that the judges had seen no,
“evidence of inappropriate use of judicial review as a campaigning tool, and it is not the experience of the senior judiciary that this is a common problem”.
That is not to dispute that judicial review procedures can be improved. The Fordham inquiry for the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law made some very sensible suggestions earlier this year. What is objectionable is the wish of the Lord Chancellor to restrict the means by which the exercise of powers by himself and other Ministers are subject to review for their legality by independent judges.
Clause 64 is the first objectionable provision. It provides that courts and tribunals must refuse to allow the judicial review application to proceed to a full hearing if the defendant shows that it is,
“highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different”.
If the case does proceed to a full hearing, the court must refuse to give any remedy to the applicant if that same test is satisfied. That is objectionable on constitutional grounds. The clause instructs judges to ignore unlawful conduct, and to do so in a context where the Government themselves are the main defendant. It is also objectionable because it fails to understand that judicial review is concerned not just with the narrow interests of the individual claimant had the results been different. Judicial review serves a public interest by exposing systematic breaches by public authorities of legal requirements. One of the most powerful remedies available to the court is the declaration, about which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, wrote the leading textbook. It tells the Government and the world that what has been done is unlawful. Ministers and civil servants know that they must change their conduct for the future, and they do. This is not a question of preventing judicial reviews on “minor technicalities”, as the Minister suggested in his opening remarks. Clause 64 is also very unwise for practical reasons, because it will require the court, at the preliminary stage, to conduct a detailed review of what would have happened. That would be time-consuming and expensive, and it would promote satellite litigation.
My second concern is Clause 67, which addresses the costs of interveners in judicial review proceedings. The Minister helpfully indicated that the Government may look favourably on amendments to the clause. Let me explain why that would be very wise. Very often in judicial review cases the court allows a person or body to intervene because it has knowledge or experience that may assist the court in deciding the case. However, Clause 67 says that interveners may not receive their costs for doing so, other than in “exceptional circumstances”. More troublingly, it says that, unless there are exceptional circumstances, the intervener must pay any costs incurred by a party as a result of the intervention. That is wholly unnecessary. The current position is clear and fair: the court has a complete discretion over whether to allow an intervener to appear, whether to order a party to pay the intervener’s costs, or whether to order the intervener to pay the costs. I am unaware of any evidence produced by the Secretary of State, or, indeed, anyone else, to suggest that there is a problem here. In any event, the provisions in the Bill are manifestly unfair. They will deter public interest bodies, whether it is Liberty, the GMC or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, from intervening. They will not intervene if they are at risk of paying the costs other than in exceptional circumstances. The courts derive considerable assistance from these public interest bodies, and it will be greatly to the detriment of our law if this clause is enacted.
The third matter that causes me concern is Clauses 68 to 70 on protective costs orders—PCOs. In a case that raises issues of public interest and importance, the court has a power, before the case is heard, to set the maximum figure for the costs that a claimant will be required to pay should their claim not succeed. The object of a PCO is to ensure that a claimant who raises issues of public importance should not be deterred from bringing the claim by the risk of having to pay unquantified costs. At the moment, PCOs are a matter for the discretion of the court. The clauses will allow the grant of a PCO only when permission to bring a judicial review has already been granted, but the risks of having to pay the costs of a contested hearing for permission will deter these claims from being brought. That, I am afraid, is precisely the aim of the Secretary of State.
I suggest that it is also objectionable that Clause 69 would give the Secretary of State the power to decide what are “public interest” cases for these purposes and to define the factors which a court should take into account. These are simply not matters for a Minister by subordinate legislation—a Minister who is one of the potential defendants in the cases that he wants to regulate. Again, I have seen no evidence to suggest that the current exercise of these powers has caused any problems whatever, other than, of course, the general problem that government departments would rather not be the subject of a judicial review application at all.
Finally, I am puzzled by Clauses 65 and 66. Clause 65 requires the provision of information about financial resources in judicial review cases, and Clause 66 will regulate the use of information about financial resources on the assessment of costs in judicial reviews. But why single out judicial review for such provisions unlike any other form of civil litigation, and where is the evidence of any current difficulty?
All these clauses are designed to impede the effective exercise of judicial review, and, if enacted, that is precisely the effect that they will have. They all arise from a failure to understand, and indeed a complete lack of appreciation for, the very concept of judicial review as a means of holding government departments and other public bodies to account as to their legality in public before an independent judge. The judiciary has made it very clear in consultation that there is no practical need for these clauses and the Government have produced no evidence to justify them. The clauses have been criticised powerfully by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Government, as the main defendant in judicial review cases, are seeking to legislate in their own interests contrary to the public interest and contrary to the rule of law.
I will be putting down amendments to these clauses in Committee. I know that the concerns that I have expressed are shared around this House and outside it. I hope that the Minister and the Secretary of State are prepared for the detailed scrutiny which Part 4 requires and which it will undoubtedly receive.