Counsellors of State Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 21st November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this Bill, which I support, would not justify a whole episode of the television series “The Crown”. However, it raises some interesting constitutional questions, despite the dismissal of its significance by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I would welcome the views of the Lord Privy Seal, in writing or when answering this debate, on those questions; I do not propose to table any amendments.

Section 6 of the 1937 Act which this Bill amends is confined to cases when His Majesty is ill or absent abroad. Does the Lord Privy Seal agree that it is anomalous that there could be no delegation to the Counsellors of State if the monarch were at Balmoral, unable to travel and unable to receive visitors because of snow or fog, but that there can be delegation if the monarch is in Paris for the day and easily able to receive a visitor or return to London to conduct urgent business? It seems anomalous that if there is a problem within the United Kingdom, no delegation can be made.

My second question arises from the fact that some of the most important royal functions have been performed by the monarch when abroad. For example, in 1908, when Edward VII was unwilling to interrupt his holiday in Biarritz, Mr Asquith was summoned there to be appointed Prime Minister. In the very useful House of Commons Library paper, Regency and Counsellors of State, written by Mr David Torrance and published in May this year, there is a reference to what happened when Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II was on a Caribbean tour in 1966. There was a request by the then Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, for a Dissolution of Parliament. The assent of Her Majesty was contained in a letter sent to Mr Wilson.

We now have the advantage of videoconferencing and documents can be sent as email attachments. We have all sorts of modern communications and, one would hope, the occasions on which His Majesty cannot personally perform royal functions because he is abroad would be reduced. I entirely accept my noble friend Lord Janvrin’s point that ceremonial occasions are best performed in person and I suggest that important constitutional functions should be performed by the sovereign personally. The Lord Privy Seal emphasised the role of the sovereign in giving consent to legislation. Can he answer the question of whether, in principle, His Majesty could signify his consent to legislation from abroad, sending his signature by email—a point raised by my noble friend? Equally, could His Majesty appear by videolink from abroad to preside over a Privy Council meeting? These important functions should be performed by the sovereign personally.

My third question concerns the scope of the powers of Counsellors of State. There are limits on these powers, as we have heard: Counsellors of State may not dissolve Parliament, except on the express instructions of the sovereign; they may not grant any rank, title or dignity of the peerage. But, in academic debates, the question has arisen of whether there are implied limits on the powers of the counsellors. Professor Vernon Bogdanor, in his book The Monarchy and the Constitution, quoted a memo written in 1954 by Sir Edward Ford, assistant private secretary to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. Sir Edward said that Counsellors of State have no power to make decisions. They are,

“if one may say it without disrespect to their persons—merely a piece of constitutional machinery—the nearest thing to a human rubber stamp that has perhaps yet been devised.”

Professor Bogdanor pointed out that the legislation provides no procedure for what should happen if the Counsellors of State disagree. He said that is because the question is “absurd”, since the counsellors have no decision-making power.

Another distinguished constitutional scholar, Professor Rodney Brazier, took a different view in his 2005 article in the Cambridge Law Journal. He said that, if the King were seriously indisposed and could not express a view, counsellors may have to take decisions to deal with urgent matters—for example, the sudden death of the Prime Minister. Can the Minister illuminate us, or at least give some guidance, on whether the Counsellors of State are merely instruments of the King’s will or have an independent decision-making function where necessary?

I shall raise my fourth point tentatively because of its sensitivity. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has already referred to it. The noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, made a football analogy, saying that it is valuable to have two further players on the bench. I would respectfully suggest that it is a curious feature of the Bill to retain two people on the team sheet who will not play any part in the match. Of course, I understand why that is.

My final point is to express hope that the Government may think it time to conduct a general review of the provisions of the 1937 Act, as amended, to see whether they are appropriate for the modern world or can be improved. This little Bill does not provide an opportunity to resolve these questions but I hope the Government will consider them.

Counsellors of State Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 23rd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I will not unduly take up the time of the Committee in introducing this amendment because my sense is that there are many Members who would not necessarily want to waste scarce parliamentary time unnecessarily.

My amendment is simple and straightforward: it proposes that, once the Bill has reached the statute book, if a Counsellor of State dies then the King may provide a replacement. It does not say the King has to do so; it simply says that he may if he wants to, and proposed new Section (1A) in the amendment provides the mechanism for doing so with the suitable involvement of Parliament. That is it.

The amendment is designed to be helpful. After all, the Bill is before us because the King has suggested that changing the Regency Act 1937 would be helpful to him in the discharge of his duties, and has asked us that two new names be added for life to the list of Counsellors of State. The Committee will know that both Princess Anne and the Earl of Wessex have already served in this role in years gone by.

As the Leader of the House said at Second Reading, it is the custom and practice for Counsellors of State to act in pairs, and he gave several examples in his speech. We saw that with our own eyes at the State Opening of Parliament when the Prince of Wales, as he then was, and Prince William, as he then was, acted as Counsellors of State and made it possible for this Session of Parliament to be opened. I believe that is the only time that Her late Majesty the Queen ever delegated these functions to Counsellors of State because of illness.

The Bill before us will solve the immediate problem and my amendment seeks only to avoid another, and to save some time. If one of the new Counsellors of State proposed in the Bill were to predecease the King, action would have to be taken again. We might even have to have a new Bill. Why? Because, as the Committee well knows, underlying the Bill is the fact that at least two of the existing Counsellors of State would not be publicly acceptable in the role that they would then have. That is why the King has recognised that there is a problem and why he has suggested the solution outlined in the Bill. My amendment is designed merely to help the King in future, and I commend it to the Committee.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee reported on the Bill in terms that are regrettably rare nowadays. It said:

“This Bill contains no delegated powers.”


The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has not had the opportunity here to complain about delegated powers, and I am very pleased about that. I should be very sorry to see a delegated power introduced at this stage, particularly a delegated power conferred on His Majesty. In 1867, Walter Bagehot wrote that the monarch has three rights—the right to consult, the right to encourage and the right to warn. The monarch has no right and no power to produce delegated legislation. I can think of no precedent for the Crown having a delegated power—certainly not since 1689.

[The Lord Privy Seal (Lord True) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, presses his amendment with good intent. He has expressed his views at every stage of this process with the utmost civility and courtesy. I thank him for that.

I understand that, from his perspective, he seeks to add a certain flexibility or, as he would see it, some insurance to the system. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, implied in his important intervention, it would add further rigidity, novelty and potentially delay to the procedure. The steps in the amendment are not required and they are unwelcome. The amendment goes considerably further than the limited modification proposed in the Bill. As I submitted to your Lordships at Second Reading, the nature of this Bill flows from a message from His Majesty. I think it was the feeling of the House at Second Reading that the Bill is appropriate and proportionate to the circumstances in which we find ourselves.

The noble Viscount is proposing a wider change to the underlying architecture of the legislation. As indicated in the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it would grant the sovereign a new authority—one which was not referenced in the King’s message—but does not indicate on what basis any such decision would be made. It would also introduce a novel parliamentary process into these matters. In this respect, it is a departure from the current framework and the proposition before us, and the Government do not believe that it is necessary or desirable.

I repeat that the Government believe that the approach suggested in the Bill is a reasonable and practical solution in the current context. The Bill as currently drafted will create a sufficient pool of counsellors who will hold this role for their lifetimes. As the noble Viscount will understand, with the effluxion of time, the order of succession will evolve and so will the situation once this Bill becomes an Act.

Although I acknowledge the spirit in which this amendment is tabled, the history of the Regency Acts demonstrates that it is a challenging task for Parliament or any legislator to predict the future. I suggest that we do not seek to do so here but seek rather to respond to the task at hand and proceed in the light of the message that the sovereign has sent us. It indicates his wishes and, I feel, the wishes of the House, that this practical, limited and moderate approach should be taken at the present time. I urge the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, in speaking briefly to Amendment 2 I can also say that I will not be moving Amendment 3 because, in his reply at Second Reading, the Minister gave an excellent and wide response. Amendment 2 is designed to formalise the Counsellors of State after the accession of King Charles, adding the Earl of Wessex and the Princess Royal to the list.

It is constitutionally very important that when the monarch is not there, this will allow the Government to continue, because we have a constitutional monarchy. That means that some of the counsellors—all of them, probably—come from the family. It is a large family and I know that King Charles has previously said that he thought it should be smaller. I do not think he has said that since he inherited the Throne, but there we are. The interesting thing to me is, what is the concept of a working royal? The counsellors obviously support the monarch in his constitutional role, so, as I think the Lord Privy Seal said at Second Reading, they clearly should be both in the UK and working, if for no other reason than that they know what is going on.

Parliamentary approval of counsellors is necessary, too, which is what we are talking about today, because there has been a history—if not recently—of monarchs going a little mad or otherwise breaking the law, as Parliament saw it. It is right that we prepare ourselves for the future. While it is also right that Parliament agree to the monarch’s proposal to add two Counsellors of State, I do not see why we cannot at the same time remove those who are no longer apparently thought suitable.

The Lord Privy Seal said at Second Reading that

“the legislation already contains provisions whereby Counsellors of State are excepted from duties if they are overseas”

and that

“in practice, working members of the Royal Family will be called on”.—[Official Report, 21/11/22; col. 1194.]

My Amendment 2 just tries to clarify that. Why not name the people concerned, rather than having to interpret what a working royal is?

I do not know whether this is from embarrassment or fear of a media frenzy. I hope it is not, but it is an important constitutional issue. It has nothing to do with who has what title or what clothes they wear for television appearances, or anything else like that. If the members of the family are not working royals, there is a fear, as the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, mentioned in his excellent speech on Monday, that the Duke of Sussex would jet in and claim that he was working because he thought that would be a good idea. A definition would be a good thing, and I see no reason why they should not be named in the Bill.

I am not going to press this amendment because I support the Bill, on the whole. However, a little clarification from the Minister, if he is able, would be very helpful. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, it seems unnecessary to exclude the Duke of Sussex and the Duke of York who, for reasons we all know and understand, are not going to be performing royal duties in the immediate future in any event. As to the drafting of the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, in proposed new paragraph (e), that there should be excluded

“any other person who in the opinion of the Lord Chancellor has not in the … preceding 2 years undertaken Royal duties on a regular basis”,

this leaves rather open for analysis what “regular” means. Does it mean once a month, once a week or once a year? What if they are ill for a period of time? The idea that the Lord Chancellor should determine this question without any criteria seems rather unsatisfactory. Mr Dominic Raab has more than enough to do at the moment.

[Lord Balfe (Con)]

I will make one small point. We will have five Counsellors of State, two of whom are not going to be used, namely the Dukes of Sussex and of York. That means that, since you have to have two Counsellors of State acting if the monarch is away, if either the Princess Royal or the Duke of Wessex were unavailable, we would have only Princess Beatrice left. We do not have anyone else on the reserves bench, so to speak.

I doubt whether we have heard anything, but noble Lords will recall that I suggested that the Princess of Wales should added to the list. I still think that would be a sensible idea because she will of course become a Counsellor of State when her husband succeeds to the Crown. Again, I will not support any votes, but the palace should look at this because you only need one person to be ill, and you have Princess Beatrice as a Counsellor of State. Although she is probably acceptable, she is virtually unknown.